The relationship between science and materialism

[Ichneumonwasp]

In the context of my preceding statements, yes! Does that worry you and why?

Seems a bit circular to me.

Do you know what "quality" means?

Well, it seems to have a connotation of a feeling associated with an event.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Geoff wrote:

There is no metaphysical difference between reductive and eliminative materialism. They both make an identical metaphysical claim : physicalism is true. The difference between them is that the reductive versions allow for the continued usage of mind to refer to something which can both be reduced to the physical yet fundamentally isn't physical.

Paul replied :

I disagree completely.

Then you're completely wrong. Reduction and elimination aren't the same thing but you think they are.

Reductive materialists explicitly state that there is nothing that cannot be reduced:

As opposed the the eliminativists who claim there is nothing to be reduced in the first place.

See the difference? It's very important.

Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

Originally Posted by Geoff :
This is impossible to do, so all reductive physicalism depend on making a distinction between mental and physical whilst at the same time being unable to explain in any detail what the distinction is. It is an attempt to have one's cake and eat it.

I don't see this in the above definition.

Then you're not looking. Sentence by sentence analysis:


"Reductive materialism (Identity theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states."

This claims that physicalism is true. It claims minds have a referent but that it "does not refer to an autonomous level of phenomena".

"Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level."

This is a claim that physicalism is true, and that all mental terms can be reduced to physicalism terms. What it does *NOT* do is explain how this "reduction" is supposed to work. In my theory, which is reductive, there are two levels of ontological description - phenomenal and noumenal. My reduction involves reducing phenomenal things to noumenal things. In this way, I do not need to eliminate any mental terms. But this "reductive materialism" cannot explain what it means by "reduce". Eliminativists would argue that this term "reduce" means nothing more than "eliminate".

In other words, reductive materialism does not (usually) explicitly claim it cannot eliminate the mental words, but it NEVER claims it can eliminate them. Instead, it tries to redefine them as physical (turning it into eliminativism) or it glosses over the unspecified relationship between mental and physical (turning it into dualism in an badly-fitting dress.)

Geoff

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

See my discussion with Ichneumonwasp. Materialism refers to quality as the explanandum in the first instance but to brain processes as the explanandum in the second instance. Don't you see the problem there?

From www.dictionary.com:

"explanandum

n : (logic) a statement of something (a fact or thing or expression) to be explained".

No. Even having looked up the term you are using, I still have no idea what you think is a problem.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul,

If "reduction" is going to work then there needs to be two levels which get reduced to one. But any admission there is two levels ends up being dualism whether you like it or not. Hence eliminativism. Neutral monism only avoids this by reducing things to the noumenal - a new layer which is neither physical nor mental. This confines the dualism to the phenomenal world and eliminates it from things-in-themselves. Therefore the reduction can work.

Geoff

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You're the one who said he wanted to get back to the definitions. If you don't want to do that, then fine.

YOUR definitions, not mine.

OK, subjectivity is the totality of subjective experiences. No, no, you never told me that. You did tell me that the totality of subjective experiences is mind, but you did not equate that with subjectivity. But now we can get somewhere if you want to continue. What is "subjective experience"?

Well I told lots of other people.

Mind = mental = subjective = 1st-person
Matter = physical = objective = 3rd-person

Easy.

Now you have a go.

Really? What is my position?

Incoherent.

You've told me at least three times. I recall that you first told me what my position was after I simply asked you three simple questions. So let's hear the divination again. What is my position? So far I've been a materialist, a physicalist, a naturalist, a non-eliminativist, an eliminativist. Which one am I now?

I haven't got a clue, wasp. Neither have you.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

This is a claim that physicalism is true, and that all mental terms can be reduced to physicalism terms. What it does *NOT* do is explain how this "reduction" is supposed to work. In my theory, which is reductive, there are two levels of ontological description - phenomenal and noumenal. My reduction involves reducing phenomenal things to noumenal things. In this way, I do not need to eliminate any mental terms. But this "reductive materialism" cannot explain what it means by "reduce". Eliminativists would argue that this term "reduce" means nothing more than "eliminate".

Marvelous. By all means, let them debate what reduce means for another millennium. Meanwhile, as you say, there is no ontological difference between reductive and eliminative materialism. The difference is one of word games.

Here's another definition:

Reductive materialism (Identity Theory) claims that there is no independent, autonomous level of phenomena in the world that would correspond to the level of conscious mental states. It also states that the level of conscious phenomena is identical with some level of purely neurological description. Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

Oh look, now conscious phenomena are identical with neurological description. This implies that reduce means equate.

When someone today describes himself or herself as a materialist, they generally mean they stand somewhere in a spectrum defined at one end as reductive materialism[3] and at the other end as eliminative materialism[4]. Reductive and eliminative materialism[5] describe the poles of the process known as intertheoretic reduction. Intertheoretic reduction[6] refers to what happens when a new scientific theory either better explains or else completely invalidates an existing scientific theory. If the new theory better explains the old one, it is said to have reduced it to a fuller, more convincing explanation. A successful reduction of this kind was the incorporation and clarification of Newton's laws of motion in Einstein's theory of relativity, or of Maxwell's laws of electromagnetism in quantum theory.

OMFG, it's a spectrum! However shall we label people if it's a spectrum?

I hereby proclaim myself a .8395549-materialist.

~~ Paul

 

[davidsmith73]

Seems a bit circular to me.

You may be right, but I have the feeling that this is a particular inevitability of trying to define something that is non-relational. You end up just substituting words, ie. experience, quality, redness. But that doesn't mean those words do not refer to something.

