What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[epeeist]

I hate to be pedantic, but the form of the statements matter. So, if we may restate (1) and (2) in conditional form.

1. If rain is water dropping from the sky and it is raining, then water is dropping from the sky.

2. If rain is blood dropping from the sky and it is raining, then blood is dropping from the sky.

Both of these statements are equally true and convey equally no information.

(A real pedant would have written, "If (it is raining if and only if water is dropping from the sky) and it is raining, then water is dropping from the sky." But I'm not that pedantic, though I am pedantic enough to mention that this is what a pedant would do.)

But when e.g. a tornado sucks up frogs or fish from a body of water and they fall to the ground elsewhere, it is often referred to as raining frogs, or raining fish, or what have you, in a literal sense referring to the fall of the named animals from the sky during a storm accompanied by the contemporaneous fall of drops of water also (unlike the figurative expression raining cats and dogs, or the disco song about men).

So I'm not so sure it's correct to limit the term rain and derivatives thereof only to water falling. And that's even without considering other situations in which water falls from the sky without it being rain, e.g. a waterbomber in a firefighting situation, solid water (snow or hail), flood water falling off a cliff edge above, etc.

 

[phiwum]

Does the rational man keep his word if he finds it inconvenient?

In my opinion, the rational moral anti-realist would keep his word only if he found it in his interest to do so.

As David Mo points out, one way it may be in his interest to do so is if he has an emotional attachment to being honest. I think, so far as possible, it would be rational to try to drop that emotional attachment, because I think it diminishes rather than increases utility, but this is a question of fact on which reasonable people can disagree.

I don't know why you keep asking me the same questions.

(1) A rational moral realist would probably try to abide by his best understanding of moral norms[1].

(2) A rational moral anti-realist would, I think, try to discard all of his personal notions of moral norms, since these diminish utility.

These are simple observations of the consequences of two different meta-ethical theories. I do not claim that, because (2) seems bad in some way, we should not be anti-realists. In fact, if anti-realism is true, I see no reason to think that the strategy outlined above is bad in any sense at all.

It might diminish social utility, but if I'm an anti-realist, there's nothing inherently good about social utility.

It might diminish my utility if others recognize that this is a consequence of anti-realism, but in that case, I ought to try to convince them that it's not a consequence, all the while accepting this strategy for myself.

You seem to think that statement (2) is somehow distasteful or negative. Can you tell me what it is that makes you think that it is saying something bad about anti-realism?

[1] I say probably here, because if I recall correctly, some realists still deny that moral norms produce reasons to act, but we can avoid this discussion. I tend to think they produce reasons to act.

 

[phiwum]

But when e.g. a tornado sucks up frogs or fish from a body of water and they fall to the ground elsewhere, it is often referred to as raining frogs, or raining fish, or what have you, in a literal sense referring to the fall of the named animals from the sky during a storm accompanied by the contemporaneous fall of drops of water also (unlike the figurative expression raining cats and dogs, or the disco song about men).

So I'm not so sure it's correct to limit the term rain and derivatives thereof only to water falling. And that's even without considering other situations in which water falls from the sky without it being rain, e.g. a waterbomber in a firefighting situation, solid water (snow or hail), flood water falling off a cliff edge above, etc.

Nothing I said depends on what the "right" definition of rain is. The two statements

1. If rain is water dropping from the sky and it is raining, then water is dropping from the sky.

2. If rain is blood dropping from the sky and it is raining, then blood is dropping from the sky.

are equally tautological (and hence true) and equally information-free.

 

[tsig]

Does the rational man keep his word if he finds it inconvenient?

In my opinion, the rational moral anti-realist would keep his word only if he found it in his interest to do so.

As David Mo points out, one way it may be in his interest to do so is if he has an emotional attachment to being honest. I think, so far as possible, it would be rational to try to drop that emotional attachment, because I think it diminishes rather than increases utility, but this is a question of fact on which reasonable people can disagree.

I don't know why you keep asking me the same questions.

(1) A rational moral realist would probably try to abide by his best understanding of moral norms[1].

