Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Craig B]

Well, that's a tad unlikely, having had their 6th army annihilated at Stalingrad, and a ton of other casualties during the Soviet counterattack during the winter.

Or did you mean 1942? Which might be at least arguable, if you don't analyse the situation too closely.

Quite so. In early 1943, the Germans began to withdraw and consolidate their positions in the (Caucusus) region due to setbacks elsewhere. They established a defensive line (Kuban bridgehead) in the Taman Peninsula from which they hoped to eventually launch new operations in the Caucasus. The fighting remained reasonably static until September 1943 when the Germans ordered fresh withdrawals which effectively ended the period of fighting in the Caucasus.​

See Battle of the Caucasus^WP.

 

[Craig B]

... The Germans were beginning to penetrate through the Caucasus. They might have broken through in the spring of 1943 ...

Here is what was happening in the Caucasus in early 1943.

3 January 1943 - Red Army retake Mozdok
21 January 1943 - Red Army retake Stavropol
23 January 1943 - Red Army retake Armavir
29 January 1943 - Red Army retake Maykop
4 February 1943 - Soviet marines beat off a German attempt to land at Malaya Zemlya
5 February 1943 - Soviet forces landing in Novorossiysk
12 February 1943 - Red Army retake Krasnodar​

 

[Henri McPhee]

There was a clip on that World at War documentary on British TV from 1973, which keeps being repeated, of Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Russia 1940-42, saying to the camera that the Russians don't want to interfere in the affairs of other countries and he has heard that from the lips of Stalin himself. That was being a bit naïve as subsequent events have proven. That's a bit like Bush in America saying watch my lips. The Russians prefer plain speaking.

 

[Border Reiver]

There was a clip on that World at War documentary on British TV from 1973, which keeps being repeated, of Sir Stafford Cripps, British ambassador to Russia 1940-42, saying to the camera that the Russians don't want to interfere in the affairs of other countries and he has heard that from the lips of Stalin himself. That was being a bit naïve as subsequent events have proven. That's a bit like Bush in America saying watch my lips. The Russians prefer plain speaking.

Which Russians have you been watching or listening too? The ones who developed the Potemkin Village, or the ones who airbrush people out of photographs after they have been purged and alter the record to claim they were never there?

Stalin may very well have said such a thing - the actions of the USSR speak a lot louder then those words and their actions in Spain, Finland, the Baltics, and Manchuria drown out that statement. Mr. Cripps' statement may simply have been what is commonly referred to as a "polite fiction."

 

[Henri McPhee]

Quite so. In early 1943, the Germans began to withdraw and consolidate their positions in the (Caucusus) region due to setbacks elsewhere. They established a defensive line (Kuban bridgehead) in the Taman Peninsula from which they hoped to eventually launch new operations in the Caucasus. The fighting remained reasonably static until September 1943 when the Germans ordered fresh withdrawals which effectively ended the period of fighting in the Caucasus.​

See Battle of the Caucasus^WP.

You may be right there. All this is getting into dangerous waters and we don't know what was discussed behind closed doors. There have been several mentions in the past that Stalin might have threatened to make a separate peace with the Germans if Britain and America didn't launch a cross-channel invasion at the time. I don't know if that is just politics by Stalin.

The diaries of Field-Marshal Alanbrooke give an insight into the situation in the Caucasus on August 22nd 1942:

It is imperative that something should be done quickly as the Germans are pushing on into the Caucasus rapidly. Our defences in Iraq-Persia are lamentably weak. "Jumbo" Wilson will have an uphill task.

It looks like the Caucasus became static, as you say, after Stalingrad in the intense cold of the 1942-3 winter, and better for the Russians after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. Guderian, the German tank expert was complaining at the time that German reserves, and some of their best troops, were being diverted from Russia to deal with the Allies who were landing in Italy and threatening Greece at the time of Kursk. That affected the German concentration of force.

 

[Tolls]

Seriously, have a look at the map of the front in May 1943 compared with August 1942, when Alan Brooke made that comment in his diary.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Seriously, have a look at the map of the front in May 1943 compared with August 1942, when Alan Brooke made that comment in his diary.

