The Zombie Poll

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The problem is not in the definitions of materialism and idealism, it is in the definitions of god and free will.

And there you have it, my friends.

No one dare say whether god has causal effect on the world.

No one can define libertarian free will's mechanism for making decisions, which must be something other than deterministic and/or random.

Talk about providing no position.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The problem is not in the definitions of materialism and idealism, it is in the definitions of god and free will.

Yes. And the problem also exists in the claim that the materialist must be 100% certain that there is no such thing as free will or God. Not only does this claim assume a particular view of what free will and God *are*, but it assumes that materialism is a known position.

There are no metaphysical positions that we can call "known". They are all choices. They are all beliefs. Since they are beliefs, one cannot speak as though one knows with 100% accuracy anything that follows from those beliefs. Fallabalism is perfectly appropriate in all such situations.

I certainly do not believe that there is any such thing as libertarian free will. I cannot make logical sense of that position with my own a priori assumptions. But compatabilist free will makes perfect sense to me. A theistic God doesn't make much sense to me. But a pantheistic "god" does. But even there, one must choose to view the universe as divine. There is nothing in the proposition that tells me that it is.

 

[Apathia]

Yes. And the problem also exists in the claim that the materialist must be 100% certain that there is no such thing as free will or God. Not only does this claim assume a particular view of what free will and God *are*, but it assumes that materialism is a known position.

There are no metaphysical positions that we can call "known". They are all choices. They are all beliefs. Since they are beliefs, one cannot speak as though one knows with 100% accuracy anything that follows from those beliefs. Fallabalism is perfectly appropriate in all such situations.

I certainly do not believe that there is any such thing as libertarian free will. I cannot make logical sense of that position with my own a priori assumptions. But compatabilist free will makes perfect sense to me. A theistic God doesn't make much sense to me. But a pantheistic "god" does. But even there, one must choose to view the universe as divine. There is nothing in the proposition that tells me that it is.

Classical Materialism and Theism are known positions that are at loggerheads with each other.

We are in a different game now. Matter just isn't what it used to be anymore, and many Christian theologians following the lead of Paul Tillich and others are no longer simple theists.
Also Hindu and Buddhist philosophies have brought some new perspectives to Western Metaphysics.

"Free Will" is often associated with Christianity, but it's not a doctrine held in all quarters of the Christian World. Reform Theology based on the works of Luther and Calvin denies Libertarian Free Will.

Wasp, thanks for another useful term, at least to me,
"Falibalism"
I embrace it. Not in the sense of some anti-intellctualism, but in the sense that perfection in worldviewing isn't really possible when we remember how limited our view is.

At the same time, we must make the best with the bad deal we have.

 

[hammegk]

I have no problem with these assumptions. These are not deal-breakers at all.

At a human behavior level, or at the level of "what-is"?

I also do not understand how the idealist gets out of the exact same assumptions.

And I don't understand what you don't see. The idealist has no need to aver that it is a 100% certainty free-will and or god do exist. That would be dualism, imo.

Neither free will nor god are required in idealism as I understand it--they are not precluded, but neither are other sorts of wishful thinking.

What types of such added wishful thinking do you suggest? I do agree neither god nor free-will are required.

Part of the problem is that our definitions of free will and god are part of our dualistic view.

Only for dualists; idealists (as you say) allow wishful anticipation as opposed to the materialists' absolute denial.

An idealist's view of free will or god is not the same as a dualist's (as, if I am not mistaken, you have been trying to tell people).

I tend to agree there could be differences.

Nor would be a materialist god ...

Ain't none ...

(and Rogers, for one, spoke of free will at a different level of analysis; our behavior is determined, but it does not feel as if it is. It feels like free will, and for Rogers, that was important enough to treat it as if it were.).
Human behavior to remain with a logical position.

The epistemology of human behavior does not address the question.

Our culture, though, uses dualistic definitions, so we reject a materialist god as "nope, that's not what I mean by god".

Again. ain't none ...

I would argue that the same is true in idealism, but that it is not as obvious.

Please do; remember my conception at the most basic is the ability of "what-is" to initiate and/or receive communication, and to choose to act, or not react, to any specific incoming communication.

The problem is not in the definitions of materialism and idealism, it is in the definitions of god and free will.

What problem? It's the same question.

Yes. And the problem also exists in the claim that the materialist must be 100% certain that there is no such thing as free will or God. Not only does this claim assume a particular view of what free will and God *are*, but it assumes that materialism is a known position.

Please define "physical" to include free-will, not that we can define free-will either, but if you do I suggest your concept of matter/energy is no longer "physical".

