bruto
Penultimate Amazing
If you believe that superstition, error, misinformation and credulity are harmful to either individuals or society, then skepticism can be seen as an ethical choice inasmuch as it combats these evils. The technical content of one's skeptical approach may not be ethical, but the decision to apply skepticism to a question rather than faith can, I believe, be construed as an ethical one, though that doesn't always mean it is. You could just be an argumentative jerk or an anti-religionist with an axe to grind, and no real interest in truth.
I am both. I hate religion, and I hate most humans. It's people on this forum which give me hope for humanity & keep convincing me to use my powers of awesomeness for good instead of evil. At the end of the day I want whats best for myself. If it involves trambling on others, then..well....so what.
Camillus
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Ashles said:
A healthy body is desirable and good thing but it is not a virtue (at least not from an ethical point of view). A virtue is not a physical characteristic; it is a way of acting in the world.
Each individual virtue is a valuable or admirable part of a whole person; more than a character trait, deeper than an habitual course of action, greater than a tendency to act in a particular way. To possess a virtue is not simply to follow a single track, to be honest, or generous or sceptical. It is, as Richard Kraut says “to be concerned with many other actions as well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires, perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset.â€
This view carries with it the acceptance that there are always a range of considerations when someone chooses a course of action. A sceptic for instance is not just some who goes around challenging any claim they come across. A person who challenges just to show off their own knowledge is not acting in a virtuous way. A sceptic who habitually points out all “woo-woo†even when it is inappropriate to do so is not virtuous. It is possible to have the virtue of scepticism without being tactless or indiscreet.
You removed my 'find or acknowledge' ...... Randi type trial doesn't look for weak effects.Ladewig said:
The type of weak (on average) effects reported by parapsychologists in laboratory controlled trials. For example with the Ganzfeld type trial 25% should be guessed right by chance, yet many trials are well over 30%. According to statistician Utts if 30 trials were held there is about a 17% chance of getting statistical significance .. . with 100 trials still only 57% chance of statistical significance.
Apart from Randi challenge not doing enough tries in a brief preliminary, his type of challenge does is more likely still to miss weaker effects as the result must be 'self evident' and also the setting of an agreed pass or failure even if somewhat positive result was obtained.....
Camillus said:Dear me, I am incredulous that people here do not believe that scepticism is entwined with ethics.
Scepticism is a virtue. By acting in a virtuous way we promote good (and isn't ethics about the promotion of good?).
I am of course willing to be convinced that I am wrong.
I am a follower of virtue ethics and all I ask is that those who hold that that scepticism is not concerned with ethics convince me that its possession is not a virtue.
I await your repsonses.
I normally use Merriam-Webster online, but it appears to be down. Therefore...
and
Anyone see the word "moral" or "ethics" in the second definition?
No... Because skepticism has nothing to do with morality or ethics.
Camillus said:
Something being an ethical choice simply means that the framework of ethics (a contextually sensistive, socially created framework) puts it in that very broad catagory.
Skepticism in a theocracy (i.e., Iran) is NOT considered ethical and/or moral when applied to the theocracy's interpretation of the Islamic religious faith. Using skepticism to question Christianity in the US, UK or Canada may be considered offensive and/or shocking by some groups (and immoral by certain Christian believers); but it's not considered particularly immoral or unethical in general within those societies. (Evidenced by a lack of public outcry over it.)
Skepticism is a tool, like a scalpel. When a scalpel is used in surgery, it can be considered an ethical use of the tool; when it's used in murder or disfigurement, then it's not an ethical use, for example.
So there's an example of skepticism utilized in exactly the same way - but in one instance, it's immoral and/or unethical, while in the other instance it's merely distasteful to various groups.
There is a definition of the word "virtue" that does fit skepticism, however:
While appropriate, this definition has nothing to do with morals or ethics.
(Edited to revise a bit and clarify some things.)
And scepticism isn't a 'way of acting' as much as it is an approach to ideas or claims.Camillus said:
BTW you ignored my example of healthy living, which is a way of acting in the world.
And who judges this? Who decides what is admirable?
Many people dislike scepticism. How can you objectively decide they are incorrect and you are correct?
Fascinating. One person's opinion of course, but fascinating nonetheless.
But not a lot to do with scepticism though.
But they are still displaying scepticism. So this demonstrates how one is not related to the other.
