The NORAD 9/11 Response

[Cylinder]

Transponders are inherently active. and interrogation in inherently a challenge reply process.

Right - I was speaking to the overall scheme. Certainly cost is a factor. A passive IFF mode has served air forces quite well over the years and would be an effective failsafe for those times that domestic airspace again becomes a battle-space.

 

[Darth Rotor]

Right - I was speaking to the overall scheme. Certainly cost is a factor. A passive IFF mode has served air forces quite well over the years and would be an effective failsafe for those times that domestic airspace again becomes a battle-space.

You refer to procedural IFF? RTF procedures?

DR

 

[gumboot]

It may be a stupid question, but how about a system that highlights all radar activity without transponders?

That would be the primary radar screen - which is what they had to use on September 11.

The problem is (as they found out) you don't know where a given aircraft is. When you have literally hundreds of aircraft in your airspace, trying to identify one is impossible.

If we look at the flights on 9/11, AA11 was initially located on primary, then lost when it entered New York Centre airspace. As a result no one knew it had crashed, and NORAD ended up chasing a ghost AA11 to Washington DC (AA11's projected direction from point at which it was lost on Boston Centre's Primary).

UA175 was never located on primary, and AA77 was only located on primary 5 minutes before it hit The Pentagon.

UA93, likewise, was never located on primary.

To make matters worse, twice in the first 90 minutes of NORAD operations, they were sent after their own fighters because the ATCs picked up the primary contacts of the NORAD fighters and thought they were hijacked airliners.

Now, I made an interesting discovery from all this information:

Airlines independently track all their aircraft - which enabled United Airlines to confirm that UA 175 had hit the WTC within minutes. Sadly American Airlines were not so forthcoming with their own information.

If Airlines can track their own aircraft independent of the ATC system, surely a secondary tracking system using the same methods can be run parallel to the ATC, to be used in emergencies.

Secondly, I am sure by now the computer technology exists for a program to cross-reference primary and secondary radar returns in real time. This would make locating aircraft without transponders as easy as looking at the primary radar screen (I imagine non-cross-checked contact appearing in a different colour or whatever).

-Andrew

 

[defaultdotxbe]

That would be the primary radar screen - which is what they had to use on September 11.

The problem is (as they found out) you don't know where a given aircraft is. When you have literally hundreds of aircraft in your airspace, trying to identify one is impossible.

i think his suggestion would be taking primary radar and dropping off any returns with transponders, leaving only the "blips" with no identification

of course that could still very well be a mess too

 

[gumboot]

i think his suggestion would be taking primary radar and dropping off any returns with transponders, leaving only the "blips" with no identification

of course that could still very well be a mess too

Oh right, that's very much what I am suggesting then - except I am suggesting simply having them in a different colour. I suppose you could have a third screen that only outputs blips without transponder information.

-Andrew

 

[eeyore1954]

Any objections to me posting this timeline on the Ed Schultz board and the loose change board.

Thank you

dave

 

[gumboot]

Any objections to me posting this timeline on the Ed Schultz board and the loose change board.

Thank you

dave

No, please do. I only ask that you include the links to the original sources from which I compiled it.

-Andrew

 

[gumboot]

Bumped for Geggy

 

[kevin]

for being the masterminds behind a huge conspiracy these guys getting more information from CNN than the airport is telling....

 

[kevin]

preventing transponders being turned off, having a pre-existing shoot-down order

I'm not convinced this is a good idea. I can see situations where the transponder makes the plane a terrorist target and the ability to turn them off might be beneficial.

This is one of those reponses that seems to be fighting the last war, rather than anticipating the next one.

 

[kevin]

Secondly, I am sure by now the computer technology exists for a program to cross-reference primary and secondary radar returns in real time.

I think you can accomplish this with one radar and the transponder information. Just difference the last pass with the current pass, anything moving with no current transponder info is highlighted.

 

[gumboot]

I'm not convinced this is a good idea. I can see situations where the transponder makes the plane a terrorist target and the ability to turn them off might be beneficial.

Such as?

I should clarify, obviously you have to be able to turn transponders off, otherwise you get clutter from aircraft on the ground. I mean more making them more tamper-proof so terrorists can't disable them.

I believe they have already done this.

You are right of course, these sorts of measures are fighting the old war - I propose that passengers will prevent anyone ever hijacking a civil airliner again.

-Andrew

 

[Brainache]

BUMP because it is relevant to current discussions and a shame to see such great work go to waste.

 

[Josh Redstone]

Agreed. Excellent job on this by the way =)

 

[maccy]

Bump because there is a lot of nonsense being talked about NORAD yet again.

Also, here is Gumboot's full document on this.

http://screwloosechange.xbehome.com/fst/NORAD.pdf

via

http://www.lolinfowars.co.nr/

 

[gorgg]

Great job indeed.

