Um... Dude. You ARE aware...
I am convinced that you believe you have provided said definition. This is not the same as actually having provided said definition.
The Hard Problem of Gravity
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Um... Dude. You ARE aware...
I am convinced that you believe you have provided said definition. This is not the same as actually having provided said definition.
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
Really?
Where is this definition of consciousness you claim to have provided?
I have seen you make the assertion that my definition is insufficient, yes. All your attempts so far to demonstrate this have been logically incoherent. Sorry.
AkuManiMani
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..............
Yes. You're right. Those pages of definition, clarification, and dictionary references I provided were never actually posted.
What the h3ll is wrong with you...?
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
As far as I am aware, you have never posted a definition of consciousness. Or awareness. Or any of the other terms you have been using...............
Yes. You're right. Those pages of definition, clarification, and dictionary references I provided were never actually posted.
What the h3ll is wrong with you...?
Just post the definition. Or if I'm incorrect, then repost it. Because it would seem that everyone has missed it, not just me.
AkuManiMani
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In just about every page of this thread.
Edited by Tricky:
Edited for rule 12 violation
Fiat assertion is not argumentation, Pixy. I've clearly provided pages of coherent, detailed clarification of my position and rationale for why your position is incorrect and all you've done is post mindless one-liners in response such as "Wrong", or "Irrelevant". Then you make an occasional appeal to authority and somehow you think that that is sufficient argumentation.
You rely almost entirely on fiat assertion, obtuse stonewalling, deliberate straw-manning, and out-right lying. Seriously Pixy, where do you get the unmitigated gall?
Edited by Tricky:
Edited for Rule 12 violation.
Please remember the Membership Agreement. Attack the argument, not the arguer.
Replying to this modbox in thread will be off topic Posted By: Tricky
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AkuManiMani
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Sorry. I'll try to tone it down. I just have little patience for deliberate dishonesty.
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
Sorry, still can't see it. Please repost.
Wrong.
I, and many other posters here, including Rocketdodger, Mercutio, and Darat, have explained at considerable length why your conception of consciousness is wrong at best. I've actually had you on ignore for a while, and I'm only checking your posts because others have been responding to you.
If you make an incorrect statement, I will explain why it is wrong. If you make the same incorrect statement again, I will simply tell you that it is still wrong. If you make the same incorrect statement yet again, I'll likely put you on ignore, and so I have.
Perhaps you could address the argument I have made?
I have told you exactly how to do this:
Tell me what it is that my explanation for consciousness fails to cover.
Define this behaviour.
Define it operationally.
Show that it happens.
Show that my explanation for consciousness really does fail to provide for this behaviour.
And then we can begin the discussion.
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AkuManiMani
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I've stated repeatedly that the words 'consciousness' and 'awareness' are synonymous -- even going as far as to provided a thesaurus link. In previous posts I went to great length to define what is meant by 'qualia' and subjective experience. These are some of the lengthier responses:
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4536778&postcount=413
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4536919&postcount=419
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4538926&postcount=478
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4541837&postcount=548
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4579232&postcount=1081
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4582588&postcount=1182
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4580658&postcount=1093
http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=4582929&postcount=1198
In short, a conscious entity experiences information as 'qualia'.
Again, consciousness is qualitative experience of any kind. In humans and many other animals, it is exhibited in the states of wakefulness and some phases of sleep [i.e. Rem Sleep]. States of unconsciousness, would be states like dreamless sleep, coma, or death. Merely processing information [self-referentially or otherwise] is not sufficient to produce such states since they continue even during periods of complete unconsciousness.
Lucid subjective experience of information/information processing.
My central point is that no sufficient operational definition has been devised yet.
You do so yourself my dint of being awake
Its too broad; the operational criteria you've set for consciousness are met even in individuals that are unconscious. Your definitions also fails to define exactly how subjective experience [i.e. what we colloquially call consciousness] is generated.
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AkuManiMani
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Just stumbled across this post. Sorry, I missed it in all the hubbub; didn't meat to ignore it.
Earlier I mentioned that there is strong evidence the the carrier of conscious experience is the EM field generated by neurons and thoughts and memories are distributed patterns of information within that field.
I've posted some links discussing the theory but, just in case you've missed them I'll post them again:
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Holonomic_brain_theory
http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/Models_of_consciousness#Field_models
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yy2bggggs
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Nope, not a joke. The entire paragraph doesn't make sense to you?
Not knowing where you get lost, all I can do is punt, so let's start with the concept of equivalence versus identity.
Let's say I have a meeting at work, on a Friday, with a bunch of peers, and this meeting starts at 3:00pm. It drags on to 5:00pm, and everyone wants to leave, but the issues aren't resolved. So what we do is agree to meet at "the same time" on Monday to continue the meeting. There's a standard sense by which we judge "the same time of the day", and that is by reference to a standard clock. 3:00pm forms an equivalence class with respect to the time of day, and there's an implied equivalence relation, being the same reading on a standard clock. Still, 3:00pm Monday isn't the same exact time as 3:00pm Friday; that is, it's not an identical time. Rather, it's merely equivalent under the equivalence relation.
