Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Degeneve]

I am still trying to understand how the UK could have been defeated in one week in 1938. The question has been raised almost a week ago and still did not get any answer. Not even the beginning of an answer. Maybe because there is no answer available. At least an answer which makes sense...

 

[HansMustermann]

I think a question that definitely wasn't solved in '38, or later for that matter, was how to bring the German army over the channel. Thing is, no matter how well you do with bombers, they can't actually hold ground.

And really, without troops on the ground, what are you going to do with any amount of bombers, to defeat the UK? They haven't ever made anyone want to surrender. Even a German report from the Spanish Civil War indicated that actually bombing cities just strengthens the people's resolve.

The 'domino theory' of knocking out key parts of the economy also wouldn't even work, when those bombers don't have the range to attack a significant part of the British industry.

Plus, see above, even if you did somehow manage that, so what? You still need boots (and tanks) on the ground to actually defeat anyone. Some of the allies did have the unexplainable delusion that if you bomb enough of the countries, the rich will rather oust Hitler than see their wealth destroyed, but the Germans actually never did believe it would work that way. So exactly what campaign would they be planning against the UK at that point?

 

[Henri McPhee]

I think a question that definitely wasn't solved in '38, or later for that matter, was how to bring the German army over the channel. Thing is, no matter how well you do with bombers, they can't actually hold ground.

I agree with you that it is a strategic error to try to make an opposed landing unless you intend to stay there. That's where Eisenhower and Marshall went wrong with their proposal to cross the channel in 1942, and the fiasco of the Dieppe raid. General Alan Brooke had to try to persuade the Americans to try North Africa and Italy instead, which made more sense.

There are some interesting opinions about all this at:

http://www.city-data.com/forum/history/844777-should-czechoslovakia-have-fought-germany-1938-a.html

Except if Britain had made their stand in 1938, they would have had no air force capable of matching the Luftwaffe. That extra year bought the Brits the time they needed for the Spitfire fighters to come on line and be ready for the Battle of Britain.

Without the Spitfires to match the ME-109's, the Battle of Britain would have been lost.

As it was, it was pretty close.

 

[jimbob]

Henri, you are quoting someone on an internet forum. With the greatest of respect, they could be on that forum quoting you to support their views.

It is no better than saying "a mate in the pub said this"

 

[Garrison]

I agree with you that it is a strategic error to try to make an opposed landing unless you intend to stay there. That's where Eisenhower and Marshall went wrong with their proposal to cross the channel in 1942, and the fiasco of the Dieppe raid. General Alan Brooke had to try to persuade the Americans to try North Africa and Italy instead, which made more sense.

There are some interesting opinions about all this at:

http://www.city-data.com/forum/history/844777-should-czechoslovakia-have-fought-germany-1938-a.html

You've offered a quote without any supporting evidence that simply reiterates your own claim about the RAF versus the Luftwaffe in 1938, for all we know that's you posting under a different name. And of course the quote is utterly irrelevant because again, the Bf109 can't reach Britain in 1938, you do understand that by now?

You need to offer a reasoned explanation as to why unescorted bombers of inferior types flying much further are going to bring about the defeat of Britain in a week.

 

[ddt]

I agree with you that it is a strategic error to try to make an opposed landing unless you intend to stay there.

I don't think Hans ever suggested that.

But how is that one-week-from-Berlin-to-London campaign going?

 

[HansMustermann]

I agree with you that it is a strategic error to try to make an opposed landing unless you intend to stay there.

What I was saying is rather that it's a strategic error to even try that landing, if you don't have the ships to bring those troops there, nor the means to protect those ships from the Royal Navy, nor the means to keep those troops supplied. It's kinda like saying I could be leaving for Mars in a week, except I have no rocket and no means to support a base there

 

[Henri McPhee]

Henri, you are quoting someone on an internet forum. With the greatest of respect, they could be on that forum quoting you to support their views.

