The relationship between science and materialism

[UndercoverElephant]

Damn this is fast... and I have lots of available time!

I just read the page I asked you to read. Turns out Buddhism has already got a term for what I call "Zero":

http://naturyl.humanists.net/diamon.html

Sunyata

A neutral monism based on our modern understanding of reality must take into account the fact that the "potential-filled nothingness" described not only by Eastern philosophy but also by quantum mechanics is the bedrock of the world and is prerequisite to both matter and mind. Interestingly, we find that Buddhism has an ancient term for just such a concept - Sunyata - meaning "pregnant void."

You might also remember that it was the exact same concept which ultimately toppled lifegazer's argument, which started with "There is SOMETHING experiencing a world". I claimed the "something" might be a nothing and he had no response apart from to claim that taoism was evil and Heidegger was stupid. Anyone know where he is?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No, he doesn't. But he doesn't want to accept physicalism can be shown to be wrong, either. Paul is a weird one. Somewhere deep down, it is obvious he doesn't believe that physicalism is true, but he doesn't want this to be shown logically, and he doesn't like any of the alternatives. That's how it looks to me anyway. Whatever, this certainly isn't a description of a typical physicalist.

Ed, how I hate it when bozos pull out the armchair psychology on an Internet forum.

Here is what I think: If you define all monisms carefully, they will be equivalent. You can call it frogmuffin monism for all I care. The only way you are going to select one over the other is if your monism is inherently dualistic.

I just read the page I asked you to read. Turns out Buddhism has already got a term for I call "Zero"

So does Hinduism. The idea that there is some basic "isness" from which everything arises is not all that deep.

There is ONE rule only: You not allowed define physicalism to be true. If you do that then you are committing the crime that scientific materialism is accused of in the opening post of this thread: you have turned materialism into your own version of the Bible; defined to be true.

There is another rule: You are not allowed to define mind/mental/subjective/etc. to imply a different kind of existent from all the other stuff.

~~ Paul

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

One word.

Incoherent.

How about, um, no.

Your P1 and P2, from a physicalist perspective, form a causality chain. P2 is cause. P1 is effect. The simplest example is neuron firing as external observable cause, subjectivity as effect -- which you call incommensurate.

The resolution from a physicalist perspective is emergentism. The concept is well-represented in the history of ideas, so incoherence is not the issue unless you want to call that entire branch of philosophical speculation incoherent.

Your next step is clear so you can go ahead and take it.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Why is it incoherent to say that example 2 is the same as example 3?

It isn't, yet. But as soon as you try to give me a coherent definition of the following seven words, it will become incoherent to say that 2 = 3:

Objective
Subjective
Physical
Mental
1st-person
3rd-person
Qualia

The only coherent way to define these terms and defend physicalism isn't to claim 2 = 3. If you try to define ALL the above terms, I will prove there is a contradiction somewhere. But you can isolate the following:

Subjective
Mental
1st-person
Qualia

...and claim they either don't exist, or can be defined (eliminated) in terms of the other three. If so, you are denying the existence of minds (you are an eliminative materialist). I don't argue with people who claim this. They are logically sound, but mad.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

How about, um, no.

Your P1 and P2, from a physicalist perspective.....

NOTE: If you want to challenge this proof then you must challenge either the premises, the definitions or the reasoning. What you must not do is make some other sort of statement, which depends on an assumption that physicalism is true (thus assuming the proof fails before examining it), and claim that this means the proof is false. Any responses to this proof which take this form will be rejected on the grounds they they have nothing to do with the proof.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Here are my definitions:

Objective: in principle perceptible by all observers
Subjective: perceptible only by me
Physical: capable of being observed
Mental: a term circumscribing certain subjective experiences
1st-person: from my point of view
3rd-person: from everyone's point of view
Qualia: ridiculous term
physicalism: undefined
eliminativism: undefined
plain incoherent: copout

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

NOTE: If you want to challenge this proof then you must challenge either the premises, the definitions or the reasoning. What you must not do is make some other sort of statement, which depends on an assumption that physicalism is true (thus assuming the proof fails before examining it), and claim that this means the proof is false. Any responses to this proof which take this form will be rejected on the grounds they they have nothing to do with the proof.

We know this, for crying out loud. Stop posting it in red. Stop repeating it. If you're going to repeat it, add the stipulation that you can't beg "nonphysicalism" either. Stop treating us like children.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

We know this, for crying out loud. Stop posting it in red.

It wasn't directed at you. I am sorry I have to keep repeating it. But every time someone tries to do it, I have no choice but to repeat it!

Stop repeating it. If you're going to repeat it, add the stipulation that you can't beg "nonphysicalism" either.

OK. I will.

Stop treating us like children.

It was directed at NON-Paul.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

NOTE: If you want to challenge this proof then you must challenge either the premises, the definitions or the reasoning.

Just to recap, we already told you what we disagree with:

(E) Physical is both (P1 and P2):

This is just plain incoherent. We’ve already agreed that this isn’t a valid option.

We did not agree it was invalid and we don't think it's incoherent. Note that we are not saying P1 and P2 are the same thing.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Paul

There will be no new proof till tomorrow, because I've drunk a bottle of wine and three pints of lager. I've got several questions to ask you about your definitions but one springs to mind straight away.