Of course it is. Because scepticism is not a moral position. It is an entirely seperate concept.
Exhibiting scepticism does not confer any measure whatsoever of virtue or ethics or goodness.
By the actual definition of the concepts your position is untenable Camillus.
Consider the following positions:
"I am sceptical that allowing races to mix is good for the whole of a community"
"I am sceptical that dropping the bomb on Japan was justified"
"I am sceptical that the death penalty deters criminals"
"I am sceptical that England has less violent crime because it has no death penalty"
"I am sceptical that atacking Iraq was a good idea"
"I am sceptical that leaving Iraq under Saddam's rule would have been a good idea"
"I am still sceptical about these claims that there were no WMDs"
"I am sceptical that the Jews didn't know about 9/11 before it happened"
All display scepticism, but are all the people who express such ideas virtuous?
Scepticism does not in itself have any moral weight.
Doubting claims can sometimes be a good thing and other times bad. But doubting itself is neither.
The Odd Emperor
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Ashles said:
Skepticism is nothing more (or less) than a logical toolset. It’s not in itself a weapon but it can be used to attack. It’s not itself a belief system but it can be utilized to support one. It is not itself a moral or ethical position, it cannot have morals or ethics no more than a hammer can.
Skepticism is simply an attitude. I find that it’s preferable to belief insomuch as beliefs tend to disallow open enquiry and scientific refutation. When one believes, you no longer need to enquire, all you need to do is validate.
Pure logical genius. I note that the general/social term 'skeptism' is attributed to an attitude. Or rather elements of a whole attitude. Which is correct in my opinion.The Odd Emperor said:
'A very skeptical person'.
Spock gives you the IDIC award for such an outstanding post of logic.
The Odd Emperor
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DavoMan said:
Thanks but its TOO STIFF! I need to liven it up a bit, make it funny!
Camillus
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Sorry for the delay in replying; I am not the swiftest of writers and it has taken me some time to construct this reply. I apologise for the length.
If I may I would like to begin with jmercer and the argument that because the dictionary definition of scepticism contains no mention of “moral†or “ethicsâ€
I have to say that I think this argument weak. I checked the entry in the same dictionary for “courageâ€, which is one of the classical virtues, and found no mention of “moral†or “ethics†there either. While it may be that modern language does not regard courage as a virtue I find this unlikely so I would conclude instead that the dictionary is producing a definition based on everyday language use rather than the special use of the term in an ethical debate. I do not think that the dictionary argument counts against my contention that scepticism is a virtue.
He then goes on to deal with a post he attributes to me but in fact came from Bruto and is not representative of my views. However his reply to that section does contain this:
A scalpel is indeed a tool and like all tools it has a purpose. Its purpose is to cut well. All we can say about a scalpel is that is a good one when it cuts well and a poor one when it cuts badly. The use to which it is put does not affect whether it is “good†or “badâ€.
The same is also true of human beings: we have a purpose. The question then is what is that purpose? To answer that we have to find something that is distinctive of humans (just as the distinctive feature of a scalpel is that it cuts) and the thing that is most characteristic of us is that we are rational beings. It is because we are rational that we can make decisions and more importantly be held responsible by others for those decisions.
This is of fundamental importance to any argument about virtue ethics because those who support it hold that a life lived in a rational way is a better life than one lived in an irrational way. We strive to live a life that is in accord with reason, but we also recognise that humans are complex creatures. So we look for a way of integrating the complexity of human life into a rational system and the way that presents itself is through the expression of virtue.
Which brings me to jmercer’s last point: that the definition of virtue that he agrees does fit scepticism as an “advantage or benefitâ€
Next I turn to Ashles reply and his initial response that:
My answer is that for a virtue ethicist striving to live a good life in accord with reason the virtue of scepticism is a way of acting in the world. When I encounter a claim I will have an emotional response to it, either good or bad. However because I possess the virtue of scepticism I will examine it more closely to see if my initial feelings are right or wrong. The speed, accuracy and quality with which I can make that judgement depends on the degree to which I possess the virtue of scepticism. In turn I can only develop the virtue by practising it and internalising it so it becomes an integral part of the way that I act in the world.
Virtue ethics, in contrast to the other two main theories of normative ethics, acknowledges that our feelings are central to our existence as human beings; they are a lens through which we experience the world. It is our emotional responses to situations that make us sensitive to the nuances of the particular circumstances that are important in each case. Without emotions we would have great difficulty appreciating the depth and resonance of a problem and in choosing the best way of dealing with it.