There are no metaphysical positions that we can call "known". They are all choices. They are all beliefs. Since they are beliefs, one cannot speak as though one knows with 100% accuracy anything that follows from those beliefs.

True. The best one can do check the logic as one examines one's worldview under a specific monism as it effects or affects one understanding of all things.

Fallabalism is perfectly appropriate in all such situations.

Each to his own.

I certainly do not believe that there is any such thing as libertarian free will. I cannot make logical sense of that position with my own a priori assumptions.

Most should find it a problem.

But compatabilist free will makes perfect sense to me.

Other than you don't actually have faith your free-will is as non-existent as the compatibalist free-will your computer currently exhibits.

A theistic God doesn't make much sense to me. But a pantheistic "god" does. But even there, one must choose to view the universe as divine. There is nothing in the proposition that tells me that it is.

Again, each to his own. Define "devine".


Hyparxis: You often have interesting "thoughts".

 

[Apathia]

Is this discusion evolving into "Metaphysics by Billy?"


Imagine Metaphysics being taught in middle school (Heck if they have to teach Intelligent Design ...).

The teacher has just explained how Materialism and Theism are incompatable.
Billy raises his hand.

"I don't think so."

"Really Billy? What do you think?"

"In my Materialism, there's God."

"Oh, so is God Matter or some kind of proto-matter?"

"No, God is Mind."

"What's this God made of, then?"

"Just what I said, Mind!"

"What's Mind made of? is it made of matter?"

"No! It's Mind!"

"Is Matter made of Mind?

"No, of course not! It's made of Matter!"

"So there's Mind stuff and Matter stuff?"

"Uh, no, that's Dualism!"

"So, what's the real stuff?"

"Mind!"

Billy, that's not Materialism

"It's my Materialism!"

Billy's position has no one on one with any ones in this thread. But I wonder if we don't have some My Materialism or My Idealism going on here.

These words do have technical meanings that seem to be getting lost in the cracks now and then.

There are terms in popular philosophy that are slippery eels.
"Trancendentalism" is one. Speak to one transendentalist and it's that behind our world of physical appreances there is a real world of Consciouness.
Talk to another and it's that there is no other world but that the world we experience is shot through and through with the principle of self-transcendence.

Sure lot's of things are up for grabs now. Just don't grab an apple for me when I ask for an orange.

As for any position I might advance, let's just call it, "My Muddle."

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Please define "physical" to include free-will, not that we can define free-will either, but if you do I suggest your concept of matter/energy is no longer "physical".

The whole point of my post was that one could not be entirely sure that one's metaphysical position is correct, so one cannot be entirely sure that the concepts that follow from that position are correct. If the position is not 100% neither are the consequences of the position. I believe that libertarian free will is non-sensical because I choose to believe that physicalism is a likely true position. The absence of free will follows from the premise of "physicalism", but I cannot be sure that my original premise is correct. I'm fine with simply resorting to choice in the absence of clear knowledge and realizing that I may be wrong about that choice. Libertarian free will, as you know, is simply non-sensical in a physicalist paradigm.

Other than you don't actually have faith your free-will is as non-existent as the compatibalist free-will your computer currently exhibits.

I'm not sure it makes sense to refer to a computer as working free of constraint. Computers certainly do not have emotional systems, nor motivational systems to enable a feeling of free will.

I am also very open to the possibility, as stated above, that physicalism is wrong.

Again, each to his own. Define "devine".

Precisely my point in another thread. I don't have a definition beyond "that which I can't explain and which appears to me to be completely other (e.g. Ground of Being)." Since the general definition of divine is "relating to God or deity" and the general definition of God or deity seems to be "the divine", it looks to me like a self-referential word game.


Unless, of course, you refer to the all important process of picking grapes for wine.

 

[Mercutio]

Billy makes a great strawman. Do you know of any materialist who defines god as mind?

Hammy...if you agree (in truth, you said you "tend to agree") that there are differences between the dualist and idealist "god", and if you were forced to use the dualist definition, would it not be the case that the idealist would also have to say that god does not exist? This is the corner you paint the materialist into. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, though. If there "ain't none" for materialists because it is not what our dualist culture defines a god as, then there "ain't none" for the idealist for the same reason.

my conception at the most basic is the ability of "what-is" to initiate and/or receive communication, and to choose to act, or not react, to any specific incoming communication.

The "choose to act, or not react" is, I think you will agree, something that must be assumed and cannot be evidenced (as I read it, anyway); I know you define "communication" more broadly than most here, but (IMO) reasonably. One cannot, though ever know whether something was not affected or simply chose not to react. Whether something *must* react in a given way repeatedly, or merely chooses to. It is the same unknown that materialism works with. Materialism assumes no free will in these situations--just mechanism and randomness. Idealism assumes free will in these situations--just choosing to be influenced or not.

