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The relationship between science and materialism

EXACTLY. It makes no sense. That is what I proved logically. You no longer need my proof. You are agreeing with me. "Reductive materialism" isn't materialism at all.

Gerald Broflovski: Dammit!
Chef: What?
Gerald: He's using the Chewbacca Defense!

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chewbacca_defence

(Seriously, I was actually pointing out that it was your silly neutral monism that multiplies entities beyond necessity).
 
Is that the same as saying that our first philosophical job is making sense of the data our senses give us? If so we are on the same page so far.

That's not what I meant. The first philosophical job (with regards to this avenue of inquiry) is to identify that quality, not data, is the thing that needs explaining.

I have no idea why you think this is a second instance. It looks to me like more of the first instance.

Because you have made the above mistake

It looks to me like it has explained both, insofar as they can be explained at all.

And again
 
According to YOU, Kevin, anything but eliminative materialism multiplies entities beyond neccesity.

I never said that. I'm also very much agnostic about whether your version of eliminative materialism is logical, useful, or an accurate representation of what actual eliminative materialists believe.

Kindly get back to defending your position, instead of making one up for me.
 
Posted again, so nobody can miss it:

http://web.mit.edu/bnickel/www/24-00/handout6.pdf

1 Philosophical Behaviorism

Philosophical (= Dispositional) Behaviorism takes for granted a distinction between mental predicates and non-mental ones.

[snip]

2 Functionalism

Functionalism is the claim: Functionalism Mental States are Functional States.

Functional states are states specified in terms of their relations to inputs, outputs, and other states.

[snip]

3 Reductive Materialism

Reductive Materialism is the claim: Mental States are Physical States.

Reductive Materialism identifies a mental state with a particular physical state. In that, it agrees with functionalism and behaviorism that all mental states confer certain dispositions on the thing that has these mental states. I.e., reductive materialism accepts (1). However, and this is where reductive materialism differs from functionalism, it is not enough for a creature to have the dispositions that certain counterfactuals are true; they must be true in virtue of the creature’s having a particular physical constitution. Here’s a different way of putting the same point: Reductive Materialism claims that, among all the possible realizers of the machine table associated with human psychology, only the realizers that have our physiology count as actually having mental states like pain.

4 Eliminative Materialism

Eliminative Materialism is the claim : There are no mental states.

Crucially, eliminative materialism does not say that we don’t talk using words like “pain”; we obviously do. But when we believe that there’s something out there that answers to this, we’re wrong. So eliminative materialism denies all three claims (1), (2), and (3).
 
I never said that. I'm also very much agnostic about whether your version of eliminative materialism is logical, useful, or an accurate representation of what actual eliminative materialists believe.

Kindly get back to defending your position, instead of making one up for me.

I can only defend my position from you by demonstrating that your attempts at a refutation are incoherent. Unless you know what position it is that you want to defend, then what you are doing is the equivalent of trying to attack me with an imaginary weapon.
 
Geoff said:
EXACTLY! <shakes head>
So why are you talking as if reductive materialism assumes the independent existence of the things to be reduced?

What on earth could "reduce" mean?

a) It could mean that all mental terms can be replaced by physical terms. But this would be eliminativism.
And also reductive materialism. What is the difference?

~~ Paul
 
Kevin, Wasp and Mercutio:

It's this simple: Unless you have a coherent position you are willing and able to specify and to defend, all of your claims that my position is wrong are worthless. You cannot tell me "your position doesn't make sense" unless you have a better position which you can show makes MORE sense. Not one of you has this. At least Paul knows he's struggling for a position and is trying to do something about it. The rest of you don't seem to think it matters. It does matter.

If you've got no better explanation for fossils than evolution, you are not entitled to go round claiming evolution is stupid.

If you've got no better explanation for minds than neutral monism, you are not entitled go round claiming neutral monism is stupid.
 
Geoff said:
4 Eliminative Materialism

Eliminative Materialism is the claim : There are no mental states.

Crucially, eliminative materialism does not say that we don’t talk using words like “pain”; we obviously do. But when we believe that there’s something out there that answers to this, we’re wrong. So eliminative materialism denies all three claims (1), (2), and (3).
Whoa! First of all, what is a mental state? Is there an implied dualism to this term? Second, what in hell does "something out there that answers" mean?

~~ Paul
 
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Geoff said:
It [reductive materialism] doesn't assume this [dualism]. It is an unintended consequence.
You said:

If "reduction" is going to work then there needs to be two levels which get reduced to one. But any admission there is two levels ends up being dualism whether you like it or not.
No one is admitting there are two levels! Reductionists are not making any dualistic claims. The two levels are conceptual. The word reduction does not imply anything dualistic.

There is, as you said, no ontological difference between reductive and eliminative materialism. So what is this unintended dualism you're on about?

