That was a failure of leadership, not the ships or men of the IJN.
I will agree, actually. "Failure of leadership" is a much more accurate way of summarizing what I was trying to say.
I don't think that ANYBODY foresaw the importance of air in the coming war, though I agree Japan had the best idea of it. Nobody's navy was equipped to deal with what was coming.
I'm giving Japan much less slack there, because the exact same guy was simultaneously (A) the biggest proponent of naval air warfare, and (B) the one who insisted on the Pearl Harbour attack. Other navies did have people who foresaw the importance of airplanes in naval warfare, but they were not in positions to be listened to. Yamamoto on the other hand was in such a position. And still thought it's a great idea to start a war with the USA with the fleet that had the worst air defense since WW1.
Just like all the older battleships of the USN and RN.
Maybe, but see above: they weren't looking to start a war (see all the appeasement the UK did, for example) and the guys who knew airplanes were going to be the biggest problem weren't the same guys wanting a glorious war with that fleet.
So the entire navy is crappe because of one weapon?
If that weapon system creates a huge vulnerability, then it kinda is, innit?
The USN, at the beginning of the Pacific War, was still depending on the 50 caliber BMG for anything close. They had a few, but not many, of the unsuccessful 1.1 quad mount.
Maybe, but put this into context. Japan also actually changed the old machineguns and 1.1" mount. In fact, they realized they needed to change it as early as mid-30's. And changed it to something even more crap, then stopped there.
But again, my main beef is with the leadership that decided that, meh, that's good enough to start a war with.
Japan lacked the resources to develop much in the way of new systems once the war had started.
So don't start a war, is all I'm saying
And you make it sound as if the IJN was using those "fireworks" shells in their medium caliber guns in place of time-fuzed. That's wrong. The
Type 3 shell was intended only for battleship caliber guns, to augment their other AA weapons. They were also used as incendiaries for land attack; which is how
South Dakota came to be hit be a couple off Guadalcanal -- they were loaded for bombardment of Henderson Field.
Oh, they were time fused all right. All anti-air shells were. They were also crap as anti-air shells. Is all I'm saying.
And still they clung to the idea of a final decisive surface battle almost until the end.
I'll give them some partial slack there. One of the reasons for that was that they basically lacked the fuel and logistics to actually do much more than keep those ships in reserve for a decisive battle. So, yeah... logistics, man... that's the real killer.
Of course, as you say, it's still a failure of leadership. They just drank deep and greedily of their own kool-aid. Oh, sure, we don't need logistics. We'll just need one big battle and *bam* we win the war
In my opinion, the Imperial Japanese Navy was the best in the world in January of 1942, and by FAR the best in the theater of interest, the Western Pacific. Compared to the USN, they had more aircraft carriers, better naval aircraft and aviators, better old battleships (Nagato being the best of any from the Dreadnought era), better cruisers, and far superior night-fighting capability.
Well, on the topic of the air war, though, the problem is that anything that gets past those fighters, you can't really stop them. Midway is a perfect example of what happened when the fighters were out of position to stop the dive bombers. The AA weapons could have at least made SOME difference, but they were crap and they didn't really.