Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Hubert Cumberdale]

You're absolutely right. The range of the Bf109 is 660km. The distance, as the crow flies, from Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) to London is 440km. So they were perfectly capable to reach the UK, just not to get back home.

The Belgians would probably have some objections to that flight path.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

I note that Henri has still not ventured an explaination for how Germany is going to defeat the UK in 1 week.

We wait with baited breath!

 

[Tolls]

A concerted bombing campaign of Britain simply wouldn't have happened without a collapse of France (IMO).

Also, even with a collapse of France, it wouldn't have happened until summer 1939 at the earliest anyway, unless someone wants to predict a German success over the last couple of months of 38 (slightly unlikely, to say the least). Even then that would mean air attacks in winter 39...even more unlikely.

General Ismay above is focused on a war on the continent, rather than a Battle of Britain. This is important to remember as it is the focus of all defence analysis that was forwarded to Chamberlain. It's also worth noting that they weighed in the addition of Czech production to the German military, or at least seem to have.

 

[Andy_Ross]

As to Manstein, the fact that he viewed Sealion favourably simply underscores the total lack of German expertise with amphibious operations. His enthusiasm for the scheme is at best crass ignorance of the realities of such an operation, and at worst willful delusion.

Manstein may have just been bigging up the army, if they could be transported across the channel and in to the UK his job was straightforward. He could afford to be enthusiastic.
It was the Navy that had to get them there and they were never enthusiastic about the escapade.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I note that Henri has still not ventured an explaination for how Germany is going to defeat the UK in 1 week.

We wait with baited breath!

Chamberlain was a realist. I agree he talked a lot of blah blah about appeasement and disarmament and peace in our time, but that is politicians all over. Chamberlain did not make any strategic errors. Both Chamberlain, and experienced soldiers, were fully aware of British military weakness in 1938, and that America or the League of Nations or Australia or New Zealand or Canada were not going to be much help in 1938. This is from the parliamentary debate about Munich in 1938:

https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/munich.htm

While we must renew our determination to fill up the deficiencies that yet remain in our armaments and in our defensive precautions, so that we may be ready to defend ourselves and make our diplomacy effective--[Interruption]--yes I am a realist-

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

Manstein may have just been bigging up the army, if they could be transported across the channel and in to the UK his job was straightforward. He could afford to be enthusiastic.
It was the Navy that had to get them there and they were never enthusiastic about the escapade.

Which kind of links into the trope about German officers and their complete disregard for logistics and intelligence

OKW: Lets invade Russia

Logisticians: Eh, you'll run out of supplies and end up with your balls hanging out in the middle of a Russian winter

OKW: Wotever!

Logisticians: Told you! Told you!

OKW: WTF I hate Russia now

 

[Henri McPhee]

A concerted bombing campaign of Britain simply wouldn't have happened without a collapse of France (IMO).

Also, even with a collapse of France, it wouldn't have happened until summer 1939 at the earliest anyway, unless someone wants to predict a German success over the last couple of months of 38 (slightly unlikely, to say the least). Even then that would mean air attacks in winter 39...even more unlikely.

General Ismay above is focused on a war on the continent, rather than a Battle of Britain. This is important to remember as it is the focus of all defence analysis that was forwarded to Chamberlain. It's also worth noting that they weighed in the addition of Czech production to the German military, or at least seem to have.

I am not terribly sure about that. This is the sort of military advice Chamberlain was getting at the time:

https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/causes-of-ww2/the-czech-crisis-of-1938/

The attitude of the British tended to reflect the view of the majority in Britain at this time. If there was the chance of negotiating a peace, then that chance should be taken. The policy of appeasement has been criticised over the years since 1938, but the fear of war in 1938 was very real. The images shown in the cinemas of the horrors seen in Guernica during the Spanish Civil War terrified many – and Germany had openly displayed the might of the Luftwaffe with its many bombers from 1936 on. It was also German bombers that had caused such devastation in Guernica.

Britain, under Neville Chamberlain, chose to negotiate with Hitler over the Sudenten crisis. Chamberlain knew very well that Czechoslovakia was a land-locked nation and that Britain’s military strength – its navy – could play no part in a conflict here. Britain’s army – though professional – was small. Britain’s air force was far from strong and undergoing change from a bi-planed force to using the new monoplanes which were still not ready for combat.

His military chiefs had advised Chamberlain that over one million people would be killed by bombing raids in just 60 days and that mass graves would be needed as there simply would not be enough wood for timber coffins. Any form of conflict with Germany was fraught with dangers – hence Chamberlain’s desire for a negotiated peace. Many British people supported Chamberlain at the time and before the meetings took place no-one would have known what it would be like negotiating with Hitler. It seemed right that a negotiated settlement should be tried and the attempts to succeed started in September 1938.