(2) A rational moral anti-realist would, I think, try to discard all of his personal notions of moral norms, since these diminish utility.

These are simple observations of the consequences of two different meta-ethical theories. I do not claim that, because (2) seems bad in some way, we should not be anti-realists. In fact, if anti-realism is true, I see no reason to think that the strategy outlined above is bad in any sense at all.

It might diminish social utility, but if I'm an anti-realist, there's nothing inherently good about social utility.
It might diminish my utility if others recognize that this is a consequence of anti-realism, but in that case, I ought to try to convince them that it's not a consequence, all the while accepting this strategy for myself.

You seem to think that statement (2) is somehow distasteful or negative. Can you tell me what it is that makes you think that it is saying something bad about anti-realism?

[1] I say probably here, because if I recall correctly, some realists still deny that moral norms produce reasons to act, but we can avoid this discussion. I tend to think they produce reasons to act.

I asked about the rational man you mentioned earlier now he has morphed into the rational moral anti-realist.

This anti realist doesn't care about living in society where rules are followed? I'm sure that most rational men would rather live in a society where they would not be killed by the next person they meet.

 

[phiwum]

I asked about the rational man you mentioned earlier now he has morphed into the rational moral anti-realist.

I have always said that this claim applies to ideally rational persons who are convinced that there are no objective moral norms. That's what anti-realism is.

I think I've been quite explicit that what I say here does not apply to realists.

This anti realist doesn't care about living in society where rules are followed? I'm sure that most rational men would rather live in a society where they would not be killed by the next person they meet.

Right. So they want others to act according to certain rules. And insofar as their behavior encourages similar behavior in others, then they will act according to those rules too, but not out of any moral obligation but mere self-interest.

And, if breaking any particular rule is better for the ideally rational anti-realist than not, then he ought to break that rule.

Do you see the difference between these two statements?

(1) A certain moral norm entails that I do this action and thus I do it.

(2) A certain (non-objective) moral norm entails that I do this action, and I do it in this case, not because the norm itself gives me reason to do so but because it is in my self-interest to do so. If, on another occasion, I am quite certain that my self-interest is in breaking the norm, then surely I ought to break it.

 

[David Mo]

You're not wrong, but the point is that we don't inherently have to tie these things to human desires in order for us to make sense of them. We can, and that helps us understand things a great deal, but it isn't necessary.

Let's take three propositions:

1. It is irrational to prefer false beliefs over true beliefs.
2. It is unhealthy to value disease over wellness.
3. It is immoral to choose suffering over cooperation.

1 and 2 be identified as objectively true, even though it's easy to imagine someone with goals contrary to those values. "Oh yeah, well I don't care about being rational," or, "Maybe I like having syphilis, now what?" don't really constitute valid rebuttals.

In the same sense, it is possible (though not necessary), that #3 could also be objectively true. In other words, there is nothing inherently wrong/incoherent with that sentence.

Let's set aside the first and second sentences. The only moral is the 3, as you say.

But it is ambiguous. Who is suffering and who is cooperating in your example?

Two possibilities.
(a) I prefer to be cooperating to be in pain. Not too much sense, is it not? And it is not a moral example.
(b) I prefer to cause suffering to cooperate, if I obtain gain with it or because I am a sadist.
(c) I don't matter if I cause pain or pleasure or if I cooperate or not. Only my personal benefit is important to me.

Do you think you can show that (b) and (c) are in a mistake in the same way that 1. and 2.? Go ahead! Try it!

 

[phiwum]

I asked about the rational man you mentioned earlier now he has morphed into the rational moral anti-realist.

Let's see who's doing the morphing. Here's a short synopsis of our conversation recently. I've highlighted every time I've explicitly mentioned that the conclusion depends on denying the objectivity of moral norms, and I've also highlighted every occassion in which you restated what I said without that condition.

What I said earlier is this: if an ideally rational person believed that moral norms were purely subjective, then he would work to rid himself of any allegiance to such norms. I stand by that. Why would a rational being prefer to live according to subjective rules which artificially restrict his choices and actions?
[...]

