The plausibility of a Nazi Victory

For me personally it would depend entirely on the circumstances. I think the Germans winning the war they began on September 1 1939 is a plausible scenario, however it requires certain things to have happened/not happened throughout the progress of the war - mainly on the part of the allies. These are things that were likewise plausible.

If you mean the later stages of the war then no, Nazi victory is implausible.

The more obvious condition is the USA not joining the war against Germany, even after Pearl Harbor. I think this could have easily happened, and without the enormous weight of US industry behind them, the allies would have been hard pressed to defeat Germany in Europe.

That's what I was trying to get at, gumboot.

What we call the Second World War really began as a series of regional conflicts. It was distinguished from the outbreak of the Great War in several ways. The will to resist fascism was much less solid, especially in the Western democracies, than the will to resist the Kaiser had been. Fascism was even welcomed in many political circles as a bulwark against communism and a cheap way to accommodate German, Italian, and Spanish national aspirations.

All bets were off after Churchill and friends were elected to power in the UK and the Neutrality Acts were sufficiently modified to allow the US to pursue a more responsible foreign policy.

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I think MaGZ is referring to something like this: http://www.unmuseum.org/nbomb.htm. There is no evidence anywhere that the Germans were close to developing atomic weapons.
 
I tried to come up with something witty to say here, but failed. So I'd like you to all pretend that I said something really, really funny, and nominate me.

Ditto
After all, what's the point?
Didn't the Allies win?
Yeah U.S.!
 
Germany had similar long range strategic bomber research going on: the flying wing. Couple this with their bomb and things could have been different.

would this please you? if Germany had dropped a nuke on NYC or Washington, D.C.?
 
Germany successfully tested their bomb in the Fall of 1944 and March 1945.


Perhaps in some alternate universe, but not in the one we currently inhabit.


Germany had similar long range strategic bomber research going on: the flying wing. Couple this with their bomb and things could have been different.


You mean the Horten Ho 229? It had nowhere near the specifications that the U.S. had laid down in 1941. These are what were requested in 1943: a 620 mile range; a bombload of 2,220 lbs; a speed of 620 MPH. The speed is certainly impressive, but the other specs are far short of anything even remotely resembling a strategic bomber. The original U.S. specifications called for a combat radius of 5,000 miles while carrying a 10,000 lb bombload (subsequently reduced to a 4,000 mile combat radius).

The B-29, for its part, could carry a bombload of 12,000 lbs over a combat radius of 1,600 miles at medium altitude.


Russia won the war against Germany, Britain was an afterthought, and the US' biggest role was to ship arms to the Russians.

9 out of 10 dead German soldiers died in the Russian Campaign. Everything else? 1 out of 10. D-Day? THe battles to shatter what was left of Hitler's armies? The bombings and air strikes and African warfare? 1 out of 10.


The Strategic Bomber Offensive over Germany, specifically the Oil and Transportation Plans beginning in the latter part of 1944, were critical elements in crippling and then collapsing the German economy. It didn't win the war by itself, but a nation unable to transport raw materials to the factories, and the products of the factories to the soldiers at the front, will not be able to continue fighting for long.
 
I consider the Holocaust to be the Nazi's third front. Admittedly the Final Solution ended up as a pivotal piece in their master plan, and I don't want to minimise the human tragedy, but what an incredible waste of resources when they were already fighting long odds.
 
Minor nitpick, but Churchill wasn't elected; he was appointed Prime Minister by the King.

That's an election in a way. Just by a fairly exclusive franchise. ;)

In retrospect, wars always appear to be inevitably won by the victors but that one is almost a case study in how near run they really are. Had Chamberlain not committed to Norway and remained "neutrally hostile" then he could have captured the support of his cabinet and the public. Had Sweden fully accommodated Germany and Finland then Hitler's Scandinavian adventure wouldn't have even been necessary.

Here's a small essay on Swedish policy in 1940: http://digital.library.okstate.edu/OAS/oas_pdf/v47/p318_324.pdf

The now-infamous Norwegian Vidkun Quisling was, as early as 1922, a part of Nobel Peace Prize winner Fridtjof Nansen's humanitarian mission to the Soviet Union: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fridtjof_Nansen. There's some reason to believe that the Scandinavian adventure could have worked out for both Chamberlain and Hitler and maybe a Nobel Peace Prize in it for each of them.

