Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

I would return though to

A) whether it was an error, GIVEN THE PREMISES, and
B) whether Chamberlain actually was THAT convinced that he can secure peace.

With regards to A, let's look back at the data he was being fed by the military. The Christie report was already mentioned, but what seems to still escape many is the way it was evaluated. Again, by the military.

The doctrine at the time was that the bomber always gets through. This was not just wishful thinking of the RAF for their own bombers, but what they expected of enemy bombers too. The result was that evaluating the Christie report numbers produced an estimated 1 million deaths and 3 million displaced, with London very nearly obliterated, if the Germans were to start bombing.

Now in retrospect we know that both the report was grossly wrong, and the doctrine was also wrong. But that's the data they fed Chamberlain, and the data that he based his decisions on. He wasn't a RAF general himself, so he had to trust the data that the RAF feeds him. He trusted his officers. That's a good thing, right?

I would also add that nowadays we know that you can't purely bomb a country into submission, but at the time proponents of strategic bombing were believing just that. And not just in Britain. America was also going full tilt into dada land with that idea. And not just at the time. Bomber Harris continued believing it all through WW2 for example.

Again, nowadays we know that that's wrong. In fact, the Germans discovered in Spain that bombing civilians only strengthens their resolve. Britain however had not discovered that. They thought that if you bomb enough homes and industry, the people and the industrialists will just overthrow the government that got their homes and their precious factories bombed and surrender. Again, even years later Harris expected that exactly this would happen in Germany.

So, given the data he was being fed, the inescapable conclusion was that there's a distinct possibility for that to happen to Britain. Yes, yes, NOWADAYS we know that that's not how the Brits reacted to the Blitz, just like the Spanish hadn't, the the Germans later also wouldn't. But that was not what the doctrine said at the time.

But now let's look at B. What did Chamberlain do with that data? Did he just hope the war never happens?

Well, no, he did what he can to strengthen the RAF, build AA defenses, build bomb shelters, make plans for dispersing as much of the population as possible into the country side, etc. All those AA guns and bomb shelters that were used during the Blitz didn't start happening in Churchill's time. Most of those were started by Chamberlain.

So it seems to me like he was very much aware that he may just be buying some extra time to prepare his country for the downright apocalyptic scenario that his military was telling him would happen.

Which frankly doesn't sound like a particularly horrible politician to me.
 
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Okay so leaving aside the whole ‘who benefited most?’ issue lets focus on that ‘buying time’ claim. If we allow that buying time was the intention going into Munich then that is in itself an admission that Appeasement, a policy that Chamberlain had been deeply involved in, had failed. The whole point of appeasement was to avoid war, not buy time for rearmament. The other problem with the idea that ‘buying time’ was a deliberate policy is that it is very clearly a last desperate throw of the dice intended to change the mind of Adolf Hitler who was intent on war in the Autumn of 1938. Chamberlain’s willingness to make so many concessions is not the product of any clearly thought out long term strategy and in the end only succeeded because there were so many voices in Germany arguing against war. Had the Wehrmacht been as sanguine about the prospects of war in October 1938 as they were in August 1939 Hitler would have had his war regardless of Chamberlain’s desperate concessions.

The above of course assumes that ‘buying time’ was actually the intent at Munich and not simply an after the fact attempt to rationalize what was nothing more than one last attempt to buy off Hitler and avoid war. If as seems likely Chamberlain did believe ‘the bomber will always get through’ rhetoric where is the evidence that he also believed that the upgrades to Fighter Commands capabilities planned in 1938 would change that? For that matter where is the evidence before or after Munich that Chamberlain expected war? There certainly seem to some records that suggest the opposite, that at least until March 1939 Chamberlain actually believed in ‘peace in our time’. Leaving aside diaries and so forth there are also practical matters that point to ‘buying time’ as a rationalization. Firstly there is the issue of the Army and rearmament. Chamberlain knew full well how ill prepared the army was for war in 1918, so if he thought a European war was likely/inevitable after Munich why was the army left to languish? Again only after the Germans marched into Prague does the preparing the Army kick into high gear. There’s also the question of the Czech gold that was handed over to Germany after the country’s final dismemberment. This makes no sense in the context of preparing for war, it does however make some sense as a continuation of appeasement. There is also the remarkably anaemic attempts to make a deal with Stalin after Prague. Granted these efforts were probably doomed to fail because Hitler was willing to offer Stalin things the British couldn’t, but this hardly explains the half-hearted effort made to do the only thing that would actually have allowed them to defend Poland.

Basically Chamberlain’s action’s at Munich are either an admission that appeasement, the policy he had been an architect of, had been an abject failure and weakened Britain’s strategic position to the point that further concessions had to be made to shore up her defences. Or Munich is the continuation of appeasement by a man who is appalled by the prospect of war and still assumes others feel the same way, meaning ‘peace in our time’ at any price was the real policy and ‘buying time’ nothing but an excuse when war came anyway.
 
Garrison said:
For that matter where is the evidence before or after Munich that Chamberlain expected war?
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That's a sensible posting from HansMustermann.