This doesn’t mean, though, that followers of virtue ethics believe that we should be slave to our emotions. For a virtue ethicist emotions are something that must be cultivated so that they are displayed appropriately and used as well developed sensitivities that inform judgement rather than merely instinctive reactions.
This raises the issue of experience. Within virtue ethics we can make a distinction between the “nice child†and the “virtuous adultâ€. It is possible to find a child who is honest, generous and kind (at least I am told it is possible) and we would certainly be happy to acknowledge that such a child is very nice. However we are unlikely to describe a child as virtuous. Furthermore we know that such a child although acting out of the best intentions is more prone to make errors than an adult with the same characteristics. Why? Because the child lacks the practical wisdom that life experience brings.
A child may act with the best intentions but fail because he lacks insight into the full consequences of what he does, does not fully appreciate what he needs to know in order to bring about the desired result or has an understanding of what may be beneficial or harmful that is lacking or frankly mistaken. Making mistakes that come from these deficiencies is part of growing up and we, as rational adults, would rarely (if ever) hold a child culpable for mistakes that come from them and lead to undesirable outcomes.
In contrast we do hold adults to account if their actions or decisions lead to poor outcomes that could have been avoided by a more thoughtful approach or better grasp of likely outcomes or predicted from the knowledge that they had of the situation. We expect that an adult’s life experience will prevent them from making the same mistakes that a child would.
Unfortunately despite their life experiences many adults continue to make mistakes in their ethical dealings with the world. Many of them are highly intelligent, they are often educated and yet they continue to make poor or hurtful decisions. A virtue ethicist would argue that although these people have life experience they lack the practical wisdom to apply it correctly and thus cannot live in accordance with the virtues.
The practically wise, on the other hand, understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important and truly advantageous in life. They know, to put in a nutshell, how to live well.
Which brings me to:
The living well that the virtuous experience is almost always expressed using a term from ancient Greek moral philosophy – eudaimonia. This is usually translated as either “happiness†or “flourishingâ€, although neither term really captures what it means. Obviously the problem with using “happiness†is that our modern understanding of it makes it an entirely subjective state. The only person who can tell if I am happy or have led a happy life is myself and if I say I am happy you have to accept that what I say is true. Flourishing on the other hand, while a better approximation, carries with it the idea of physical well-being. I can point at plants and animals and say that they are flourishing but the concept of eudaemonia can only be applied to rational beings. Flourishing does have the advantage, though, that it is a potentially more objective term. I may claim to be flourishing physically or mentally, and even believe that, but I may also be demonstrably wrong.
Is healthy living on its own a virtue? No, because it arises out of being eudaemon, out of flourishing. While I can point to honesty or compassion and hold them up as virtues I cannot isolate a healthy life from being wise, temperate and prudent.
For instance you assert that scepticism is disliked by many, would not be recognised by them as a virtue and hence cannot be considered one. I would disagree with this – I think it would be difficult to find anyone who would claim that scepticism qua scepticism is a bad thing. Indeed many practitioners of the “woo arts†claim that they were sceptical when they first encountered X but were converted by the evidence of what they saw or experienced. They attribute to themselves a virtue they do not possess in order to improve their standing in the eyes of those they are speaking to.
People dislike scepticism when it is used to expose what they espouse to be false. This doesn’t mean that they do not think of it as a virtue. I’ve seen people who challenge irrational views labelled “pseudo-sceptics†by opponents in what is clearly a (rather pathetic) attempt to demonstrate that those who expose “woo†in fact lack the real virtue of scepticism and instead have fallen into one of its related vices. These people recognise that scepticism is a virtue, just as the conman recognises that honesty is a virtue, they just do not like having it used against them.
Richard Kraut’s writing on what it is to possess a virtue elicited this response:
Ashles next challenges me because I claim that someone who disputes something only in order to show off their knowledge is not displaying the virtue of scepticism. His response:
Ashles next point, in answer to my assertion that it is possible to have the virtue of scepticism without being tactless or indiscreet, was:
Scepticism is not a moral position; it is a virtue*. The two are not the same thing and are not synonymous with one another. Exhibiting scepticism does not mean I have the virtue of scepticism, just as exhibiting honesty does not mean I have that virtue. My reasons for acting are paramount – in order to have the virtue of scepticism it must be part of my character, not simply an expedient way of dealing with a situation.
