Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Thunderchief]

I originally said that there was no rational grounds for a materialist to object to using the teleport. This is because nothing is lost and no one dies (emphasis on one). This thought experiment had been used for decades to distinguish between genuine and false materialists. Nick

Are we talking about the same type of teleporter? Because in the version I'm thinking of the original dies, is there another version? If so could you explain how it works?

The version I know of copies the person who steps into the transporter, sends the data to mars, and then reassembles the data into a physical body in the same state it was when copied. At some point during this procedure the original is destroyed. (I don't recal exactly when it's supposed to happen, but I don't think it matters.)

 

[Nick227]

All you have to do is supplement the teleporter to merge people back together. It's really not a big deal

You'd have to destroy both and create one with two sets of memories of what happened that day. Nick

 

[Nick227]

Are we talking about the same type of teleporter? Because in the version I'm thinking of the original dies, is there another version? If so could you explain how it works?

It's the strict semantics necessary in this situation. Yes the original dies. But no one dies.

Some body is killed but no one dies. If you get the distinction then you get materialism at this deeply personal level.

Nick

 

[Checkmite]

There are two ways I can respond to this.

First, I'm saying the process is not the particles -- it is the sequence of causal events between the particles. If two sequences of causal events are identical, then the process is identical. Whether the particles are the same particles is irrelevant. You can swap out A for C and B for D and the sequence would be identical into the future ( as long as A and C are entirely equivalent, etc ).

And there is the disconnect. I don't agree that whether the particles are the same particles is irrelevant. The very fact that there now exists a second "identical process" makes it necessary to use other means, external to the process itself, to distinguish one from the other. The identities of the exact particles engaging in the two identical processes is the next easiest way to distinguish between the two of them. Consider again my analogy of two seperate cassette tapes containing the exact same album. You can stop one, start the other, and it might be the same album that's playing, but it is definitely not the same tape.

Second, I don't think physics necessarily supports the idea that a particle remains the "same" particle over time. A particle could disappear and another one reappear to take it's place and all physical laws remain intact as long as that event happened inside of a planck time. This sort of invalidates the criteria we humans use for "sameness" because you could do something like teleport a whole person inside of a planck time and then ask "which particles are the originals and which are the copies?" and there is no possible correct answer.

But we're not talking about a system in which the original particles are made to disappear and others are made to appear in their place near-instantly; we're talking about the Star Trek transporter, in which (if I understand it right), free particles at the destination are trapped and repurposed in order to build the new "copy".

No I'm not avoiding it. Everyone agrees that *after* the teleport there are two people. The question is what happens at the exact moment of the materialization of the copy.

It may be for you; it isn't for me - and we've each been asked the same thing, which is would WE use the transporter, and why/why not?

If you recognize that, imagining for the moment that the "original" could be not-killed, the transporter essentially results in two discrete organisms, even if they are functionally two iterations of the same "consciousness", then you recognize the basis of my objection: practically-speaking (for the purposes of this argument), the required transporter procedure is that of the two discrete organisms that result from the transportation process, the one that first steps into the "departure" end is destroyed. Killed.

All this talk about whether the "consciousness that stays alive is the same" is irrelevant to my particular objection; because my consciousness is not concerned with preserving itself, it's concerned with preserving the organism in which it took form. I don't care whether "it can be said that a Checkmite still exists in the universe once the procedure is done".

 

[dudalb]

I'm not a fan of the show, I haven't seen many episodes. What kind of things used to go wrong?

Actually for a very graphic version of what could go wrong using a matter transporter see "The Fly". EIther version, though I prefer the 1986 Cronenburg film.

 

[Thunderchief]

It's the strict semantics necessary in this situation. Yes the original dies. But no one dies.

Some body is killed but no one dies. If you get the distinction then you get materialism at this deeply personal level.

Nick

So the original and the copy are not individuals? You don't see them as separate beings? I think they are, they behave the same, but do so independently.

