"New" book on Pearl Harbor, attack analysis.

Tolls said:
It ceased to be overly meaningful even during Napoleons career. Once the coalition commanders stopped allowing themselves to panic whenever Napoleon disrupted their communications, or struck from somewhere unexpected, and started leading him on a merry dance instead it all sort of fell apart.
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Yes, though to nitpick, it does not really encapsulate Napoleon's mindset nor aim as well as "I may lose a battle, but I shall never lose a minute," and his constant aim for the battle of annihilation.
Along those lines, Blucher is, to my mind, an unsung hero of the extended resistance to Napoleon. Frequently beaten but never defeated, the man never quit.
 
I couldn't agree more about Blucher (and Gneisenau, they were very much a team). Old Vorwarts, indeed.

He at the very least holds joint credit for Waterloo, something Wellington seemed to downplay (though undoubtedly politics played its part).
 
Tolls said:
It ceased to be overly meaningful even during Napoleons career. Once the coalition commanders stopped allowing themselves to panic whenever Napoleon disrupted their communications, or struck from somewhere unexpected, and started leading him on a merry dance instead it all sort of fell apart.
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I suppose Austerlitz was a bit different from Borodino.
 
Maybe we all ought to get out our copies of Harpoon and play it out :)
 
Tolls said:
I couldn't agree more about Blucher (and Gneisenau, they were very much a team). Old Vorwarts, indeed.
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Agreed.

Tolls said:
He at the very least holds joint credit for Waterloo, something Wellington seemed to downplay (though undoubtedly politics played its part).
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Doubly agreed. I am a Wellington fan, a big fan, in fact, particularly his Peninsular War days and his time in India, but Waterloo was a defeat-in-the-offing had Blucher not been Blucher.


Craig B said:
I suppose Austerlitz was a bit different from Borodino.
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Vastly. Austerlitz was Nappy's crowning glory and the final proof to Europe that battles of annihilation were how wars were won. Borodino was Nappy's attempt to achieve his Russian Austerlitz while it was merely a part of Kutuzov's campaign of annihilation.

And now I will stop contributing to the derail. I find the OP sufficiently interesting. I haven't contributed because my knowledge of the details of Pearl Harbor planning is far less than others in this thread, so I'm just reading.
 
Tolls said:
I couldn't agree more about Blucher (and Gneisenau, they were very much a team). Old Vorwarts, indeed.

He at the very least holds joint credit for Waterloo, something Wellington seemed to downplay (though undoubtedly politics played its part).
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It wasn't so much Wellington, who did seem to give credit to Blucher any time he was asked but wasn't keen on being asked. It was more an effect of Wellington's staff and junior officers who tried to blame every shortcoming of the battle on anyone but themselves and their men. This is why a lot of Belgian and other allies get the short end of credit for their roles in the battle. For a short while the officers were trying to plant damn near everything that went wrong in the battle on Blucher and the Prussian army. When Blucher heard about it he appealed to Wellington to stop such slander and Wellington did make it clear he did not appreciate such sentiments.
 
Corsair 115 said:
Shattered Sword is available in the library system here, so I'll be putting in a request to have a copy sent to my local branch. It's been awhile since I read a book on WWII. This one looks to fit the bill nicely. Thanks for bringing it up, everyone! :)
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Just finished the book and the fragility of an aircraft carrier is one of the things I noted. The Japanese didn't seem to worry much about protecting these valuable assets either by their own fighters, armament or escorts. Since the only defense against another carrier is to sink it or render it inoperable the Admiral should launched all he had at the first confirmation of a US carrier, of course, the info was spotty and having your superior ready to second guess your every move tends to inhibit ones' actions.

I concluded that being a carrier admiral is a less than enviable job with lots of responsibility but no real control of events.
 