The map of the front in Russia was constantly changing every day at the time. The fact remains that Alan Brooke, who didn't suffer from a lack of vision, had strenuous business worries that our defences in Iraq and Persia were lamentably weak against any German attack through the Caucasus. These strenuous business worries continued until after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. The Americans tried to help out at the time by suggesting American air bases in Russia, which Stalin refused, presumably for political reasons.

It's a bit like dealing with the half-mad North Koreans now. Hitler has been described mockingly on TV in the past as Corporal Hitler.

There is a bit of background waffle about all this in that Russian Outlook book published in 1947 by Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Martel:

As it turned out the Germans did not make much headway and the line stabilised in the autumn of 1942. The Russians made a magnificent stand for the defence of Moscow. What should the Germans have done at this stage? For the second summer in succession they had failed to smash the Russian Army, though they had caused them great casualties and losses. Possibly a third attempt might succeed in the summer of 1943. The Germans however were now extended on a long front and with very long lines of communication. This was no position from which to launch a great offensive in the following summer. They should have withdrawn several hundred miles that winter and stabilised a position on a shorter front and with shorter communications. They could then have collected reserves and prepared for a great and final offensive. Hitler would not, however, hear of such a plan.

As a result the Germans stood their ground, but once again the Russians launched a winter counter offensive. Great German armies opposite Stalingrad were surrounded and captured. The German front was driven back to a position 150 miles west of Moscow. They retained Orel farther south in a pronounced German salient. Farther south again the Russians held a salient round Kursk and then the line of the Upper Donetz and to the sea of Azov.

 

[Tolls]

No Brooke's worries didn't continue until after the Battle of Kursk.
They continued until the German withdrawal in early 1943, caused by Zhukov's massive counterattck in late 1942 that isolated Stalingrad (Uranus) and finalised by Saturn in early 1943, which pretty much sealed off the Caucasus.

Months before Kursk.

 

[Rincewind]

No Brooke's worries didn't continue until after the Battle of Kursk.
They continued until the German withdrawal in early 1943, caused by Zhukov's massive counterattck in late 1942 that isolated Stalingrad (Uranus) and finalised by Saturn in early 1943, which pretty much sealed off the Caucasus.

Months before Kursk.

Indeed,

And, of course, the Germans provided the Russians with perfect targets for attack: the sixth Army (at Stalingrad) had Romanian armies on either side, and further north were Italian and Hungarian Armies.

At best, these were second class troops.

 

[Craig B]

The Americans tried to help out at the time by suggesting American air bases in Russia, which Stalin refused, presumably for political reasons.:

The USA did in fact have air bases in the USSR.

Poltava was designated as USAAF Station 559 and became headquarters, Eastern Command, headed by General Alfred Kessler. Two smaller nearby U.S. fields, also along the Kiev railway, were Mirgorod and Piryatin (Stations 561 and 560).​

Their main purpose was to facilitate shuttle bombing.

Operation Frantic began with 325th Reconnaissance Wing flights from England and Italy in late May 1944, and a photo lab and reconnaissance detachment with a few F-5 Lightnings were based at Poltava. Bombing runs (FRANTIC-1) began from Italy (15th Air Force) on 2 June 1944, returning four days later. The concept of operations was for American aircraft to use England (8th Air Force), Italy, and the Ukrainian bases as vertices of a triangular bombing campaign against Axis targets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.​

 

[Elagabalus]

And this anti-democratic feeling in Germany was fueled by the first great mistakes the Allies made, and that was on 11 November 1918. When the German army command sued for an armistice, the Allies allowed it to be signed in German side by a MP, the catholic Centre party member Matthias Erzberger, and not by the military....

Hmmmm ...interesting. I guess to the Dutch/Calvinist Hammer everything looks like an RCC Nail ...

 

[Tolls]

At best, these were second class troops.

Yes.
The Romanians were especially poorly positioned as they had precious little in the way of anti-tank equipment. The troops weren't bad, but they simply had nothing they could counter the T-34s with and so were overrun.

