Unabogie
Philosopher
I don't know that the author Matt Volz was being particularly careful with his words there, nor is it obvious that he has any experience in campaign finance law (not that I do either!).
His LinkedIn profile says he's a generic reporter with a generic education:
Columbia University - Graduate School of Journalism
M.S., Journalism
2001 – 2002
University of Richmond
B.A., International Studies
1991 – 1995
So, I'm not going to put a lot of stock in a background paragraph he wrote in a news story.
My understanding is that coordination on issue advocacy is allowed. It is express advocacy (specifically advocating for or against a particular candidate) which is regulated. This is the concession that campaign finance laws must make to the 1st Amendment.
Additionally, super-pacs are not 501(c)(4)s like the groups at issue in the John Doe case in Wisconsin. 501(c)(4)s are supposedly social welfare organizations which must spend less than half of their time and money on campaign politics. Super-pacs have no such restriction, but at the cost of donor confidentiality. Super-pacs, historically, have been heavily involved in express advocacy, which is why coordination with a campaign looks bad on its face. It would be very hard to disentangle express from issue advocacy coordination with a super-pac, so my guess is that lawyers for campaigns just tell their clients not to coordinate with super-pacs, ever. Although, as Colbert and Stewart pointed out, there is a giant loophole in that it is possible for effective coordination to take place via public statements in the media.
Ha, you are too funny. If you don't like an AP story because it disagrees with your biases, you present as counter-evidence the guy's LinkedIn profile and wash your hands of it.
How about this?
http://columbialawreview.org/coordination-reconsidered_briffault/
. The distinction between the two types of campaign spending turns not on the form—the fact that contributions proceed from a donor to a candidate, while expenditures involve direct efforts to influence the voters—but on whether the campaign practice implicates the corruption concerns that the Court has held justify campaign finance regulation. As a result, not all expenditures are exempt from restriction.2 Independent expenditures undertaken by an individual or group in support of a candidate or against her opponent are constitutionally protected from limitation. In the Court’s view “[t]he absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure with the candidate or his agent not only undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate.”3 But, as Buckley found, expenditures by supporters of a candidate that are coordinated with the candidate benefited are in reality “disguised contributions” that pose the same corruption dangers as outright contributions.4 Congress can regulate such coordinated expenditures as contributions, and, indeed, has done so5 in order to distinguish between “independent expressions of an individual’s views and the use of an individual’s resources to aid in a manner indistinguishable in substance from the direct payment of cash” to a candidate.6 As the Supreme Court has noted approvingly, “Congress drew a functional, not a formal, line between contributions and expenditures.”7 This coordination/independence distinction is, thus, critical to maintaining the integrity of the foundational contribution/expenditure distinction.