I have one small remark though.

Well, yeah. If the hijacking is inside the ADIZ, NORAD scramble to escort the hijacked aircraft to an airport - standard proceedure is to tail the aircraft 5 miles back.

In the event of a hijacking in the USCON Defence Zone, the FAA hand the entire situation over to the FBI, and it would be up to the FBI to determine whether a military escort was required. In the event that they did use a military escort, there is no reason to assume they would involve NORAD.

It looks to me this contradicts with what's in the commission report (chapter 1):

Interagency Collaboration. The FAA and NORAD had developed protocols for working together in the event of a hijacking. As they existed on 9/11, the protocols for the FAA to obtain military assistance from NORAD required multiple levels of notification and approval at the highest levels of government.101

FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by "squawking" a transponder code of "7500"-the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.102

If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command.103

 

[Sword_Of_Truth]

I just posted the following over at Conspiracy Smasher, I believe it has relevance here:

Dumbocrap believes one of two things:

That dedicated servicemen from two countries with the most advanced equipment and training in the world are too stupid to be able to tell when they are being manipulated. He believes that they are so moronic that even after 5 years they can't figure it out.

Or...

He believes that US and Canadian servicemen know what happened and they don't care that they helped kill the people they swore to protect.

If the twoofers want to trash NORAD, they can bring it on. It's a free country (thanks to those they accuse). But let's not let them get away with denying the complete ramifications of their accusations.

If someone believes these men are stupid, evil or both, they should say it. They should not be allowed to state thier accusations and then say they aren't trying to insult our nations servicemen.

 

[gumboot]

Great job indeed.

I have one small remark though.

It looks to me this contradicts with what's in the commission report (chapter 1):

Not really. What the Commission Report failed to mention was those proceedures were only in place for military intercepts WITHIN the ADIZ.

I'm not sure why the Commission Report failed to make this distinction, because it is fairly clear in FAA regulations. The FAA can only directly involve NORAD in operations over CONUS Airspace when a "Special Air Security Situation" (not sure on the precise phrasing) has been declared - in other words, when the country is on a heightened state of alert.

Intercept proceedures are dictated by the FAA's Aeronautical Information Manual, CH 5, Sect. 6 - National Security and Intercept Proceedures

Which states:

a. National security in the control of air traffic is governed by 14 CFR Part 99.

And 14 CFP Pt.99 states:

(a) This subpart prescribes rules for operating all aircraft (except for Department of Defense and law enforcement aircraft) in a defense area, or into, within, or out of the United States through an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) designated in subpart B.

(b) Except for §§99.7 [special security instructions], 99.13 [transponders], and 99.15 [position reporting] this subpart does not apply to the operation of any aircraft-

(1) Within the 48 contiguous States and the District of Columbia, or within the State of Alaska, on a flight which remains within 10 nautical miles of the point of departure;

-Gumboot

 

[Peephole]

Not really. What the Commission Report failed to mention was those proceedures were only in place for military intercepts WITHIN the ADIZ.

I'm not sure why the Commission Report failed to make this distinction, because it is fairly clear in FAA regulations. The FAA can only directly involve NORAD in operations over CONUS Airspace when a "Special Air Security Situation" (not sure on the precise phrasing) has been declared - in other words, when the country is on a heightened state of alert.

Sorry for bumping this thread but the Commission Report gives some pretty clear references and I don't see how there's anything in these pre-9/11 procedures that indicates it would be a problem to involve NORAD outside the ADIZ:

FAA guidance to controllers on hijack procedures assumed that the aircraft pilot would notify the controller via radio or by "squawking" a transponder code of "7500"-the universal code for a hijack in progress. Controllers would notify their supervisors, who in turn would inform management all the way up to FAA headquarters in Washington. Headquarters had a hijack coordinator, who was the director of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security or his or her designate.102

102. See FAA regulations, Hijacked Aircraft, Order 7110.65M, para.10-2-6 (2001); David Bottiglia interview (Oct. 1, 2003); FAA report,"Crisis Management Handbook for Significant Events," Feb. 15, 2000. From interviews of controllers at various FAA centers, we learned that an air traffic controller's first response to an aircraft incident is to notify a supervisor, who then notifies the traffic management unit and the operations manager in charge.The FAA center next notifies the appropriate regional operations center (ROC), which in turn contacts FAA headquarters. Biggio stated that for American 11, the combination of three factors-loss of radio contact, loss of transponder signal, and course deviation-was serious enough for him to contact the ROC in Burlington, Mass. However, without hearing the threatening communication from the cockpit, he doubts Boston Center would have recognized or labeled American 11 "a hijack." Terry Biggio interview (Sept. 22, 2003); see also Shirley Miller interview (Mar. 30, 2004); Monte Belger interview (Apr. 20, 2004).

