Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

I am also amused by the notion that the fact Hitler had ordered his troops to leave the Rhine lands if the French sent troops in, response to the Germans violating the Treaty of Versailles by sending in troops themselves, is silly and irrelevant to discussing the Rhineland crisis of 1936. The bottom line is that their would have been no almost certainly no war. The Nazis government would have been discredited and possibly future history changed for the better.

Nobody in their right mind would have gone to war over Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. It would have been a wild project. Similarly the Sudetenland crisis in 1938 would have been another wild project without the support of any other allies. With what?

 

[Tolls]

Nobody in their right mind would have gone to war over Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland. It would have been a wild project. Similarly the Sudetenland crisis in 1938 would have been another wild project without the support of any other allies. With what?

For god's sake, we've been over this!
What allies? Well, it would have been Britain, France, Russia and Czechoslovakia for starters.

What with? Well, us and the French had a fair amount of useful kit...

 

[Andy_Ross]

So that narrows it down to the actual plan used, and even that success was pretty much predicated on the, frankly, uselessness of Gamelin, and his decision to use crap troops in his hinge in front of the Ardennes. Stick someone actually kitted out with anti-tank weapons...

Positioning 'weak' units in a part of the line not expected to be attacked is not unusual though.
It frees up better equipped forces to be used elsewhere.
As we know pushing armoured divisions through the Ardennes was unprecedented at the time.
A lesson lost on the allies later in the war in the same area.

 

[HansMustermann]

Gamelin is still to blame, though, for overruling the reports that the Germans HAVE been spotted coming through the Ardennes. Not expecting it, sure, I can understand that. Ignoring your own intel is a whole other issue, though.

 

[Henri McPhee]

For god's sake, we've been over this!
What allies? Well, it would have been Britain, France, Russia and Czechoslovakia for starters.

What with? Well, us and the French had a fair amount of useful kit...

There is a sensible article with regard to France and Soviet Russia and their attitude to the Sudetenland in 1938 at this website:

https://history.blog.gov.uk/2013/09/30/whats-the-context-30-september-1938-the-munich-agreement/

France

France was joined in alliance with the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, but very reluctant to risk war with Germany, and certainly not without British support.

Some hoped that in the event of war the Soviet Union would fight on France’s side, but others were less sanguine and feared that neither Poland nor Roumania would willingly let Soviet troops pass through their territories.

On 29 September the French Foreign Minister begged the British Ambassador in Paris to urge on Chamberlain ‘how absolutely vital he felt it was that an arrangement should be reached over the Sudeten question at Munich at almost any price’.

 

[Garrison]

There is a sensible article with regard to France and Soviet Russia and their attitude to the Sudetenland in 1938 at this

So basically yet again you dredged up some blog that agrees with you? To date Henri the only thing you have persuaded anyone here of is that you know nothing about appeasement and that you are largely motivated to keep posting because of your hatred of Churchill.

 

[Tolls]

Positioning 'weak' units in a part of the line not expected to be attacked is not unusual though.
It frees up better equipped forces to be used elsewhere.
As we know pushing armoured divisions through the Ardennes was unprecedented at the time.
A lesson lost on the allies later in the war in the same area.

Except that French wargaming in '38 showed the Ardennes was not impassable to armour, and was in fact not the defensive barrier the high command thought.

Gamelin was warned then, and again (as Hans says) in '40 when the Germans were building up to drive through there.

To stick troops who had no anti-tank kit to speak of at that point was a gross mistake. And the fact it happened again in 1944 doesn't absolve him of that.

 

[HansMustermann]

Oh, not just when they were building up. They had actually started moving through there when a plane saw them. But Gamelin decided that the pilot was just seeing things.

Also he wasn't just warned at the wargaming AND in '40. In the meantime even Churchill took the time to go over and tell him that that's a weak spot, but he dismissed that too.

Edit: I'd also add that they weren't just lacking AT abilities. Some of the French divisions were really just crap, and had massive morale problems too. To the point where, during his Ghost Division stunt, when going back with just an armoured car to see where the hell he left most of his division, Rommel ran into some motorized French infantry and just told them that THEY are the ones left behind enemy lines (actually HE was) and demanded their surrender, so they did. So he gets back to the German lines with 1 armored car and a whole bunch of trucks full of unguarded French prisoners just following him.

Really, some of their divisions may have had the spirit of the gallic cock, but that was more like the spirit of the gallic cock-up

 

[dudalb]

Except that French wargaming in '38 showed the Ardennes was not impassable to armour, and was in fact not the defensive barrier the high command thought.