[...]
But if this is the case, then it seems to be a psychological fact about our limited rationality. I still think that an ideally rational being, convinced that morality consists of nothing but subjective opinions, would encourage others to believe in objective morality while considering himself bound by no moral norms at all. If this isn't the case, then so much the better for some version of objective norms I think.

What you are saying is the standard Christian view that "Without god everything is permitted".

I never mentioned god at all, so no, that's not what I'm saying.

What I'm saying is that, unless I believe that there are objective moral norms, it seems to me that ideal rationality requires that I maximize my utility by rejecting all (subjective) moral norms and reasoning purely based on prudence.

According to Rand and phwim rational beings cast aside moral considerations and act only in their own self interest like the heroes in Atlas Shrugged.

(I'm glad someone else picked up in the Rand reference it explains a lot.)

[...]
What I said is that, if there are no objectively true moral norms, then prudence requires that one act selfishly, and to do that effectively, one should try to stop accepting any (necessarily subjective) moral norms.
[...]

Earlier you said a rational man would ignore all moral rules in favor of utility so if a false belief served him better than a true on he should hold a false one.

You invoke this "rational being" whenever you wnat to prove you are right.

What I said earlier is this: if an ideally rational person believed that moral norms were purely subjective, then he would work to rid himself of any allegiance to such norms. I stand by that. Why would a rational being prefer to live according to subjective rules which artificially restrict his choices and actions?
[...]

Does the rational man keep his word if he finds it inconvenient?

In my opinion, the rational moral anti-realist would keep his word only if he found it in his interest to do so.[...]

I asked about the rational man you mentioned earlier now he has morphed into the rational moral anti-realist.

Brilliant. Right. 'Cause I never mentioned anti-realism before.

NOTE: It's possible that you didn't realize that anti-realism means denying the objectivity of moral norms. If this is the case, (1) you should have asked rather than accusing me of changing horses midstream and (2) it does not excuse the many times you've obviously misrepresented my position despite numerous corrections.

 

[tsig]

Let's see who's doing the morphing. Here's a short synopsis of our conversation recently. I've highlighted every time I've explicitly mentioned that the conclusion depends on denying the objectivity of moral norms, and I've also highlighted every occassion in which you restated what I said without that condition.






















Brilliant. Right. 'Cause I never mentioned anti-realism before.

NOTE: It's possible that you didn't realize that anti-realism means denying the objectivity of moral norms. If this is the case, (1) you should have asked rather than accusing me of changing horses midstream and (2) it does not excuse the many times you've obviously misrepresented my position despite numerous corrections.

A rational man who denied the objectivity of moral norms would then lie, cheat, steal and murder if those furthered his goals.

 

[phiwum]

A rational man who denied the objectivity of moral norms would then lie, cheat, steal and murder if those furthered his goals.

An ideally rational man, yes, who denied the objectivity of moral norms. I think that is undeniable.

I also think that it is undeniable that in most situations, his interests are best served by not lying, cheating, stealing or murdering. I think it's a matter of some controversy how often his interests would be better served by lying, cheating, stealing or murdering, but it is surely a small minority of times, because we live in a social setting in which reputation, feelings of security, good will and so on matter to our own personal utility.

If you disagree with this conclusion about the ideally rational anti-realist, then perhaps you should say why, rather than just asking the same question over and over again. It can't be because you think that such behavior is intrinsically bad, because after all, the hypothetical condition is that there is no such intrinsic badness. So, what is it that makes you think this conclusion is in the least bit controversial?

 

[Pup]

If an ideally rational man accepted the existence of objective moral norms, how would his behavior be any different? If he's following norms to get a desirable outcome, and objective norms produced that outcome, he would still follow them. If objective norms produced an undesirable outcome, he would not follow them.

Examples: God says you must pay a tithe. Negative outcome because it reduces income so you don't do it.

God says you must tithe or you will go to hell. Positive outcome because you avoid hell, so you tithe.

