D-Day 1943

[Gawdzilla Sama]

There is a difference between being fully trained, and combat experienced.

I didn't know that!

IIRC there were enough fully trained US divisions for a 1943 invasion (at least the initial stages), the issue is that they were on the wrong side of the Atlantic. The US also did less than the UK in putting combat experienced commanders into divisions being trained, to ensure training was realistic and ease them through their first battles.

The point of the invasion wasn't just to invade, of course, so sustainable effort was required. DDE's orders, from memory, "You will enter the continent of Europe, and in association with other allied forces, undertake military operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces."

I like to point out to folks that if SHAEF could issue a one sentence order to Eisenhower it should be entirely possible for them to do the same when it comes to cleaning out the storage locker.

 

[SpitfireIX]

In fairness, the Allies probably could have mounted an invasion in 1943, with a reasonable chance of success, if they'd been willing to postpone the start of offensive operations in the Pacific for two years. That would have been a very bad idea, IMO, but it would have been feasible.

 

[Border Reiver]

How soon everyone in the World (except Canada) forgets Dieppe (19 August 1942).

Dieppe_Raid^WP

Though, I suppose, the results of this insane action did have some considerable value.

The lessons though are remarkably similar to the ones expounded in the NCO and Jr Officer schools at the time - and to this day:

Time spent on recce is seldom wasted.

One of the interesting characters on the Dieppe Raid was Capt MacDonald RCA. He went ashore with 2 Lts and 35 or so Gunner NCMs. They had all been trained on a wide variety of German AT and field artillery pieces so that as the infantry captured them, these guys would then turn them about and employ the against the Nazis, reducing the need for the Royals and the RHLIs to bring mortars along (not eliminating). The plan didn't work as advertised and they all ended up as "guests" for the duration, less Capt MacDonald, who escaped, made his way to Paris on foot, and from there back to England in time to get posted to 4 RCA, 2 Bty in time for Overlord.

 

[Major Major]

Second Front Now

There is a somewhat more statistical version of the Invasion 1943 thesis, Walter Scott Dunn's Second Front Now --- 1943: An Opportunity Delayed (1980).

http://www.amazon.com/Second-Front-Now-1943-Opportunity-Delayed/dp/0817355472

He deploys an immense amount of statistical information, arguing that the divisions and shipping that could have invaded Europe were sent to the Pacific, where they ended up doing nothing. He comes across as one of those buffs who meticulously memorizes everything that supports his viewpoint, while passing over whatever doesn't

 

[catsmate]

I've seen the same thing many times. Usually in a sulky tone of voice, of course. "You westerners let the Soviet Union bleed for you while taking it easy!" Da. Better you than me, comrade.

Maybe he would have preferred the USSR controlling more of Europe?

My take:
Firstly the British opposition to a cross-Channel invasion in '43 came, not from Churchill, but from Brooke and the Imperial General Staff.

Secondly, yes there could have been a UK/US invasion of Northern France in .43; it would probably have been a disaster, lengthened the European phase of WW2 somewhat and might well have given the USSR eventual control not just of all of Germany but Austria, Denmark and other countries also.

Problems
1. Air cover, the Luftwaffe was still very much operational in '43 and the Allies would have had, at best, air parity.
2. Lack of sealift capability. Not only would this have reduced the rate of landing, but it'd also have reduced the effective range, thus limiting choices of landing sites. The Cherbourg peninsula was the suggested landing area and would have been a disaster.
3. The US Army was, frankly, in no shape to take on the Germans in France. Just look at the problems they encountered in North Africa against vastly less opposition. They were still learning.
4. Air cover, again. The bulk of Allied fighter designs did not have the range in 1943 to provide any sort of reasonable cover.
5. Air power, yet again; the Close Air Support doctrine and tactics were developmental in '43, not ready for use.
6. Sealift, again; the ability to keep a large field force resupplied didn't exist. No Mulberry harbours and no PLUTO. Plus fewer ships, especially for beachhead support.
7. Airborne forces were in poor shape for deployment in '43; weaker and far less co-ordinated. Look at the paratroops dropped into Sicily, no pathfinders and troops scattered to such an extent that they were, in many cases, combat ineffective.
8. The critical importance of aerial interdiction of German logistics and transport had not yet been identified. Hence a less capable landing force would have been met with a more rapid German counter attack.
9. The UK/US didn't have the forces free in the UK to carry out such a landing; therefore it have required much of the forces in the Mediterranean be transported to the UK. Not only would such have been vulnerable to submarine attacks but it would have been obvious to the Germans.
10. In 1943 the Germans still had Italian forces garrisoning Greece and the Balkans, freeing up German troops. Plus German forces in Italy that could have been recalled to Northern France (IIRC, thats three Panzer and two Panzergrenadier devisions and the Airborne). That's in addition to, again I believe, six Panzer, four PG and more than 20 Infantry divisions (albeit many understrength) available in Western Europe.
11. No deception operations.
12. Less effective naval gunfire support; firstly fewer available ships, second less refined operational doctrine, thirdly the Luftwaffe of '43 was far better at anti-ship strikes than, say, 1940. And it had Fritz-X bombs and PCD1000...