 

[Thunderchief]

All this talk about whether the "consciousness that stays alive is the same" is irrelevant to my particular objection; because my consciousness is not concerned with preserving itself, it's concerned with preserving the organism in which it took form. I don't care whether "it can be said that a Checkmite still exists in the universe once the procedure is done".

I think this sums up my objections as well.

 

[rocketdodger]

You'd have to destroy both and create one with two sets of memories of what happened that day. Nick

You do have to destroy both, yes.

But you don't have to have two sets of memories. You merge both sets into a single set.

This is entirely possible if you think about it -- our memory doesn't work in terms of values. You don't remember "I was doing this 4 hours ago, and doing this 3 hours ago" etc. All you remember is the events themselves. To the extent that we can determine order, it is only based on our ability to infer logically based on the content of the memories.

For example, I bet if you recall something that happened years ago, and then recall something else, you can't tell immediately which happened first. You need to evaluate the contents of the memories to infer which *must* have happened first, given the content of the memories.

So merging a set of memories from your time on mars, with a set from your time on Earth, even though both spans of time are the same, is trivial ( in a mathematical sense ). What is not trivial is hooking up the neural networks properly without nuking important stuff.

 

[RenaissanceBiker]

Actually for a very graphic version of what could go wrong using a matter transporter see "The Fly". EIther version, though I prefer the 1986 Cronenburg film.

The question was not, would you use the matter transporter form the 1986 movie "The Fly." I think everyone agrees that if a fly landed on your shoulder right before a Star Trek transporter beamed you, you would simply have a fly on your shoulder at your destination.

 

[rocketdodger]

And there is the disconnect. I don't agree that whether the particles are the same particles is irrelevant. The very fact that there now exists a second "identical process" makes it necessary to use other means, external to the process itself, to distinguish one from the other. The identities of the exact particles engaging in the two identical processes is the next easiest way to distinguish between the two of them. Consider again my analogy of two seperate cassette tapes containing the exact same album. You can stop one, start the other, and it might be the same album that's playing, but it is definitely not the same tape.

Yes but my point is that the notion of whether two particles are two particles or one particle breaks down in the scenario. Its sort of like infinitesimal relativity. If one particle is destroyed and another created within one planck time, any conceivable definition of "same" will hold. Even if for a moment there are two particles, there really aren't two particles, because we can only count particles across time intervals greater than or equal to one planck time.

Granted, this also implies that there won't be two particles ever, because you can't do anything in the universe that takes less than one planck time. So it's a "magical" teleporter that doesn't operate according to math or physics. Go figure.

But we're not talking about a system in which the original particles are made to disappear and others are made to appear in their place near-instantly; we're talking about the Star Trek transporter, in which (if I understand it right), free particles at the destination are trapped and repurposed in order to build the new "copy".

Ok, but the typical refutation of objections to using that kind is that all the particles in your body are routinely swapped out anyway. You just don't know it because the cells remain intact even though their particles don't.

So the question is -- why is a quicker swap of particles somehow bad, when a slow swap is part of nature already?

All this talk about whether the "consciousness that stays alive is the same" is irrelevant to my particular objection; because my consciousness is not concerned with preserving itself, it's concerned with preserving the organism in which it took form. I don't care whether "it can be said that a Checkmite still exists in the universe once the procedure is done".

Alright, that's a valid position to hold.

I could care less about my body ( I don't really like it ) and would much rather be a free floating consciousness that could inhabit anything I wanted. I can't wait to get rid of this dumb body. To each their own.

 

[dasmiller]

As a general rule:

If I ask whether I will survive doing a thing, and the answer is "in a manner of speaking" or "it depends on how you look at it," I won't do that thing.

 

[Jomante]

I love this thread, this is one of the things I've long thought about.

Teleporting the ST way uses the same technology as the replicator in ST. A copy is made and the original destroyed. I would not be happy to use it because I'd be "killed" and my clone would prevent life insurance payout. But what about transporting?

