Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

You people talk as though weak little Germany's bombers and fighters were incapable of reaching the UK in 1938. The point is that RAF fighters were woefully inadequate in 1938. Chamberlain's priority was to put that right, which he did, and he also organised radar. Churchill just had a 'with what' strategy and he wanted to choose war before dishonour.

Von Manstein, who was one of Hitler's best generals, always maintained that an invasion of Britain would be risky, but necessary. Hitler himself seems to have been opposed to an invasion of the UK as long as the RAF was still operational, which thankfully it was in 1940.

There is a bit about Chamberlain's military advice on the internet. Chamberlain would have been foolish to ignore this:

(a) A German absorption of Czechoslovakia will enhance her military prestige, increase her war potential and probably enable her to dispose of stronger land forces against France and ourselves than she can do at present.

(b) So far as air power is concerned, Germany may be able to maintain her lead over the Franco-British Air Forces in air striking power. On the other hand, it is open to us, provided that we make the necessary effort, to catch her up, or at least greatly reduce her lead, in the matter of defence (both active and passive) against air attack. By so doing we shall have heavily insured ourselves against the greatest danger to which we are present exposed: indeed by substantially reducing Germany’s only chance of a rapid decision, we shall have provided a strong deterrent against her making the attempt.

(c) It follows, therefore, that, from the military point of view, time is in our favour, and that, if war with Germany has to come, it would be better to fight her in say 6-12 months’ time, than to accept the present challenge.

 

[Henri McPhee]

From a Wikipedia about Von Manstein:

Battle of Britain[edit]
Main article: Operation Seelöwe

Manstein was a proponent of the prospective German invasion of Great Britain, named Operation Seelöwe. He considered the operation risky but necessary. Early studies by various staff officers determined that air superiority was a prerequisite to the planned invasion. His corps was to be shipped across the English Channel from Boulogne to Bexhill as one of four units assigned to the first wave. But as the Luftwaffe failed to overcome the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain, Operation Seelöwe was postponed indefinitely on 12 October. For the rest of the year, Manstein, with little to do, spent time in Paris and at home.

 

[Craig B]

... a bit about Chamberlain's military advice on the internet ...

Your sources never cease to impress. What next? "A man on the telly once said ... "?

 

[Henri McPhee]

The source for that Chamberlain military advice is at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/chamberlain-and-hitler/source-3/

 

[ddt]

Well France did get troops ashore in 1797... but I wouldn't call it a great success.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Fishguard

Which is why I said successful invasions. France also tried repeatedly to invade with one or the other Scottish pretender, every time with failure.

 

[ddt]

From a Wikipedia about Von Manstein:

Yes, and? Von Manstein is also very good at blaming his own failures on Hitler's micromanagement.

 

[lobosrul5]

Which is why I said successful invasions. France also tried repeatedly to invade with one or the other Scottish pretender, every time with failure.

Yeah, I just felt like mentioning it, its a funny story I saw on a documentary a few months back. Most of the French troops were more interested in drinking than fighting. And it was just a rouse for a much bigger invasion of Ireland that went awry. Had never heard of it before.

 

[ddt]

Your sources never cease to impress. What next? "A man on the telly once said ... "?

My bet is not a man but the penguin on his telly. Which has the same fate as all his arguments.

 

[Craig B]

The source for that Chamberlain military advice is at:

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/chamberlain-and-hitler/source-3/

And here it is, pasted from the page you specify

3. This is the conclusion of a note from General Ismay to the British Cabinet sent on 20th September 1938, marked ‘Secret’. Ismay was Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence.​

This source is part of the National Archives' educational materials, and it asks its youthful readers to consider this question

How might General Ismay’s views affect what Chamberlain did when he met Hitler later, at Munich on 29 September?​

I think the credit for this advice from the Secretary of the Committee of Imperial Defence to the Cabinet belongs to General Ismay, its author.

 

[ddt]

You people talk as though weak little Germany's bombers and fighters were incapable of reaching the UK in 1938.

You're absolutely right. The range of the Bf109 is 660km. The distance, as the crow flies, from Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) to London is 440km. So they were perfectly capable to reach the UK, just not to get back home.

 

[lobosrul5]

You're absolutely right. The range of the Bf109 is 660km. The distance, as the crow flies, from Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) and London is 440km. So they were perfectly capable to reach the UK, just not to get back home.

Yup and in summer 1938, no Ju-88's, and only a handful of Dornier Do 17's. They would've relied on un-escorted He 111's. Bristol Blenheim's could make mincemeat out of them, no need for Spits or Hurricane's.

 

[Andy_Ross]

This thread is really going in rounds, isn't it? To up your Sandhurst wargame report, here's from page 4 of the thread:




I wonder if sending some good old-fashioned burners into the crowd of barges would also have been effective, like it was in 1588?

Steel barges.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Disregarding intelligence from the Dutch underground that there were significant German troops around Arnhem, and fitting out your troops with radios that only have a range of 5km while you drop them 20km off the intended target does not help. Still, John Frost held Arnhem bridge for four days.

German Paratroopers had a big problem with their equipemnt.
They were suspended from the parachute by a single attachment point on their back. They had little control over the descent and couldn't carry any equipment.
All they had with them when they landed was a pistol.
British and American Paratroopers had their weapon and kit bag with them. it was strapped to their leg and they jumped with hit. When the chute opened they released the leg strap and the bag hung from a line below them.
It hit the ground first and the wight of the kit wasn't added to that of the paratrooper when he landed.