Gamelin was warned then, and again (as Hans says) in '40 when the Germans were building up to drive through there.

To stick troops who had no anti-tank kit to speak of at that point was a gross mistake. And the fact it happened again in 1944 doesn't absolve him of that.

I always though it was pretty dumb of Allied intelligence in late 1944 not to seriously consider that the Germans might try a repeat of their 1940 surprise attack in the Ardennes...

 

[Garrison]

The thing is that until February 1940 Gamelin was right to dismiss the Ardennes, the Germans were going to do exactly what the Allies expected, launch a Mark II Schlieffen Plan. In February the Mechelen Incident happened and the Allies got their hands on the German battleplan, which confirmed their expectations, so to this point you can give Gamelin the benefit of the doubt, however rather than wondering about what the German might do if they realized their plan had been compromised he doubled down on the Dyle Plan and moved more units from the reserve to take part in it. At no point did he appear to consider any contingencies and he rigidly stuck to his belief in the German attack in Belgium being the main attack in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

 

[lobosrul5]

I always though it was pretty dumb of Allied intelligence in late 1944 not to seriously consider that the Germans might try a repeat of their 1940 surprise attack in the Ardennes...

Not only that, but Courtney Hodges' (commander of the US First Army) behavior during the Ardennes offensive should've resulted in immediate dismissal. IIRC his chief of staff basically took over while he hunkered down, and was basically unable to cope with the fact that the Germans were actually attacking his section of the front.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Except that French wargaming in '38 showed the Ardennes was not impassable to armour, and was in fact not the defensive barrier the high command thought.

Gamelin was warned then, and again (as Hans says) in '40 when the Germans were building up to drive through there.

To stick troops who had no anti-tank kit to speak of at that point was a gross mistake. And the fact it happened again in 1944 doesn't absolve him of that.

You misunderstand the doctrine of the time. Tanks coming through the Ardennes was one thing but getting horse drawn artillery and it's ammunition train through was a whole lot more difficult.
What Germany did was to use the air force as tactical artillery. There was close cooperation between forward observers and the bombers, they were called and responded as artillery batteries would.
Another thing the french had no inkling of was the 'Blitzkreig' tactics used by the Germans, again they didn't think armoured units supported by infantry were a major attack, Tanks were there to support the infantry and most of that was to the north along with the artillery.
In effect the major part of the German forces was a huge dummy attack.

 

[Mondial]

Belgium and Holland were not genuine neutrals in 1939-40. The Belgian military was working with the French military and the Dutch armed forces were doing the same with their British counterparts. The Dutch government also allowed the RAF to fly over its territory to bomb targets in Germany. Protests from the German ambassador to Holland were ignored. That's why Hitler attacked the Low Countries - they were not genuine neutrals. And what if the shoe was on the other foot ? What if the Belgians and Dutch were working with the Germans ? Do you think Churchill would have hesitated to attack them ? I doubt it!
https://forum.codoh.com/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12153
Above link includes info on book in Dutch language by Loe De Jong called Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden In De Tweede Wereldoorlog.

 

[HansMustermann]

Really? Exactly where did the Brits drop any bombs during the Phoney War? 'Cause I only know of leaflets being dropped

 

[erwinl]

The thing is that until February 1940 Gamelin was right to dismiss the Ardennes, the Germans were going to do exactly what the Allies expected, launch a Mark II Schlieffen Plan. In February the Mechelen Incident happened and the Allies got their hands on the German battleplan, which confirmed their expectations, so to this point you can give Gamelin the benefit of the doubt, however rather than wondering about what the German might do if they realized their plan had been compromised he doubled down on the Dyle Plan and moved more units from the reserve to take part in it. At no point did he appear to consider any contingencies and he rigidly stuck to his belief in the German attack in Belgium being the main attack in the face of all evidence to the contrary.

Yeah. The refusal or inability of Gamelin to adapt did not help matters at all(understatement).

The problem really starts with the French (and the British) understanding the way a next war would have to be fought in order to conclusively win. No more hurling yourself against the enemy, like at the start of the Great War.
They figured that the only way to defeat Germany was to make it a war of attrition, where the complete economies and productions of both sides would in the end decide who would win.

And to be fair. They were completely right in this.
Defeating Germany did take beating after beating, until losses could no longer be replaced and Germany finally collapsed.

