The Hard Problem of Gravity

[rocketdodger]

IBM measures single-atom memory, molecular switch

Nope. The switch was a molecule, not a single atom. The single atom was merely part of the switch.

Material dependence of switching speed of atomic switches made from silver sulfide and from copper sulfide

Only an abstract, but it looks like the same error you made above.

Illustration of an atomic switch with the double well potential for Xe atom and vibrational energy levels.

Closer, but still wrong. The only example of a single atom "switch" in that paper involved an external property changing nonlinearly (the position of a Xe atom relative to a substrate), not an internal one, so it doesn't satisfy the definition I gave.

Want to keep trying?

 

[PixyMisa]

You can go through your usual routine of low-level put downs, endless questions or random demands for definitions, and fragmented answers but the fact remains that these notions are the backbone of GWT and are clearly widely accepted amongst cognitive neuroscientists. They might not agree with your pet fantasy and so must of course be subjected to the usual unconscious attempts to push them out of your awareness, but nevertheless they do represent the real world.

I take it that means you don't have an answer.

* there is the neuronal capacity for global access

No there isn't. This is complete nonsense.

Your theory just doesn't fit with what we know of human consciousness and no amount of your usual chatbot routine is going to alter this.

I'll ask you again to name an aspect of consciousness that doesn't fit with my explanation.

Yet, attention-directed amplification can produce a state of global access for specific informations and this is consciousness, according to GWT.

As I keep telling you, this is a high-level model of the human mind. And that attention-directed amplification? If it's directed at sensory data, that's awareness. Directed at itself, that is consciousness, and that is self-referential information processing.

Yes, yes, but as usual it's meaningless because you don't actually state what you mean by this.

Tell me what you think these so-called "streams" are, and I'll tell you why they're not conscious. There are no "streams" in the brain, so these are emergent properties or conceptual models. Tell me what they are, and I'll tell you why they're not conscious.

You don't expand.

I'm not the one claiming signals are conscious.

As usual you give nothing to ratify your case, and I am left wondering if you really believe this nonsense about self-referencing loops at all even yourself.

Read Hofstadter.

 

[Belz...]

I mean that by executing an algorithm that consciousness is exhibited. Choose whatever more appropriate definition you prefer.

Er... no. YOU're the one who mentioned it. What does algorithms have to do with it ?

 

[Belz...]

That's what the neurons are doing, communicating with those next to them. GWT simply proposes that when that communication is distributed across a wide array of unconscious modules, so that communication is consciousness. Other communication is unconscious.

You seemed to imply that there was GLOBAL access. But each single neuron can only access adjacent neurons...

 

[Nick227]

I take it that means you don't have an answer.

It means I accept the precepts of GWT. See Dennett below...

As the Decade of the Brain (declared by President Bush in 1990) comes to a close, we are beginning to discern how the human brain achieves consciousness. Dehaene and Naccache see convergence coming from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model. There are still many differences of emphasis to negotiate, and, no doubt, some errors of detail to correct, but there is enough common ground to build on. - Dennett (2000)

~~~~~

No there isn't. This is complete nonsense.

See Dennett below...

Theorists are converging from quite different quarters on a version of the global neuronal workspace model of consciousness, but there are residual confusions to be dissolved. In particular, theorists must resist the temptation to see global accessibility as the cause of consciousness (as if consciousness were some other, further condition); rather, it is consciousness.- Dennett (2000) (bold italics mine)

Read slowly, this is a grand-daddy of Strong AI speaking here....Global accessibility is consciousness.

~~~~

I'll ask you again to name an aspect of consciousness that doesn't fit with my explanation.

Why bother? I've named plenty over the past few dialogues and you've refused to examine any of them. Self-referencing only meaningfully applies to inner dialogue. That's it.

As I keep telling you, this is a high-level model of the human mind. And that attention-directed amplification? If it's directed at sensory data, that's awareness. Directed at itself, that is consciousness, and that is self-referential information processing.

And as I keep telling you, this may be usage of terms in AI, but not in human consciousness, Pixy. It's not like that. The monitor in front of me is an aspect of consciousness. If I see the monitor without inner dialogue that is still consciousness. It doesn't suddenly change to just awareness. Your whole position makes no sense when we stop considering machines and start looking at real people.

Nick

 

[Steel Rat]

The consciousness in Deep Blue, would obviously be much more narrow in scope than that of a human.

Was there consciousness in the use of that comma?

 

[Nick227]

You seemed to imply that there was GLOBAL access. But each single neuron can only access adjacent neurons...

Global accessibility does not here infer that literally every single neuron is busy with the same stuff, rather that a array of unconscious modules are being broadcast to with similar information. See Dennett, Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? (2000), linked earlier, for a good introduction to GWT.

