What mess? So what did Hitler's "peace offer" entail? You haven't specified.
You want proof?
http://gooring.tripod.com/goo22.html
1946 Nuremberg War Crimes Trial: On day 85, Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus gives testimony on behalf of his friend, Hermann Göring.
From this interrogation it becomes clear that Dahlerus frequently (on a daily basis) travelled between Germany and Britain before and after september 1, 1939, and that he was trusted by both parties. Although a personal friend of Goering, he certainly is no Nazi or hostile against Britain. He was in other words the perfect mediator.
Dahlerus tells Goering that the mood in Britain is serious and that an attack on Danzig will nog be tolerated (Danzig, as you will remember, was a German town, where 97% of the population wanted to return to the Reich, but the noble Allies had decided in Versailles that this should not be the case).
Goering tells Dahlerus on july 6 that he thinks the British are bluffing (he was right about it, the British indeed did declare war but did not attack, until the Jew servant Churchill came along).
Dahlerus had proposed a meeting between Germans and Brits on neutral territory, like Sweden.
Dahlerus: I met Lord Halifax on 20 July. He said particularly that he did not want any members of the British Government or Parliament to participate. However, His Majesty's Government would await the results of the meeting with the greatest interest. The meeting took place at Soenke Nissen Koog, in Schleswig Holstein, near the Danish border. The house belongs to my wife. Seven Englishmen, Göring, Bodenschatz, and Dr. Schoettl were present.
This discussion took place on August 7, including Goering and English businessmen. All agreed that a high-level meeting should take place in order to prevent war. The British government was fully informed about this meeting.
Goering told Dahlerus that Hitler was interested in a conference between Britain, France, Italy and Germany.
On the 24th Dahlerus met Goering in Berlin. G. told D. how serious the situation had become and that the Poles were unwilling to compromise (911I because of the British war garantee, exactly Buchanan's point). Goering confirmed that he was interested in a understanding with Britain.
On the 25th Dahlerus spoke with Halifax, who hinted at an agreement. H. thanked D. and said that his services were probably not needed any longer. Dahlerus called Goering about this the same night. Later that night Dahlerus persuaded Halifax to write a letter to Goering, which he did, co-signed by Chamberlain, that Britain was interested in an understanding. Dahlerus flew to Berlin with this letter. Goering discussed the letter with Hitler.
On the 27th Dahlerus had a meeting with Hitler and Goering. Here comes the decisive point:
Dahlerus: In condensed form, they were as follows: (1) Germany wanted an agreement or an alliance with England. (2) England was to help Germany in the annexation of Danzig and the Corridor. (3) Germany gave the assurance that it would guarantee Poland's boundaries. (4) An agreement should be reached on Germany's colonies. (5) Adequate guarantees should be given for the treatment of German minorities. (6) Germany gave its word to defend the British Empire with the German Wehrmacht wherever it should be attacked.
Do my opponents understand what this means? That this Lebensraum accusation is an Anglo lie and nothing more.
Dahlerus flew back to London and met Chamberlain and Halifax in Downingstreet 10, 27th August. Result:
Dahlerus: I must say that the English made the greatest effort to deal in a fair and peaceable way with the various points. Naturally, Point 6, the offer to defend the British Empire, was rejected. Similarly, they did not want to have any discussion on the colonies as long as Germany was not demobilized. With regard to the Polish boundaries, they wanted these boundaries to be guaranteed by the five great powers: Russia, Germany, England, France, and Italy. Concerning the Corridor, they proposed that negotiations with Poland be undertaken immediately. With reference to the first point, England was willing in principle to come to an agreement with Germany.
Dahlerus flew back to Berling and met Goering.
Dahlerus: He did not consider the reply very favorable. I told him, however, that in view of the events of the last year he could hardly expect the English to be satisfied with the guarantees of Poland's boundaries by Germany only. With reference to the colonial question, I made it clear to him that any British Government would be overthrown at once that tried to force this point in Parliament as long as Germany's forces were mobilized. In reference to the sixth point, I tried to make it clear to him that England, or the British Empire, preferred to look after their own affairs themselves. Finally he said that it would probably be better if he talked with Hitler alone. He went immediately to the Reich Chancellery and I went to my hotel. At about 1 o'clock on Monday morning, the 26th, I received a telephone call and heard that Hitler would accept the English standpoint provided that the reply expected from Henderson on the next day was, in general, what I had said.
Dahlerus met with Goering twice after that...