With respect to red, there's an equivalence class. The color red qua red, however, is entirely a function of human experience and convention; outside of the particular constructs of human vision, there's nothing particularly special about objects that make them red. What we refer to as red, instead, is a result of the particular constructs of the human visual system, and how it in particular responds to light.
Without referring to this visual system, there's nothing special by which we can judge "things" (whatever things you want to judge) as red. In order to tell that, say, this flashing light is flashing the color red, you need a human.
Now, what the human does to decipher the color of the flashing light is to simply look at it. On looking at it, the flashing light invokes a percept within the human, and that percept in itself provides the critical distinguishing value that allows the human to say that the light is red. Subjective though it may be, it's this quality that is your equivalence relation with regards to red--it's the one and only basis you have of establishing that the light is what we mean by red.
The paper Mercutio cited (which I'm about to read) mentioned "Jack" and "Jill", as platforms to discuss such concepts as whether or not Jack, when looking at red objects, sees "the same thing" as Jill sees when looking at red objects, and part of the point of the confusing paragraphs that I was citing is that, at the moment, all we can say is that they are equivalent (identity implies equivalence, but equivalence doesn't imply identity).
In terms of identity, strictly speaking, the percepts are definitely not identical--Jack's "seeing" of red isn't Jill's because Jack simply isn't Jill. Whether or not there's some other meaningful (i.e., useful) sense other than the equivalence class we use culturally to define the concept red, to discuss "identity", is an unresolved question in my mind.
Is this better?
The first link suggests a fourier analytic process in visual perception; there is (really cool) evidence for this, but it in no way suggests that "the carrier of conscious experience is the EM field...." Not at all. Just a really cool fourier analysis being performed by cells analogous to feature detector cells.
The second link does cite two authors who propose an EM field sort of analysis, but many others who do not. And of course, your source does say that descriptions of such fields which distinguish them from the (presumably non-conscious) activity of any other neurons does not exist.
To me, this suggests a misuse of "field" in some of your sources, and a proper use of "field" in a few unsupported sources.
True. What is more, one cannot say that red is "X wavelength of light" because there is no single wavelength of light that is experienced as red. Red is always a mixture of at minimum two wavelengths, in a context.
Knowing the spectral sensitivity curves of the alpha, beta, and gamma photopigments, and the rules for exitatory or inhibitory signaling to the opponent process systems, we can program a light detector to respond as we would under given ranges of ambient light. Is there more that the human element adds than this?
This presumes quite a bit of experience, does it not? There is no "simply" about it; a human with no experience in the matter will not be able to help you here.
And what does the percept invoke, and its percept, and its? Here I must begin to quite disagree with you. We cannot know that the percepts are common, but we can know that the environmental stimuli are.
We do not have this, so it is not our basis.
Please do read the paper.
Read the paper.
AkuManiMani
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Lets not be too hasty to brush off what I'm saying. Just to clarify:
In the context of neural activity, the only logical medium that could be the wave carrier for Fourier transforms would be the waves of EM field patterns generated by neural cells. As far as we know, the strong, weak, and gravitational forces play no significant role in biological interactions so EM is the only reasonable candidate.
A holonomic distribution of information across the brain would be more evidence in support of the notion that mental processes [like attention, memories, sensations, etc.] are examples of coherent wave phenomenon. Of course, the theories being suggested are a bit tentative but, as you can see, there is enough evidence in their favor to justify serious investigation of them.
I don't see why you would say that the term 'field' is being misused in describing those hypotheses. The theories presented in both sources are examples of field processes.
Yet another reason why a field explanation for mental processing and consciousness is so likely is that, as I pointed out in my expository post, is that the actual atomic components that comprise an organism at any given time are constantly being replaced via metabolic processes. The only aspect of an organism that is contiguous thru time is the informational system that organizes the flow of matter and energy thru it. Things like instincts, conditioned behaviors, memories, and thoughts must be carried by some distributive pattern that remains even as cells metabolize, divide, and die. I can think of no medium, other than a field, that would effectively accomplish this.
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rocketdodger
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Yes. It wasn't with "equivalence classes" and "percepts" where I got lost, it was with the wordy talk about q~ this and q~ that.
So all that you said -- what does it have to do with "quality" versus "reasoning?"
I have a formal definition for "reasoning" that I can use to create and/or study reasoning systems.
I do not have a formal definition for "quality" that I can use to create and/or study "qual --- ing" systems. In fact we don't even have a word for the "act" of "quality," as you see in the previous sentence...
rocketdodger
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In all of these "definitions" you merely define what you think consciousness is not. In particular, you are clear that it is not mathematically describable physical computation. But you never say what it is. I mean, you talk at length about "quality," but you never say what that is, except to assert that we all experience it.
See?
PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
Which we're all fine with.