Without an incentive, why would an ideally rational man do anything?

 

[phiwum]

If an ideally rational man accepted the existence of objective moral norms, how would his behavior be any different? If he's following norms to get a desirable outcome, and objective norms produced that outcome, he would still follow them. If objective norms produced an undesirable outcome, he would not follow them.

Examples: God says you must pay a tithe. Negative outcome because it reduces income so you don't do it.

God says you must tithe or you will go to hell. Positive outcome because you avoid hell, so you tithe.

Without an incentive, why would an ideally rational man do anything?

Not an easy question, but here's my answer. See if it works or not.

First of all, when I talk about objective norms, I don't mean God-given norms that we obey or are punished for. The sort of objectivity I have in mind is a norm that all rational persons would, were they acquainted with the appropriate arguments, concede gives them a reason to act accordingly.

I will obviously admit that I have no clear arguments that such moral objective norms exist. I think I have a decent argument to the effect that certain non-moral norms are objective, but that's a whole other kettle of fish.

In any case, it should obviously follow that any rational person has, therefore, a reason to obey objective moral norms, should they be aware of such norms. Most ethicists agree that such norms, by their nature, would override other reasons to act, in which case utility would not enter into any consideration of whether I ought to behave thus or not (though, of course, beings of limited rationality might choose self-interest over moral reasons in any particular choice).

I don't have a handy argument as to why moral reasons override non-moral considerations. I'm not an ethicist by training and my interest in these matters comes largely from the classroom, so my background has many holes.

But I hope that gives you an idea why I think the ideally rational moral realist would not always act according to self-interest.

 

[Pup]

Not an easy question, but here's my answer. See if it works or not.

First of all, when I talk about objective norms, I don't mean God-given norms that we obey or are punished for. The sort of objectivity I have in mind is a norm that all rational persons would, were they acquainted with the appropriate arguments, concede gives them a reason to act accordingly.

I will obviously admit that I have no clear arguments that such moral objective norms exist. I think I have a decent argument to the effect that certain non-moral norms are objective, but that's a whole other kettle of fish.

In any case, it should obviously follow that any rational person has, therefore, a reason to obey objective moral norms, should they be aware of such norms. Most ethicists agree that such norms, by their nature, would override other reasons to act, in which case utility would not enter into any consideration of whether I ought to behave thus or not (though, of course, beings of limited rationality might choose self-interest over moral reasons in any particular choice).

I don't have a handy argument as to why moral reasons override non-moral considerations. I'm not an ethicist by training and my interest in these matters comes largely from the classroom, so my background has many holes.

But I hope that gives you an idea why I think the ideally rational moral realist would not always act according to self-interest.

Let me see if I understand--correct me if I've got it wrong.

Objective morals are things that a rational person would agree produce the best outcome: a reason to act accordingly. Therefore a rational person would, of course, act accordingly.

Okay, but then what's the difference between objective and non-objective morals? They're both the result of applying what seems to be a kind of game theory and choosing the outcome that rewards rather than punishes.

But why limit objective morals to those derived from rational game theory? Are you just arbitrarily excluding a passionate jealous god who's behind them, for example, even though that's what many people believe in real life?

 

[Leumas]

I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Now, what's most commonly done (in my experience) is that when someone's religious moral views are challenged, the theist will exclaim that without religion (or some belief system) you can't have Objective Moral Values (OMV). They will then attack moral relativism as if it's the only alternative since they see it as entirely subjective (I'm not sure, tbh).

Ofc, I see their religious views as subjective even if the morals themselves are supposed to be objective (after all, it's based on interpretation or emotion, both of which are considered to be NOT objective at least under WLC's definition)...

I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?

I honestly don't know and am just rambling a bit. Feel free to share your thoughts.

If an ideally rational man accepted the existence of objective moral norms, how would his behavior be any different? If he's following norms to get a desirable outcome, and objective norms produced that outcome, he would still follow them. If objective norms produced an undesirable outcome, he would not follow them.

Examples: God says you must pay a tithe. Negative outcome because it reduces income so you don't do it.

