The Hard Problem of Gravity

How did you come to that conclusion ? Are we reading the same thread ?

I suggest a reread of Rocketdodger's recent posts. He is denying that ordinary random matter contains switches, which he considers the essential building blocks of consciousness. Such switches are to be found in animal brains, and in artefacts created by human beings. He's fairly clear about it. So do you agree with what he's saying?

Don't just accept my paraphrase of it, look at his post and see if you agree that he's saying what I say he's saying. Then you can decide if you agree that he's saying that, and whether you agree that it's right.
 
I explained why that is, and why it has nothing to do with the human-centric anthropomorphic doctrine you seem to be advocating.

I've noticed that if I say "Consciousness appears to be the result of an as-yet-unknown physical process" that gets translated into human-centric mystical theistic fluffiness.

It is a result of the mechanism of natural selection. Period.

But nevertheless you believe that consciousness is restricted to animals, humans and human artifacts?
 
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Right. Translational motion. If translational motion is involved, then some emulation of the behaviour is involved. If there's no motion - actually something going from one place to the next - then it's just a simulation.

Wrong. Again.

I already explained to you that movement is a relative property.

You can't say something is moving without also specifying what it is moving relative to.

It is entirely valid to say something in a simulation moves relative to something else in the simulation. The definition holds.

What you seem to want to say is that movement isn't "real movement" unless you yourself are included in the reference frame. Well.... ok... but that isn't the accepted definition of movement.
 
But nevertheless you believe that consciousness is restricted to animals, humans and human artifacts.

On Earth, yes -- those happen to be the entities that resulted from natural (and artificial) selection.

Elsewhere, I have no idea. I would be willing to bet it is also the results of natural (and artificial) selection, though, no matter where you find it.
 
Right. Translational motion. If translational motion is involved, then some emulation of the behaviour is involved. If there's no motion - actually something going from one place to the next - then it's just a simulation.

Running is a fairly vague thing. We might argue whether a man is running or just walking fast. But we know that a picture isn't running, and a story in a book isn't running, and a film of someone running isn't running. There has to be that translational motion. Indeed, we could claim that someone on a treadmill is runnning, even if he's not getting anywhere, but at least real legs are moving up and down.


In adition to waht RD already said -- translational motion is defined as a relational property -- keep in mind that one must describe any relation with reference to the proper frame.

A simulated dog running in a computer program runs in relation to the background of the simulation -- that's the only way that we can say that it runs or tell that it is running. It does no good to say that it does not run in relation to the 'real world' because that is not the proper frame for analysis.

When discussing if a person is running we speak of them moving translationally in reference to a group of trees or the grass on which they are running, not to the concept "liberty" or something else inappropriate.

And, yes, a person on a treadmill is running because they move translationally in reference to the strip below their feet.
 
I've noticed that if I say "Consciousness appears to be the result of an as-yet-unknown physical process" that gets translated into human-centric mystical theistic fluffiness.

Because it reads like Akumanimani's nonsense "consciousness field."

If all you mean is that some process which relies on known physical principles is responsible, and we simply haven't elucidated it yet, then you need to be clear.

Case in point -- I still don't think that is what you mean. I still think you mean a bonified undiscovered fundamental principle of physics. Like a "consciousness field."
 
The issue of intentionality is important - though I'm not sure that it still means that the calculator is necessarily calculating if sat on.

I want to go into this in more detail because of the thought experiment of a perfect simulation of the universe done in stones laid out on sand. I'm convinced that this is not equivalent to the actual universe, even if the actual universe is entirely quantised and discrete. But I think it's necessary to say why.


I'm afraid that I don't understand the issue of 'sitting on a calculator'. If you mean that if random numbers are hit along with the plus sign and the equals sign in proper sequence, then yes it is still calculating. There is no higher order intentionality since the process of choosing the numbers is random, but the program of adding numbers only occurs because of a preset 'intentional' function within the calculator.

The calculation has no higher order meaning, but that would still be calculation, because we pre-arranged for it to be that way.
 
I suggest a reread of Rocketdodger's recent posts. He is denying that ordinary random matter contains switches, which he considers the essential building blocks of consciousness. Such switches are to be found in animal brains, and in artefacts created by human beings. He's fairly clear about it. So do you agree with what he's saying?