FAA Order 7110.65M: Air Traffic control

10-2-6. HIJACKED AIRCRAFT​

When you observe a Mode 3/A Code 7500, do the following:​

NOTE-
Military facilities will notify the appropriate FAA ARTCC, or the host nation agency responsible for en route control, of any indication that an aircraft is being hijacked. They will also provide full cooperation with the civil agencies in the control of such aircraft.

EN ROUTE. During narrowband radar operations, Code 7500 causes HIJK to blink in the data block.​

NOTE-
Only nondiscrete CODE 7500 will be decoded as the hijack code.​

a. Acknowledge and confirm receipt of Code 7500 by asking the pilot to verify it. If the aircraft is not being subjected to unlawful interference, the pilot should respond to the query by broadcasting in the clear that he/she is not being subjected to unlawful interference. If the reply is in the affirmative or if no reply is received, do not question the pilot further but be responsive to the aircraft requests.​

PHRASEOLOGY-
(Identification) (name of facility) VERIFY SQUAWKING 7500.​

NOTE-
Code 7500 is only assigned upon notification from the pilot that his/her aircraft is being subjected to unlawful interference. Therefore, pilots have been requested to refuse the assignment of Code 7500 in any other situation and to inform the controller accordingly.​

b. Notify supervisory personnel of the situation.​

c. Flight follow aircraft and use normal handoff procedures without requiring transmissions or responses by aircraft unless communications have been established by the aircraft.​

d. If aircraft are dispatched to escort the hijacked aircraft, provide all possible assistance to the escort aircraft to aid in placing them in a position behind the hijacked aircraft.​

NOTE-
Escort procedures are contained in FAAO 7610.4, Special Military Operations, Chapter 7, Escort of Hijacked Aircraft.​

e. To the extent possible, afford the same control service to the aircraft operating VFR observed on the hijack code.​

[SIZE=-2]REFERENCE-
FAAO 7110.65, Code Monitor, Para 5-2-13.[/SIZE]​

http://www.btinternet.com/~nlpWESSEX/Documents/FAAprotocol.htm

If a hijack was confirmed, procedures called for the hijack coordinator on duty to contact the Pentagon's National Military Command Center (NMCC) and to ask for a military escort aircraft to follow the flight, report anything unusual, and aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency. The NMCC would then seek approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide military assistance. If approval was given, the orders would be transmitted down NORAD's chain of command.103

103. FAA regulations, Special Military Operations, Requests for Service, Order 7610.4J, paras. 7-1-1, 7-1-2 (2001); DOD memo, CJCS instruction, "Aircraft Piracy (Hijacking) and Destruction of Derelict Airborne Objects," June 1, 2001.

Chapter 7. Escort Of Hijacked Aircraft

Section 1. GENERAL​

7-1-1. PURPOSE​

The FAA hijack coordinator (the Director or his designate of the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security) on duty at Washington headquarters will request the military to provide an escort aircraft for a confirmed hijacked aircraft to:​

a. Assure positive flight following.​

b. Report unusual observances.​

c. Aid search and rescue in the event of an emergency.​

7-1-2. REQUESTS FOR SERVICE​

The escort service will be requested by the FAA hijack coordinator by direct contact with the National Military Command Center (NMCC). Normally, NORAD escort aircraft will take the required action. However, for the purpose of these procedures, the term "escort aircraft" applies to any military aircraft assigned to the escort mission. When the military can provide escort aircraft, the NMCC will advise the FAA hijack coordinator the identification and location of the squadron tasked to provide escort aircraft. NMCC will then authorize direct coordination between FAA and the designated military unit. When a NORAD resource is tasked, FAA will coordinate through the appropriate SOCC/ROCC.

http://web.archive.org/web/20011122232504/www.faa.gov/ATpubs/MIL/Ch7/mil0701.html#7-1-1​

​

 

[gumboot]

Sorry for bumping this thread but the Commission Report gives some pretty clear references and I don't see how there's anything in these pre-9/11 procedures that indicates it would be a problem to involve NORAD outside the ADIZ:

You're quite right, I've done more research since then...

My issue is that CTers think there was a standard proceedure for the FAA directly involving NORAD alert aircraft (the only aircraft in the US on stand-by for scramble). This direct relationship is only for ADIZ flights.

As your documents show, the steps for involving the military in an event other than an ADIZ deviation are quite convoluted - and in fact we know that on 9/11, while attempts were made to follow these steps, in all cases they failed miserably.

(For example the ARTCCs couldn't even notify FAA HQ about UA175 or AA77 because the HQ staff were in a meeting about AA11 and directed not to be disturbed for any reason).

-Gumboot