Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[jimbob]

You are missing the point Henri; we aren't disputing the assertion that Churchill wasn't a strategic genius. We are pointing out that this assessment is hardly novel.

The bits about the state of the German forces at Kursk is different. We do disagree with that.

Similarly, we also disagree that Chamberlain had any useful knowledge of the German plans for the invasion of Russia due to him being dead when the planning started.

 

[Craig B]

Henri, you quote Peter Hitchens (of all people) who chooses to tell us that he can't distinguish between the post war loss of Empire, and being conquered by the Nazis. To Hitchens there's no difference really, so he doesn't know if we won the war or not. This is a remarkable point of view.

Because we lost so much wealth and power in the Second World War, we still have to keep telling ourselves that we won it. Or did we - as my father (who served in a pretty rough bit of it) used to ask from time to time, as he contemplated the state of the country he had helped to save.​

What drivel. The state of the country is much better than it would have been if the Nazis had conquered it.

 

[dudalb]

You are missing the point Henri; we aren't disputing the assertion that Churchill wasn't a strategic genius. We are pointing out that this assessment is hardly novel.

The bits about the state of the German forces at Kursk is different. We do disagree with that.

Similarly, we also disagree that Chamberlain had any useful knowledge of the German plans for the invasion of Russia due to him being dead when the planning started.

Hell, Churchill talents as a strategist were being criticized as early as 1915, when Gallipoli,which was very much Churchill's strategic baby,did not turn out very well and ended up costing Churchill his post as the British Equivilent of Secretary of the Navy.

The role of the Sicilian landings in causing the halt to the Kursk Offensive is debated. Many feel it gave Hitler an excuse to stop an offesinve the was rapidly losing steam anyway and was proving very costly.

 

[jimbob]

Hell, Churchill talents as a strategist were being criticized as early as 1915, when Gallipoli,which was very much Churchill's strategic baby,did not turn out very well and ended up costing Churchill his post as the British Equivilent of Secretary of the Navy.

The role of the Sicilian landings in causing the halt to the Kursk Offensive is debated. Many feel it gave Hitler an excuse to stop an offesinve the was rapidly losing steam anyway and was proving very costly.

I wondered about mentioning Gallipoli.

However Churchill did manage to listen to people and he did have some good ideas.

 

[Tolls]

Re: Churchill's strategic genius:

"The soft underbelly of Europe"

That is a man who hasn't really looked at a map.

 

[catsmate]

Hell, Churchill talents as a strategist were being criticized as early as 1915, when Gallipoli,which was very much Churchill's strategic baby,did not turn out very well and ended up costing Churchill his post as the British Equivilent of Secretary of the Navy.

Even in 1911 Churchill's judgement was being questioned after his actions at Sidney Street. This led to him being sidelined from the Home Office to the Admiralty.

 

[Henri McPhee]

You are missing the point Henri; we aren't disputing the assertion that Churchill wasn't a strategic genius. We are pointing out that this assessment is hardly novel.

The bits about the state of the German forces at Kursk is different. We do disagree with that.

Similarly, we also disagree that Chamberlain had any useful knowledge of the German plans for the invasion of Russia due to him being dead when the planning started.

I don't know the exact details of the German forces at Kursk. Much of the information and intelligence given to the Russians by Ultra about numbers and intentions of the Germans is still secret and has never been published. I do know that Kursk was a battle that involved millions of troops, and many tanks, and is a battle that Churchill can't take the political credit for now.

I still maintain that Chamberlain and Halifax were fully aware that Hitler intended to invade Russia. Hitler mentioned it in his Mein Kampf book in the 1920s, and our secret service knew about it from 1934. Chamberlain's strategy of giving Britain another year to get organised for the Battle of Britain, and prepared for war was right judgment by him. Chamberlain's piece of paper about the Czechs, which keeps coming under so much criticism, was just diplomatic language, a bit like Tony Blair's empty waffle nowadays.