It is no better than saying "a mate in the pub said this"

It's not a question of " a mate in the pub said this" but more a question of hard documentary evidence. I agree that there was a widespread view at the time that bombers would get through, and force a surrender. That proved not to be the case against Germany, and even in more recent years, like Vietnam. The point is that the RAF fighter defences were in a woefully inadequate state in 1938, and radar was in its infancy. Chamberlain had to make a military judgment in 1938 and not just to choose between war and dishonour as Churchill would have done:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_radar

In 1937, Bowen's team set their crude ASV radar, the world's first airborne set, to detect the Home Fleet in dismal weather.[20] Only in spring 1939, "as a matter of great urgency" after the failure of the searchlight system Silhouette,[21] did attention turn to using ASV for air-to-air interception (AI).[21] Demonstrated in June 1939, AI got a warm reception from Air Chief Marshal Hugh Dowding, and even more so from Churchill.

This proved problematic.[21] Its accuracy, dependent on the height of the aircraft, meant that CH, capable of only 4 sm (0.0068 km), was not accurate enough to place an aircraft within its detection range, and an additional system was required.[22] Its wooden chassis had a disturbing tendency to catch fire (even with attention from expert technicians),[23] so much so that Dowding, when told that Watson-Watt could provide hundreds of sets, demanded "ten that work".[24] The Cossor and MetroVick sets were overweight for aircraft use[21] and the RAF lacked night fighter pilots, observers,[25] and suitable aircraft.[26][page needed]

 

[Border Reiver]

I agree with you that it is a strategic error to try to make an opposed landing unless you intend to stay there. That's where Eisenhower and Marshall went wrong with their proposal to cross the channel in 1942, and the fiasco of the Dieppe raid. [/url]

First, you will never find a Canadian who will argue that Dieppe was not a fiasco.

Second, Dieppe was NEVER intended to be anything other than a large scale raid. The purpose was to:

a. Test the amphibious techniques used for landings;
b. Give the Canadians something to do so they felt useful; and
c. Let Lord Mountbatten feel useful.

What it actually accomplished was to demonstrate:

a. You need better intel than a single flyover and someone's prewar holiday pics for operational planning;
b. Landings need to be practised on the same type of beaches where you will be landing - vehicles behave differently on pebbles then they do on sand;
c. Don't skimp on either the naval firepower, or the aircover, if you want success; and
d. There needs to be a better reason to commit a division of soldiers to an operation than "well, they need to be seen to be doing SOMETHING or morale will start to slip."
e. Practice getting off the beach under fire.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

It's not a question of " a mate in the pub said this" but more a question of hard documentary evidence. I agree that there was a widespread view at the time that bombers would get through, and force a surrender. That proved not to be the case against Germany, and even in more recent years, like Vietnam. The point is that the RAF fighter defences were in a woefully inadequate state in 1938, and radar was in its infancy. Chamberlain had to make a military judgment in 1938 and not just to choose between war and dishonour as Churchill would have done:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_radar

As has repeatedly been pointed out to you, the Germans had no fighters at all capable of reaching mainland UK in 1938.

None.

At all.

And you do realise your quoted passage relates to airborne intercept radar and not the Chain Home system?

Given that you concede that the ability of bombers to force a nation to surrender was vastly overestimated, how then was Germany going to force Britain to surrender in 1 week.

Again Henri, you made the claim that Germany could defeat Britain in 1 week but you have failed to provide even the flimsiest explanation for how this could be achieved.

Please provide an explanation or be good enough to admit that you were mistaken and withdraw the assertion.

