D-Day 1943

Given the extent to which Stalin's policies knowingly, cynically, and opportunistically enabled Hitler's aggression, and the extent to which Nazi Germany and the USSR were de facto allies at the start of the war, I think it's entirely reasonable that a) the Allies should have had little compunction about letting Soviet Russia take its lumps while they made complete preparations for an offensive in the west..
Another issue that could be considered...

Yes, Russia had significant casualties in the fight against Germany, but how many of those casualties were due to Russia's own mistakes?

If they didn't (for example) kill off many of their top officers, or engage in military actions with troops that did not have adequate supplies, then perhaps Russia wouldn't have had to take so many "lumps".
 
Not to mention that, in 1943, Operation Fortitude (the deception plan to make the Germans believe the landings would take place in or near Pas de Calais and/.or through Norway), had not yet been carried out.

Besides, the Allies were already pre-occupied with another invasion at around that time, Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, which had its own deception plan, Operation Mincemeat, better known as "The Man who Never Was" deception.
 
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A landing in Northern France will only happen when the US has got an Army Group (say 15-20 divisions) in the UK. They struggled to ship more than 1 or 2 per month before late 1944, due to shipping shortages, and after Torch stopped shipping divisions to the UK (although they continued to send airforces).

Therefore an invasion decision needed to be made c 9 months before the planned date as it would restrict operations elsewhere due to logistic limitations. Before mid 1943 resources were too limited and committed to other campaigns for anybody to agree to it. Whether the US were led up the Mediterranean garden path, or used it to wriggle out of Germany First, will keep historians busy for years.
 
A landing in Northern France will only happen when the US has got an Army Group (say 15-20 divisions) in the UK. They struggled to ship more than 1 or 2 per month before late 1944, due to shipping shortages, and after Torch stopped shipping divisions to the UK (although they continued to send airforces).

Queen Elizabeth could move a division at a time in a five day transit.
 
Throw in no Transport Plan (in all likelihood), lack of air superiority ...


I think these two are rather important factors myself. Neither the RAF nor USAAF were at anywhere near the strengths they were to have a year later. (The 8th Air Force in particular grew incredibly quickly in 1944, going from 1,082 serviceable heavy bombers and 654 fighters on March 6th to 1,947 operational heavy bombers and 961 fighters just three months later. Bomber Command grew at a slower rate; it had 642 heavy bombers on Feb. 4, 1943; it had 1,183 on D-Day).
 
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How soon everyone in the World (except Canada) forgets Dieppe (19 August 1942). :mad:

Dieppe_RaidWP

Though, I suppose, the results of this insane action did have some considerable value.

The lessons learned at Dieppe essentially became the textbook of "what not to do" in future amphibious operations, and laid the framework for the Normandy landings two years later. Most notably, Dieppe highlighted:

  • the need for preliminary artillery support, including aerial bombardment;
  • the need for a sustained element of surprise;
  • the need for proper intelligence concerning enemy fortifications;
  • the avoidance of a direct frontal attack on a defended port city; and,
  • the need for proper re-embarkation craft.
As a consequence of the lessons learned at Dieppe, the British developed a whole range of specialist armoured vehicles which allowed their engineers to perform many of their tasks protected by armour, most famously Hobart's Funnies. The operation showed major deficiencies in RAF ground support techniques, and this led to the creation of a fully integrated Tactical Air Force to support major ground offensives.

Another effect of the raid was change in the Allies' previously held belief that seizure of a major port would be essential in the creation of a second front. Their revised view was that the amount of damage that would be done to a port by the necessary bombardment to take it, would almost certainly render it useless as a port afterwards. As a result, the decision was taken to construct prefabricated harbours, codenamed "Mulberry", and tow them to lightly defended beaches as part of a large-scale invasion.
:can:
 
The thing that gets missed in this is that the division they were sending to England were not fully trained. They had to become effective fighting units before they could be sent into battle or they'd be wasted. (One of the two divisions in the first US wave at Normandy had never been in combat as a unit.) An invasion in 1943 with poorly trained units would have been a recipe for disaster.
 
How soon everyone in the World (except Canada) forgets Dieppe (19 August 1942). :mad:

Dieppe_RaidWP

Though, I suppose, the results of this insane action did have some considerable value.


The Dieppe raid also resulted in some pretty fierce battles in the air. The results in the air—the RAF suffered a 2.2:1 loss rate—likely made clear the necessity of achieving air supremacy before attempting any major seaborne landing attempt.
 
Another issue that could be considered...

Yes, Russia had significant casualties in the fight against Germany, but how many of those casualties were due to Russia's own mistakes?

If they didn't (for example) kill off many of their top officers, or engage in military actions with troops that did not have adequate supplies, then perhaps Russia wouldn't have had to take so many "lumps".

This is a very important point. If you divide the war up into two halves. Before the battle of Moscow and after the battle of Moscow. You do see a dramatic shift in the casualty rates for the Soviets.
 