It is quite impossible to distinguish free will from determinism and randomness. Or vice versa. Not so long as we *could* choose to freely act in ways which we could also have been forced. Not so long as we *could* have randomness to blame for unpredictable, seemingly free, behavior.

 

[Apathia]

Billy makes a great strawman. Do you know of any materialist who defines god as mind?

No.
There was a punchline lost!

I know you aren't a Materialist, and are not playing fast and loose with the term.

The joke about Billy is in the word "my" where defined Philosophical terms get so twisted about that they turn into mush.
The level of mush in UE's Materialist Thread was amazing. A number of people weighed in without a clue what the words they were using meant.
Some folks (not you btw) shouldn't have opened their mouths till they did some homework on basic Metaphysics. Some other just suffered from a general lack of reading comprehension skills.

Oh, but is there any objective meaning to the Metaphysical madness anyway?
Only on the margins. Metaphysical truth is Subjective.

 

[Apathia]

Where have all the zombies gone? With the flowers and the cowboys?

We segwayed from the original topic. I fell off mine though, didn't even have the blamed thing turned on. So I gave it to Prime Minister Koizumi, but he already had one.

Wasn't it Billy's Dualism or something like that?

 

[hammegk]

Hammy...if you agree (in truth, you said you "tend to agree") that there are differences between the dualist and idealist "god", and if you were forced to use the dualist definition, would it not be the case that the idealist would also have to say that god does not exist?

Nope. I might assign a very very very near zero probability, for, say, Jesus=God. I need not state at 100% the chance = 0.

I can see that some positions, even though dualist, say, possible flavors of deist, pantheist, panentheist or ??, might approach an idealist's personal understanding of free-will and/or god. On a personal basis I assign very very low chances to any concept of god I can think of or have heard of.

This is the corner you paint the materialist into.

Yeah, doncha hate 100% certainty?

What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander, though. If there "ain't none" for materialists because it is not what our dualist culture defines a god as, then there "ain't none" for the idealist for the same reason.

As I say above, sorry, but no.

The "choose to act, or not react" is, I think you will agree, something that must be assumed and cannot be evidenced (as I read it, anyway); I know you define "communication" more broadly than most here, but (IMO) reasonably.

Thank you.

One cannot, though ever know whether something was not affected or simply chose not to react. Whether something *must* react in a given way repeatedly, or merely chooses to. It is the same unknown that materialism works with. Materialism assumes no free will in these situations--just mechanism and randomness. Idealism assumes free will in these situations--just choosing to be influenced or not.

Just so. (Probs usually very very very close to zero in the macro world, certainly.)

It is quite impossible to distinguish free will from determinism and randomness. Or vice versa. Not so long as we *could* choose to freely act in ways which we could also have been forced. Not so long as we *could* have randomness to blame for unpredictable, seemingly free, behavior.

We agree epistemology fails.



As to the wasp: Hi, dualist!

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

These words do have technical meanings that seem to be getting lost in the cracks now and then.

The question is, do they have technical meanings that remain consistent across all metaphysical writings? I don't think so. Tell me what materialism is. Tell me what eliminativism is.

Then there are words that just don't mean anything at all. Tell me what libertarian free will is.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

As to the wasp: Hi, dualist!

I'm sorry, but in what way? Because it might be possible that idealism is correct? What two substances exist in my world in which I believe that physicalism is correct but cannot state with unequivocal certainty that I am right about that decision? My hesitancy, by the way, is a product of not knowing precisely what the "substance" that physicalism describes consists in.

The ground of Being is not new substance, but expression of the totality that surrounds us and may simply be viewed as worthy of worship. The inability for us to really understand the nature of this reality (that includes whatever stuff it is we call physical) is what is the true mystery and can be called divine.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm sorry, but you're not allowed to have a philosophy that doesn't fit neatly in one of the bins.

~~ Paul

 

[Apathia]

The question is, do they have technical meanings that remain consistent across all metaphysical writings? I don't think so. Tell me what materialism is. Tell me what eliminativism is.

Then there are words that just don't mean anything at all. Tell me what libertarian free will is.

~~ Paul

Let them be whatever Billy wants them to be when he wants them to be. Far from me to play teacher, especially after that Emerson quote. lol.

 

[Mercutio]

Nope. I might assign a very very very near zero probability, for, say, Jesus=God. I need not state at 100% the chance = 0.

Come on...that's a fairly low bar.

I can see that some positions, even though dualist, say, possible flavors of deist, pantheist, panentheist or ??, might approach an idealist's personal understanding of free-will and/or god. On a personal basis I assign very very low chances to any concept of god I can think of or have heard of.