 

[Tolls]

Though I agree with pretty much all of that...

6. Pluto existed and had been fully tested by the end of 1942 (across the Bristol channel from South Wales to Devon). There were changes between then and 1944, but nothing that implied a 1943 version would not have worked. Also, there were (I believe) enough bits for a single Mulberry mid-1943.

9. The argument usually involves shutting down the Med post North Africa. Also an earlier Torch to allow troops to be redeployed and definite reduction of operations in the Pacific (which would never have gone down well). The result of which would have been:

10. A number of divisions were rebuilding in France in mid '43 as well, replacing the ones lost at Stalingrad. These were ear-marked for the east (so don't usually appear as forces available in France), but events in Italy meant a number (4 or 5) were shipped to Kesselring instead. An invasion of France would have had these deployed there. Essentially you need to redeploy the 10th Army to France.

 

[catsmate]

The lessons though are remarkably similar to the ones expounded in the NCO and Jr Officer schools at the time - and to this day:

Time spent on recce is seldom wasted.

This. I still quote this in IT deployments when people start talking about the lack of need for on-site audits.

The Dieppe raid also resulted in some pretty fierce battles in the air. The results in the air—the RAF suffered a 2.2:1 loss rate—likely made clear the necessity of achieving air supremacy before attempting any major seaborne landing attempt.

A lot of that was down to the poor endurance of Allied fighters; limited loiter time over France.

A few more points.
1a. PLUTO: The first tests of the pipeline were on 27DEC1942, this involved ~3.5km of 2" diameter pipe capable of a flow of 6.5kl/h nowhere near the capability needed for the invasion of France. It also showed up a number of problems with the laying and joining of the cable, it took more than three months to get the short experimental section operational. Manufacture of the full size pipeline didn't start until September 1943 (due to the need to fix the problems discovered in testing and issues scaling up) and it took almost exactly a year to complete production with the system fully operational in March 1945.

1b. Mulberry.The construction of the various parts of the artificial harbours began in late summer '43 and employed (at it's peak) over 40,000 people constructing the 212 caissons (totalling ~10km of breakwater), 31 pier-heads and 17km of floating roadway. Plus the approximately seventy blockships ('Gooseberries') had to be prepared and transported. Further the covert hydrographic reconnaissance of the Normandy shore, which was needed for the detailed planning of Mulberry, only took place in January 1943.

2. Vichy France. In the event of a 1943 invasion the Vichy regime still exists in North Africa as well as southern France. This means less need for German forces for policing/occupation duties and well as Vichy production of materiel.

3. Opportunity cost. In the invasion of Northern France in 1943 further Allies operations (invasions of the Balkans, Norway, Italy et cetera) are now impossible, something the Germans will know. This in turn frees up substantial German forces. Historically the invasion of Italy saw Germany deploy several dozen divisions not only to Italy but to other areas whose coast was or might be threatened by Allied landings.

4. Italy. If Italy remain uninvaded that means Mussolini is secure and a reduced need for German forces there (as I mentioned previously) and Italian forces available as garrisons. It also means Italy is available for further operations against North Africa. The lack of Allied operations in Italy frees up perhaps half a million troops.

5. North Africa. Pulling forces from the Med for an invasion means weakening the forces in NA, while also reducing Allies naval and air strength in the Med and leaving the Axis a pool of forces to use. Even a fraction of that half million will be able to stabilise the Axis situation in Libya against
Montgomery and will little prospect of British reinforcement of Egypt once the invasion of France is on.

6. Who'd be SCAEF? Not Eisenhower in '43. The US will insist on an American and in 1943 there's still a lot of dead wood in the US command structure. Marshall? Maxwell Andrews (if he lives)? Jesus wept, not Mark Clark...

7. Politics. If the invasion fails (and it will) Churchill is finished. The echoes of Gallipoli will be too strong. Also '44 was a US election year so it may will be President Thomas E. Dewey deciding to use the atomic bombs, either against Germany or Japan. (A 2.75% swing against Roosevelt and the Democratic party would suffice).

 

[Tolls]

I know it's wiki, but this ties up with what I remember reading:
"
Full-scale production of the two-inch pipe was started on 14 August 1942, using steel from the now near defunct Corby steel works, and six weeks later, on 30 October a thirty-mile length was loaded on board HMS Holdfast under the command of Commander Treby-Heale OBE, RNR, which was to be used as a full-scale rehearsal of Operation PLUTO. This trial took place between 26 December and 30 December 1942, the thirty-mile length being laid across the Bristol Channel, in very bad and rough weather, and the shore ends being connected up at Swansea and Ilfracombe.
"

The diameter increase reduced the number of pipes needed, not the usefulness of the device.