Ashles then presents a list of statements he says display scepticism and asks if the people making them are virtuous. The answer is of course “I don’t know†because I cannot make a judgement about whether someone is virtuous from a single statement. A single act or statement tells me nothing about their character.
Virtue ethics is concerned with character. Most ethics systems ask the question “How do I make the right decision?†In contrast virtue ethics asks, “What sort of person should I be and how should I live my life?â€
Remember I am arguing from the point of view of virtue ethics. I am not concerned with whether or not you can universalise scepticism** I am concerned with whether scepticism is necessary to live a flourishing life. I am arguing that you do need it and that it is a virtue to have it and I haven’t seen any convincing arguments that I am wrong.
* There is a strand within virtue ethics that argues that “moral†and “ethical†are not the same thing. Something is moral, this group argues, if it is rule based and if blame can be apportioned if that rule is broken. Something is ethical on the other hand if it contributes to a good life.
** I think you probably could make a good argument for universalising scepticism under both consequentialist and deontological approaches but this post is already way too long.
If I may I would like to begin with jmercer and the argument that because the dictionary definition of scepticism contains no mention of “moral†or “ethicsâ€
I have to say that I think this argument weak. I checked the entry in the same dictionary for “courageâ€, which is one of the classical virtues, and found no mention of “moral†or “ethics†there either. While it may be that modern language does not regard courage as a virtue I find this unlikely so I would conclude instead that the dictionary is producing a definition based on everyday language use rather than the special use of the term in an ethical debate. I do not think that the dictionary argument counts against my contention that scepticism is a virtue.
He then goes on to deal with a post he attributes to me but in fact came from Bruto and is not representative of my views. However his reply to that section does contain this:
Which I will speak to because it helps to illustrate one of the key points of virtue ethics.
A scalpel is indeed a tool and like all tools it has a purpose. Its purpose is to cut well. All we can say about a scalpel is that is a good one when it cuts well and a poor one when it cuts badly. The use to which it is put does not affect whether it is “good†or “badâ€.
The same is also true of human beings: we have a purpose. The question then is what is that purpose? To answer that we have to find something that is distinctive of humans (just as the distinctive feature of a scalpel is that it cuts) and the thing that is most characteristic of us is that we are rational beings. It is because we are rational that we can make decisions and more importantly be held responsible by others for those decisions.
This is of fundamental importance to any argument about virtue ethics because those who support it hold that a life lived in a rational way is a better life than one lived in an irrational way. We strive to live a life that is in accord with reason, but we also recognise that humans are complex creatures. So we look for a way of integrating the complexity of human life into a rational system and the way that presents itself is through the expression of virtue.
Which brings me to jmercer’s last point: that the definition of virtue that he agrees does fit scepticism as an “advantage or benefitâ€
I would argue that he is wrong and that this part of the definition in fact supports my contention that scepticism is a virtue. My answer above about the purpose of humans hopefully makes it clear why I would believe that.
Next I turn to Ashles reply and his initial response that:
My answer is that for a virtue ethicist striving to live a good life in accord with reason the virtue of scepticism is a way of acting in the world. When I encounter a claim I will have an emotional response to it, either good or bad. However because I possess the virtue of scepticism I will examine it more closely to see if my initial feelings are right or wrong. The speed, accuracy and quality with which I can make that judgement depends on the degree to which I possess the virtue of scepticism. In turn I can only develop the virtue by practising it and internalising it so it becomes an integral part of the way that I act in the world.
Virtue ethics, in contrast to the other two main theories of normative ethics, acknowledges that our feelings are central to our existence as human beings; they are a lens through which we experience the world. It is our emotional responses to situations that make us sensitive to the nuances of the particular circumstances that are important in each case. Without emotions we would have great difficulty appreciating the depth and resonance of a problem and in choosing the best way of dealing with it.
This doesn’t mean, though, that followers of virtue ethics believe that we should be slave to our emotions. For a virtue ethicist emotions are something that must be cultivated so that they are displayed appropriately and used as well developed sensitivities that inform judgement rather than merely instinctive reactions.
