Dave Rogers
Bandaged ice that stampedes inexpensively through
And the relevance of this to the topic is....?
Dave
Dave
And the relevance of this to the topic is....?
Dave
That book provides background information to the military situation of the Czechs at the time which Klimax keeps mentioning. You people keep saying that Britain and the Soviet Union and France and the Czechs should have gone to war in 1938, as the Israelis keep saying nowadays, but it was more complicated than that. I think, though I may be wrong, that Moravec thought Stalin intended an alliance with Hitler, which information Chamberlain, and even Churchill, would have found interesting.
Stalin didn't intend to ally with Germany until after the west abandoned his ally the Czechs. Also, no one is saying the west should've "gone to war" preemptively, which is what its in the news right now vis Trump & Netanyahu. An analogy would be if right now Iran was demanding a third of Turkey and Turkey's NATO allies said, OK sure whatever.
And absolutely positively needlessly wasted lives taking Peleliu. And his "defense" of the Phillipines was an amateurish shambles.
This. While MacArthur deserves all the accolades for Inchon, Ridgway deserves the credit for turning back the Chinese, starting with his replacement of Walker and then with his replacement of MacArthur.There is a whole industry of uncritical hero worship of Douglas MacArthur. Countless books and articles writhe in ecstatic extasy at the feet of the great military genius. why? well mainly because MacArthur was very good at self publicity / promotion, and many people want to grovel at the feet of the great "genius".
MacArthur was ussualy a competent military leader whose one stab at brilliance was the Inchon landing. Otherwise MacArthur's handling of military matters was usually competent not brilliant. And of course MacArthur had two really significant failures.
You mentioned MacArthur's basically incompetent defence of the Phillipines in 1941, I would add MacArthur's defeat in 1950 in his invasion of North Korea after the Inchon landing. MacArthur's handling of the whole thing. Was beyond mere incompetence and into sheer stupidity.
Also MacArthur had a huge firepower and logistic superiority over the Chinese. (The Chinese had superior numbers but not by much.) By any reasonable criteria the Chinese offensive should have been a failure. instead the Chinese under their commander Peng completely out smarted MacArthur and drove the American's and their allies out of North Korea.
MacArthur's pig headed ness and bottomless conceit made him. Utterly unable to see what was coming, (Massive Chinese intervention), the result was a defeat that could only be called humiliating.
You disagree with what? Eisenhower's broad front strategy worked - that is incontrovertible. Need evidence - whose armed forces were occupying what country at the end of hostilities?
The Battle of the Bulge/Ardennes Offensive was contained by Allied Reserves and then crushed - the initial tactical success for the Germans turned into an operational defeat with extremely negative strategic consequences.
As for these allegedly unsuccessful attacks you are referring to - when, what attacks specifically are you talking about?
And many somebodies right here have told you and provided evidence in support of their claims, that this "somebody on the telly" is full of codswallop.
The only way that Britain could have lost WWII is if the people of the UK lost the will to fight and sued for peace. There was no way that Germany could have landed troops in the United Kingdom in quantities large enough to take an intact port fast enough to resupply any forces left in the UK.
There was no way that Germany would have been able to bomb Britain into submission - the Allies with a vastly larger and more effective strategic bombing force were unable to do that to Germany over a course of years, why do you think the Germans could have done so in less time with a less effective force?
Brooke, Monty and Patton disagreed with Eisenhower's strategy because they all wanted to the be general leading the strategic advance into Germany and therefore the Western general that won the war. Monty and Patton in particular were a pair of glory hounds very interested in being having that particular feather in their cap. The biggest criticism of that Eisenhower's strategy from all of them is, "That isn't what I would have done." Not that it wasn't a sound strategy that played to the Allied strength of greater materiel superiority and that practically guaranteed positive results, just at a slower rate than the glorious thrust to the enemy's heart.
There is a whole industry of uncritical hero worship of Douglas MacArthur. Countless books and articles writhe in ecstatic extasy at the feet of the great military genius. Why? Well mainly because MacArthur was very good at self publicity / promotion, and many people want to grovel at the feet of the great "genius".
MacArthur was ussualy a competent military leader whose one stab at brilliance was the Inchon landing. Otherwise MacArthur's handling of military matters was usually competent not brilliant. And of course MacArthur had two really significant failures.
You mentioned MacArthur's basically incompetent defence of the Phillipines in 1941, I would add MacArthur's defeat in 1950 in his invasion of North Korea after the Inchon landing. MacArthur's handling of the whole thing was beyond mere incompetence and into sheer stupidity.
Also MacArthur had a huge firepower and logistic superiority over the Chinese. (The Chinese had superior numbers but not by much.) By any reasonable criteria the Chinese offensive should have been a failure. Instead the Chinese under their commander Peng completely out smarted MacArthur and drove the Americans and their allies out of North Korea.