Nick

 

[Belz...]

Global accessibility does not here infer that literally every single neuron is busy with the same stuff, rather that a array of unconscious modules are being broadcast to with similar information. See Dennett, Are We Explaining Consciousness Yet? (2000), linked earlier, for a good introduction to GWT.

Nick

No, no. Wait. What's "broadcast" in this context ? Does this mean that information from one group of neurons is being transmitted to an unconnected one ? Again, how does that work ? One neuron can only communicate with an adjacent one, unless one is claiming that the impulses use wormholes.

 

[Belz...]

Why bother? I've named plenty over the past few dialogues and you've refused to examine any of them. Self-referencing only meaningfully applies to inner dialogue. That's it.

"Inner dialogue" isn't a term that logically makes sense to me. "Inner monologue", maybe. But if a process references to itself, it doesn't need an "inner monologue" (whatever the heck that is) to do it.

 

[Belz...]

Not the rock, the surrounding system.

That'll teach me to not read properly.

 

[Nick227]

No, no. Wait. What's "broadcast" in this context ? Does this mean that information from one group of neurons is being transmitted to an unconnected one ? Again, how does that work ? One neuron can only communicate with an adjacent one, unless one is claiming that the impulses use wormholes.

AFAIK nothing magical is being proposed by GWT. As quoted above..."An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain." As I understand it, and I stress that I'm no expert on GWT, this means that an attentional process has the power to make certain neural representations "globally available" to a great range of unconscious neuronal modules.

How does it do this? Don't ask me! But I think it should be clear that it's not through applying some self-referencing loop. You'll have to read more. Maybe certain frequency modulations are involved.

Nick

 

[Nick227]

"Inner dialogue" isn't a term that logically makes sense to me. "Inner monologue", maybe. But if a process references to itself, it doesn't need an "inner monologue" (whatever the heck that is) to do it.

"Inner dialogue" is the term I usually see being used to convey the process we more commonly know as "thinking" - the apparent passage of thoughts in and out of awareness, making for example these discussions possible.

Nick

 

[westprog]

This is the important part of this argument.

Westprog believes that only biological things can be conscious. There is something special about biological matter.

Is it the 'essence of life' perhaps? Or maybe the soul?

I wonder what special thing could happen to matter when it becomes part of a living thing that allows it to then, and only then, become conscious.


Hmm, I wonder...

Like I said in page two or three, no, I don't.

There's a fairly mighty Whoosh there.

I was describing what Rocketdodger is saying. He's flat out refusing to accept that the physical structures that give rise to consciousness can exist except in biological and man-made objects. I've been arguing that we don't know what physical process gives rise to consciousness.

Do people actually read this or do they just assign opinions by alphabetical order?

 

[Third Eye Open]

There's a fairly mighty Whoosh there.

I was describing what Rocketdodger is saying. He's flat out refusing to accept that the physical structures that give rise to consciousness can exist except in biological and man-made objects. I've been arguing that we don't know what physical process gives rise to consciousness.

Do people actually read this or do they just assign opinions by alphabetical order?

My mistake.

 

[PixyMisa]

I was describing what Rocketdodger is saying. He's flat out refusing to accept that the physical structures that give rise to consciousness can exist except in biological and man-made objects.

Wrong.

I've been arguing that we don't know what physical process gives rise to consciousness.

Yeah, well, that's wrong too.

 

[rocketdodger]

I was describing what Rocketdodger is saying. He's flat out refusing to accept that the physical structures that give rise to consciousness can exist except in biological and man-made objects.

Naw.

Although I would probably agree that typically the physical structures that give rise to consciousness happen to be in biological and man-made objects.

I wonder why that is?

I doubt it has anything to do with the mechanisms of natural selection. I doubt it has anything to do with the fact that systems with lots of switches are able to process information in a predictable and hence useful way for survival, giving them a distinct selective advantage. I doubt it has anything to do with the fact that such systems would be by far the most likely to evolve into what we know as biological life.

I guess it will forever remain a mystery. Man, I wish I wasn't so dumb.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

AFAIK nothing magical is being proposed by GWT. As quoted above..."An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain." As I understand it, and I stress that I'm no expert on GWT, this means that an attentional process has the power to make certain neural representations "globally available" to a great range of unconscious neuronal modules.

How does it do this? Don't ask me! But I think it should be clear that it's not through applying some self-referencing loop. You'll have to read more. Maybe certain frequency modulations are involved.

Nick

Earlier I linked to this study – Converging Intracranial Markers of Conscious Access – where you can follow a step-by-step study of what the GWT would imply in practical terms.

