What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[phiwum]

I agree with the highlighted part, but I suspect that is not what phiwum isaiming for. Rather it seems to be the word (pure) rational somehow turns particular desires, point of view, etc into an objective proposition.

I'm not sure I agree with you.

I think that what he says is roughly right, so long as we recognize that "speakers" are, of necessity, rational beings. To communicate (in a sophisticated sense beyond "Agh! Predator!") requires a bit of rationality, and this is certainly so when we consider communication of propositions.

So, what does it mean to say that a proposition is true, independent of a speaker's subjective features? It is to say, first, that it is true, but also that it is true in a way that anyone can determine, in principle, its truth. What sets "I like vanilla" apart from "This is vanilla?" The fact that anyone can determine, given sufficient access to evidence, arguments, etc., the truth value of the latter, but only the speaker has access to the conditions making the former true[1].

[1] It is conceivable that preferences can eventually be read off of brain states, so it is conceivable that even the former is objective. At present, this is not obviously so.

 

[phiwum]

This may be way too simplistic, so go ahead and laugh if it is, but...

HA HA HA HA. HA. Stupid Pup.

No, I like the question. Let's continue.

I don't see how any moral statement can be objectively true without a human-chosen goal that will always be subjective. For example, believing that truth is better than falsehood increases understanding, helps trust, lessens the distraction of uncertainty, and all kinds of things. But what if none of those things matter?

One could say a rational person would think those things matter, but that requires assuming a rational person thinks that success and survival are better than failure. But why should a rational person assume that?

It just seems that everything goes back to arbitrarily deciding that success is better than failure, or living is better than dying, based purely on self-interest and not some external truth, unless the success of humans is as much a law of nature as gravity.

A couple responses.

First, and most significantly, I think that there is an inherent contradiction in claiming, "I am indifferent in whether I reach my goal." This is what you suggest when you say that perhaps success is not better than failure (let's leave living out of it for now). What it means to have a goal is to desire success in reaching one's goal. Do you not agree?

Thus, there's a consequent norm: Either I should give up my goal or do what's necessary to achieve it.

I claim that this norm is one that any rational being will accept.

Second, and less essential (and maybe more controversial), I'm also claiming that a desire for truth over falsity is about the intrinsic, not extrinsic, value of truth. Most truths are good for us in lots of ways, but some don't give us any particular boost in utility. Even though it doesn't matter to my utility whether I am right or wrong in my belief that the 10000000000000000000'th digit of pi is 7 or not, I prefer to believe it if it is true, and not believe it if it is not true.

I hope that clarifies what I'm saying, Pup. Please let me know if not.

 

[phiwum]

One still has to tie it to a goal, whether a human goal or not. Concerning #3, one could say it's objectively true that choosing suffering causes more suffering than choosing cooperation, but why is causing more suffering immoral? One could go the tautology route and say that "causing suffering" is one of the definitions of immorality so doing it is immoral, but that's just word games.

If the goal you mean is some universal goal of rationality, then I agree.

All rational beings aim to attain true beliefs rather than false. This is a universal goal, so far as rationality is concerned. Agreed so far?

I don't pretend that I can convince you that moral claims are objective, but if we can agree that some normative claims are entailed by rationality, we've made some small progress.

 

[I Am The Scum]

What do you mean be objectively true?

The same thing I meant the last time you asked that question.

 

[Pup]

First, and most significantly, I think that there is an inherent contradiction in claiming, "I am indifferent in whether I reach my goal." This is what you suggest when you say that perhaps success is not better than failure (let's leave living out of it for now). What it means to have a goal is to desire success in reaching one's goal. Do you not agree?

Thus, there's a consequent norm: Either I should give up my goal or do what's necessary to achieve it.

I claim that this norm is one that any rational being will accept.

No problem there. But it seems to be one step below morality. A rational person could either do what's necessary to murder his parents for their inheritance or to give them a happy old age, and the logic works either way. He's working toward a goal.

Morality would be the previous step, how to choose a goal, and a truly rational person unswayed by emotions might conclude that secretly murdering his parents would be the most rational thing, as there would be no emotional attachment to them and he would suffer no social consequences if he was careful not to be caught.

 

[porch]

Very roughly, a statement is tautologous if it is true in a trivial sense that tells us nothing at all. Somewhat more precisely, it is tautologous if the very form of the statement makes it true regardless of the meanings of its parts. (Much more precisely would require talking about propositional logic.)

The statement "If it is raining, then it is raining," is tautologous in this sense, as is any statement of the form "If P then P." I think that what you've defended is of this form, asserting that "If a person chooses to do X, then he chooses to do X."

Okay, I think I get all that. So yes, in a sense, all I am saying is, ``I define x as y. We`ve got an x here, so we have a y.`` (sorry about my quotation marks - keyboard issues). Pretty trite when dealing with xs and ys.