There is such a thing as what our secret service had been telling Chamberlain dating back to 1934 about Germany's military strength and excellent troops, and Hitler's intention to invade Soviet Russia. Stalin never believed his own spies about the matter and rather like Putin he was concentrating on bumping off people he didn't like. The British media were keeping it dark at the time. Politicians say things in private which they don't say in public.

There is a bit of background information about the matter at this website:

https://hitchensblog.mailonsunday.c...berlain-just-as-set-on-war-as-churchill-.html

‘After hours without food in the unheated aircraft, the party then rushed back to Downing Street where, according to Home's account, as Chamberlain was still taking off his coat, he said to senior colleagues who had gathered to greet him: “Gentlemen, prepare for war.” According to this story at least, far from being fooled by Hitler, Chamberlain had become just as aware of his true intentions as Churchill. By pretending otherwise, he bought another year for Britain to step up preparations for a war he now realised was inevitable.’
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Henri McPhee said:
There is such a thing as what our secret service had been telling Chamberlain dating back to 1934 about Germany's military strength and excellent troops[/url]
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What kind of warning would they be giving in 1934?

German mostly used light tanks in the invasion of Poland in 1939, and then France.

Which troops were they talking about? In 1934 they would have still been under the post war limits, and they didn't announce the increase in troops until 35 or 36. Hell they didn't even have a draft until 35 or 36.

Their armor was light and fast, their troops were not tested in battle, yes their planes were probably better for ground attack, but no one would know about the air to air capabilities in 1934. They certainly had no heavy bombers. What would they have been warning Chamberlain about in 1934?

Maybe you know, but in 1934, I think it was mostly bravado on the part of the Germans, and unwillingness to fight on the part of the Allies. Unless you are saying the Intelligence was boosting the German military and giving Chamberlain a false sense of weakness against such a superior force that the Intelligence was telling him. Are you saying this false intelligence is why Chamberlain was in Appeasement mode?
 
@Garrison
Oh, it's appeasement all right. And sure, in retrospect, it wasn't a good decision.

I'm just saying that given the data he was given, I can see how he'd take that decision. Garbage in, garbage out, as they say.
 
Henri McPhee said:
That's a sensible posting from HansMustermann.
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Yes it was, perhaps you could learn from it and stop posting the same old drivel sourced from blogs and op ed pieces.

HansMustermann said:
@Garrison
Oh, it's appeasement all right. And sure, in retrospect, it wasn't a good decision.

I'm just saying that given the data he was given, I can see how he'd take that decision. Garbage in, garbage out, as they say.
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There's certainly an argument to be made for that, but my view is that Chamberlain never really abandoned it. Munich was simply another round of trying to buy off Hitler and the argument that it was a an attempt to buy time doesn't really coincide with Chamberlain's actions after Munich. As I say that's just my view, it is plausible to argue that Chamberlain was the victim of faulty intelligence and the belief that the bomber would always get through drove him to seek peace at any price, or indeed that he believed that buying time at Munich was worth sacrificing the Czechs.
 
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Not just "faulty". It was wrong by orders of magnitude. The total British civilians killed in the bombings during the actual Blitz was a little over 40,000. The estimates before the war were at one million. That's being wrong by a factor of 250.

But to put the number in a better perspective, the total British death toll in WW1 was 700,000 (out of some 6 million mobilized.) And it was... not very much appreciated at home. The estimates for that supposed German bombing apocalypse were almost 50% higher than THAT.

So, yes, he was appeasing and yes it was a bad decision, but, as I was saying, I can understand how he'd come to that decision. Not saying it's necessarily the right one, mind you. Just that I can see how he'd come to it. As I was saying, garbage in, garbage out. I can see how he'd get garbage out, is all.
 
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Also, just to make it clear, I'm not saying that he didn't hope, maybe even believe, that he got a lasting peace at Munich. He may have. We'll probably never know. All I'm saying is that he also put contingency plans into motion, in case that's not the case. Which is IMHO sane.
 
Yes, well, Churchill sure spared no ink when it came to beating his own drum. But actually believing that he was all around right and Chamberlain was all around wrong just because Churchill himself says so... let's just say that applying the same standard to what Stalin wrote would get you to believe that there was a Trotskyite plot in the Soviet army in '37 :p

But yeah, that's the all around PROBLEM with WW2. Those who lived to write memoirs were somehow always right in their own memoirs. Be it Churchill in England or Halder in Germany.
 
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Drewbot said:
Which troops were they talking about? In 1934 they would have still been under the post war limits, and they didn't announce the increase in troops until 35 or 36. Hell they didn't even have a draft until 35 or 36.
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It's more complex than that. Military conflict is not the solution to every problem. It has been said that the Germans had 30000 or so excellent troops for the occupation of the Rhineland. In my view, the only way of preventing war would have been for regime change in Germany and Soviet Russia which was practically impossible then.