Don't just accept my paraphrase of it, look at his post and see if you agree that he's saying what I say he's saying. Then you can decide if you agree that he's saying that, and whether you agree that it's right.

No, not just animal brains, all biological systems.

I made it clear that even cellular processes contain switches.
 
I'm a bit confused by what you are saying, I'm afraid. Do you have the idea that neurons contain information in some way?

The frequency of neuron firing, the pattern of firing, the types of connections created between them (strong, weak) and the resonant frequencies (in the cortex this generally occurs at 40 Hz) are the information. Neurons are just cells. They don't contain any information in and of themselves.


ETA:

It is very likely that I am just misreading you.

But, if anyone else is interested and does not know how the nervous system works, it is the slight variations in firing that code information.

If the whole brain does that same thing over and over again (one big reverberating loop), then no cognitive work can be performed. That "whole brain reverberating loop" is check-out time. It's what happens (essentially) during NREM sleep (but sleep is a bit more complicated than that), and what a seizure basically is. Absence seizures -- when kids stare off and are unresponsive for several seconds -- consist in a reverberating thalamocortical loop at a frquency of 3 Hz, for instance.

Hi INW,

Well, I think this agrees with what I'm trying to say!

Pixy's case, as I understand it, was that this "self-sustaining reverberation," which Dehaene et al are describing, and that is characteristic of neurons in the global workplace, was the result of self-referencing activity. I'm saying that this reverberation is more like a carrier frequency and that little actual information would be encoded in it.

Nick
 
Hi INW,

Well, I think this agrees with what I'm trying to say!

Pixy's case, as I understand it, was that this "self-sustaining reverberation," which Dehaene et al are describing, and that is characteristic of neurons in the global workplace, was the result of self-referencing activity. I'm saying that this reverberation is more like a carrier frequency and that little actual information would be encoded in it.

Nick

Hey Nick,

You may be talking about two very different things. I don't think that anyone claims a simple loop contains much (or any) information. It is variations of function within the looping behavior that are important. That is how many neural nets are set up, so I assume that is what is going on in the paper (but I haven't read it).

ETA:

For instance, what happens in the nervous system with many loops is that the strength of connection between groups of neurons changes (and that type of change is what constitutes learning).
 
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Because it reads like Akumanimani's nonsense "consciousness field."

If all you mean is that some process which relies on known physical principles is responsible, and we simply haven't elucidated it yet, then you need to be clear.

Case in point -- I still don't think that is what you mean. I still think you mean a bonified undiscovered fundamental principle of physics. Like a "consciousness field."

No, I mean we don't know. And my viewpoint is that all the explanations are nonsense according to the degree of certainty espoused. Since we don't have a physical explanation, we can only speculate.
 
I'm sure it can. However, if we consider a group of neurons resonating at, say, 50Hz, it strikes me that whilst this frequency may favour inter-neuronal communication, rather as a carrier wave favours the transmission of information in radio waves, it does not itself contain much information.
This is AkuManiMani's magic fields again. There are, as I said, a couple of problems with this idea.

The mind doesn't behave that way.
The brain doesn't work that way.
There is no possible transmitter for such a field.
There is no possible receiver for such a field.
There is no such field.
It's physically impossible.

Thus, that the information represented neuronally either does or does not self-reference IMO makes no difference.
Completely wrong. That information is all there is.

I very much doubt that you get neurons to resonate by getting them to reference their neighbour's information.
If it's a referential loop, then it is resonating. Simple as that. You need to get an electronics kit with a few NAND gates and build some flip-flops and oscillators and stuff.

I could be wrong but it seems to me unlikely.
Unlikely... but true!

So, as far as I can tell, and the linked paper doesn't seem to go into these neuronal dynamics, self-reference is not a factor here in creating the conditions for conscious access.
Read Hofstadter.
 
Pixy's case, as I understand it, was that this "self-sustaining reverberation," which Dehaene et al are describing, and that is characteristic of neurons in the global workplace, was the result of self-referencing activity.
Not the result of. It is self-referential information processing.
 