 

[Henri McPhee]

The thing is Churchill and Eden were amateur strategists, like Trump and Mrs. May now, and Cameron and Tony Blair. Churchill was continually trying to invade Norway during the war, and he tried to get the Canadians to do it, but they refused.

It's true that the Russians were not fighting the war on our behalf. They despised us. They had their own political plans for Eastern Europe, and the Baltic states. It's just that the oil from Iraq and Persia was vital because the Americans could not replace that oil supply due to the U-boat menace, and any German attack through the Caucasus could have linked up with the Japanese and threatened India.

There is a bit about the insincerity of politicians in the diaries of Alan Brooke. It's a bit like Chamberlain's spooferies piece of paper saying it showed the determination of our two peoples never to go to war again:

Four days later, on May 26th 1942, he was present when the treaty with Russia was signed. "........Went out to lunch at Russian Embassy to meet Molotov again. A memorable lunch party held prior to signing of new Anglo-Russian Treaty. Lunch attended by P.M., Eden, Attlee, Stafford Cripps, Oliver Lyttelton, Evatt (Australian Minister for External Affairs), Bevin, John Anderson, Chiefs of Staff, etc. Many toasts and many speeches. Somehow the whole affair gave me the creeps, and made me feel that humanity has still many centuries to live through before universal peace can be found." 'I had evidently,' he commented, not yet become hardened to the insincerity of statements contained in the speeches of statesmen and politicians on such occasions.

 

[Craig B]

Posted in error.

 

[Craig B]

... any German attack through the Caucasus could have linked up with the Japanese and threatened India.

That may well be, and it's not in dispute. What is being denied is that the Germans were still capable of such an operation in early 1943.

 

[Henri McPhee]

The USA did in fact have air bases in the USSR.

Poltava was designated as USAAF Station 559 and became headquarters, Eastern Command, headed by General Alfred Kessler. Two smaller nearby U.S. fields, also along the Kiev railway, were Mirgorod and Piryatin (Stations 561 and 560).​

Their main purpose was to facilitate shuttle bombing.

Operation Frantic began with 325th Reconnaissance Wing flights from England and Italy in late May 1944, and a photo lab and reconnaissance detachment with a few F-5 Lightnings were based at Poltava. Bombing runs (FRANTIC-1) began from Italy (15th Air Force) on 2 June 1944, returning four days later. The concept of operations was for American aircraft to use England (8th Air Force), Italy, and the Ukrainian bases as vertices of a triangular bombing campaign against Axis targets in Eastern Europe and the Balkans.​

That may have happened in negotiations later on in the war. It was different in the 1942 -3 period.

From that 1947 The Russian Outlook book by Lieutenant-General Sir Giffard Martel:

We looked round to see how we could help the Russians in preventing the Germans from penetrating the Caucasus. After discussion with America we thought the best chance would be to send an Anglo-American air force to land on Russian soil and operate against the Germans who were advancing in that direction. Very friendly meetings took place between our senior air-force officers and the Russians, but it soon became apparent that they had no intention of allowing such a large force to be established on their soil. The position for Russia was very critical at that time, and yet they preferred to risk disaster rather than allow a large party of foreigners to land on their soil. There were two reasons for this. First of all, it might affect the prestige of the Communist Party if the people saw foreign forces coming in to protect them. Secondly, the Russians hated the fact that their troops and people would inevitably see the far higher standard of living and equipment in the foreign forces. This gives a clear idea of Russian mentality. It seemed almost impossible to us that any nation should take such foolish risks.

 

[Craig B]

That may have happened in negotiations later on in the war. It was different in the 1942 -3 period.

No doubt it was, but the uninformed reader of your

The Americans tried to help out at the time by suggesting American air bases in Russia, which Stalin refused, presumably for political reasons.​

would be surprised to learn that such bases were permitted by Stalin a year later, at a time when the danger to his regime had abated, or even been dispelled, post Stalingrad and Kursk. Your comment would indicate an perpetual unyielding refusal by Stalin, but it could be and was temporarily overcome.

