World's Worst Warships?

For my next nomination, I would like to nominate, well, the whole IJN fleet.

For a nation that was probably the foremost proponent of naval air war, it decided to join a world war with a fleet that was probably the least suited for it.

- A lot of ships were still using casemate guns that couldn't even shoot upwards at planes.

- They used the 25mm/60 Type 96 AA autocannon, which was actually based on a decent French Hotchkiss design, but with Japanese modifications. Some of which included trying to work with the ridiculously loose Japanese manufacturing tolerances, resulting in jams. (Not unlike any Japanese machinegun in WW2.) But even without those tolerance problems, it tended to have trouble ejecting at high elevations -- you know, like an AA gun is supposed to -- and thus jam.

A more egregious problem though was the wobbly mount, which pretty much nixed any accuracy it may have had to start with.

As an honourable mention, the small magazine size and it being impossible to change barrels quickly (you actually need a couple of men with hammers and spanners and several minutes) didn't do it any favours either.

It has been in fact called by many THE worst AA gun in service in WW2. Personally I would say the manually breech-loaded Soviet 45mm with only contact fuses, of which a few were still around, beats it in that category hands down. But I would call it the worst AA gun actually mounted on a ship in WW2.

- They lacked any equivalent of the 40mm Bofors all through the war, so basically they had NO mid-range AA. It was either the larger calibre guns shooting timed fuses once in a while, or the 25mm.

- Those larger calibre guns actually shot awfully ineffective fireworks shells. No, literally fireworks. The 'smart' idea was that instead of exploding into lots of hard metal shrapnel, they burst around some burning tubes. Really, fireworks. This MIGHT have had merit against older canvas-covered biplanes, which might be set on fire by such burning fragments, but was very much inferior against any modern planes.

- Damage control crews which were nowhere near trained to deal with being on the receiving end of the naval warfare stick. (See the Taiho for a slapstick example of damage control incompetence.)

Etc.

Basically they were the ones who had the best idea that the next war will be more air based than BB based... and decided to go into a world war with a fleet that was not equipped to deal with exactly what they thought the war would be.
 
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That much is clear. But what people seem to miss about that dictum is that it only really applies to defensive or alliance-mandated wars. E.g., the UK or USA, sure, had no choice once the war started, than to use everything the had or could make in time. But when STARTING a war, like Japan did, you also have the choice to not start the war at all in the first place. If looking at your fleet should have told you that you're not prepared to win that war, then just don't bloody start it.
 
But when you've got the best naval fighter, torpedo bomber, and carrier dive bomber in the world, in large numbers, with a good pilot and observer corps, you won't think defensively.

Light AA was and is a feeble defense. I wonder if any light gunner (like those .50 cal shooters at Pearl) ever knew for sure that he knocked down a plane.

Howsomever, the IJN's 25 mm round for the Type 96 had an mv of 820 m/s, or 2,700 fps, which is pretty potent with a .71 lb. shell. Chambered in a better gun, it would have done as well as any other light piece in WW2.
 
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For my next nomination, I would like to nominate, well, the whole IJN fleet.

For a nation that was probably the foremost proponent of naval air war, it decided to join a world war with a fleet that was probably the least suited for it.
Tony Tully begs to disagree.

- A lot of ships were still using casemate guns that couldn't even shoot upwards at planes.
Just like all the older battleships of the USN and RN.
- They used the 25mm/60 Type 96 AA autocannon, which was actually based on a decent French Hotchkiss design, but with Japanese modifications. Some of which included trying to work with the ridiculously loose Japanese manufacturing tolerances, resulting in jams. (Not unlike any Japanese machinegun in WW2.) But even without those tolerance problems, it tended to have trouble ejecting at high elevations -- you know, like an AA gun is supposed to -- and thus jam.

A more egregious problem though was the wobbly mount, which pretty much nixed any accuracy it may have had to start with.

As an honourable mention, the small magazine size and it being impossible to change barrels quickly (you actually need a couple of men with hammers and spanners and several minutes) didn't do it any favours either.

It has been in fact called by many THE worst AA gun in service in WW2. Personally I would say the manually breech-loaded Soviet 45mm with only contact fuses, of which a few were still around, beats it in that category hands down. But I would call it the worst AA gun actually mounted on a ship in WW2.
So the entire navy is crappe because of one weapon?
The USN, at the beginning of the Pacific War, was still depending on the 50 caliber BMG for anything close. They had a few, but not many, of the unsuccessful 1.1 quad mount.
- They lacked any equivalent of the 40mm Bofors all through the war, so basically they had NO mid-range AA. It was either the larger calibre guns shooting timed fuses once in a while, or the 25mm.