This raises the issue of experience. Within virtue ethics we can make a distinction between the “nice child†and the “virtuous adultâ€. It is possible to find a child who is honest, generous and kind (at least I am told it is possible) and we would certainly be happy to acknowledge that such a child is very nice. However we are unlikely to describe a child as virtuous. Furthermore we know that such a child although acting out of the best intentions is more prone to make errors than an adult with the same characteristics. Why? Because the child lacks the practical wisdom that life experience brings.
A child may act with the best intentions but fail because he lacks insight into the full consequences of what he does, does not fully appreciate what he needs to know in order to bring about the desired result or has an understanding of what may be beneficial or harmful that is lacking or frankly mistaken. Making mistakes that come from these deficiencies is part of growing up and we, as rational adults, would rarely (if ever) hold a child culpable for mistakes that come from them and lead to undesirable outcomes.
In contrast we do hold adults to account if their actions or decisions lead to poor outcomes that could have been avoided by a more thoughtful approach or better grasp of likely outcomes or predicted from the knowledge that they had of the situation. We expect that an adult’s life experience will prevent them from making the same mistakes that a child would.
Unfortunately despite their life experiences many adults continue to make mistakes in their ethical dealings with the world. Many of them are highly intelligent, they are often educated and yet they continue to make poor or hurtful decisions. A virtue ethicist would argue that although these people have life experience they lack the practical wisdom to apply it correctly and thus cannot live in accordance with the virtues.
The practically wise, on the other hand, understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important and truly advantageous in life. They know, to put in a nutshell, how to live well.
Which brings me to:
I apologise for that. I’ll try and put it right now.
The living well that the virtuous experience is almost always expressed using a term from ancient Greek moral philosophy – eudaimonia. This is usually translated as either “happiness†or “flourishingâ€, although neither term really captures what it means. Obviously the problem with using “happiness†is that our modern understanding of it makes it an entirely subjective state. The only person who can tell if I am happy or have led a happy life is myself and if I say I am happy you have to accept that what I say is true. Flourishing on the other hand, while a better approximation, carries with it the idea of physical well-being. I can point at plants and animals and say that they are flourishing but the concept of eudaemonia can only be applied to rational beings. Flourishing does have the advantage, though, that it is a potentially more objective term. I may claim to be flourishing physically or mentally, and even believe that, but I may also be demonstrably wrong.
Is healthy living on its own a virtue? No, because it arises out of being eudaemon, out of flourishing. While I can point to honesty or compassion and hold them up as virtues I cannot isolate a healthy life from being wise, temperate and prudent.
The charge of cultural relativity is a difficult one for any ethical system to overcome, not just virtue ethics. However it is possible to argue that virtue ethics copes better with this than others since it is the way that virtues are applied within a society that produces the conflict not the virtues themselves.
For instance you assert that scepticism is disliked by many, would not be recognised by them as a virtue and hence cannot be considered one. I would disagree with this – I think it would be difficult to find anyone who would claim that scepticism qua scepticism is a bad thing. Indeed many practitioners of the “woo arts†claim that they were sceptical when they first encountered X but were converted by the evidence of what they saw or experienced. They attribute to themselves a virtue they do not possess in order to improve their standing in the eyes of those they are speaking to.
People dislike scepticism when it is used to expose what they espouse to be false. This doesn’t mean that they do not think of it as a virtue. I’ve seen people who challenge irrational views labelled “pseudo-sceptics†by opponents in what is clearly a (rather pathetic) attempt to demonstrate that those who expose “woo†in fact lack the real virtue of scepticism and instead have fallen into one of its related vices. These people recognise that scepticism is a virtue, just as the conman recognises that honesty is a virtue, they just do not like having it used against them.
Richard Kraut’s writing on what it is to possess a virtue elicited this response:
I hope that I have demonstrated why this passage is a lot to do with scepticism. If scepticism is a virtue then to have it is to integrate it into a deep and complex ethical life that is concerned with a lot more than simply demonstrating that someone’s ideas are wrong. BTW it’s not just one person’s opinion; it is a fairly good summation of what virtue ethicists think it is to possess a virtue.
Ashles next challenges me because I claim that someone who disputes something only in order to show off their knowledge is not displaying the virtue of scepticism. His response:
is, I would argue, incorrect. A person who habitually challenges claims in order to make themselves appear more knowledgeable or in order to browbeat others is not displaying scepticism. They are instead displaying vices such as indiscretion, tactlessness, bullying or egotism. What this sort of behaviour shows is that such a person, while they have the mental faculties to be sceptical lacks both the other virtues that are necessary to be ethical and the practical wisdom to develop them. Would any of us describe such a person as living a flourishing life?