 

[Andy_Ross]

It's not a question of " a mate in the pub said this" but more a question of hard documentary evidence. I agree that there was a widespread view at the time that bombers would get through, and force a surrender. That proved not to be the case against Germany, and even in more recent years, like Vietnam. The point is that the RAF fighter defences were in a woefully inadequate state in 1938, and radar was in its infancy. Chamberlain had to make a military judgment in 1938 and not just to choose between war and dishonour as Churchill would have done:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_radar

Air to Air radar is not the same as the Chain Home system

Here is a site hat will tell you all you ever need to know about British Radar in WW2 and the Cold War.

http://www.radarpages.co.uk/

 

[Henri McPhee]

I still think Chain Home radar was in its infancy in 1938:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_Home_Low

During early tests against Chain Home in 1938, RAF pilots had noticed they could escape detection by flying at low altitudes. This was due to the minimum angle of the CH being about 1.5 degrees above the horizon, which meant aircraft were below the radar's sight until they approached within a few miles. They could escape detection entirely by flying between two CH stations at altitudes around 1,500 feet (460 m). At first this was not considered to be a serious limitation, as bombers typically flew at altitudes of 15,000 feet or greater, and at that altitude they could be detected over France.

But as the magnitude of the problem became clear, Watt became concerned.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I still think Chain Home radar was in its infancy in 1938:

Missing the point. In 1938, Germany had not occupied France or the Low Countries, so the only German aircraft with a sufficient range to operate over Britain from bases available to the Luftwaffe - that is to say, bases in Germany - were the Dornier Do17 and the Henikel He111. Both of these were extremely vulnerable to fighter attack even from the Hurricanes and Gladiators equipping Fighter Command at the time (though Gladiators might have found the Do17 hard to catch), and both would have to approach over the North Sea, giving the defences plenty of time to react and to harry them on the way home. And even had they been able to operate completely undisturbed, at best they could only have done serious damage in south-eastern England. The Luftwaffe's anti-shipping capability, quite inadequate even in 1940, was nonexistent in 1938, so the Royal Navy could have prevented any landing attempt. There is no realistic means, therefore, by which Germany could have forced Briatin to surrender in 1938 at all, let alone "within a week."

Dave

 

[Henri McPhee]

I agree that the German fighters did not have the range at first to be much use to the Germans in escorting their bombers, even from France. I disagree that the RAF were capable of stopping the German bombers in 1938. The number of Hurricanes in 1938 was woefully adequate, and the rest of the RAF fighters were a load of crap. There were practically no Spitfires then. Hitler's strategy would have been to force Britain to accept his will, or London would have been bombed with terrible damage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Hurricane

On 12 October 1937, the maiden flight took place of the first production Hurricane I, which was powered by a Merlin II engine and flown by Flight Lieutenant Philip Lucas. Production deliveries had been delayed by roughly six months due to a decision to equip the Hurricane only with the improved Merlin II engine, while the earlier Merlin I had been prioritised for the Fairey Battle and the Hawker Henley.[15] By the following December, the first four aircraft to enter service with the RAF had joined No. 111 Squadron, stationed at RAF Northolt. By February 1938, No. 111 Squadron had received 16 Hurricanes.

 

[Dave Rogers]

I agree that the German fighters did not have the range at first to be much use to the Germans in escorting their bombers, even from France.

Not "not much use," no use at all. They couldn't make the journey. Escort fighters three hundred miles away are completely ineffective.

I disagree that the RAF were capable of stopping the German bombers in 1938. The number of Hurricanes in 1938 was woefully adequate, and the rest of the RAF fighters were a load of crap.

Stopping them from doing what, precisely?

There were practically no Spitfires then.

For shooting down bombers, Spitfires weren't actually as good as Hurricanes; their wings tended to flex, reducing accuracy and concentration of fire. Hurricanes were better gun platforms. There's no particular reason to get so hung up on Spitfire numbers.

Hitler's strategy would have been to force Britain to accept his will, or London would have been bombed with terrible damage.

The Luftwaffe didn't have the strength to do a tenth the amount of damage that Bomber Command inflicted on German cities for a couple of years later in the war, yet Germany didn't surrender in a week; in fact, it didn't surrender till Berlin was over-run. One of the great lessons of WW2 was that conventional bombing of cities simply couldn't force a nation to surrender. Even two atom bombs just barely did the trick when Japan had no oil, no raw materials, no navy and no hope.