Dahlerus: Well, the most important development was that on Tuesday morning, or at 1:15, that is, shortly after midnight, on the 29th, I received a telephone call from the Reich Chancellery, made at Goering's request by Lieutenant Colonel Konrad. He told me that Henderson had submitted his reply in writing, that it was highly satisfactory, and there was every hope that the threat of a war was past. I met Göring again then and he told me that he was highly pleased that the matter had developed so well.
Then the setback:
Dahlerus: I was in my hotel, late in the evening, about 10:30. Forbes called me up and said he had to see me at once. He came to my hotel and said that Henderson and Hitler had had a meeting on Tuesday evening which had taken a very unsatisfactory course. They had parted after a big quarrel. He asked me what I could suggest under these circumstances. During our conversation I was called on the phone by Göring, and he asked me to come to his house immediately. He told me the same story and seemed very upset at the development. He showed me the German reply to the British note and went through it point by point. He tried to explain to me the reasons for the contents of this note. Finally he told me I should go back to London again immediately and make every effort to explain this unfortunate incident to the British Government. He concluded then by saying that Hitler was busy, and that he was working out a proposal for Poland which should probably be ready the next day
Dahlerus flew back to London to meet the British government (Chamberlain, Halifax). Core message: the British government did not really trust the Germans to be sincere.
Dahlerus back to Berlin. Further discussions with Goering. Next meeting with Polish ambassador to Berlin Lipski:
Dahlerus: He said that he had no reason to negotiate with the German Government. If it came to war between Poland an Germany, he knew -- since he had lived 51/2 years in Germany -- that a revolution would break out in Germany, and that they would march on Berlin.
Lipski did not say: "Well Gdansk is 97% Polish therefor the German demands are unreasonable", no he said: "if the German army will get Gdansk back the German population will rise against the German government".
This highlights the stupidity of the Polish position. There was no march against Berlin after september 1.
Henderson btw was the British ambassador in Berlin.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neville_Henderson
On september 1, Dahlerus has another meeting with Goering where he is told that Germany invaded Poland.
Dahlerus: Well, before I mention what happened then, I should like to mention that I met Hitler on 1 September, immediately after his Reichstag speech in the Kroll Opera House. He was at that time exceedingly nervous and very agitated. He told me he had all along suspected that England wanted the war. He told me further that he would crush Poland and annex the whole country. Göring interrupted, and pointed out that they would advance as far as certain given points. But Hitler was in an uncontrollable frame of mind. He began to shout he would fight for 1 year, 2 years, and ended up in great agitation that he would, in fact, fight 10 years. Then, on Sunday, 3 September, I was informed early in the morning by Forbes that at 9 o'clock that morning an ultimatum would be given. The conditions were that the hostilities must cease immediately and the German forces must be withdrawn to the German border. I went immediately to Goering's headquarters near Potsdam. He was there and not with Hitler. I appealed to him to try at least to arrange for a reasonable reply to the ultimatum. I had the impression that certain members of the German Government were in favor of war and I was afraid if a written reply were giver it would not be worded so as to avoid war with England. I therefor suggested that Göring should declare himself prepared to go to England, at once, before 11 o'clock, to negotiate there. Dr. Stahmer: How did Göring react to this suggestion?
Dahlerus: He accepted this suggestion and telephoned Hitler, who likewise concurred with it.
Dr. Stahmer: Did you then telephone London?
Dahlerus: Yes. I telephoned London and got in touch with the Foreign Office. They gave the reply that they could not consider this proposal before they had received a written reply to the ultimatum.
Dr. Stahmer: Did you forward this communication to Göring?
Dahlerus: Yes, I told Göring this.
Dr. Stahmer: What impression did your communication make on Goering?
Dahlerus: Göring seemed to be sorry that the proposal was not accepted.
Summarizing this: there is no way you can read from this account that Hitler had a cold-blooded plan al along to conquer Poland. The whole argument was about the reversal of Versailles and Danzig and nothing else. There is no reason to assume that Hitler was not sincere with his peace proposals and an alliance with Britain. It was obvious from the behavior of the Poles that they would never give in. The key was Britain. And the frustration of the German leadership with Britain, who, together with the French, had caused Germany to be in this mess in the first place. Germany had been robbed by Britain (and France) for 20 years, they had been outright betrayed by them, after Wilson had lured Germany into the prospect of a harsh, but at least bearable peace. Why should Germany expect Britain to have any other intent then to try to crush Germany again? Britain, that had never accepted the emergence of a Germany in 1871 on the continent in the first place and never would.