I'll sit corrected on Mulberry...I thought it was started in early 43.

 

[catsmate]

I know it's wiki, but this ties up with what I remember reading:
"
Full-scale production of the two-inch pipe was started on 14 August 1942, using steel from the now near defunct Corby steel works, and six weeks later, on 30 October a thirty-mile length was loaded on board HMS Holdfast under the command of Commander Treby-Heale OBE, RNR, which was to be used as a full-scale rehearsal of Operation PLUTO. This trial took place between 26 December and 30 December 1942, the thirty-mile length being laid across the Bristol Channel, in very bad and rough weather, and the shore ends being connected up at Swansea and Ilfracombe.
"

The diameter increase reduced the number of pipes needed, not the usefulness of the device.

I'll sit corrected on Mulberry...I thought it was started in early 43.

The original 2" (internal) pipe design was found to be too difficult to join, less flexible than desired and couldn't handle the higher pressures (eventually about 30MPa) required for the desired fuel flow rate.

The trials of this pipeline material were carried out, in several stages, between Swansea and Watermouth as you said, with that test pipline being operational on 27DEC1942. This involved joining multiple sections.

Hence the move to a 3" (internal, it was about 4.6" externally) pipe. They also switched to a seamless pipe, made in 65km lengths and pressurised before laying. Manufacture of this piping, which was the primary PLUTO design, started at Siemens Brothers & Co Ltd. in Woolwich in September 1943.

The best reference books on PLUTO are Adrian Searle's PLUTO - Pipe-line under the Ocean (which I've used as a reference here) and PLUTO - World War 2's Best-Kept Secret by Bob Knight (a small booklet which may still be in print).

 

[lobosrul]

6. Who'd be SCAEF? Not Eisenhower in '43. The US will insist on an American and in 1943 there's still a lot of dead wood in the US command structure. Marshall? Maxwell Andrews (if he lives)? Jesus wept, not Mark Clark...

I can't understand why you think Eisenhower for sure wouldn't be made SCAEF for an invasion in '43. He was after all, already in charge of AFHQ by then. Devers (an underrated general IMO) seems to be a likely candidate as well, as he was in charge of ETOUSA before Ike.

I think this thread has made my mind up though; a French invasion in summer '43 was a very bad idea. At worst it would have ended in total disaster, at best we're less prepared and left facing many more German divisions than we did in '44.

With 20/20 hindsight I think we would have been better off still going ahead with operation Husky and Avalanche. But scrap operation Shingle, and just hold onto the southern third of Italy. We could still have tied up a whole bunch of German troops, effectively take Italy out of the war, and capture some useful airbases for the 15th AF, all with far, far fewer casualties.

Instead move Anvil/Dragoon up to mid June. That may have significantly altered the Normandy campaign.

 

[catsmate]

I can't understand why you think Eisenhower for sure wouldn't be made SCAEF for an invasion in '43. He was after all, already in charge of AFHQ by then. Devers (an underrated general IMO) seems to be a likely candidate as well, as he was in charge of ETOUSA before Ike.

Devers I don't know enough about to comment. But my impression, from various books and other sources, is that by (say) mid 1942 when planning for an invasion of Northern France in '43 would have been underway, is that Eisenhower wasn't considered a good choice for a major combat command; he was considered highly suitable for the ETOUSA role, which was administrative and political, but not for a combat role. This changed after his success with Operation Torch.

I think this thread has made my mind up though; a French invasion in summer '43 was a very bad idea. At worst it would have ended in total disaster, at best we're less prepared and left facing many more German divisions than we did in '44.

With 20/20 hindsight I think we would have been better off still going ahead with operation Husky and Avalanche. But scrap operation Shingle, and just hold onto the southern third of Italy. We could still have tied up a whole bunch of German troops, effectively take Italy out of the war, and capture some useful airbases for the 15th AF, all with far, far fewer casualties.

Instead move Anvil/Dragoon up to mid June. That may have significantly altered the Normandy campaign.

Well with hindsight a lot of things could have been done better, though of course changing any one operation could have unexpected consequences.

For example, and this was suggested to me once, why bother with an invasion of France at all? Wait until late '45 and use the atomic bombs to force a German surrender.
Of course that's fine, if a damn stupid plan, with our knowledge that the bombs actually worked and would be available...

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Eisenhower was a Major in 1939. He was being groomed by Marshall to take his spot so Marshall could lead the invasion of France if a 2nd World War started. Eisenhower was that good. Marshall wanted the SCAEF slot himself, but his wee touch of anglophobia got in the way. FDR told him "I couldn't sleep well at night if you weren't near by." So Ike got the job.