Here is the introductory remarks about what GW says about the necessary conditions for conscious access:

Incoming visual information becomes conscious, however, if and only if the three following conditions are met: Condition 1: information must be explicitly represented by the neuronal firing of perceptual networks located in visual cortical areas coding for the specific features of the conscious percept. Condition 2: this neuronal representation must reach a minimal threshold of duration and intensity necessary for access to a second stage of processing, associated with a distributed cortical network involved in particular parietal and prefrontal cortices.

Condition 3: through joint bottom-up propagation and top-down attentional amplification, the ensuing brain-scale neural assembly must “ignite” into a self-sustained reverberant state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain.

Condition 3 is the important point here. They also made a prediction about phase syncronity and causality (derived from GWT). In fact, the study showed that increased phase syncronity appeared in the beta frequency range rather than in the gamma band.

When the recorded neuronal groups are more distant, phase-coherent oscillations are often found in the lower-frequency beta range [57–62], probably because their slower period (30–80 ms) allows them to resist the longer conduction delays (5–15 ms) needed to bridge large cortical distances. Thus, beta-coherent oscillations may preferentially subserve long-distance synchronization and broadcasting.

I'm not a neuro scientist, but it seems to me that, when they talk about sustained synchronized oscillation, it's not that far from the idea about self-reference on a smaller scale (or from another field of study with it's own vocabulary). How else should we look at terms like "self-sustained", "reverberant" and "oscillation"?

 

[Nick227]

I'm not a neuro scientist, but it seems to me that, when they talk about sustained synchronized oscillation, it's not that far from the idea about self-reference on a smaller scale (or from another field of study with it's own vocabulary). How else should we look at terms like "self-sustained", "reverberant" and "oscillation"?

Great link, thanks. I look forward to reading it through.

About reverberation, for me it's a pretty tentative link to claim that this is the same as self-referencing. Pixy was referring to information processing systems which are, AFAIK, not dependent on oscillation. Yes, any oscillating structure is behaving as a whole, but I wouldn't personally call this self-reference. Besides, I imagine that it is not the reverberation itself per se that is needed to create consciousness, rather specific frequencies or frequency groups. So, at my current level of awareness, I would consider this link pretty far-fetched. I could be wrong.

It's also not clear for me what they mean by "self-sustained" here. I'll have to read the paper. Presumably the neuronal reverberation is still driven by the RAS or whatever.

Nick

 

[westprog]

Utility. It did not have to; the people who did this were more successful.
Given that we learn to label even our private behavior through the public behavior of others, your view requires a bit more to get it started.

It might need more, but the question remains - is our concept of consciousness dependent primarily on the third person observation of behavior, or on the experience of qualia?

I find it implausible that we invented the concept of consciousness in order to explain what other people were doing, and that this happened to match neatly with actual personal experience. While the language and understanding of consciousness is almost certainly strongly influenced by behavioural observation, the concept of consciousness itself seems unlikely to be independent of the private experience.

You are under no obligation to be right.

It's all right, it's no trouble.

It most certainly is, if you don't have the benefit of an experimental analysis of behavior.
And far less useful. Given that we cannot see their environmental histories in casual interactions, knowing that they are the products of their histories would not help us to predict their actions. The naive personality theory has utility.

"A lot simpler" is only helpful if the options are equally useful.

 

[PixyMisa]

About reverberation, for me it's a pretty tentative link to claim that this is the same as self-referencing. Pixy was referring to information processing systems which are, AFAIK, not dependent on oscillation. Yes, any oscillating structure is behaving as a whole, but I wouldn't personally call this self-reference.

Nick, it's the information processing system itself that's oscillating. Any information processing system that involves loops can be viewed as an oscillator.

They are talking about self-referential information processing here.

Besides, I imagine that it is not the reverberation itself per se that is needed to create consciousness, rather specific frequencies or frequency groups.

What the...

What on Earth are you talking about now? How in Heaven are specific oscillation frequencies (or "frequency groups", whatever those are supposed to be) supposed to create consciousness, when other frequencies (or "frequency groups") do not?

Do you think consciousness is some sort of neurologicomusical chord?

So, at my current level of awareness, I would consider this link pretty far-fetched. I could be wrong.

Could be, yeah.

It's also not clear for me what they mean by "self-sustained" here.

Self. Sustained. Self-sustained. Sustained by self.

I'll have to read the paper. Presumably the neuronal reverberation is still driven by the RAS or whatever.

It would play some role, I'm sure, but remember that the reticular formation is responsible for arousal, which is absolutely not the same thing as consciousness. You can be conscious and fast asleep - I experience this fairly regularly.