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tsig said:
Just finished the book and the fragility of an aircraft carrier is one of the things I noted. The Japanese didn't seem to worry much about protecting these valuable assets either by their own fighters, armament or escorts. Since the only defense against another carrier is to sink it or render it inoperable the Admiral should launched all he had at the first confirmation of a US carrier, of course, the info was spotty and having your superior ready to second guess your every move tends to inhibit ones' actions.
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It always struck me as having been a bad idea to launch a strike at Midway using about half the aircraft from each of the four carriers rather than launching all the aircraft (minus CAP contribution) from two of the carriers and keep the other two carriers in reserve in case USN ships were spotted.
 
I am reading the book. Very interesting. There are a lot of goodies for LIHOP conspiracists there to cherry-pick, but the overall picture really shows how ridiculous the CT is.

Hans
 
jj said:
Maybe we all ought to get out our copies of Harpoon and play it out :)
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Meh, I never found the WW2 battleset that good.

Corsair 115 said:
It always struck me as having been a bad idea to launch a strike at Midway using about half the aircraft from each of the four carriers rather than launching all the aircraft (minus CAP contribution) from two of the carriers and keep the other two carriers in reserve in case USN ships were spotted.
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IIRC this was down to the mix of aircraft, with the dive bomber contingent from each carrier being used against Midway. Though I may be wrong...

Gawdzilla said:
I'm currently converting US Naval Regulations, 1945, to HTML. The table of contents is 133 pages. That is a hefty tome.
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Shades of Beilstein. :)
 
Got Shattered Sword at the library. I'll read it as soon as I finish George Henry Thomas: As True As Steel. Still didn't get to read Zimm; I had to cut my time at the library short for emergency babysitting duty. :(
 
Corsair 115 said:
It always struck me as having been a bad idea to launch a strike at Midway using about half the aircraft from each of the four carriers rather than launching all the aircraft (minus CAP contribution) from two of the carriers and keep the other two carriers in reserve in case USN ships were spotted.
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catsmate1 said:
IIRC this was down to the mix of aircraft, with the dive bomber contingent from each carrier being used against Midway. Though I may be wrong...
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It turns out Shattered Sword answers why the Japanese did the attack that way. It has to do with the way they organized and operated their carriers, and their emphasis on massed, co-ordinated air strikes. Their method did actually have sense and efficiency to it. (But as it happened it did not work out for them at Midway.)
 
Corsair 115 said:
It turns out Shattered Sword answers why the Japanese did the attack that way. It has to do with the way they organized and operated their carriers, and their emphasis on massed, co-ordinated air strikes. Their method did actually have sense and efficiency to it. (But as it happened it did not work out for them at Midway.)
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A short explanation, if practicable, would be gratefully received.
 
Tolls said:
I couldn't agree more about Blucher (and Gneisenau, they were very much a team). Old Vorwarts, indeed.

He at the very least holds joint credit for Waterloo, something Wellington seemed to downplay (though undoubtedly politics played its part).
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Blücher was given an honorary doctorate by an English university, and commented that they ought to have made Gneisenau an apothecary, since that was how they worked together.

For some reason that got quoted as an example of his senility.

:blackcat:
 
When you think about it, doesn't it seem utterly stupid that the Japanese should attack America at Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines because they actually wanted this territory? I mean, considering that Japan was incredibly pre-occupied with China and IndoChina, why at this time start a war of conquest against the most powerful industrial power the world had ever seen?

Put like this - as most Historians would have you see it. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is the ultimate Historical Non Sequiter.

So...why did the Japanese attack?
 
Jules Galen said:
When you think about it, doesn't it seem utterly stupid that the Japanese should attack America at Pearl Harbor and the Phillipines because they actually wanted this territory? I mean, considering that Japan was incredibly pre-occupied with China and IndoChina, why at this time start a war of conquest against the most powerful industrial power the world had ever seen?

Put like this - as most Historians would have you see it. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is the ultimate Historical Non Sequiter.

So...why did the Japanese attack?
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Because Yamamoto insisted on it, and threatened to resign if Imperial General Headquarters didn't approve the plan. Why he wanted it is the subject of brisk debate in some circles. :boxedin:
 
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