Iran is the new Sweden in a lot of ways. They aren't particularly committed to the interests of anyone in their region but their avowed neutrality and self-interest is greatly in dispute.
 
Minor nitpick, but Churchill wasn't elected; he was appointed Prime Minister by the King.

By the way, have you read Troublesome Young Men? The other guy I'd never heard of before was Ronald Cartland.
 
The 'Battle of the Atlantic' one of the most embarrassing 'battles' ever fought in the history of warfare? By 1943, the Germans had sank nearly a million tons of allied cargo for the price of a few handfuls of U-boats.

Its more like 10 million tons -- they sand something like 7 million in 1942.
 
I'd like to point out though that, while the US aid certainly helped a lot, it helps if it's put in perspective.

The Russians produced some 84,000+ T-34's alone. Add in the heavy tank category approximately 5,219 KV-1, 255 KV-2, 3,854 IS-2, 2,311 IS-3, 250 IS-4. Then there was the buttload of older tanks which are much maligned, but were fairly on par with what Germany had in the early days. And then there are the tank destroyers and SP Artillery pieces (the ISU-152 sounds like a mobile howitzer, but the massive shell could mess up even a Tiger) and whatnot.

The 7000 tanks received from the allies were hardly the backbone of Russia's tank armies.

And for example they actually had to convert a lot of the 2000 or so underpowered 75mm Shermans (which couldn't penetrate the sloped armour on a Panther at any distance) to their own 76mm guns, as well as replace the tracks on most Shermans with something that actually worked in heavy snow. The gasoline engine also made it very much unloved by the crews.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to say it didn't help, or anything. Just that one shouldn't underestimate the massive resources the Soviets themselves threw at it.
 
I'd like to point out though that, while the US aid certainly helped a lot, it helps if it's put in perspective.

The Russians produced some 84,000+ T-34's alone. Add in the heavy tank category approximately 5,219 KV-1, 255 KV-2, 3,854 IS-2, 2,311 IS-3, 250 IS-4. Then there was the buttload of older tanks which are much maligned, but were fairly on par with what Germany had in the early days. And then there are the tank destroyers and SP Artillery pieces (the ISU-152 sounds like a mobile howitzer, but the massive shell could mess up even a Tiger) and whatnot.

The 7000 tanks received from the allies were hardly the backbone of Russia's tank armies.

And for example they actually had to convert a lot of the 2000 or so underpowered 75mm Shermans (which couldn't penetrate the sloped armour on a Panther at any distance) to their own 76mm guns, as well as replace the tracks on most Shermans with something that actually worked in heavy snow. The gasoline engine also made it very much unloved by the crews.

Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to say it didn't help, or anything. Just that one shouldn't underestimate the massive resources the Soviets themselves threw at it.



It stands to reason that the allies would not send Russia things it had plenty of. You cannot win a campaign just by building a lot of tanks, How will you get them to the front? How will you supply them in the field? And so forth.

You also have to be careful of your figures - a total of 84,000 T-34s were built, but that production run extended to 1958. Only about 57,000 had been built by the end of 1945 (still a huge number mind you).

Russia undeniably expended a vast amount of effort producing huge numbers of weapons. But part of the reason they could do that is because they could focus their industry on a few products as they were getting much of everything else from the allies.

How well do you think those Russian tanks would have been supplied without the trains and trucks supplied by the allies? During WW2 Russia received 1,900 locomotives from the allies. During the war they built only 94 of their own. Yet the overwhelming majority of their military equipment was transported to the front via train. Many of the locomotives they were using were built in the previous century.

Likewise trucks - another vital piece of equipment; the allies supplied Russia with over three times as many trucks as they themselves produced.

And don't forget boots. Fifteen million pairs of boots were supplied to the Russian army by the allies. Soldiers don't last long without good boots in a Russian winter.
 
The 'Battle of the Atlantic' one of the most embarrassing 'battles' ever fought in the history of warfare? By 1943, the Germans had sank nearly a million tons of allied cargo for the price of a few handfuls of U-boats.