Physical: capable of being observed
Physicalism: undefined

Since you have now defined "physical", why is "physicalism" undefined? Why not just define "physicalism" as "Everything which exists is capable of being observed?"

Geoff

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

the reasoning

You don't get it do you? There is more than one form of causality in this world.

What you must not do is make some other sort of statement, which depends on an assumption that physicalism is true

Yes, that is one of the two options I figured you would take. So let's get this straight, any answer that provides a physical explanation for the problem is by its very nature wrong? You have defined the only possible solution as a non-physical one then. You have committed an error at the very start. Our answers are not attempts to prove physicalism by recourse to physical answers. There are other ways of disproving physicalism than this example. You provided the "proof" and you obviously view it as disproving physicalism in some way. That we do not agree does not mean that we are using physicalism to prove physicalism. We are using physical explanations to disprove your proof and allow for the possibility that physical explanations may account for consciousness. It is only in your world where consciousness must not have a physical explanation, since you consider it to be an integral part of the universe, that the issues are so conflated. It is not a problem for any of us who only seek a natural explanation for consciousness, whether or not we assume a physical basis for it.

You cannot exclude any and all physical explanations from the outset unless you want to just say "it's my ball and you can't play with it".

You have one other option. Do you want to try that one now?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Since you have now defined "physical", why is "physicalism" undefined? Why not just define "physicalism" as "Everything which exists is capable of being observed?"

Because that requires more baggage. I would be willing to define epistemological physicalism if you think that would help. Stimpy's already done it anyway.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

You don't get it do you? There is more than one form of causality in this world.

That accusation could only come from someone who does not know me.

Since you have been interacting with me, I have been sitting on the fence between naturalism and anti-naturalism, and I have defined "naturalism" to mean "all causality is empirical".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Wasp:

So let's get this straight, any answer that provides a physical explanation for the problem is by its very nature wrong?

No. Any explanation that defines physicalism to be true turn physicalism into something resembling a religion. Physicalism then becomes your Bible. Not to be challenged. Defined to be true. That is the point of this thread. The opening post claims scientific materialism is equivalent to a religion and scientism is the fundamentalist version of that religion. And answer that defines physicalism to be true is equivalent to an answer that defines the Bible to be true. Worthless, but impossible to refute.

You have defined the only possible solution as a non-physical one then.

I didn;t define the terms. I asked other people to do that, so people couldn't accuse me of what you just accused me of.

You have committed an error at the very start. Our answers are not attempts to prove physicalism by recourse to physical answers. There are other ways of disproving physicalism than this example.

I offered to make up a proof, depending on any terms Paul gave me. He gave me some definitions. I made a proof. Now he's giving me some new ones. Are you going to have a go?

You provided the "proof" and you obviously view it as disproving physicalism in some way. That we do not agree does not mean that we are using physicalism to prove physicalism. We are using physical explanations to disprove your proof and allow for the possibility that physical explanations may account for consciousness. It is only in your world where consciousness must not have a physical explanation, since you consider it to be an integral part of the universe, that the issues are so conflated. It is not a problem for any of us who only seek a natural explanation for consciousness, whether or not we assume a physical basis for it.

I'm drunk. Tonight this made no sense. If I read it tomorrow and it makes sense, I'll reply to it.

You cannot exclude any and all physical explanations from the outset unless you want to just say "it's my ball and you can't play with it".

I didn't. I didn't define ANYTHING. Paul provided the definitions.

You have one other option. Do you want to try that one now?

What option is that then?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

If it helps, we have three (not two) things that might be confused:

1) The external (to mind) thing which causes perceptions of a chair (a real chair?)

2) The experience of seeing a chair

3) The brain process that sits between them

I hadn't noticed this before. How odd. Could you give an example of a physical thing that the experience might be, if it is not the brain process?

~~ Paul

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I didn't. I didn't define ANYTHING. Paul provided the definitions.

No, I did not.

~~ Paul

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

So define "physical" in terms of P1 and P2, please. Paul tried, and couldn't do it. Can you do better?

Okay. Watch closely, team.

The answer to this question is "Physical in this sense refers to everything which exists, which in these terms would include all P2s, and all P1s".

Geoff is going to say in response "You are just assuming physicalism to be true, just like I said you would. I win by stating beforehand that any answer consistent with science is begging the question".

Then I am going to respond to Geoff by saying "That's quite all right in this context, because you were seeking to construct a watertight, logical proof that the scientific worldview cannot possibly be correct no matter what. To defeat such an argument, all that I have to do is show that the scientific worldview is somehow reconcileable with the definitions of P1 and P2 we are using. I have shown this, so your argument fails to disprove that possible view".

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Because that requires more baggage. I would be willing to define epistemological physicalism if you think that would help. Stimpy's already done it anyway.

~~ Paul

We aren't doing epistemology. This is ontology.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Posted by Geoff:

If it helps, we have three (not two) things that might be confused:

1) The external (to mind) thing which causes perceptions of a chair (a real chair?)

2) The experience of seeing a chair

3) The brain process that sits between them

Paul replies:

I hadn't noticed this before. How odd. Could you give an example of a physical thing that the experience might be, if it is not the brain process?

~~ Paul

No.

Can you?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

No.

Can you?

Yes: The experience of seeing the chair is precisely the brain process. If you will not accept this or some other such explanation as a possible explanation, then you are assuming that the experience of seeing the chair is nonphysical, and therefore you are begging the question.

~~ Paul