- Those larger calibre guns actually shot awfully ineffective fireworks shells. No, literally fireworks. The 'smart' idea was that instead of exploding into lots of hard metal shrapnel, they burst around some burning tubes. Really, fireworks. This MIGHT have had merit against older canvas-covered biplanes, which might be set on fire by such burning fragments, but was very much inferior against any modern planes.
Japan lacked the resources to develop much in the way of new systems once the war had started.
And you make it sound as if the IJN was using those "fireworks" shells in their medium caliber guns in place of time-fuzed. That's wrong. The Type 3 shell was intended only for battleship caliber guns, to augment their other AA weapons. They were also used as incendiaries for land attack; which is how South Dakota came to be hit be a couple off Guadalcanal -- they were loaded for bombardment of Henderson Field.
- Damage control crews which were nowhere near trained to deal with being on the receiving end of the naval warfare stick. (See the Taiho for a slapstick example of damage control incompetence.)
The USN lost Lexington in much the same way. They did a better job of learning from the experience.
Etc.

Basically they were the ones who had the best idea that the next war will be more air based than BB based... and decided to go into a world war with a fleet that was not equipped to deal with exactly what they thought the war would be.
I don't think that ANYBODY foresaw the importance of air in the coming war, though I agree Japan had the best idea of it. Nobody's navy was equipped to deal with what was coming.
And still they clung to the idea of a final decisive surface battle almost until the end. That was a failure of leadership, not the ships or men of the IJN.

In my opinion, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the best in the world in January of 1942, and by FAR the best in the theater of interest, the Western Pacific. Compared to the USN, they had more aircraft carriers, better naval aircraft and aviators, better old battleships (Nagato being the best of any from the Dreadnought era), better cruisers, and far superior night-fighting capability.
And then there were the torpedoes. Japanese torpedoes could not only run farther faster than their American counterparts, they also ran straight at the correct depth and exploded upon reaching the target. USN "fish" couldn't do any of that.
 
So, the captain just needed to share the opium with the crew!
They could hardly have done worse...

Pretty much any insanity could be blamed on the Kamchatka; in addition to firing (ineffectively) on the Aldebaran, Sonntag and Guyane, it fired on an (unnamed) merchant ship near Tangier. The ship got lost frequently, experienced engine problems that couldn't be fixed (despite being a repair ship and being crammed with press-ganged mechanics). When leaving Tangier, one of the refuelling stops, it managed to accidentally cut the city's underwater telegraph cable with her anchor, cutting the city off from communications with Europe.
After Madagascar the ship was forbidden to fire; one source says it's guns were disabled, after "accidentally" shelling the cruiser Aurora while firing a salute.

Communications were terrible, down to troublesome radio equipment, paranoia, ships operating with different code books and (with the Kamchatka) a seemingly monumental level of stupidity; for example they sent (off the Danish coast) "Am Under Attack by Enemy Torpedo Boats" while requesting permission to dump inferior coal overboard. Off Angola it sent "Do you see torpedo boats?" rather than "We are all right now" (it'd again gotten lost in a storm; again).
 
In my opinion, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the best in the world in January of 1942, and by FAR the best in the theater of interest, the Western Pacific. Compared to the USN, they had more aircraft carriers, better naval aircraft and aviators, better old battleships (Nagato being the best of any from the Dreadnought era), better cruisers, and far superior night-fighting capability.
And then there were the torpedoes. Japanese torpedoes could not only run farther faster than their American counterparts, they also ran straight at the correct depth and exploded upon reaching the target. USN "fish" couldn't do any of that.

They just didn't have enough. Especially enough escort ships. And while they had excellent torpedoes, they also terribly misused their submarine force. It really is pretty staggering that Japan was so far out ahead of the USN and allied navies in early '42, then never strategically* won another naval battle in the war that I'm aware of after about April of 1942 (when the British Far East Fleet called it quits).

*they certainly won a few battles tactically speaking
 
That was a failure of leadership, not the ships or men of the IJN.

I will agree, actually. "Failure of leadership" is a much more accurate way of summarizing what I was trying to say.

I don't think that ANYBODY foresaw the importance of air in the coming war, though I agree Japan had the best idea of it. Nobody's navy was equipped to deal with what was coming.