Your point?



In fact, given the questionable 'quality' of the British naval ships in anti-submarine work, and the fact that merchant ships themselves were armed in the early stages, simply banding the ships into convoys and providing some weaponry would have most likely been as effective or more, at less expense, and offering more flexibility to the British Navy.

Um... you don't seem to be familiar with the Atlantic runs. The British implemented convoys from the outset (a tactic they learned to be effective in WWI), but still suffered serious losses, until they increased convoy escorts in about late 1940, at which point losses dropped and the first German "Happy Time" ended.

Then, when the USA joined the war the Germans moved to the eastern Atlantic (a testament to the effectiveness of the Royal Navy) to attack US shipping because the US failed to take basic measures: ships were unarmed, unescorted, and not in convoys. Further, coastal cities were not blacked out, so transports were easy to spot.

This started the second Germany "Happy Time".

In Spring 1942 the Americans finally caught on and implemented the British tactics including convoys, however there was still a 5-day dead patch in the middle of the Atlantic where there was no air cover (aircraft were vastly superior submarine hunters to surface ships). The USA had only 112 long range aircraft capable of covering the entire Atlantic, and all of them were sent to the Pacific.

The single undeniable fact is that without constant supply, the allied armies could not fight the Germans. The Atlantic shipping lanes were the single most important supply line of the entire Allied war effort, and as such their strategic success relied entirely on maintaining that supply line.

This was well understood by everyone involved in the war. Allied success in cutting off German supply to the Africa Korps was ultimately the reason for their loss in North Africa. Had Germany succeeded in cutting of the Atlantic supply lines the allied war machine would have ground to a halt.



No, the 'Battle of the Atlantic' was important, but only in determining the rate at which the allies lost ships to U-Boats.

That doesn't even make sense.


And there's no real evidence that the pre-1942/43 convoy efforts were truly much good at all, in terms of protection offered by naval ships.

The fact that the Germans switched from attacking British mid-Atlantic convoys (mostly originating in Canada) to American convoys in the western Atlantic is ample evidence that British security measures were highly effective.


The more important part was arming the merchant ships so that they could scare off a U-Boat in the event that one surfaced (as Torpedo quantities were limited) and the realization that a small number of highly concentrated targets is far more difficult for the Germans to target. It's that final realization that accounted for most of the success of convoys.


The British did both of these things from the outset. The Americans, once they joined in, took about a year to catch on.



In terms of importance, it's true Allied shipping was paramount, but in terms of operations, the Battle of the Atlantic wasn't a clear-cut victory, or even particularly decisive in any way.`

It was a very clear-cut victory for the allies. They achieved the objectives they sought to achieve, while denying the enemy any of their objectives. That's the very definition of victory.

1943 was a clear cut turning point in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Just look at this graph:

From 1939 to 1942 the Germans increasingly sank more and more allied shipping, and while Allied production increased, it was a doomed equation, with Germany clearly having victory.

From 1943 to 1945 the situation completely reversed, with a simultaneous enormous increase in Allied production and decrease in sinking. The Allies now had the clear victory.

The flow on effect from this abrupt turnaround was enormous. The allied supply lines from 1943 allowed the Allies to begin threatening Western Europe. They were able to choke the Germans in North Africa. Hitler and his command, increasingly concerned about Allied advances in the west, were forced to attempt a decisive move in the East, and had their armies shattered at Kursk.

The forces doing the shattering were better supplied and equipped than they had been at any other time during the conflict, primarily as a result of the enormous allied effort to maintain the Murmansk Run.

There's an old saying that holds a lot of truth in it. Tactics win battles, Strategy wins campaigns, and Logistics win wars. The Battle of the Atlantic was a battle for logistical supremacy in Europe.
 
nazi no germans a faint maybe

the nazi's ideas of race [sub-race ethnic what ever]
did not allow them to even come close to winning
as they were incapable of useing the men and equipment
they captured