God says you must tithe or you will go to hell. Positive outcome because you avoid hell, so you tithe.

Without an incentive, why would an ideally rational man do anything?

The argument that a rational man would become a psychopath if he did not believe in an "objective morality" is basically saying that a rational man would become a rampant sinner if he does not believe in a sky headmaster who would punish and reward for obeying the laws.... i.e. atheists are godless sinners.

First... this argument is basically stating that theists are sinners and the only thing preventing them from sin is knowing that morals are commanded from on high.... i.e. original sin.

Second... that the only reason theists do anything good at all is because of fear of the sky headmaster.

Third... this argument ignores utterly that there are killers and rapists and child abusers and thieves who are theists..... so how to explain that... not true Scotsman of course.

Fourth ... this argument ignores utterly that the major majority of atheists are not going around roasting babies and having orgies.... how do they account for that.... not true Scotsman of course.

So if one is a pedophile Christian priest then he is not really a Christian and he is sinning because he does not truly have the sky headmaster in his heart.... of course ignoring this incentivizing factor of Christianity which in fact encourages such hypocrisy and abuse.

On the other hand they contend that if an atheist is an upstanding contributive member of society then he must have the sky headmaster in his heart even if he does not know it or acknowledge it.

Accordingly they can then ignore any arguments for social and biological evolution along with any science that explains why we do not need a sky headmaster to threaten and reward us for doing what a rational person would do if s/he wants to live in a social group and thrive just as all social animals do.

I am sure the rats in this video (minutes 11:44 to 14:50) must have had a sky headmaster in their hearts or else they must not be ideally rational moral realists (i.e. they are not atheists).... how else can we explain their actions.

Also watch those ideally rational moral realist dogs in minutes 6:30 to 9:03.... or those bonobos in minutes 9:36 to 10:50.

 

[Leumas]

Let me see if I understand--correct me if I've got it wrong.

Objective morals are things that a rational person would agree produce the best outcome: a reason to act accordingly. Therefore a rational person would, of course, act accordingly.

Okay, but then what's the difference between objective and non-objective morals? They're both the result of applying what seems to be a kind of game theory and choosing the outcome that rewards rather than punishes.

But why limit objective morals to those derived from rational game theory? Are you just arbitrarily excluding a passionate jealous god who's behind them, for example, even though that's what many people believe in real life?

Yup... just like I tried to point out in the post below

There is nothing objective about it...it is called optimizing maximum benefits with minimum costs.

I think you might want to study a lot more about EVOLUTION and sociology and a bit about game theory.

Game theory is "the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers."[1] Game theory is mainly used in economics, political science, and psychology, as well as logic, computer science, and biology. Originally, it addressed zero-sum games, in which one person's gains result in losses for the other participants. Today, game theory applies to a wide range of behavioral relations, and is now an umbrella term for the science of logical decision making in humans, animals, and computers.​

 

[phiwum]

Let me see if I understand--correct me if I've got it wrong.

Objective morals are things that a rational person would agree produce the best outcome: a reason to act accordingly. Therefore a rational person would, of course, act accordingly.

Okay, but then what's the difference between objective and non-objective morals? They're both the result of applying what seems to be a kind of game theory and choosing the outcome that rewards rather than punishes.

But why limit objective morals to those derived from rational game theory? Are you just arbitrarily excluding a passionate jealous god who's behind them, for example, even though that's what many people believe in real life?

I don't think that I'm committed to the highlighted bit. First, it presumes a kind of consequentialist ethics (like utilitarianism). I don't think that consequentialism is the only plausibly objective moral theory. It may be that the reason that rational beings are bound to accept a certain norm has nothing to do with the fact that the norm produces desirable outcomes.

To return to the non-moral norm that rational beings ought to prefer truth over falsity: it's true that believing truth generally is useful for many things, and so is connected to utility in that sense, but I tend to think that truth is necessarily viewed as intrinsically better than falsity. I think it's in the nature of reasoning beings that they aim for truth over falsity not only because it's useful, but because rationality demands that we care about what is true.