Ashles next point, in answer to my assertion that it is possible to have the virtue of scepticism without being tactless or indiscreet, was:
I would actually agree with, although perhaps not for the reasons Ashles had when he posted. I hope that I have made it clear (although I am not a good writer) that a virtue is not simply a moral position. It is a much deeper character trait that forms part of the complex whole that is a virtuous person.
Scepticism is not a moral position; it is a virtue*. The two are not the same thing and are not synonymous with one another. Exhibiting scepticism does not mean I have the virtue of scepticism, just as exhibiting honesty does not mean I have that virtue. My reasons for acting are paramount – in order to have the virtue of scepticism it must be part of my character, not simply an expedient way of dealing with a situation.
Ashles then presents a list of statements he says display scepticism and asks if the people making them are virtuous. The answer is of course “I don’t know†because I cannot make a judgement about whether someone is virtuous from a single statement. A single act or statement tells me nothing about their character.
Virtue ethics is concerned with character. Most ethics systems ask the question “How do I make the right decision?†In contrast virtue ethics asks, “What sort of person should I be and how should I live my life?â€
Remember I am arguing from the point of view of virtue ethics. I am not concerned with whether or not you can universalise scepticism** I am concerned with whether scepticism is necessary to live a flourishing life. I am arguing that you do need it and that it is a virtue to have it and I haven’t seen any convincing arguments that I am wrong.
* There is a strand within virtue ethics that argues that “moral†and “ethical†are not the same thing. Something is moral, this group argues, if it is rule based and if blame can be apportioned if that rule is broken. Something is ethical on the other hand if it contributes to a good life.
** I think you probably could make a good argument for universalising scepticism under both consequentialist and deontological approaches but this post is already way too long.
Remember this thread?
There turned out to be an extremely high correlation between skepticism and hedonism and existentialism. As I understand existentialism (and I'm not necessarily saying I do) that is the core of a moral system based on overall good to society.
So you can't quite dismiss a connection between skepticism and morality. There is a remarkably high agreement among the skeptics here as to our moral philosophies.
There turned out to be an extremely high correlation between skepticism and hedonism and existentialism. As I understand existentialism (and I'm not necessarily saying I do) that is the core of a moral system based on overall good to society.
So you can't quite dismiss a connection between skepticism and morality. There is a remarkably high agreement among the skeptics here as to our moral philosophies.
Like hell. I am different from you people on here as far as morals goes. And you have coompletely missed the point of generalising people into 'skeptics'.rppa said:
BTW the previus post before yours was by far TOO LONG. The origional point of this thread was that you could be considered a 'skeptic' in a certain context/situation and it would say very little if nothing towards your moral virtues except for the very context you are debating.
So the morals attributed to 'skeptic' are context specific. Unless you are a 'skeptic' with relation to EVERYTHING which is unlikely & maybe impossible.
The Odd Emperor
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Camillus said:Dear me, I am incredulous that people here do not believe that scepticism is entwined with ethics.
Scepticism is a virtue. By acting in a virtuous way we promote good (and isn't ethics about the promotion of good?).
I am of course willing to be convinced that I am wrong.
I am a follower of virtue ethics and all I ask is that those who hold that that scepticism is not concerned with ethics convince me that its possession is not a virtue.
I await your repsonses.
I’m sorry, I don’t skepticism is not a virtue. (forgive me but I’m about to go all literal on you.)
http://www.chronique.com/Library/Chivalry/code.htm
The list of medieval virtues. Sometimes known as the code of chivalry.
http://www.novaroma.org/via_romana/virtues.html
and the “classic†virtues both public and private that date back to the Roman Empire.
Nowhere does skepticism or “skeptical†appear. The closest one is “Humanitas: "Humanity" Refinement, civilization, learning, and being cultured. From the Roman personal virtues.
In fact I would submit that being skeptical for a medieval person would be thought of as sinful. Especially when a large part of their culture was dictated by the Catholic Church, questioning any of that was liable to get a person into big trouble. This is exactly congruent to the reaction many believers have with outspoken skeptics. The reaction of the medieval man to skeptics was often to put them on trial and eliminate them from society.