I have a thought experiment on this. Deconstruction. Start by removing the finger and replacing it with a transplanted finger. Are "you" still "you"? I believe the answer is yes. Indeed, organ transplants are common enough and I haven't heard anybody say that they don't feel like it is a part of them. That's not to say it doesn't happen. Indeed, when I look at my arms I think of them as appendages I control, not actually a required part of me to be "me". So continue with this, the only body part where it seems to make a difference is the brain. When the brain is replaced, the identity changes.

So now let's start deconstructing the brain. If Dr. Frankenstein moved your brain from your body to another body, I think you'd agree that "you" are in the new body even though the shell of more than 85% of your DNA is lying on the other table.

Suppose Dr. Frankenstein started moving your brain one square centimeter at a time into a new body, reconnecting all parts and did this while you were fully awake and did it in such as way that at one point half of your brain in the other body was fully connected to one eyeball, one ear, half of the spinal cord, etc. and the other half was still connected to the original body. At that moment, there are TWO yous, independent and experiencing separate things and not communicating with each other. So which one is "you?" One of you goes out to a party with Dr Frankenstein, the other one stays behind in the lab cleaning the surgical tools. No clones here.

But the thought experiment doesn't end there. After a short time, the rest of the operation is now completed and your brain is now fully reassembled, having both experiences but now just one individual mind having experienced those things simultaneously. At what point does your awareness of yourself arrive in the new body?

Try wrapping your mind around that

 

[xtifr]

As far as I'm concerned, a difference that makes no difference is no difference. Before teleport, one Xtifr. After teleport, one Xtifr. If (and this is a big assumption, but one given in the original premise) there is no difference, why should I care that some original has been destroyed? It's not there any more to object, and the new me is indistinguishable from the original (again, this is given as part of the premise--that's the way Star Trek transporters work).

All the quibbles about "well you're really dead" strike me as pure metaphysical twaddle. The result is one me, unchanged, except for location. Why should I care about anything else? (Hint: this is a rhetorical question and attempts to answer it will be laughed at.)

I stick by my original post: if the transporter has been well tested, I would have no hesitation, but there's no way I'm going to be a guinea pig.

 

[Earthborn]

If I ask whether I will survive doing a thing, and the answer is "in a manner of speaking" or "it depends on how you look at it," I won't do that thing.

Don't go to sleep tonight. The person who wakes up tommorrow is not in all respects the same person as the one who went to bed. Your consciousness even "died" for some time.

Indeed, when I look at my arms I think of them as appendages I control, not actually a required part of me to be "me".

Then you look at your arms wrongly. Your brain is constantly influenced by signals from your arms (and other body parts). Without them you are not the exact same person.

I think you'd agree that "you" are in the new body even though the shell of more than 85% of your DNA is lying on the other table.

I would not agree. My brain together with another body would become a new entity. Some of my consciousness will linger, but this entity will be too different from me to be me. My old me would be mostly dead and only a bit alive.

At that moment, there are TWO yous, independent and experiencing separate things and not communicating with each other.

No, there would not even be two half me-s.

So which one is "you?"

Neither. I am not a body with half a brain, so making me into two bodies with half brains would change me so profoundly (not to mention the experience of the process of making from me two half brained bodies) that these two bodies cannot be me. This is very different from making copies of me in the teletransporter: in that case both resulting bodies would be so similar to original me that there is no significant difference and both are me.

After a short time, the rest of the operation is now completed and your brain is now fully reassembled, having both experiences but now just one individual mind having experienced those things simultaneously.

I am not convinced that two half brains that have experienced significant time in seperate bodies can converge back into one individual mind.

At what point does your awareness of yourself arrive in the new body?

At no point. The awareness of this new body has been through such profound neurological changes that it is very dissimilar to the original me.

 

[Myriad]

As a general rule:

If I ask whether I will survive doing a thing, and the answer is "in a manner of speaking" or "it depends on how you look at it," I won't do that thing.

Sleep well tonight.



Respectfully,
Myriad

ETA: Oops, Earthborn got there first.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

I originally said that there was no rational grounds for a materialist to object to using the teleport. This is because nothing is lost and no one dies (emphasis on one). This thought experiment had been used for decades to distinguish between genuine and false materialists. Nick

You're going to No True Scotsman me? Really?