There is a bit of historical background to this on the internet:

Alternatives to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler's Germany
Andrew David Stedman
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Description Author InfoBibliographic Info

Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasing Hitler's Germany has been widely condemned. However, historians (and politicians) have been divided about the viability of alternative courses of action. Andrew David Stedman here charts the origins, development and viability of the various alternatives to Chamberlain's policy of appeasement. Using a wide range of sources, many previously unpublished, he provides a fascinating study of British foreign policy before World War II, surveying the main advocates of the other strategies available and outlining the complexities of each rival option. Providing a valuable new contribution to appeasement historiography, this is the first work to offer a comprehensive synthesis of all the alternatives available to Chamberlain, as well as to illuminate the policy debate within Government itself. Stedman provides a unique analysis of how realistic Chamberlain deemed each policy to be, as well as a bold assessment of strengths and weaknesses.

Stedman asserts that it was understandable that Chamberlain rejected the other policies he had available to him and that, contrary to popular belief, Chamberlain did in fact consider and explore each alternative as part of his wider strategy and his foreign policy often contained elements of the rival options. Ultimately, this book shows that none of the alternatives would have maintained a lasting peace in the troubled conditions of the 1930s. Although some might have affected the favourability, timing and circumstances of conflict, war could not have been avoided given the rapid rise of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Also contributing to debates on the use of appeasement in the modern world, this book will be essential reading for historians of World War II and the twentieth century, as well as scholars of International Relations.

 

[Craig B]

I still maintain that Chamberlain and Halifax were fully aware that Hitler intended to invade Russia. Hitler mentioned it in his Mein Kampf book in the 1920s, and our secret service knew about it from 1934.[/indent] Chamberlain's strategy of giving Britain another year to get organised for the Battle of Britain, and prepared for war was right judgment by him. Chamberlain's piece of paper about the Czechs, which keeps coming under so much criticism, was just diplomatic language, a bit like Tony Blair's empty waffle nowadays.

Do you think that Blair is still PM? I sometimes wonder if you're living in a time warp in which Chamberlain was alive during the Battle of Kursk, and Blair is still in no 10.

Your bit about Hitler attacking Russia is nonsense. I have already explained why; that it mixes general hostility with specific plans, and as we have seen, these plans were drawn up only after Chamberlain's death.

Moreover I didn't realise just how incompetent you think the secret service was back then. Hitler published Mein Kampf in the twenties. Only in 1934 does our secret service become aware that it says bad things about Bolshevik Russia! Very poor show, eh?

 

[Border Reiver]

I don't know the exact details of the German forces at Kursk.

Henri, you haven't demonstrated much knowledge of the facts of Kursk, let alone details.

Much of the information and intelligence given to the Russians by Ultra about numbers and intentions of the Germans is still secret and has never been published.

That would be because ULTRA did not provide that information. The soviets knew most of that information from their consistent use and collation of battlefield intelligence

I do know that Kursk was a battle

Good, let's start here...

that involved millions of troops, and many tanks,

About 800K German and 1.2M Soviet, and about 8,000 tanks on both sides.

Start here for an overview, then go into the sources. For heaven's sake, stop relying on alleged documentaries that you can't remember the title of and that you saw on the telly 20 years ago, it doesn't serve you well.

and is a battle that Churchill can't take the political credit for now.

He couldn't take political credit for it then either. And so far as I am aware, no one is trying to give him political credit for the outcome of the battle.

Also, the idea that Stalin needed warning that Hitler had written in Mein Kampf in 1925 about his plan to invade the Soviet Union. First, it was written 9 years before he actually came to power and 16 years before it actually happened. Mein Kampf gives no useful information to the Soviets - which would be things like tactical and strategic objectives, allocation of forces, allocations of material, resupply plans, timetables. All it does is confirm that this Hitler guy really didn't like either the Russian people, or Bolshevism - which they had already deduced from his rather inflammatory rhetoric and being able to read the same open source material as either Chamberlain and Halifax.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Also, the idea that Stalin needed warning that Hitler had written in Mein Kampf in 1925 about his plan to invade the Soviet Union. First, it was written 9 years before he actually came to power and 16 years before it actually happened. Mein Kampf gives no useful information to the Soviets - which would be things like tactical and strategic objectives, allocation of forces, allocations of material, resupply plans, timetables. All it does is confirm that this Hitler guy really didn't like either the Russian people, or Bolshevism - which they had already deduced from his rather inflammatory rhetoric and being able to read the same open source material as either Chamberlain and Halifax.

