Any explanation that defines physicalism to be true turn physicalism into something resembling a religion.
Emergentism doesn't define physicalism to be true. It provides a potential answer to some of these dilemmas and allows physicalism to be true. There is a difference. The fact that there are emergent properties in this universe is simply a fact. That is one reason why your proof fails. You can try again.
I didn;t define the terms.
You set up this rule that you pull out any time anyone gives you an answer that you cannot counter -- Oh, no you can't use that because it defines physicalism to be true.
Are you going to have a go?
Hell no. I'm trying to stay out of this debacle. I get to have a few good laughs over it and don't have to circle the drain when everyone trots out the same arguments because you are talking past each other.
I tried to play peacemaker early on until it just got silly. It has moved past silly, leapt over riduculous and is clawing past inane.
I only jump in when I think something has been overlooked.
I didn't define ANYTHING.
Um, yes you did. You created this rule that physicalist explanations are out of bounds because they seem to define physicalism as the only possiblity. I'm sorry, man, but emergentism just is. We don't know for a fact that consciousness is an emergent property of neurons. We simply suspect it. But the existence of emergent properties means that your proof's use of causality is not exhaustive of the forms of causality. Therefore, you have not proven that physical explanations cannot in theory explain consciousness. The door is still open.
I have no idea what the final answer is. I have my guesses, but I could be wrong. I've been wrong plenty of times before. If you want to claim that you think it is more likely that neutral monism is correct, then that is fine with me. It is the claim that physical/material explanations are impossible that creates so much rancor. I'm afraid that you haven't accomplished that yet.
What option is that then?
The counter-argument is all ready. Let her rip.
Oh, wait, I remember now. Geoff keeps claiming that he didn't post any definitions. Um, yeah, Geoff, you did. In fact that is what we have been arguing against.
One of those definitions if I remember was that subjective means that which is not observable by an outside observer. But, as Paul mentioned, you already defined calculation as a purely physical process. So that means that when we calculate in our heads, we are performing a purely physical process that is subjective. There can be any number of individual experiences of this, but the calculation that is physical is subjective by your definition. So there is something wrong with your definition of subjective or you should admit that some physical processes can be subjective. Or you can simply special plead that human calculation is completely different from computer calculation.