The thing that gets missed in this is that the division they were sending to England were not fully trained. They had to become effective fighting units before they could be sent into battle or they'd be wasted. (One of the two divisions in the first US wave at Normandy had never been in combat as a unit.) An invasion in 1943 with poorly trained units would have been a recipe for disaster.

There is a difference between being fully trained, and combat experienced.

IIRC there were enough fully trained US divisions for a 1943 invasion (at least the initial stages), the issue is that they were on the wrong side of the Atlantic. The US also did less than the UK in putting combat experienced commanders into divisions being trained, to ensure training was realistic and ease them through their first battles.
 
I can't remember where I read it, but I recall an 'alternate history' claim that an Allied invasion of France in 1943 would have quite possibly been successful. Why? Well, while the Allies may have been less prepared than they were a year later, the German defences in France were also less prepared and thus less effective than they were a year later.
 
We put five ashore in the first wave of the Normandy invasion. Those four thousand ships were most landing craft, which should give you an idea of what the first day's landings entailed.

As I say, I think the "Husky landed as many as Overlord" was part of Grigg's argument. It felt rather flaky at the time.

Who is this Marxist you speak of, He is obviously lacking many historical facts on which I would be happy to enlighten him!

That would be slightly unfair on the poor chap. Apart from the thing above about Germany invading Alaska, he also happily watches Sky TV for the footie while ranting about Big Business and Murdoch. The disconnect is a thing to behold.

Hindsight is always 20/20. Since I wasn't there, I give much credit to those who were, who planned the invasion for 1944, and it worked. As far as I'm concerned, that settles it.

Whether you look at the data they had available at the time, or the data we have available, they made the right call, IMO.

Another issue that could be considered...

Yes, Russia had significant casualties in the fight against Germany, but how many of those casualties were due to Russia's own mistakes?

If they didn't (for example) kill off many of their top officers, or engage in military actions with troops that did not have adequate supplies, then perhaps Russia wouldn't have had to take so many "lumps".

I tried to come up with a "German deaths by front from Jun 41" figure, real back of the beer mat thing. Ignoring POW deaths (which would skew the figures as the death rate in Soviet camps was significantly higher) I got 60% in the East (give or take a % or two depending on where you pull the figures). The remaining 40% covered all the other fronts, naval campaigns and air campaigns.

That's not the impression you tend to get.

Anyone have a better set of figures?

The troops yes, but all the equipment, and supplies to support them were a different matter.

It would be 1917/18 all over again.

I can't remember where I read it, but I recall an 'alternate history' claim that an Allied invasion of France in 1943 would have quite possibly been successful. Why? Well, while the Allies may have been less prepared than they were a year later, the German defences in France were also less prepared and thus less effective than they were a year later.

That's part of Grigg's argument, but it ignores the forces in the Med and that were moved to Italy in September. Since there would have been no Transport Plan, the Germans would have also been able to transport troops to the new front pretty sharpish. Indeed, would a June '43 invasion have seen the new German tanks go into battle in the West rather than at Kursk?
 
I have played dozens of War Games involving either the invasion of Normandy or similar situations. My conclusion is that:

1. It is always foolish to attack when weak militarily, especially when you have the advantage otherwise. The US had a terrific advantage in industrial production for the war, partially because its industrial plants were immune to German bombers.

2. Any beachhead needs to be successful, or you will take awful casualties to no avail. Even though the Germans anticipated the landing via Calais, it was still fairly touch and go as to whether D-Day would succeed. Had Rommel been able to mass his armies at Normandy, it would have been a much bloodier battle at least.
 
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I have played dozens of War Games involving either the invasion of Normandy or similar situations. My conclusion is that:

1. It is always foolish to attack when weak militarily, especially when you have the advantage otherwise. The US had a terrific advantage in industrial production for the war, partially because its industrial plants were immune to German bombers.

2. Any beachhead needs to be successful, or you will take awful casualties to no avail. Even though the Germans anticipated the landing via Calais, it was still fairly touch and go as to whether D-Day would succeed. Had Rommel been able to mass his armies at Normandy, it would have been a much bloodier battle at least.

And, if the bombing of the beach defenses ahead of the invasion had been successful, if would have been a much less bloodier battle at least. ;)
 
I have played dozens of War Games involving either the invasion of Normandy or similar situations. My conclusion is that:

1. It is always foolish to attack when weak militarily, especially when you have the advantage otherwise. The US had a terrific advantage in industrial production for the war, partially because its industrial plants were immune to German bombers.

2. Any beachhead needs to be successful, or you will take awful casualties to no avail. Even though the Germans anticipated the landing via Calais, it was still fairly touch and go as to whether D-Day would succeed. Had Rommel been able to mass his armies at Normandy, it would have been a much bloodier battle at least.

IMO had Rommel been given complete and total control of all forces in France, Overlord may have failed. And had Rundstedt been given complete authority to hold back from the beaches and mass a large armored reserve, things would have been much worse for the Allies. Thankfully Hitler intervened and made them compromise, which was worse than either plan. That plus a silly convoluted command structure greatly helped the Allies.
 

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