I'm giving Japan much less slack there, because the exact same guy was simultaneously (A) the biggest proponent of naval air warfare, and (B) the one who insisted on the Pearl Harbour attack. Other navies did have people who foresaw the importance of airplanes in naval warfare, but they were not in positions to be listened to. Yamamoto on the other hand was in such a position. And still thought it's a great idea to start a war with the USA with the fleet that had the worst air defense since WW1.

Just like all the older battleships of the USN and RN.

Maybe, but see above: they weren't looking to start a war (see all the appeasement the UK did, for example) and the guys who knew airplanes were going to be the biggest problem weren't the same guys wanting a glorious war with that fleet.

So the entire navy is crappe because of one weapon?

If that weapon system creates a huge vulnerability, then it kinda is, innit?

The USN, at the beginning of the Pacific War, was still depending on the 50 caliber BMG for anything close. They had a few, but not many, of the unsuccessful 1.1 quad mount.

Maybe, but put this into context. Japan also actually changed the old machineguns and 1.1" mount. In fact, they realized they needed to change it as early as mid-30's. And changed it to something even more crap, then stopped there.

But again, my main beef is with the leadership that decided that, meh, that's good enough to start a war with.

Japan lacked the resources to develop much in the way of new systems once the war had started.

So don't start a war, is all I'm saying :p

And you make it sound as if the IJN was using those "fireworks" shells in their medium caliber guns in place of time-fuzed. That's wrong. The Type 3 shell was intended only for battleship caliber guns, to augment their other AA weapons. They were also used as incendiaries for land attack; which is how South Dakota came to be hit be a couple off Guadalcanal -- they were loaded for bombardment of Henderson Field.

Oh, they were time fused all right. All anti-air shells were. They were also crap as anti-air shells. Is all I'm saying.

And still they clung to the idea of a final decisive surface battle almost until the end.

I'll give them some partial slack there. One of the reasons for that was that they basically lacked the fuel and logistics to actually do much more than keep those ships in reserve for a decisive battle. So, yeah... logistics, man... that's the real killer.

Of course, as you say, it's still a failure of leadership. They just drank deep and greedily of their own kool-aid. Oh, sure, we don't need logistics. We'll just need one big battle and *bam* we win the war :p

In my opinion, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the best in the world in January of 1942, and by FAR the best in the theater of interest, the Western Pacific. Compared to the USN, they had more aircraft carriers, better naval aircraft and aviators, better old battleships (Nagato being the best of any from the Dreadnought era), better cruisers, and far superior night-fighting capability.

Well, on the topic of the air war, though, the problem is that anything that gets past those fighters, you can't really stop them. Midway is a perfect example of what happened when the fighters were out of position to stop the dive bombers. The AA weapons could have at least made SOME difference, but they were crap and they didn't really.
 
Ise and Hyuga DID see combat, at the Battle of Cape Engaño. They didn't attract all that much attention as the American pilots were more interested in the helpless carriers, but both received minor damage. They did not, however, ever operate aircraft in combat. Oh, and 1/3 of the main battery removed, not 1/2. [/pedant mode]

And just for fun, I give you Kamchatka!

Being utterly ignorant, I hadn't come across that ship, but it doesn't sound to have had a stellar career.

Thanks for sharing.
 
Tsk, as any World of Warships player will tell you the worst warship is clearly the USS Puerto Rico. ;)
 
Tsk, as any World of Warships player will tell you the worst warship is clearly the USS Puerto Rico. ;)

I don't have World of Warships, so have to ask - The Alaska class large cruiser that was never built?

Same here, although the Alaska class is well worthy of criticism and probably has been upthread. Most likely by me. If only they'd been equipped with 6x16" guns instead of 9x12". Then they'd have been true battlecruisers. With all that implies.

Other ships of the name appear to include not just one but TWO Austal-built catamarans, one of which is leased out as a ferry.
 
It's really an inside joke. There's a perfect crap storm going on World Of Warships about it at the moment, or rather about Wargaming creating a big hype for a month or so about letting people unlock a tier 10 ship for free, and it turns out that it's outright impossible to do the grind for free in the allocated time even if you play for 16 hours a day the whole month. It's really just a World Of Warships joke, rather than anything really relevant to the actual ship design.
 
To get back on topic, though, can I nominate the class informally known as "the 40 thieves"? While not a bad ship as designed and the few that were built in government shipyards were decent ships, the majority were built in private shipyards rife with corruption and pretty much tried to pull themselves apart even in moderate wind and sea conditions.
 
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Far from the worst ships, they gave decades of good service, some were even converted to steam screw ships.
 

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