 

[Corsair 115]

A lot of that was down to the poor endurance of Allied fighters; limited loiter time over France.

There was a device that helped such matters: drop tank. But for some reason these weren't accorded a high priority by some air forces.

 

[catsmate]

There was a device that helped such matters: drop tank. But for some reason these weren't accorded a high priority by some air forces.

True. But even with the belly tank the Spitfire, for example, had a short endurance over France.

Another point that's struck me (and I curse you all for diverting me from my Russo-Japanese war research, you're delaying my plans to start WW1 in 1904) is the lack of strategic transport.
Based on the details in Ruppenthal (the snazzily named United States Army in World War II European Theater of Operations: Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 1941--September 1944) it appears that there was a significant problem with the lack of shipping capacity to get US forces to the UK for a putative invasion of Europe.

In April 1942 Marshall told Roosevelt that there'd be about thirty US divisions in the UK by the end of April 1943; however when the decision to go ahead with Torch was made the estimates were down to maybe twelve. In fact even less actually made it to the European and Mediterranean theatres.
Now pulling transport from the Pacific might allow more (at the price of an almighty fight with King and probably MacArthur), but actually getting a large enough US force to Britain to convince Brooke and Churchill to agree to a 1943 invasion seems rather marginal; and that's without significant forces committed to the Mediterranean.
With a US army operational in the Mediterranean, burning through materiel and requiring transport to resupply, I'd rate it is impossible.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Another point that's struck me (and I curse you all for diverting me from my Russo-Japanese war research, you're delaying my plans to start WW1 in 1904) is the lack of strategic transport.

We've mentioned that several times already. And I posted a link to that Green Book. (Among others.)

 

[catsmate]

We've mentioned that several times already. And I posted a link to that Green Book. (Among others.)

Oops, my bad.

 

[Tolls]

snip useful PLUTO stuff

Thanks for that. PLUTO was the only part of Overlord that I could think of that might have been in place for a '43 invasion. Interesting to note that even that bit of optimism of mine has been knocked away...

So essentially we have less transport, no PLUTO, some Mulberry parts (?), less para availability (IIRC), no Transport Plan, an Ike (assuming it was he who was given command) who had not had much experience handling the likes of Monty (I do think Husky helped warn Ike of what he was going to have to deal with), fewer troops with combat experience, less training, no air superiority...etc etc.

Doesn't look good to me. Reminds me somewhat of listing all the reasons Sea Lion was never going to work.

 

[Gawdzilla Sama]

Doesn't look good to me. Reminds me somewhat of listing all the reasons Sea Lion was never going to work.

I qualified as a coxswain on an LCI just for fun "a few years back". That was in calm waters with a consistent flow rate and nobody shooting at me. Getting the landing craft crews trained properly was very, very important. A slap-dash invasion would have been problematical on that basis alone.

 

[Segnosaur]

Another issue that could be considered...

Yes, Russia had significant casualties in the fight against Germany, but how many of those casualties were due to Russia's own mistakes?

If they didn't (for example) kill off many of their top officers, or engage in military actions with troops that did not have adequate supplies, then perhaps Russia wouldn't have had to take so many "lumps".

I tried to come up with a "German deaths by front from Jun 41" figure, real back of the beer mat thing... I got 60% in the East (give or take a % or two depending on where you pull the figures). The remaining 40% covered all the other fronts, naval campaigns and air campaigns.

I wasn't thinking so much in terms of "How many Germans did the Russians kill (vs. the Americans/British/etc.)... I was thinking more in terms of "How many of their own men did the Russians sacrifice as compared to the Americans/British/etc. in order to end the war.

According to Wikipedia, the USSR had over 8 million casualties. This was over 10 times the amount suffered by the Americans and British combined. (Although I'm not sure how many of those casualties happened prior to Germany's attack.)

It sounds like a lot... but they might not have had so many losses had been smarter with their military (not purging experienced commanders, not sending troops in unequipped, etc.)

 

[Corsair 115]

So essentially we have less transport, no PLUTO, some Mulberry parts (?), less para availability (IIRC), no Transport Plan, an Ike (assuming it was he who was given command) who had not had much experience handling the likes of Monty (I do think Husky helped warn Ike of what he was going to have to deal with), fewer troops with combat experience, less training, no air superiority...etc etc.

One could add Hobart's Funnies to that list. Those specialized vehicles proved themselves quite useful on the British and Canadian beachheads.

I qualified as a coxswain on an LCI just for fun "a few years back". That was in calm waters with a consistent flow rate and nobody shooting at me. Getting the landing craft crews trained properly was very, very important. A slap-dash invasion would have been problematical on that basis alone.

Even with trained crews the results weren't guaranteed. Look at Omaha Beach where the DD tanks were all launched too far from shore (with the result that nearly all of them foundered in the channel).