That is not to argue that Stalin was motivated by sincere friendliness towards the Western Allies. He certainly was not.

 

[Henri McPhee]

That may well be, and it's not in dispute. What is being denied is that the Germans were still capable of such an operation in early 1943.

I agree with you that after Stalingrad that the Caucasus was not a priority for the Germans. The point I am trying to make is that an attack in the Caucasus by the Germans was still a threat to the British in 1943 until after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943. It was touch and go in Russia at the time and territory was constantly being taken and retaken, a bit like Syria now. It was not like the static warfare of the 1914-18 war.

There is a bit about this matter on the internet which I can't seem to link to this forum:

Abstract

This thesis examines German and Soviet operations in the Kuban area of southern Russia during January – October 1943. As the bulk of German Army Group A withdrew from the Caucasus in early 1943 to avoid encirclement following the Soviet counter-offensive at Stalingrad, Seventeenth Army was ordered to hold a bridgehead on the Kuban Peninsula as a jumping-off point for a future resumption of the German offensive into the Caucasus.

In early February, the Soviets attempted to eliminate the German bridgehead through a combined amphibious and ground operation. The ground operation did not achieve any significant gain, and the main amphibious landing operation was a catastrophic failure, but a secondary landing succeeded in gaining a foothold in the southern suburbs of the port city of Novorossiysk that was quickly expanded and became known as Malaya Zemlya (The Small Land).

Early April saw the launch of Operation Neptune, a German effort to eliminate the Malaya Zemlya beachhead. This failed utterly due to the weakness of the German assault groups and the tenacious Soviet defence. The Soviets then launched a series of attempts through the spring and summer to break the German line, with minimal success. The final phase of operations in the Kuban was the withdrawal of Seventeenth Army by sea and air across the Kerch Strait to the Crimea. Almost a quarter of a million men and the bulk of their equipment were successfully evacuated, with very light losses.

The thesis examines some factors that contributed to the success or failure of these operations and also considers why a region that was of key strategic interest in both German and Soviet planning in the first period of the war quickly diminished in importance and has been largely neglected in the published history of the war.

 

[Tolls]

It's just that the oil from Iraq and Persia was vital because the Americans could not replace that oil supply due to the U-boat menace, and any German attack through the Caucasus could have linked up with the Japanese and threatened India.

They simply didn't have the forces to do that, or the logistics.
The forces put into the Caucasus were in no way strong enough to get over the mountains and into Iraq. The big fear was a rebellion (again)...and that still wouldn't have provided enough to threaten India.

The point I am trying to make is that an attack in the Caucasus by the Germans was still a threat to the British in 1943 until after the battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943.

And, again, that wasn't the situation at all. Post Uranus and Saturn there was no threat to Iraq. None. And the British knew it.

It was touch and go in Russia at the time and territory was constantly being taken and retaken, a bit like Syria now. It was not like the static warfare of the 1914-18 war. :

No it wasn't "touch and go". Post Stalingrad the Germans were in no position to win.

 

[Craig B]

I agree with you that after Stalingrad that the Caucasus was not a priority for the Germans.

I'm not saying that at all. In early 1943 the Causasus was indeed an urgent priority.

Meanwhile, early in January 1943, only just in time, Hitler acknowledged that the encirclement of the Germans in Stalingrad would lead to an even worse disaster unless he extricated his forces from the Caucasus. Kleist was therefore ordered to retreat, while his northern flank of 600 miles was still protected by the desperate resistance of the encircled Paulus. Kleist’s forces were making their way back across the Don at Rostov when Paulus at last surrendered. Had Paulus surrendered three weeks earlier (after seven weeks of isolation), Kleist’s escape would have been impossible.​

(From Britannica.) What I am saying is that a German breakthrough, link up with Japan, occupation of Iran and invasion of British India were completely out of the question. It was not a non-priority, it was a fantasy. German troops were being pulled out of the Caucasus as speedily as possible, lest they be overwhelmed by the Red Army.