Where France and Britain went wrong was that they, in recognizing the way in which the next war would be fought, organized themselves completley in order to fight this next war that way. And foregoing any possibility to bring about a swift end to the war, should the opportunity arise (thus negating the opportunities at the Rhineland or the Munich crisis), or should a crisis come about (may 1940).

 

[Border Reiver]

Belgium and Holland were not genuine neutrals in 1939-40. The Belgian military was working with the French military and the Dutch armed forces were doing the same with their British counterparts. The Dutch government also allowed the RAF to fly over its territory to bomb targets in Germany. Protests from the German ambassador to Holland were ignored. That's why Hitler attacked the Low Countries - they were not genuine neutrals. And what if the shoe was on the other foot ? What if the Belgians and Dutch were working with the Germans ? Do you think Churchill would have hesitated to attack them ? I doubt it!
https://forum.codoh.com/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=12153
Above link includes info on book in Dutch language by Loe De Jong called Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden In De Tweede Wereldoorlog.

Nice revisionist history/fantasy, be a shame if some facts were to come by and poke holes in it.

The Belgians stopped working with France in 1920 on defence matters. By 1937 they had a non-aggression pact with Germany (fat lot of good that did, almost as much as the one Poland had with Germany). The Belgians were NOT working with the western Allies - there were no British or French troops in Belgium until after May 10, 1940 when the ever so trustworthy Nazis decided that non-aggression pacts were something other countries honoured and invaded.

The Dutch didn't resist overflights for a very simple reason - they had deliberately not spent large sums on their non-colonial forces on the pragmatic assessment that they could not resist a full out attack from any of the major powers. And then of course there was that guarantee of neutrality that the Germans gave in October of 1939 - damn, Nazi Germany really was an untrustworthy sort of nation wasn't it?

And then there is that rather inconvenient bit for your mandatory bit of Churchill hate is that he did not become PM until May 10, 1940 - which coincidently is the date that Nazi Germany broke its non aggression pacts with The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg and invaded.

For the record, lets review the "non-aggression pacts" that Nazi Germany broke:

a. Czechoslovakia - 1938
b. Poland - 1939
c. The Netherlands - 1940
d. Belgium - 1940
e. Luxembourg - 1940
f. USSR - 1941

I was tempted to include the neutral countries of Denmark and Norway, as they had been offered non-aggression pacts by Nazi Germany in April 1939, but the governments in both countries had not entered into them, so instead of attacking a nation they had formally promised not to attack, the Nazis simply attacked neutral countries.

Essentially, the Nazis were a bunch of untrustworthy scum, who would break their promises as soon as they felt they could get away with it. Cowards and bullies, the lot of them.

 

[Drewbot]

Henri still hasn't answered if Chamberlain was receiving false data about the German Army in 1934.

I think anyone warning Chamberlain in 1934 that the German Army was some special force that they needed to worry about, was lying, or mistaken.

If Chamberlain used this as a basis for his appeasement of the Germans, then that is a mistake. If they had told Chamberlain in 1934 that Germany couldn't handle a naval blockade, then perhaps he would have taken some measures.

 

[HansMustermann]

Remind me again, though, what was happening in '34? 'Cause the Rhine Remilitarization was in '36, the army-related announcements (e.g., the establishment of the Luftwaffe) were in '35... I'm drawing blanks as to why someone would want to start a war in '34.

 

[HansMustermann]

@Border Reiver
I think Yugoslavia also deserves a mention. For the lulz, if nothing else. It wasn't neutral, but actually joined the Axis in March 1941, and got invaded by its new 'allies' next month

 

[Henri McPhee]

I always though it was pretty dumb of Allied intelligence in late 1944 not to seriously consider that the Germans might try a repeat of their 1940 surprise attack in the Ardennes...

The thought occurred to me that Admiral Canaris and Colonel Oster of the Abwehr who were on our side had been taken to a concentration camp in about July 1944. The allies as a result might have been operating blind about Hitler's intentions. The battle of the Bulge was quite a large affair involving many thousands of casualties and the Arnhem campaign that year was a bit of a military disaster as well.

There is a bit about all this in that book Top Secret Ultra by Peter Calvocoressi
published in 1981:

It has frequently been said that Hitler's offensive in the Ardennes in December 1944 took allied intelligence by surprise. This is not true...……. Although this last German offensive in the west was foredoomed to failure and in fact aborted in a matter of days, it caused great perturbation on the allied side The Germans were not thought to be capable of anything of the sort....