MacArthur's pig headed ness and bottomless conceit made him utterly unable to see what was coming, (Massive Chinese intervention), the result was a defeat that could only be called humiliating.
And the relevance of this to the topic is....?
Dave
MacArthur is probably the most controversial Allied leader in World War 2. With many it's either love him or hate him.
I have a higher opinion of him as a general than Pacal does,(I give hims a lot of credit for the Island Hopping campaign n the South Pacific) but not as much as high an opinion as some historians do.
I think the problem with MacArthur is he was a pretty unpleasant individual ..the term "obonoxious" often applies..that it warps a lot of people's view of him.
I think Manchester's "American Caesar" is proably the most baslanced view of Mac,both his virtues and his flaws.
But MacArthur did not handle surprise very well. What happened in Korea in 1950 with the Chinese is a lot like what happene with the Clark Field disaster in 1941. He seemed so shocked by the surprise actually happening he was paralyzed.
Though I think strategic situation in the Phillippines in 1941 was so bad they were doomed no matter who was in command.
I see others have already commented on this. No, Henri, just no. MacArthur was not a genius, he was an egomaniac with a loud cheering section.And like nearly all senior American military commanders at the time, except the genius MacArthur, he was a believer in the classic Civil war doctrine of frontal assault, of "Everybody attacks all the time."
I agree. I think The Coldest Winter by David Halberstam covers this quite well.As for MacArthur being surprised by the Chinese. Since the Chinese had been warning for months that they would intervene, that MacArthur's own intelligence services were warning him about Chinese intentions etc., and that the Chinese had launched a spoiling offensive in November 1950 to get the Americans and their allies to draw back, that MacArthur was surprised is to a very large extent due entirely to MacArthur and his wrong headed notions.
Should he get credit for Inchon since it was his earlier incompetence that made it necessary?I will agree that MacArthur was a generally competent military commander who had at least one brilliant flash (Inchon) but his true genius was his extraordinary ability to promote himself.
Um, they're saying what I just said.
That the Soviets were backing the Czechs.
Had Britain and France supported the Czechs, and had it gone to war, Stalin is likely to at least have embargoed the food and resource shipments to Germany, wven if the Red Army could not actually get into the fight themselves.
I think, though I may be wrong
At that time Stalin was busy executing the Red Army officers corps so was in
position to do much else
Soviets were providing grain (food) and much of the ol Germany was using at the time
Cutoff oil and put serious crimp in German war machine
Question is would be enough to halt German offensive in Czechoslovakia ?
And the relevance of this to the topic is....?
Dave
As it stood in 1938 the Wehrmacht was in no position to go to war, it was short of just about everything. The acquisition of Czech resources and the influx of raw materials and food from the M-R Pact is a large part of why the generals who protested in 1938 went along with war in 1939, they believed that Germany had reached its military peak relative to its enemies and the advantage it had built up since Munich would start to erode by 1940.
First of all, in 1938 Austria possessed valuable reserves of gold and raw materials -- much the opposite of the German economy, which was becoming increasingly depleted by preparations for war. After the Annexation, around 2.7 billion shillings in gold and foreign currency fell under the control of the German Reichsbank
How was France not in "any military state to attack Germany" in 1938? As I've mentioned, the German generals commanding on the Western Front stated that they couldn't even hold out for three weeks.
Cutoff oil and put serious crimp in German war machine
Question is would be enough to halt German offensive in Czechoslovakia?
Well, this is sort of the same issue as the allied side over-estimating the German strength. I doubt the French would have been quite so pro-active. The Saar offensive encountered little German opposition, but it still was halted a few miles in.
But yes, the perception of the generals is probably more important here than the reality on the ground.
I doubt it would have had a major effect on any Czech campaign, as I really don't see them holding out into the winter, and likely French inactivity wouldn't so anything to relieve that pressure. It would have been the events after winter it would have put major brake on.
Now, a new book by the industrious, original and diligent Lynne Olson (whose ‘Those Angry Days’, a superb and badly needed account of the USA’s reluctance to enter World War Two, is still absurdly not published here in Britain) has found some more information on this.
In her interesting new work ‘Last Hope Island’, about Britain’s continental allies in the 1939 war, recently published by Scribe, Ms Olson writes that the Czech leader, Eduard Benes, and his intelligence chief, Frantisek Moravec, knew very well that the assassination of Heydrich would result in an appalling series of German atrocities and went ahead with it nonetheless, despite the direct protests of Czech resistance leaders in Prague who begged them not to proceed.
Benes wanted to please Stalin and to enhance his status as a resistance leader, weaker than that of countries which had been violently occupied.