Alright chief, let's do this. How does identifying clones as two people count as being a "false materialist?"

 

[dasmiller]

Don't go to sleep tonight. The person who wakes up tommorrow is not in all respects the same person as the one who went to bed. Your consciousness even "died" for some time.

Sleep well tonight.

First, I'll die if I don't sleep from time to time, so it's not quite the either/or proposition that the transporter is.

Second, I don't believe that consciousness has a sharply defined edge. I think that I'm still 'there' while sleeping, simply less aware; there's certainly a lot of brain activity even during normal unconsciousness. That leaves open the question of what happens during a deep coma or temporary death (e.g. a drowning victim who is revived). I don't know.

I'm aware that there's a constant turnover of cells in my brain, and that my brain is constantly changing state and therefore is not the same from one moment to the next. Consciousness is a process; if my state stopped changing, I wouldn't be conscious. The ongoing changes in my brain are a necessary part of consciousness.

I don't understand how the ongoing changes in my brain give rise to my perception of consciousness, so it's really not clear to me that the teleporter wouldn't represent a sharp change in continuity.

Here's my version of the thought experiment:

If there's one receiver, why not 2? Why not 50? So suppose that the teleporter created 50 copies of you, and each copy had a wallet. If 49 of you died, the survivor would have all 50 wallets with all that money! So, let's suppose that the teleporter was set up to create 50 of you, each in a room with a gun. 49 of the guns are loaded, one isn't. You've just been teleported into a room, and the gun is sitting there in front of you.

Would you do it?

 

[Checkmite]

Don't go to sleep tonight. The person who wakes up tommorrow is not in all respects the same person as the one who went to bed. Your consciousness even "died" for some time.

I don't know about him; but this doesn't work for me. I'm aware that my body is constantly changing and I'm not strictly the "same person" I was even when I began typing this sentence. This is another reason why stressing repeatedly that the copy that comes out of the transporter on the other side is "exactly the same in every respect, including conscious processes" as the body that was dissolved to obtain the "building instructions" doesn't do anything to convince me.

In my estimation consciousness isn't living; so it never dies. It's a function, like the light emitted from a light bulb where my body is the bulb. The bulb still exists when the light is turned off; in fact the light never even has to turn on in order for an observer to be able to say the bulb exists.

If it's theoretically possible for an outside observer to tell me that the body my consciousness turned off in is the same one my consciousness turned on in again in the morning, sleep doesn't bother me.

 

[Croc411]

I'm aware that there's a constant turnover of cells in my brain, and that my brain is constantly changing state and therefore is not the same from one moment to the next. Consciousness is a process; if my state stopped changing, I wouldn't be conscious. The ongoing changes in my brain are a necessary part of consciousness.

Maybe you can consider it a process on some higher abstract level, but certainly not on the fundamental level (particles, bits).

I don't understand how the ongoing changes in my brain give rise to my perception of consciousness, so it's really not clear to me that the teleporter wouldn't represent a sharp change in continuity.

All that's required for continuity is already part of your conscious state (in your memory), at any given moment.

If there's one receiver, why not 2? Why not 50? So suppose that the teleporter created 50 copies of you, and each copy had a wallet. If 49 of you died, the survivor would have all 50 wallets with all that money!

Where's the problem here? Obviously someone has to pay for the raw materials the copies consist of and for the energy used.

So, let's suppose that the teleporter was set up to create 50 of you, each in a room with a gun. 49 of the guns are loaded, one isn't. You've just been teleported into a room, and the gun is sitting there in front of you.

Would you do it?

Sure. Again, I don't see a problem there. One guy enters the teleporter, one guy comes out alive. Nothing was lost in the process.

 

[BenBurch]

Since they are exact copies, you would want them to be of whoever is willing and able to do those things you like done. I don't see the advantage of having two identical people who want nothing to do with you.

So, if they are both copies of the same individual, if they were to have sex would that be incest, lesbianism, or masturbation?