Hey Nick,

You may be talking about two very different things. I don't think that anyone claims a simple loop contains much (or any) information. It is variations of function within the looping behavior that are important. That is how many neural nets are set up, so I assume that is what is going on in the paper (but I haven't read it).

ETA:

For instance, what happens in the nervous system with many loops is that the strength of connection between groups of neurons changes (and that type of change is what constitutes learning).

Well, here we're looking at how consciousness manifests according research based around a GWT-style model. One of the basic precepts of such a model is that there exists unconscious information which can become conscious if certain conditions are met. One of those conditions is that certain areas of neurons begin to reverberate at specific frequencies and that this allows a rapid transfer of information across a wide range of unconscious brain modules.

So, for me, this is not so much about learning but more about how unconscious information becomes conscious.

Nick
 
In adition to waht RD already said -- translational motion is defined as a relational property -- keep in mind that one must describe any relation with reference to the proper frame.

A simulated dog running in a computer program runs in relation to the background of the simulation -- that's the only way that we can say that it runs or tell that it is running. It does no good to say that it does not run in relation to the 'real world' because that is not the proper frame for analysis.

When discussing if a person is running we speak of them moving translationally in reference to a group of trees or the grass on which they are running, not to the concept "liberty" or something else inappropriate.

And, yes, a person on a treadmill is running because they move translationally in reference to the strip below their feet.

But when we discuss the simulated dog, or the fictional dog, or the photograph of a dog, we need to remember that when we are using the word "running" then it means something quite different to what we mean when we speak of a real dog. However the relation between the simulated dog and its background, and a real dog and its environment are very different. The relationship implied by "running" is entirely defined by its context.
 
Not the result of. It is self-referential information processing.

I don't think this is correct, and I'll tell you why.

In GWT, as I understand it, information may be represented unconsciously in neuronal arrangements. However, any piece of information, encoded within certain specific areas of the brain, may become conscious if other conditions are met. What happens is that the lucky piece of information is propagated, through amplification and resonance, to a whole bunch of neurons engaged in connecting unconscious modules together. This state of being connected "globally" is consciousness.

I don't see where self-referencing meaningfully comes into it. The about-to-be-famous piece of information (to paraphrase Dennett) is driven out of obscurity and unconsciousness by being amplified and propagated across a reverberating mass of neurons. I will happily accept that the attentional circuit that mediates the amplification is no doubt one of Dennett's "proto-self evaluators", but this aside self-referencing does not here look significant to me.

Nick
 
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Running is a fairly vague thing. We might argue whether a man is running or just walking fast. But we know that a picture isn't running, and a story in a book isn't running, and a film of someone running isn't running.

I think you just illustrated very nicely what the discussion is here, about consciousness.
 
I suggest a reread of Rocketdodger's recent posts. He is denying that ordinary random matter contains switches, which he considers the essential building blocks of consciousness. Such switches are to be found in animal brains, and in artefacts created by human beings. He's fairly clear about it. So do you agree with what he's saying?

I'm not sure because I'm having some problem following the conversation between the two of you.

I suppose it's all a question of how we define a "switch". I wouldn't venture to give my own definition, seeing as how I'm not the one arguing for or against that position, but perhaps it'd help if the both of you restated yours so we all know where we stand.
 
No, I mean we don't know. And my viewpoint is that all the explanations are nonsense according to the degree of certainty espoused. Since we don't have a physical explanation, we can only speculate.

This comes right back to the beginning of the thread. No one seems able to define their own "sense" of consciousness except by comparing to other beings that they label as conscious. So if we can't define it at all, maybe it isn't as mysterious as it seems at first glance. If it is only behaviour, there is nothing to explain.
 
Wrong. Again.

I already explained to you that movement is a relative property.

You can't say something is moving without also specifying what it is moving relative to.

It is entirely valid to say something in a simulation moves relative to something else in the simulation. The definition holds.

What you seem to want to say is that movement isn't "real movement" unless you yourself are included in the reference frame. Well.... ok... but that isn't the accepted definition of movement.

Dreams...reality...

Real life is quite different from imagined things. Learning that films and books and computer games aren't real is something most of us learn quite young.

No, the relationship between a running man and his environment, and a simulated running man and his environment are not the same. They have very little in common.
 

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