Dave

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

I agree that the German fighters did not have the range at first to be much use to the Germans in escorting their bombers, even from France. I disagree that the RAF were capable of stopping the German bombers in 1938. The number of Hurricanes in 1938 was woefully adequate, and the rest of the RAF fighters were a load of crap. There were practically no Spitfires then. Hitler's strategy would have been to force Britain to accept his will, or London would have been bombed with terrible damage.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hawker_Hurricane

Its not that they didn't have the range "at first" its that they didn't have the range at all without bases in North East France which they didn't have at all in 1938.

On what basis do you think the RAF was not capable of stopping German bombers in 1938?

The RAF had 4 operational Hurricane squadrons and even 1 squadron re-fitting with the Spitfires you seem to love so much.

But they didn't need either of these, as since the Germans would have had literally not one single fighter in the air, the Gladiators would have been more than capable of tearing through He111's.

And again, how is Germany going to defeat Britain in a week?

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

I still think Chain Home radar was in its infancy in 1938:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chain_Home_Low

How is Germany going to defeat Britain in week?

 

[Garrison]

I agree that the German fighters did not have the range at first to be much use to the Germans in escorting their bombers, even from France. I disagree that the RAF were capable of stopping the German bombers in 1938.

And if you could offer a shred of the 'hard documentary evidence' you seem so keen on to support your belief it might have some weight.

The number of Hurricanes in 1938 was woefully adequate, and the rest of the RAF fighters were a load of crap.

Versus a Bf109 yes they were crap. Against the bombers that they would actually have had to engage, probably quite effective. Bear in mind they don't have to shoot them down in one day, as long as they can inflict a rate of attrition higher than the Lufwaffe's replacement rate their winning. They don't even have to shoot a bomber down to destroy, make them burn fuel dodging fighters and they may not get home. Also flying from Germany in 1938 British fighters may not be the only ones they have to worry about.

There were practically no Spitfires then.

You really need to get past the myths that have grown up around the Spitfire. It was a great fighter, but it was not a wonder weapon and if I recall correctly it was the Hurricane that did the heavy lifting in the Battle of Britain.

Hitler's strategy would have been to force Britain to accept his will, or London would have been bombed with terrible damage.

Yes that might have been Hitler's strategy, doesn't mean it stood any more chance than Sealion did in 1940.

You keep avoiding the bigger picture. The question is not whether Munich was 'dishonourable', its who benefited most from it, Britain or Germany.

Oh and of course we are still awaiting your explanation of how Germany could defeat Britain in a week.

 

[Dave Rogers]

You really need to get past the myths that have grown up around the Spitfire. It was a great fighter, but it was not a wonder weapon and if I recall correctly it was the Hurricane that did the heavy lifting in the Battle of Britain.

From what I can tell, the outer four machine guns on a Spitfire were very good at scattering bullets throughout the sky, because of the way the wings flexed in a turn. Wing flexure was also why it took a while for cannon installations to be effective; at first they simply weren't rigid enough. The Hurricane, on the other hand, had tightly grouped batteries of guns in stiffer wings, so tended to concentrate all its firepower in the place a good pilot expected it to go, making it a much better proposition as a bomber destroyer. But, hell, a Gladiator could catch an He111 and put a good few bullets into it.

Dave

 

[Rincewind]

Henri,

I thought that perhaps you might find this interesting.

London to Essen directly over Holland is around 400 miles.

The Dornier 17Z, with a bomb load of 1,000 Kg had a combat range of around 410 miles.

With a bomb load of 500 KG, it was 628 miles.

It had a top speed of 264 mph, but would spend most of it's time cruising at around 186.

So - even if it had the range it could be caught by more nimble fighters.

Oh - and I couldn't find numbers for earlier versions - the Do-17Z was actually introduced into service in 1939.

The He111H had a maximum speed of 243 mph, so would likely be cruising at less than 180 mph.

The Gladiator had a top speed of 253, so with planning ought to be able to hit the Luftwaffe bombers before they could accelerate to maximum speed.

If they could have made the journey....

[all hail Wikipedia!]