German troops had to find their equipment canisters to get to their weapons after landing.
This was a problem on Crete and also when they were used in the Netherlands to attempt capturing air fields.

 

[Andy_Ross]

From a Wikipedia about Von Manstein:

All very nice but it ignores the Navies.

The Royal Navy had overwhelming superiority and the German navy couldn't have protected the fleet of invasion barges.
Germany had no specialist landing barges. They were going to use un powered barges towed across the channel and pushed ashore. Then the troops inside were going to lower wooden ramps over the bows and ride their motorbikes down them. In the face of opposing fire from machine guns and artillery in to mine fields and barbed wire.

They had no supporting fire from naval guns to help them.

Then somehow the unpowere barges would be towed off the beach, re strung and towed back across the channel to pick uo more men and supplies.

Yup. piece of cake.

then somehow the

 

[Garrison]

You're absolutely right. The range of the Bf109 is 660km. The distance, as the crow flies, from Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) to London is 440km. So they were perfectly capable to reach the UK, just not to get back home.

Henri really seems fixated on Spitfires, so its no surprise he's ignorant of actual Luftwaffe capabilities.

Yup and in summer 1938, no Ju-88's, and only a handful of Dornier Do 17's. They would've relied on un-escorted He 111's. Bristol Blenheim's could make mincemeat out of them, no need for Spits or Hurricane's.

I mentioned the Ju-88 issue earlier, only to have it studiously ignored by Henri.

 

[jimbob]

All very nice but it ignores the Navies.

The Royal Navy had overwhelming superiority and the German navy couldn't have protected the fleet of invasion barges.
Germany had no specialist landing barges. They were going to use un powered barges towed across the channel and pushed ashore. Then the troops inside were going to lower wooden ramps over the bows and ride their motorbikes down them. In the face of opposing fire from machine guns and artillery in to mine fields and barbed wire.

They had no supporting fire from naval guns to help them.

Then somehow the unpowere barges would be towed off the beach, re strung and towed back across the channel to pick uo more men and supplies.

Yup. piece of cake.

then somehow the

Indeed, for an estimate for how successful an invasion would have been, one only needs to see what D-Day required. And the Allies didn't have to worry about German ships or aircraft, and had dedicated vessels, not just barges.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Hitler admitted he didn't understand sea power and apart from a brief period up to WW1
Germany never made any attempt to be a sea power.

Sealion was treated as just a wide river crossing which was the job of light forces who would capture a small bridgehead and hold on until a pontoon bridge was thrown across.

Sealion would use light forces to capture a port which would receive the main force by ship.

For Overlord it was understood that everything would have to come over the landing beaches for quite a time after D-Day and planning was undertaken accordingly.

 

[jimbob]

Hitler admitted he didn't understand sea power and apart from a brief period up to WW1
Germany never made any attempt to be a sea power.

Sealion was treated as just a wide river crossing which was the job of light forces who would capture a small bridgehead and hold on until a pontoon bridge was thrown across.

Sealion would use light forces to capture a port which would receive the main force by ship.

For Overlord it was understood that everything would have to come over the landing beaches for quite a time after D-Day and planning was undertaken accordingly.

It's almost as if one was serious, and the other was just sufficient to enable the generals to tell a dangerously volatile leader that the planning was underway.

 

[ddt]

Steel barges.

Fair enough. And as far as I can see from some googling, also with a steel superstructure.

It's almost as if one was serious, and the other was just sufficient to enable the generals to tell a dangerously volatile leader that the planning was underway.

You forgot to weave an overweight, cocaine-addicted air force chief into that narrative.

But it seems the Germans actually put a lot of effort in requisitioning the barges, of the peniche and kampine types, and preparing them for the operation, even welding them in pairs side by side together.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

You people talk as though weak little Germany's bombers and fighters were incapable of reaching the UK in 1938. The point is that RAF fighters were woefully inadequate in 1938. Chamberlain's priority was to put that right, which he did, and he also organised radar. Churchill just had a 'with what' strategy and he wanted to choose war before dishonour.

Von Manstein, who was one of Hitler's best generals, always maintained that an invasion of Britain would be risky, but necessary. Hitler himself seems to have been opposed to an invasion of the UK as long as the RAF was still operational, which thankfully it was in 1940.

There is a bit about Chamberlain's military advice on the internet. Chamberlain would have been foolish to ignore this:

No Henri, we people are talking as if Germany's fighters were incapable of reaching the UK in 1938, which is demonstrably a factual assertion.

Neither the Bf109 nor the Bf110 (and nor the Ju87) could reach mainland Britain from Germany.

To reach London from Germany without overflying neutral/hostiles would mean roughly a 1000mile round trip.

That means only He111's and Do17's capable of doing the job, both of which were plenty vulnerable to the aircraft in RAF service at the time (which included two operational Hurricane squadrons) and could have been detected by the Thames estuary chain-home radar system which was in operation by the time of the Munich crisis

As to Manstein, the fact that he viewed Sealion favourably simply underscores the total lack of German expertise with amphibious operations. His enthusiasm for the scheme is at best crass ignorance of the realities of such an operation, and at worst willful delusion.