Second, even if we deal with consequentialist ethics, the good outcome that moral norms aim at are typically not defined in terms of the actor's self-interest. Utilititarianism, for instance, demands that we aim for the good of all those affected by our actions. If, in fact, the principle of utility is an objective moral norm, then the argument for it cannot depend solely on one's considerations merely about what is good for him.

Contrast this with the threat of a vengeful God. If we act according to God-given moral norms, in order to avoid punishment, we are acting purely according to our self-interest. In such a case, so-called moral norms are really reducible to prudential norms. This would not be what I call an objective moral norm.

Does that clarify the difference between a realist's and an anti-realist's motivations?

 

[phiwum]

The argument that a rational man would become a psychopath if he did not believe in an "objective morality" is basically saying that a rational man would become a rampant sinner if he does not believe in a sky headmaster who would punish and reward for obeying the laws.... i.e. atheists are godless sinners.

Since I have explicitly said that I'm not talking about God-given moral laws and the threat of punishment, your comments are plainly off the mark.

 

[tsig]

An ideally rational man, yes, who denied the objectivity of moral norms. I think that is undeniable.

I also think that it is undeniable that in most situations, his interests are best served by not lying, cheating, stealing or murdering. I think it's a matter of some controversy how often his interests would be better served by lying, cheating, stealing or murdering, but it is surely a small minority of times, because we live in a social setting in which reputation, feelings of security, good will and so on matter to our own personal utility.

If you disagree with this conclusion about the ideally rational anti-realist, then perhaps you should say why, rather than just asking the same question over and over again. It can't be because you think that such behavior is intrinsically bad, because after all, the hypothetical condition is that there is no such intrinsic badness. So, what is it that makes you think this conclusion is in the least bit controversial?

1) I presume you consider yourself a rational individual

2) I gather from your posts that you do not believe in objective morals

3) people want to win arguments(utility)

So why shouldn't I consider your posts lies?

 

[Leumas]

I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Now, what's most commonly done (in my experience) is that when someone's religious moral views are challenged, the theist will exclaim that without religion (or some belief system) you can't have Objective Moral Values (OMV). They will then attack moral relativism as if it's the only alternative since they see it as entirely subjective (I'm not sure, tbh).

Ofc, I see their religious views as subjective even if the morals themselves are supposed to be objective (after all, it's based on interpretation or emotion, both of which are considered to be NOT objective at least under WLC's definition)...

I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?

I honestly don't know and am just rambling a bit. Feel free to share your thoughts.

A rational man who denied the objectivity of moral norms would then lie, cheat, steal and murder if those furthered his goals.

Of course... the founding fathers of Christianity also denied objective moral norms.

They most definitely lied and justified and sanctified and encouraged lying and cheating in order to further the goals of their ill begotten son of their sky daddy (see here).

 

[phiwum]

1) I presume you consider yourself a rational individual

2) I gather from your posts that you do not believe in objective morals

3) people want to win arguments(utility)

So why shouldn't I consider your posts lies?

I'm not an anti-realist. I don't think that realism has been proved either, but my leanings are clearly on that side of the fence.

But let's suppose that I was an anti-realist and suppose that I was quite a clever one at that. Should you conclude that my statements in this argument are lies, since people like to win arguments?

No, because there are many advantages to being viewed as an honest poster, and these benefits outweigh the advantage of winning a single obscure argument.

Moreover, you should be able to evaluate the plausibility of what I say, since most of it does not depend on matters of fact, but rather on simple reasoning. If this were an argument over some historic or scientific claim, then perhaps you should worry about whether I'm lying about matters of fact. But I don't think that I've stated any clear facts that are beyond your capability to confirm.

 

[phiwum]

Of course... the founding fathers of Christianity also denied objective moral norms.

They most definitely lied and justified and sanctified and encouraged lying and cheating in order to further the goals of their ill begotten son of their sky daddy (see here).

Who are you arguing against? The current conversation has nothing to do with Christianity.