 

[ddt]

Chamberlain was a realist. I agree he talked a lot of blah blah about appeasement and disarmament and peace in our time, but that is politicians all over. Chamberlain did not make any strategic errors. Both Chamberlain, and experienced soldiers, were fully aware of British military weakness in 1938, and that America or the League of Nations or Australia or New Zealand or Canada were not going to be much help in 1938. This is from the parliamentary debate about Munich in 1938:

https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/munich.htm

That's still no answer to how Germany was going to defeat the UK in a single week. We're waiting for an answer to that question, Henri.

 

[ddt]

The Belgians would probably have some objections to that flight path.

I don't know. The planes would run out of fuel and need to emergency-land in Belgium. They'd only have to do a paint job to get their own wing with some fine fighters.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Yup and in summer 1938, no Ju-88's, and only a handful of Dornier Do 17's. They would've relied on un-escorted He 111's. Bristol Blenheim's could make mincemeat out of them, no need for Spits or Hurricane's.

Tell that to the Marines. Had the police been informed?

 

[lobosrul5]

Tell that to the Marines. Had the police been informed?

The Royal Marines? OK I'll build myself a time machine and go tell them.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is a detailed account of the Luftwaffe on the internet at:

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-1.html

which I admit includes its weaknesses in 1938. I still don't think it's correct to say the Luftwaffe were unable to get to the UK, and London, in 1938 to drop bombs, to be countered by the advanced British Blenheims. The Germans managed it in the First World War, and I think there was quite a big bombing raid at Folkestone then, which was a British troop embarkation point at the time.

The failure of the Luftwaffe to progress further towards a "strategic" bombing capability is attributable to several factors. The first is that many within the Luftwaffe thought that they possessed sufficient capability with their twin-engine aircraft to launch "strategic" attacks against Germany's most likely continental opponents--France, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. England presented greater

--10--

problems, but even here General Felmy, Commander of Luftfotte 2 and charged with planning of an air war against Britain in 1939, saw possibilities.

Concluding the 1939 spring planning effort, Felmy admitted to his subordinates that the Luftwaffe did not yet possess any of the prerequisites for a successful "strategic" bombing offensive against Great Britain. He did suggest, however, that the panic that had broken out in London in September at the height of the Munich crisis indicated that a massive aerial onslaught directed against London might break Britain's powers of resistance.

 

[jimbob]

There is a detailed account of the Luftwaffe on the internet at:

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF-Luftwaffe/AAF-Luftwaffe-1.html

which I admit includes its weaknesses in 1938. I still don't think it's correct to say the Luftwaffe were unable to get to the UK, and London, in 1938 to drop bombs, to be countered by the advanced British Blenheims. The Germans managed it in the First World War, and I think there was quite a big bombing raid at Folkestone then, which was a British troop embarkation point at the time.

Did you see the bit about the combat radius of the fighters? The bombers could have potentially flown to London, unescorted, which would not have been a good idea. The British and French would have had the Czech resources on their side rather than the German side. Germany would have had a war on two fronts at the start. And on top of this, we now know that there were German generals waiting for an excuse for a coup against Hitler.

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is a bit of waffle about the Bristol Blenheims at this website:

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_bristol_blenheim_combat.html

The Blenheim suffered heavily during the Battle of France. Loses in the air were matched by heavy losses on the ground. No. 144 squadron lost almost its entire strength of Blenheims to a bombing attack. After two days of fighting an initial force of 135 Fairey Battles and Blenheims had been reduced to 71 aircraft. Reinforcements kept coming, but the losses kept mounting. The attacks on the Sedan bridgehead on 14 May that famously saw the loss of so many Battles, also saw five out of eight Blenheims lost. Another seven were lost in another attack on the bridgehead later that day. The majority of Blenheims sent to France were lost either to the fighting, or destroyed to prevent them falling into German hands.

The fighting in France revealed the Blenheim Mk IV to be under armoured, under armed and too slow. The problem was that any attempt to solve the first two problems would simply make the third one worse.

 

[Dave Rogers]

There is a bit of waffle about the Bristol Blenheims at this website:

Noted that you don't know the difference between the fighter and bomber versions of the Blenheim, or about their roles in combat.