There are historians who think that Stalin intended to double cross Hitler before the Russian invasion, as well as the usual Holocaust denier nutso historians. It's just that the British public have never been given any evidence of that. There is something that Stalin sacked his Foreign Minister in May 1938, who had proposed an alliance with the Czechs, and replaced him with Molotov who came to an agreement with the German Ribbentrop to carve up Poland. Personally, I think Stalin was taken by surprise.

There is a bit of background to this on the internet:

The controversy will continue, at least until the former Allied powers Britain, the United States and Russia, whose governments have liberally exposed Germany's wartime records, release the relevant material in their own archives. The Austrian newspaper Die Presse of April 4, 1997 quoted the Moscow journalist Konstantin Preobrashenskiy about use of the Russian archives. "Once again, the archivists only approve access to the documents when they feel like it. It is regrettable to see how what was accessible yesterday is today closed once more."

 

[Craig B]

There are historians who think that Stalin intended to double cross Hitler before the Russian invasion, as well as the usual Holocaust denier nutso historians. It's just that the British public have never been given any evidence of that.

If it's not true, then no evidence for it can exist. It has been discussed, and rejected, by many historians. See eg What Stalin Knew David E Murphy.

There is something that Stalin sacked his Foreign Minister in May 1938, who had proposed an alliance with the Czechs, and replaced him with Molotov who came to an agreement with the German Ribbentrop to carve up Poland.

In the context of Nazi insanity, it is worth noting that the previous foreign minister, Maxim Litvinov^WP, was a Jew. He adopted the pseudonym Litvinov when he joined a socialist party in tsarist days, but he was originally Meir Henoch Wallach-Finkelstein, which would not have endeared him to Hitler or Ribbentrop.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Historians seem to disagree in the same way as economists and psychiatrists disagree among themselves.

In theory America and Russia should have done a sledgehammer on Hitler in 1933 or 1934, but it never happened. America was isolationist, and it had the same 'with what' problems as Britain at the time. The Czechs were a far away country of which few Americans had heard.

Also in theory there was nothing to stop the Czechs from taking on Nazi ruthlessness themselves on their own if they had such marvellous tanks, as some people say on this forum. As it turned out several Czech pilots joined the RAF, and the monster German Heydrich was bumped off by Czech agents during the war.

It could be that Stalin was only interested in a Russian Empire, including the Baltic states and Eastern Europe, including Bulgaria, which turned out to be the case after the war. The problem the Russians had with that was that the Czechs and the Poles and Rumanians were not reliable Russian allies, as has been proved in recent times. They joined the European Political Union at the earliest opportunity.

Chamberlain gave the Poles a guarantee which he never did with the Czechs. That's not appeasement. There is background waffle about this on a Wikipedia website:

Historic views of appeasement and the guarantee of Poland[edit]

A major historiographical debate about Chamberlain's foreign policy was triggered in 1976 by the American historian Simon K. Newman's book March 1939. Newman denied there was ever a policy of appeasement as popularly understood. Newman maintained that British foreign policy under Chamberlain aimed at denying Germany a "free hand" anywhere in Europe, and to the extent that concessions were offered they were due to military weaknesses, compounded by the economic problems of rearmament.

Most controversially, Newman contended that the British guarantee to Poland in March 1939 was motivated by the desire to have Poland as a potential anti-German ally, thereby blocking the chance for a German-Polish settlement of the Danzig (modern Gdańsk, Poland) question by encouraging what Newman claimed was Polish obstinacy over the Danzig issue, and thus causing World War II.

Newman argued that German-Polish talks on the question of returning Danzig had been going well until Chamberlain's guarantee, and that it was Chamberlain's intention to sabotage the talks as a way of causing an Anglo-German war.