Well, it seems to have a connotation of a feeling associated with an event.

You may have demonstrated my above point. I suggest you have directly substituted "quality" with "feeling":

Well, it seems to have a connotation of a quality associated with an event

In addition, I don't think the last part is necessary. The quality may indeed be associated with an event but that is not necessary is it? Imagine experiencing a total visual field of redness. What event would that be? In any case, you have not provided a relational definition of "feeling", yet you use the word freely in everyday life and understand what it means, correct?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

YOUR definitions, not mine.

I was giving you definitions and asking if they were acceptable to you based on your earlier statements. Decide if you want to play that game or not. Stop wasting my time with this stupid game. I really do have better things to do with my time.

Quite funny that I have no clue what my position is since I have repeated it several times in this very thread and have not changed an iota from the outset.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If "reduction" is going to work then there needs to be two levels which get reduced to one. But any admission there is two levels ends up being dualism whether you like it or not. Hence eliminativism. Neutral monism only avoids this by reducing things to the noumenal - a new layer which is neither physical nor mental. This confines the dualism to the phenomenal world and eliminates it from things-in-themselves. Therefore the reduction can work.

Nonsense. There is nothing about the term reduce that implies independent existence of the thing being reduced, unless you simply insist on a dualistic framework to begin with. In fact, if there was an independent existence, then the thing could not be reduced.

Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

Where does this give any independent existence to "conscious phenomena"?

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

But that doesn't mean those words do not refer to something.

If they are circular how can you be sure that you have the right definition? HOw can you be sure that they really refer to something and are not just place-holders for a non-existent concept?

If quality does not denote a feeling, what does it denote? For words to make sense, they must be defined in terms of other words that are not their equivalent.

 

[davidsmith73]

From www.dictionary.com:

"explanandum

n : (logic) a statement of something (a fact or thing or expression) to be explained".

No. Even having looked up the term you are using, I still have no idea what you think is a problem.

Quality is identified as the thing that, in the first instance, needs explaining. In the second instance, materialism constructs a explanation that equates to brain processes. Thus, in the second instance, materialism has explained brain process, not quality.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Paul,

If "reduction" is going to work then there needs to be two levels which get reduced to one. But any admission there is two levels ends up being dualism whether you like it or not.

What a hilarious idea.

By that "reasoning" there are as many "levels" as you like. Want to reduce ice and steam and water to one substance? Too bad, any admission that there are three substances means that those three substances have irreversibly gained metaphysical status of their own.

Neutral monism only avoids this by reducing things to the noumenal - a new layer which is neither physical nor mental. This confines the dualism to the phenomenal world and eliminates it from things-in-themselves. Therefore the reduction can work.

That's not reducing Geoff, that's multiplying entities beyond necessity.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I was giving you definitions and asking if they were acceptable to you based on your earlier statements. Decide if you want to play that game or not. Stop wasting my time with this stupid game. I really do have better things to do with my time.

Quite funny that I have no clue what my position is since I have repeated it several times in this very thread and have not changed an iota from the outset.

So why can't you tell me what it is?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's not reducing Geoff, that's multiplying entities beyond necessity.

EXACTLY. It makes no sense. That is what I proved logically. You no longer need my proof. You are agreeing with me. "Reductive materialism" isn't materialism at all.

 

[davidsmith73]

If they are circular how can you be sure that you have the right definition? HOw can you be sure that they really refer to something and are not just place-holders for a non-existent concept?

I'm not sure I understand you. Quality refers to any experience. Redness refers to redness. Which bit of that statement are you doubting?

If quality does not denote a feeling, what does it denote?

I'm saying that my use of "quality" and your use of "feeling" is the same.

For words to make sense, they must be defined in terms of other words that are not their equivalent.

You gave me a definition of quality that failed to do that. You just substituted "feeling" for the word "quality".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

Nonsense. There is nothing about the term reduce that implies independent existence of the thing being reduced, unless you simply insist on a dualistic framework to begin with. In fact, if there was an independent existence, then the thing could not be reduced.

EXACTLY! <shakes head>

What on earth could "reduce" mean?

a) It could mean that all mental terms can be replaced by physical terms. But this would be eliminativism.

b) It could mean that not all mental terms can be replaced by physical terms. But this would not be materialism.

c) !!!!! THERE IS NO (c) !!!!!

Conscious phenomena are nothing over and above the neural level, thus it can be reduced to that level.

What does "reduce" mean? a, b or c?

A and B are mutually exclusive. One of them has to be true.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So why can't you tell me what it is?

Because I already have repeatedly, and I refuse to play the Geoff game of "what is your stance?" when you can't answer a question. You have done it again -- refusing to answer questions and pretending not to know what other's think as a ploy to cover your evasion. I won't play that game any longer.

Put up or shut up.

I'm saying that my use of "quality" and your use of "feeling" is the same.

OK, so we are getting somewher. Quality = Feeling. Is that correct?

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Quality is identified as the thing that, in the first instance, needs explaining.

Is that the same as saying that our first philosophical job is making sense of the data our senses give us? If so we are on the same page so far.

In the second instance, materialism constructs a explanation that equates to brain processes.

I have no idea why you think this is a second instance. It looks to me like more of the first instance.

Thus, in the second instance, materialism has explained brain process, not quality.

It looks to me like it has explained both, insofar as they can be explained at all.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is stupid.

Here is a concise description of the differences between functionalist, reductive and eliminative forms of materialism:

http://web.mit.edu/bnickel/www/24-00/handout6.pdf

 

[davidsmith73]

OK, so we are getting somewher. Quality = Feeling. Is that correct?

yes