Dave

 

[lobosrul5]

There is a bit of waffle about the Bristol Blenheims at this website:

The Blenheim suffered heavily during the Battle of France. Loses in the air were matched by heavy losses on the ground. No. 144 squadron lost almost its entire strength of Blenheims to a bombing attack. After two days of fighting an initial force of 135 Fairey Battles and Blenheims had been reduced to 71 aircraft. Reinforcements kept coming, but the losses kept mounting. The attacks on the Sedan bridgehead on 14 May that famously saw the loss of so many Battles, also saw five out of eight Blenheims lost. Another seven were lost in another attack on the bridgehead later that day. The majority of Blenheims sent to France were lost either to the fighting, or destroyed to prevent them falling into German hands.

The fighting in France revealed the Blenheim Mk IV to be under armoured, under armed and too slow. The problem was that any attempt to solve the first two problems would simply make the third one worse.
http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/weapons_bristol_blenheim_combat.html

Yes, it was wholly outmatched by the Bf109, no one has said otherwise. And it seems more were lost on the ground than in the air in France.

 

[Garrison]

I am not terribly sure about that. This is the sort of military advice Chamberlain was getting at the time:

https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/world-war-two/causes-of-ww2/the-czech-crisis-of-1938/

His military chiefs had advised Chamberlain that over one million people would be killed by bombing raids in just 60 days and that mass graves would be needed as there simply would not be enough wood for timber coffins. Any form of conflict with Germany was fraught with dangers – hence Chamberlain’s desire for a negotiated peace.

Yes Chamberlain did base his policy on a wholly unrealistic assessment of the impact of airpower summed up in the mantra the 'bomber will always get through' and presented to the public through media like the film 'Things to Come'. The reality was of course that the bomber did not always get through, especially if was attacking without fighter support(look at what happened to Luftflotte 5 in 1940).

When bombers did reach their targets the damage they could do, especially with the aircraft available in 1938, was far removed from what the advocates of air power claimed.

Add to that the Luftwaffe's propaganda success in tricking the British and others into substantially overestimating Luftwaffe strength, helped by the likes of Charles Lindbergh.

Perhaps if Chamberlain hadn't fallen for this hysterical vision of bomber power he might have made a better job of Munich.

The Germans managed it in the First World War, and I think there was quite a big bombing raid at Folkestone then, which was a British troop embarkation point at the time.

At a time when the British had no fighters that could fly high enough to hit the Zeppelins you mean? A situation that no longer applied in 1938.

I still don't think it's correct to say the Luftwaffe were unable to get to the UK, and London, in 1938 to drop bombs.

Good thing no one claimed that then, please do look at the link above about what happened when Luftflotte 5 ran into RAF fighters without any escorts. Even with fighter cover the Luftwaffe bombers suffered heavy attrition and failed in their objective in 1940. How on Earth are the unescorted and less powerful Luftwaffe bombers of 1938 going to do better?

 

[jimbob]

Yes Chamberlain did base his policy on a wholly unrealistic assessment of the impact of airpower summed up in the mantra the 'bomber will always get through' and presented to the public through media like the film 'Things to Come'. The reality was of course that the bomber did not always get through, especially if was attacking without fighter support(look at what happened to Luftflotte 5 in 1940).

When bombers did reach their targets the damage they could do, especially with the aircraft available in 1938, was far removed from what the advocates of air power claimed.

Add to that the Luftwaffe's propaganda success in tricking the British and others into substantially overestimating Luftwaffe strength, helped by the likes of Charles Lindbergh.

Perhaps if Chamberlain hadn't fallen for this hysterical vision of bomber power he might have made a better job of Munich.



At a time when the British had no fighters that could fly high enough to hit the Zeppelins you mean? A situation that no longer applied in 1938.

Yes but the British tanks would have been destroyed by the Panthers and Tigers, the Hurricanes without spitfires would have been destroyed by the Me-262 and FW-190s and the Royal Navy would have er... still been dominant.

 

[ddt]

Did you see the bit about the combat radius of the fighters? The bombers could have potentially flown to London, unescorted, which would not have been a good idea. The British and French would have had the Czech resources on their side rather than the German side. Germany would have had a war on two fronts at the start. And on top of this, we now know that there were German generals waiting for an excuse for a coup against Hitler.

Chamberlain also knew; he just didn't believe and/or trust them. The only thing we know more than Chamberlain did is that the main plotters participated in the 20 July plot.

 

[ddt]

Yes but the British tanks would have been destroyed by the Panthers and Tigers and Leopards, the Hurricanes without spitfires would have been destroyed by the Me-262 and FW-190s and Eurofighters and the Royal Navy would have er... still been dominant.

FTFY. Hope that helps Henri get the point.