In Newman's opinion, the guarantee of Poland was meant by Chamberlain as a "deliberate challenge" to start a war with Germany in 1939. In this way, Newman argued that World War II, far from being a case of German aggression was really just an Anglo-German struggle for power. Newman wrote that World War II was not "Hitler's unique responsibility..." and rather contended that "Instead of a German war of aggrandizement, the war become one of Anglo-German rivalry for power and influence, the culmination of the struggle for the right to determine the future configuration of Europe".

The "Newman controversy" caused much historical debate about what were Chamberlain's reasons for the "guarantee" of Poland in March 1939, with some reviewers arguing that Newman had failed to support his case with sufficient evidence,] whilst the Polish historian Anna Cienciala described Newman's views as wrong, and argued the British and French wanted to avoid war by pressuring the Poles to make concessions

Recently, Newman’s book was cited by the American journalist Patrick Buchanan in his 2008 book Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War" to lend support to his assertion that the British guarantee of Poland in March 1939 was an act of folly that caused an "unnecessary war" with Germany.

 

[jimbob]

CHAMBERLAIN WAS DEAD WHEN THE GERMANS STARTED PLANNING THE INVASION OF RUSSIA. HE WASN'T ABLE TO CONVEY ANY USEFUL INFORMATION ABOUT THOSE PLANS BECAUSE OF THIS INCONVENIENCING FACT

 

[Craig B]

Also in theory there was nothing to stop the Czechs from taking on Nazi ruthlessness themselves on their own if they had such marvellous tanks, as some people say on this forum...

If you are in doubt about that, why in God's name don't you consult an article about these weapons, of which there are many on the Internet? You will find material like this.

By May 1939, the Germans had received the balance of the TL38s ... which had been part of the original order from Skoda for the Czech Army. Soon after, as a result of favorable field trials, the Wehrmacht ordered the production of 325 additional such vehicles. All would be almost identical to the initial Czech design. The PzKpfw 38(t), which the Wehrmacht placed in its light divisions in the following three months, proved a very potent weapon and soon earned the admiration of its crews as Robuste Fahrzeuge (durable vehicles) ... Following the renewal of major operations in the West on May 10, 1940, Czech-designed tanks of the German Army roll(ed) rapidly across France and toward the English Channel. Using Czech technology enabled the panzer arm of the Wehrmacht to deliver firepower and mobility to the front in the early days of the war.​

So the Wehrmacht, as well as "some people on this forum", rated these vehicles quite highly.

The Czechs were inhibited from risking a Nazi invasion because Chamberlain had given away the Sudetenland which contained the hilly area in which the Czechs had constructed their main defensive lines.

 

[dudalb]

Re: Churchill's strategic genius:

"The soft underbelly of Europe"

That is a man who hasn't really looked at a map.

Yeah, all those mountains in the Balkans and Italy should have told him something.
As one Historian, commenting at the WW2 Italian campaign, which Churchill basically forced on a skeptical FDR (there was a strong feeling in the US military to stop after Sicily) said that the Soft Underbelly turned out to be a Tough Old Gut.

 

[jimbob]

The soft underbelly of Europe was another phrase that sprung to mind

 

[ddt]

There are historians who think that Stalin intended to double cross Hitler before the Russian invasion, as well as the usual Holocaust denier nutso historians. It's just that the British public have never been given any evidence of that. There is something that Stalin sacked his Foreign Minister in May 1938, who had proposed an alliance with the Czechs, and replaced him with Molotov who came to an agreement with the German Ribbentrop to carve up Poland. Personally, I think Stalin was taken by surprise.

Litvinov was sacked a year later, in May 1939, so after Munich and after the annexation of the Czech lands by the Nazis. Moreover, Stalin was dismayed at not being invited in Munich: the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had a Treaty on Mutual Assistance since 1935. As you can read from the protocol, Soviet assistance to CS was conditional on French assistance.

Stalin may well have been surprised at Barbarossa, but that doesn't mean he was surprised that Nazi Germany would attack; it only means he didn't expect it already in 1941.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Litvinov was sacked a year later, in May 1939, so after Munich and after the annexation of the Czech lands by the Nazis. Moreover, Stalin was dismayed at not being invited in Munich: the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had a Treaty on Mutual Assistance since 1935. As you can read from the protocol, Soviet assistance to CS was conditional on French assistance.