There is some background information about the matter from Fred Winterbotham, who was in Air Intelligence and had interviewed many high ranking Germans about the situation from 1934. Baldwin and Chamberlain would have been aware of this:

www.combatreform.org/thegermansarecomingthegermansarecoming.htm

By the end of 1938, the chance had gone. All indications were that if the Maginot Line could be bypassed around the north, which seemed an inevitable probability to those who knew the strength of the German armour, then there was little doubt that there would be complete defeat in France.

America had been assiduously wooed by the Nazis; a large section of the population and the press were definitely Germanophiles. The Germans had every reason to suppose that America would stay out of a war in Europe. They proved right, of course, until Pearl Harbor enabled Roosevelt to persuade America that the war was global.

In March 1939, the Nazis seized those parts of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia) which they had not been given under the Munich Pact. There was ample evidence coming out of Germany that the Army was preparing to bring forward their operations to rectify the Danzig Corridor position in September 1939. And now the British Government, without any means of backing up a military threat, resorted to a diplomatic one: they made a Defence Pact with Poland and Romania which everyone knew could not be implemented. This finally set us on a collision course. Those of us who could, made plans to take a last holiday with a deadline for everybody to be back in London by mid-August.
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"
By the end of 1938, the chance had gone. All indications were that if the Maginot Line could be bypassed around the north, which seemed an inevitable probability to those who knew the strength of the German armour, then there was little doubt that there would be complete defeat in France.
"

That's a complete misinterpretation of the events of May 1940.
 
Henri McPhee said:
It's more complex than that. Military conflict is not the solution to every problem. It has been said that the Germans had 30000 or so excellent troops for the occupation of the Rhineland. In my view, the only way of preventing war would have been for regime change in Germany and Soviet Russia which was practically impossible then.

There is some background information about the matter from Fred Winterbotham, who was in Air Intelligence and had interviewed many high ranking Germans about the situation from 1934. Baldwin and Chamberlain would have been aware of this:

www.combatreform.org/thegermansarecomingthegermansarecoming.htm
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Combatreform.org?
You’re invoking Mike Sparks? The military version of time-cube?

Okay. This is not even pretending anymore.
 
HansMustermann said:
Yes, well, Churchill sure spared no ink when it came to beating his own drum. But actually believing that he was all around right and Chamberlain was all around wrong just because Churchill himself says so...
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If you're replying to me, then you seem to have badly misunderstood the gist of my post. Here's what Churchill had to say, in his eulogy:

Whatever else history may or may not say about these terrible, tremendous years, we can be sure that Neville Chamberlain acted with perfect sincerity according to his lights and strove to the utmost of his capacity and authority, which were powerful, to save the world from the awful, devastating struggle in which we are now engaged. This alone will stand him in good stead as far as what is called the verdict of history is concerned.

[...]

Herr Hitler protests with frantic words and gestures that he has only desired peace. What do these ravings and outpourings count before the silence of Neville Chamberlain’s tomb? Long, hard, and hazardous years lie before us, but at least we entered upon them united and with clean hearts.

https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1940-the-finest-hour/neville-chamberlain/

​

This is not "I was right and Chamberlain was wrong." This is "Chamberlain was a good man who did everything in his power to save the world, by the best means he could think of. He did not succeed, but at least he tried, and he tried for all the right reasons. History will honor his attempt, as I honor it now."
 
In a way Churchill's Norway campaign lacked strategic logic, and Chamberlain got the blame for it as usual. The trouble is economic conditions create war as is happening now.

General Alan Brooke had a bit to say about this lack of strategic logic in his diaries at the time:

"January 30th (1940)... Martel (commanding 50th Div.) and his staff came in. He was wondering why we were not more concerned with preparing offensive measures to attack the Siegfried Line, and seemed quite oblivious of the fact that, instead of attacking this spring, we are far more likely to be hanging on by our eyelids in trying to check the German attacks."
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From German Army Group A, War Diary appendices, cit. The war in France and Flanders 1939-1940:

The objective, as defined by Rundstedt and Manstein, was "to annihilate the Allied forces on land and in the air, to eliminate the continental sword of the English and then, as a second step, to attack England herself by air and sea."
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Henri McPhee said:
In a way Churchill's Norway campaign lacked strategic logic, and Chamberlain got the blame for it as usual.
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And? How does the failure of the Norwegian campaign have anything to do with Appeasement, besides obviously only happening because Appeasement failed to prevent war.

The trouble is economic conditions create war as is happening now.
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More nonsense, it was Hitler's drive for war that wrecked the German economy.
From German Army Group A, War Diary appendices, cit. The war in France and Flanders 1939-1940:
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Again a battle that was the result of the failure of Appeasement.
 
All indications were that if the Maginot Line could be bypassed around the north, which seemed an inevitable probability to those who knew the strength of the German armour, then there was little doubt that there would be complete defeat in France.
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That was the point of the Maginot Line, to direct a German Attack in to the gap between the coast and the northern end of the line. A defending force would secure their left flank on the coast and their right flank against the northern end of the fortifications.
It was a good idea and plan if things had gone according to plan.
Unfortunatley we know the outcome but it wasn't the line being bypassed to the north in the way that was expected..
 
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