Now let`s take two similar statements:

1. I define rain as water droplets falling from the sky. It`s raining out. Water drops are falling down to earth.

2. I define rain as drops of blood falling from the sky. It`s raining out. The earth is becoming soaked with blood.

They both say the same thing: If it is raining, then it is raining. Yet they are quite different in substance. One is right and the other is wrong. And I can think of a few ways to show this. I could demonstrate at least one instance of it raining not blood, for example.

Please, throw a dog a bone with some meat on it.

So much more to say, but prudence dictates that I have to pop in and out, for now.

 

[phiwum]

No problem there. But it seems to be one step below morality. A rational person could either do what's necessary to murder his parents for their inheritance or to give them a happy old age, and the logic works either way. He's working toward a goal.

Morality would be the previous step, how to choose a goal, and a truly rational person unswayed by emotions might conclude that secretly murdering his parents would be the most rational thing, as there would be no emotional attachment to them and he would suffer no social consequences if he was careful not to be caught.

I don't pretend to be able to show that there are objective moral norms.

But insofar as you agree that there are at least some objective non-moral norms, we've made some progress. At least we've agreed that "objective norm" is not an oxymoron.

That's about as far as my arguments go, I'm afraid.

 

[phiwum]

Okay, I think I get all that. So yes, in a sense, all I am saying is, ``I define x as y. We`ve got an x here, so we have a y.`` (sorry about my quotation marks - keyboard issues). Pretty trite when dealing with xs and ys.

Now let`s take two similar statements:

1. I define rain as water droplets falling from the sky. It`s raining out. Water drops are falling down to earth.

2. I define rain as drops of blood falling from the sky. It`s raining out. The earth is becoming soaked with blood.

They both say the same thing: If it is raining, then it is raining. Yet they are quite different in substance. One is right and the other is wrong. And I can think of a few ways to show this. I could demonstrate at least one instance of it raining not blood, for example.

Please, throw a dog a bone with some meat on it.

So much more to say, but prudence dictates that I have to pop in and out, for now.

I hate to be pedantic, but the form of the statements matter. So, if we may restate (1) and (2) in conditional form.

1. If rain is water dropping from the sky and it is raining, then water is dropping from the sky.

2. If rain is blood dropping from the sky and it is raining, then blood is dropping from the sky.

Both of these statements are equally true and convey equally no information.

(A real pedant would have written, "If (it is raining if and only if water is dropping from the sky) and it is raining, then water is dropping from the sky." But I'm not that pedantic, though I am pedantic enough to mention that this is what a pedant would do.)

 

[tsig]

If the goal you mean is some universal goal of rationality, then I agree.

All rational beings aim to attain true beliefs rather than false. This is a universal goal, so far as rationality is concerned. Agreed so far?

I don't pretend that I can convince you that moral claims are objective, but if we can agree that some normative claims are entailed by rationality, we've made some small progress.

Earlier you said a rational man would ignore all moral rules in favor of utility so if a false belief served him better than a true on he should hold a false one.

You invoke this "rational being" whenever you wnat to prove you are right.

 

[phiwum]

Earlier you said a rational man would ignore all moral rules in favor of utility so if a false belief served him better than a true on he should hold a false one.

You invoke this "rational being" whenever you wnat to prove you are right.

What I said earlier is this: if an ideally rational person believed that moral norms were purely subjective, then he would work to rid himself of any allegiance to such norms. I stand by that. Why would a rational being prefer to live according to subjective rules which artificially restrict his choices and actions?

I don't think that one would choose utility over truth. I think that we would prefer to believe that which is true, even if believing something false would make us happier somehow. But I could be mistaken -- there might be situations where this is false.

Which is why I speak of this principle in terms of intrinsic value. All things being equal, a rational being prefers truth over falsity. If there are situations where believing falsity produces a great advantage, it might be that a rational being would choose falsity, but without such advantage, clearly truth is better.

 

[tuco]

Its like that Pup. It takes human to determine whats "good" and "bad" and there is no other way to do it. That is why Mr Harris, and others, are probably wrong when thinking "objective morality" is something to be figured out (by sci method for example). No, it just to be agreed on. Does not matter what philosophical dictionary one uses. There is no way around this.

 

[David Mo]

Actually, if you don't mind, I'd like to settle this problem. I think it is more relevant than you believe.

Do you agree that the following statement is true?

(1) The axioms of Euclidean geometry entail the Pythagorean theorem.

Do you furthermore agree that there is a clear method to determine that it is true? Namely, one can carefully examine any of the valid arguments that the conclusion follows from the axioms and confirm the validity of the arguments?

If so, why should you doubt that the above statement is objective?

If objective it is not in the same way that law of gravity.

Pythagoras' theorem: because it is deduced from Euclidean axioms.
Law of gravity: because it is evidenced by the experimental method.

YOu can call both "objective" but you ought to distinguish between two kinds of objectivity.

Note: moral objectivity is more like mathematics in my opinion.

Wonderful.