~~ Paul
 
If you've got no better explanation for fossils than evolution, you are not entitled to go round claiming evolution is stupid.
Not true. What is true is that you are not entitled to claim that, since you have poked holes in evolution, whatever it is that you believe in its place is automatically supported.

Note, we are not simply saying your view is stupid. We are poking holes in it. Deflating it. This does not require something to take its place. Phlogiston is wrong independently of the existence of oxygen.
 
Geoff said:
It's this simple: Unless you have a coherent position you are willing and able to specify and to defend, all of your claims that my position is wrong are worthless. You cannot tell me "your position doesn't make sense" unless you have a better position which you can show makes MORE sense. Not one of you has this. At least Paul knows he's struggling for a position and is trying to do something about it. The rest of you don't seem to think it matters. It does matter.
What the hell? I don't need any position whatsoever to suggest that you have made a spurious distinction between reductive and eliminative materialism.

~~ Paul
 
Whoa! First of all, what is a mental state?

The thing you would find it inconceivable to eliminate. Your subjective experiences. Why do you keep ending up having to ask this question? A mental state is just another word for "a subjective experience".

Is there an implied dualism to this term?

Not in my system. But if you are a materialist then there is either an implied dualism in this term or it is excess to requirements and you're going to end up being an eliminativist.

This is the crux question. The materialist has to give an answer:

Answer "Yes" and he's an eliminativist.
Answer "No" and he's a dualist.

There's no other logically available route to take from this point. You cannot answer "Yes and No".

Second, what in hell does "something ou there that answers" mean?

~~ Paul

"something out there answers to" is exactly the same as the usage here:

U1: "Something out there which answers to the sun rising (going up into the sky)"

as opposed to

U2: "Something out there which answers to the Earth turning to face the sun"

There is something which answers to U2. Nothing answers to U1 - because U1 is already covered by U2 and U2 is the correct version. U1 is, technically speaking, plain wrong.
 
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What the hell? I don't need any position whatsoever to suggest that you have made a spurious distinction between reductive and eliminative materialism.

~~ Paul

Yes you do. You need to explain why the distinction is spurious. You are going to have a hard to time claiming that you cannot distinguish between eliminativism and reductionism. The difference between them is clearly specified, well understood and disputed by nobody (to my knowledge). There simply isn't any room for misunderstanding on this one.

Reductive materialism claims that minds are brain processes.
Eliminative materialism claims that minds aren't brain processes because there are no such things as minds.

Once you've read and understood the definitions, there's simply no possibility of confusing these two things, which is why nobody who is familiar with the terms ever disputes them. EM is a very SPECIFIC claim about language. RM SPECIFICALLY does not make that claim. Therefore there is no room for accusations of a "spurious distinction".

Do you now understand the difference between EM and RM?

And for the record, the post you were reacting to was not aimed at you. You are at least attempting to find and defend a position. Some other people are just claiming they have such a position, but aren't willing to tell me what it is!
 
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Geoff said:
Not in my system. But if you are a materialist then there is either an implied dualism in this term or it is excess to requirements and you're going to end up being an eliminativist.

This is the crux question. The materialist has to give an answer:

Answer "Yes" and he's an eliminativist.
Answer "No" and he's a dualist.

There's no other logically available route to take from this point. You cannot answer "Yes and No".
I'm sorry, but I can answer that I am a reductive materialist. Why? Because there is no ontological difference between a reductive and eliminative materialist. There is no implied dualism. Then you can ask me exactly how eliminative I'd like to be and we can have some amusing wordplay about words being excess to requirements.

"something out there answers to" is exactly the same as the usage here:

U1: "Something out there which answers to the sun rising (going up into the sky)"

as opposed to

U2: "Something out there which answers to the Earth turning to face the sun"

There is something which answers to U2. Nothing answers to U1 - because U1 is already covered by U2 and U2 is the correct version. U1 is, technically speaking, plain wrong.
As an reductive materialist I can say that there is something that answers to pain, but I do not yet know exactly what it is. However, by Ed, it does not include some silly dualistic notion.

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
Yes you do. You need to explain why the distinction is spurious. You are going to have a hard to time claiming that you cannot distinguish between eliminativism and reductionism. The difference between them is clearly specified, well understood and disputed by anybody (to my knowledge). There simply isn't any room for misunderstanding on this one.
Horsecrap.

Do you now understand the difference between EM and RM?
Nope.

~~ Paul
 
Geoff said:
Reductive materialism claims that minds are brain processes.
Eliminative materialism claims that minds aren't brain processes because there are no such things as minds.
This depends entirely on the definition of mind. Are you comfortable with:

Reductive materialism claims that pain is brain processes.
Eliminative materialism claims that pain isn't brain processes because there are no such thing as pain.

regardless of how I define pain?

~~ Paul
 

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