3 major points that could have helped

1 get russia to attack poland first
that may slow/stop the english and french declaring war
as the allied powers wanted to limit german expansion
far more then the russian's
and that could get russia in the war as a full ally
germany had no pressing reason to attack first
as they had preagreed to the split borders
and could even claim to occupy their 1/2 of poland
to ''save'' it from the dreaded commies after a short delay
best case they get 1/2 poland and no war
better case they get england and france as allies in a war against the commies and thats about the only way to beat the USSR
worse case they get russia as a active ally in a war with england and france
I really see little down side to this [except for poles]
but nazi's being nazi could not let the USSR go first

2 capture the brit's on the coast at Dunkirk quickly
use the 250k + POW's to settle the war with england in 1940
slim best hope that rational germans could pull this off
nazi's no chance
get their so called allies italy and japan to loan their fleets
and all attack invade england or at minimum use the threat
to force a settlement
but nazi's hate to ask for help

3 even slimmer
feed cloth house and train the russia POW's
build a national liberation army of them
or at least support/supply troops workers ect
but being nazi's that thought was missing intil to late
 
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From 1939 to 1942 the Germans increasingly sank more and more allied shipping, and while Allied production increased, it was a doomed equation, with Germany clearly having victory.


Well, it didn't help German fortune that is was starting the war with only one-third of the number of submarines it was estimated were needed to close the Atlantic. Add to that the terrible trouble with torpedoes the Germans had early on, and they were fighting an uphill struggle from the start.

I've heard it said, and it seems there's some validity to it, that the mystery is not that the Germans lost, but rather they managed to do as well as they did considering the many disadvantages they faced.
 
This has nothing directly to do with Nazis and their chances of plausibly winning the war but it shows the impact and mistake of forcing the USA into the fray. At one point during the Pacific theater of the war, we had one fleet carrier (the USS Enterprise). By the end of that theater of the war (less than four years), we had built and put into service like 20 or more fleet carriers. Think about that. And that doesn't include escort carriers, destroyers, battleships, PT boats, planes, subs, tanks, weapons, artillery, ammunition, and so on and so on. That ability to attain resources and build so relentlessly so quickly put Nazi Germany at an extreme disadvantage as soon as we declared war on Japan. Their only possibility for changing the tide of the European theater would have been to develop the atomic bomb first and employ it (especially threatening if added as a warhead to their V2 rockets). Had they had the resources and could maintain manufacturing maybe air superiority using jet airplanes and rockets would have had an impact. All hypothetical for sure.
 
Their only possibility for changing the tide of the European theater would have been to develop the atomic bomb first...

An effort which would consume an enormous amount of resources in and of itself.

...and employ it (especially threatening if added as a warhead to their V2 rockets).


Which would have required further development of the V-2. It didn't have the payload capacity to carry an atomic warhead (if the weight of the Fat Man and Little Boy bombs are any indication), nor did it have anywhere near the range to threaten the United States directly.

Had they had the resources and could maintain manufacturing maybe air superiority using jet airplanes and rockets would have had an impact.


Even if the jet fighter they did have, the Me 262, had entered service earlier, it wouldn't have changed the ultimate outcome. It would have made the air war more costly for the Allies however.
 
If you asked me if I'd rather roll around northern France in a Sherman or a Tiger, I'd take the German tank unhesitatingly, but I understand your point.

That's fine. You take your sexy Panther, I'll take the Shermans that were far easier on logistics, ran better and more reliably and that in their better/later incarnations were a match for the Panther anyways. I'll also take the late war Allied tanks that would have stomped any German tank and in far larger numbers. I'll also take the far superior planes and artillery that you couldn't swing a dead cat without hitting one or two nearby by the end of the war. I'll also take the massive amounts of trucks and mechanized transport, and the superior comms systems. :cool:
 
That's fine. You take your sexy Panther, I'll take the Shermans that were far easier on logistics, ran better and more reliably and that in their better/later incarnations were a match for the Panther anyways. I'll also take the late war Allied tanks that would have stomped any German tank and in far larger numbers. I'll also take the far superior planes and artillery that you couldn't swing a dead cat without hitting one or two nearby by the end of the war. I'll also take the massive amounts of trucks and mechanized transport, and the superior comms systems. :cool:

My immediate point was that if my goal were to stay alive in a confrontation between a single U.S. tank and a single German tank, then the choice was very clear. My secondary point was that "better equipped" can be defined in more than one way.
 

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