Now, let's talk about what that means. To me, it means that rational persons could come to agreement on the truth or falsity of the proposition, given sufficient evidence, argument, etc. It doesn't mean that everyone or indeed anyone knows the truth of the statement now, but it is knowable in principle, and this in principle knowableness consists of familiarity with certain evidence and/or arguments regarding the matter.

What is a rational man? I think it is a man that uses a rational method to think or to debate. Therefore the decisive feature is the method. I doubt very much you can find empirical evidence in favour of a moral principle. And I doubt very much you were able to find a moral principle evident in himself as mathematical axioms. (I am adopting your extreme empiricism for tactical reasons).

 

[David Mo]

What I said earlier is this: if an ideally rational person believed that moral norms were purely subjective, then he would work to rid himself of any allegiance to such norms. I stand by that. Why would a rational being prefer to live according to subjective rules which artificially restrict his choices and actions?

Maybe the solution is not in the absolute rationality of the moral principles. Maybe the solution is in emotional impulses or reciprocity.

 

[phiwum]

If objective it is not in the same way that law of gravity.

Pythagoras' theorem: because it is deduced from Euclidean axioms.
Law of gravity: because it is evidenced by the experimental method.

YOu can call both "objective" but you ought to distinguish between two kinds of objectivity.

Note: moral objectivity is more like mathematics in my opinion.

You gave a definition of objectivity that entails both math and science are objective. So did I. I don't think there is a pressing need to distinguish two kinds of objectivity, but if so, the distinction is simply that scientific reasoning requires physical observations, math doesn't.

I agree that objective norms, especially of the moral variety, are likely to be more like math than like science. I'm not committed to that view, but it seems plausible.

What is a rational man? I think it is a man that uses a rational method to think or to debate. Therefore the decisive feature is the method. I doubt very much you can find empirical evidence in favour of a moral principle. And I doubt very much you were able to find a moral principle evident in himself as mathematical axioms. (I am adopting your extreme empiricism for tactical reasons).

I don't know why you think that I'm looking for empirical evidence for moral principles, or that I'm an extreme empiricist. I don't think I've suggested either of those things.

 

[phiwum]

Maybe the solution is not in the absolute rationality of the moral principles. Maybe the solution is in emotional impulses or reciprocity.

Yes, but that's prudential reasoning and nothing I said suggested he shouldn't reason about his enlightened self-interest.

An ideally rational person who believed there was no objective moral norms would stop believing that his personalmoral beliefs had any normative force. That doesn't mean he would rape and pillage, because there is great advantage to appear as if one accepts the norms of society in the great majority of one's actions.

As far as emotional impulses tied to one's moral beliefs, that's a trickier one. If one could learn to do without them entirely, then perhaps utility would be improved, but perhaps not. It's also not clear that we can get rid of emotional impulses, which is why I have usually said something to the effect that the ideal rational moral non-realist would reject all moral norms as far as that is possible.

 

[Dancing David]

In short - e.g. sexual competition within a species is not given to go one way. Or another angle - more egalitarian is one way the human species could evolve, but you have to give more evidence, if it is the only way.

I doubt very highly that human evolution has much to do with any sort of morals or discussion of game theory and egalitarian societies.

There are very few, all five of them, human fixed action patters, there is a biological basis to some of the 'mirroring' neurology but I am surprised that you are discussing genetics in what is a social exchange discussion.

Mores and morals are by and large social constructs.

 

[Dancing David]

Okay, but that is not objectively true.

I believe that is sophistry, words are involved in discussion. Definitions are part of that discussion.

If you want to provide counter examples then please do so.

 

[David Mo]

An ideally rational person who believed there was no objective moral norms would stop believing that his personalmoral beliefs had any normative force. That doesn't mean he would rape and pillage, because there is great advantage to appear as if one accepts the norms of society in the great majority of one's actions.

That is a factual (and literary) theory. I don't know if moral relativists are worse than moral naturalists or theists. I don't know any investigation on this. My hypothesis is that people don't behaves motivated by moral theories but urged by moral emotions, that is to say, feelings of sympathy, guilty, shame, pride, etc. The moral relativists I know don't steal, kidnap or kill when no one sees them.

 

[phiwum]

That is a factual (and literary) theory. I don't know if moral relativists are worse than moral naturalists or theists. I don't know any investigation on this. My hypothesis is that people don't behaves motivated by moral theories but urged by moral emotions, that is to say, feelings of sympathy, guilty, shame, pride, etc.

I agree that this claim is about matters of fact which are beyond our knowledge.

The moral relativists I know don't steal, kidnap or kill when no one sees them.

Er, right. Except, of course, how would you know? It would presumably behoove them to do so only when the chance of discovery is exceedingly small.

 

[tsig]

I agree that this claim is about matters of fact which are beyond our knowledge.



Er, right. Except, of course, how would you know? It would presumably behoove them to do so only when the chance of discovery is exceedingly small.

Does the rational man keep his word if he finds it inconvenient?