"Approach" is not "is". (or...may we say that it depends on what your definition of "is" is?) I respectfully suggest that you are using similarity as a fudge factor. If there is a dualist position with the same definition of god as the idealist, after all, then what distinguishes your view from this particular dualism?

Yeah, doncha hate 100% certainty?

I have very little need of it, pragmatically speaking. Too many years teaching scientific method, statistics and probability.

 

[Apathia]

I'm sorry, but you're not allowed to have a philosophy that doesn't fit neatly in one of the bins.

~~ Paul

And anything you say will be placed in a bin not of your choosing for you.
Furthermore: you aren't allowed to show up with a bin of your own.
The acceptable bins are Materialism and Idealism. The unnaceptable, but still agknowledged bin is Dualism. Other bins do not exist and must be left at the door.
Content deposited in any bin (All content will be deposited in a bin.) is subject to being moved from bin to bin at the convenience of other posters.
All posts will be deconstructed and reconstructed in order to be assigned to a desirable bin.
Bins will be deconstructed and reconstructed to insure that no content is without a bin.
Undesirable content will be ignored or reconstructed into the Dualism Biin.
Persons wishing to create or offer a single bin all significant content can be carried in, will be placed in a bin and loaded onto the next laundry truck.

 

[hammegk]

I'm sorry, but in what way? Because it might be possible that idealism is correct?

Any choice of monism may be correct as I see it, and, nope, we as humans will apparently never know. The problem as I see it is that any name given a monism describes something that finally arrives, in essence, at one of the positions that are often stated as body (materialism) vs mind (~materialism, or in the vernacular, idealism). To me, "neutral (agnostic as recently coined) monism", just delays the choice.

What two substances exist in my world in which I believe that physicalism is correct but cannot state with unequivocal certainty that I am right about that decision?

Body / Mind, as always; that's what the equivocation gets you.

My hesitancy, by the way, is a product of not knowing precisely what the "substance" that physicalism describes consists in.

The choice remains; the same old split is inherent in the difference between any definitions. If you take the tack that reality is not a local phenomena (courtesy of Aspect/Bell on through Delayed Choice Quantum Eraser), where is the materialist then?

The ground of Being is not new substance, but expression of the totality that surrounds us and may simply be viewed as worthy of worship. The inability for us to really understand the nature of this reality (that includes whatever stuff it is we call physical) is what is the true mystery and can be called divine.

Agreed. And for a dualist, goddidit (i.e. allows in an unknowable way body to communicate with mind) remains the unprovable option.

"Approach" is not "is". (or...may we say that it depends on what your definition of "is" is?) I respectfully suggest that you are using similarity as a fudge factor. If there is a dualist position with the same definition of god as the idealist, after all, then what distinguishes your view from this particular dualism?

IMO, no 2 humans have ever reached a mutually agreeable definition of god (Good Orderly Direction ain't too bad .. ), so how is that my problem?

I have very little need of it, pragmatically speaking. Too many years teaching scientific method, statistics and probability.

Yeah, but now you're back to epistemology.

 

[Mercutio]

IMO, no 2 humans have ever reached a mutually agreeable definition of god (Good Orderly Direction ain't too bad .. ), so how is that my problem?

It is only your problem if you insist it is also the materialist's. (Allow me to speak in abstractions, please; I am certain there are idealists whom you would label dualists, just as you label [many?] materialists dualists.) If we play the game of "no true materialist", those kilts fit idealists as well.

If it is not your problem, nor is it the materialist's.

Yeah, but now you're back to epistemology.

Agreed. But that is my training and experience, so it is an effort to leave it behind.

And...this training shows the very real limits of our human sensory/perceptual/cognitive capabilities. The 100% you ask for is much like asking for a measurement in 1/10000000000ths, when the tools you have available have a maximum sensitivity of 1/10.

Thus...all those assumptions...

 

[hammegk]

It is only your problem if you insist it is also the materialist's. (Allow me to speak in abstractions, please; I am certain there are idealists whom you would label dualists, just as you label [many?] materialists dualists.) If we play the game of "no true materialist", those kilts fit idealists as well.

If it is not your problem, nor is it the materialist's.

Not so. I have no 100% certain problem with free-will and/or god. That's reserved for materialists. And recall matter/energy is in this idealist's view the epiphenomena of "mind" doing its' thing.

 

[Mercutio]

Not so. I have no 100% certain problem with free-will and/or god. That's reserved for materialists.

What, by assertion? What did I get wrong?

And recall matter/energy is in this idealist's view the epiphenomena of "mind" doing its' thing.

Must be nice not to have to ask the question "how?".