Stalin may well have been surprised at Barbarossa, but that doesn't mean he was surprised that Nazi Germany would attack; it only means he didn't expect it already in 1941.

You are right that Litvinov was sacked by Stalin in May 1939. There is something in a Wikipedia article about him that he tried to send Russian troops to help the Czechs, but this was refused by Poland. The Czech other neighbour Rumania was going Nazi Fascist at the time. Hitler was putting on pressure for Slovakia to split from the Czechs and for Slovakia to have a pro-German Nazi Fascist government.

I still firmly believe that Chamberlain knew Hitler intended to invade Russia. Our secret service knew about it in 1934. It could be that Stalin didn't expect a German attack in 1941, though that was not too bright of him if it's true. The warning signs were there. Our secret service definitely had the warning signs. Even Churchill tried to warn Stalin. It was speed surprise and simplicity, and deception, and even secrecy, by Hitler.

Part of the trouble is, as I have said before, that much of the hard documentary evidence in Russia and America, and even Britain, is still secret. In the UK there are these 30 and 50 year rules, and then much of it is redacted, or even destroyed. It's like trying to find out about bugging.

There is some background to all this in a recent American newspaper article:

Moreover, there were fears overall about Britain’s military preparedness in 1938, as Nick Baumann, now an editor at the Huffington Post, detailed in a 2013 article in*Slate:

In March 1938 the British military chiefs of staff produced a report that concluded that Britain could not possibly stop Germany from taking Czechoslovakia. In general, British generals believed the military and the nation were not ready for war.

On Sept. 20, 1938, then-Col.Hastings Ismay, secretary to the Committee of Imperial Defense, sent a note to Thomas Inskip, the minister for the coordination of defense, and Sir Horace Wilson, a civil servant. Time was on Britain’s side, Ismay argued, writing that delaying the outbreak of war would give the Royal Air Force time to acquire airplanes that could counter the Luftwaffe, which he considered the only chance for defeating Hitler.

British strategists, including Ismay, believed their country could win a long war (so long as they had time to prepare for it).*This was a common belief, and doubtless factored into Chamberlain's calculations.

 

[theprestige]

Jesus Christ, Henri, *everybody* knew Hitler intended to invade Russia. It was never a secret. The only question was when, where, and how. And Chamberlain could not have known that, because those things didn't get decided until *after he was dead*.

Seriously, what are you trying to get from this? What agreement are you looking for, here?

 

[Craig B]

I still firmly believe that Chamberlain knew Hitler intended to invade Russia. Our secret service knew about it in 1934. It could be that Stalin didn't expect a German attack in 1941, though that was not too bright of him if it's true. The warning signs were there. Our secret service definitely had the warning signs. Even Churchill tried to warn Stalin. It was speed surprise and simplicity, and deception, and even secrecy, by Hitler.

Part of the trouble is, as I have said before, that much of the hard documentary evidence in Russia and America, and even Britain, is still secret. In the UK there are these 30 and 50 year rules, and then much of it is redacted, or even destroyed. It's like trying to find out about bugging.

There is some background to all this in a recent American newspaper article:

This is all complete rubbish. Nobody could have warned Stalin about June 1941 on the basis of somebody reading Mein Kampf in 1934, as you have been told many times. Chamberlain knew nothing. He didn't even know that Hitler intended to invade the rest of Czechoslovakia after he had swallowed the Sudetenland. Chamberlain was deceived, and consented to the annexation of Sudetenland, although it deprived Czechoslovakia of her lines of defence and opened her to complete destruction. Did Chamberlain foresee that? Did Chamberlain foresee the Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact of August 1939? Was that in Mein Kampf?

Did Chamberlain know that Hitler hated Jews, Slavs and communists? Yes. After reading Mein Kampf everyone knew that. But what does it have to do with Churchill discovering the date of Barbarossa? That date was decided by Hitler after Chamberlain had died.

Please also identify your sources, which by the way don't look very impressive.