I took a look.
E. Roy John, the first person cited, is, frankly, talking complete nonsense. "Global negative entropy"? An "electrical field resonating in a critical mass of brain regions"? No, sorry, this is junk science.
Pockett and McFadden, on the other hand, are cogent and coherent, merely wrong in every possible way.
As I said earlier:
There is no mechanism for producing such a field.
There is no mechanism for receiving such a field.
The brain does not work that way.
The mind does not behave that way.
No such field is possible.
No such field exists.
Each of these we have learned independent of the others, but any one of them is sufficient to destroy the idea.
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PixyMisa
Persnickety Insect
That tells me nothing.
Telling me consciousness and awareness mean the same thing to you (to me, they are quantitatively different) does not tell me what you think either one is.
You also told me that you thought consciousness was the same thing as what psychologists term arousal. Well, you can't do that, because awareness and arousal aren't the same thing.
Yes, but you aren't using the standard definition of qualia either. We've pointed that out to you before.
That's not a definition. It might look like a definition, but it's not.
What's a "qualitative experience"? What does it do? How does it interact?
So a qualitative experience is a thought, or a class of thought?
Sorry, that does not follow.
All that demonstrates is one particular self-referential process is largely inactive in these states.
Okay, I'll ignore the inadequacies of that definition and just ask you this:
How do you think it is possible to have a "lucid subjective experience" of information except by processing that information? What is a "lucid subjective experience" if it's not information processing?
I have one. If you want to address it, you have to define your counter-claims operationally.
Otherwise, as has been noted several times, all you are saying is "It just feels wrong to me."
Sorry, all I note is self-referential information processing.
That's because you're switching definitions. Unconscious individuals are [switch definitions] conscious.
To be more precise, there are conscious processes going on in all unconscious individuals short of outright brain death. There is one specific conscious process that is inactive, partly, largely, or entirely.
Sorry, you must have missed it. Here it is: Self-referential information processing. There. Easy, isn't it?
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yy2bggggs
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Not exactly, but close enough. You can get red with one wavelength, in context (though you need enough light of this wavelength to bootstrap the color vision system). I understand what you're saying, though--there are locality comparisons that come into play; under ordinary situations, red is the result of multiple wavelengths.
Yes. It's a technicality, but it's part of my point. The human element adds the definitive aspect to this. Red is what we call red. Said detector can only possibly be described as accurate insomuch as it is able to classify objects according to their "proper" equivalence class, and what defines the "proper" equivalence class still necessarily refers to how the human visual system works. The thing that makes humans special, in this regard, is simply a "technical default"--it's their word, tied to their concept, so they get the final say in meaning about it (so long as there is a meaning in the first place... and there is, as demonstrated by the ability to consistently and independently classify the same objects as red).
Not at all. It presumes a tiny bit more than what I have evidence for--something that is very fair to claim under Occam's razor. What I have evidence for, in particular, is that humans are capable of identifying color on the basis of something they are not specifically trained, culturally, to identify; that is, that in terms of color, there's something innate. The fact that the psyche seems to work this way, and that the evidence suggests humans work this way, simply makes a perfect marriage.
And second, might I point out that said claims are being made specifically about color. Why just color? Because (a) that's what my evidence is about, and (b) I have very good reason to suspect that this whole thing, from a representative trait perspective of how the mind and brain works, is a vast oversimplification, and that, instead, not every percept even remotely works this way, nor do they model each other in the overall aspect of "how percepts work". Why, I don't know, but that's exactly what seems to be the case.
Regarding color, specifically, and phrasing it in terms of a behavioral point of view, my claim is that there's an internal basis for the equivalence relation of "red things". Particular things that tilt me this way include:
- Subjective inter-comparitive traits that mimic the mechanics of the signals.1 For example, violet at the end of the spectrum. This is evidence pointing towards a mechanical rather than "merely learned" basis for the commonality among humans in defining these equivalence classes.
- Consistency of percepts through color illusions. This also suggests another sort of "information source", other than things that we "merely learn". The genetic tendencies of a brain to phenotypically express a certain way seems to be the natural place to associate with this tendency.
- Cross-cultural capabilities to identify colors.
- Case studies of visual agnosics--in particular, their similarities and differences to "normal sighted" humans. For example, a break in certain structures leading to an inability to be specifically-trained-to-recognize certain things, is more evidence that the structures in themselves, as opposed to some form of highly malleable "blank slate", are critical to said capabilities.
The reason I limit these claims to color is that other sorts of percepts of various forms (even within the context of vision) do not quite have the same sort of characteristic--that is, they don't seem to suggest that there's something internal--something not specifically trained for--that drives the equivalence classes they identify. Shape, for example, seems a bit more learned than color. To pick on the auditory system--pitch, in terms of octave perception, is pretty universal (the staircase illusion, for example, is pretty universal). But phonemes lie way on the other side of the spectrum--they're essentially culturally influenced shared hallucinations.
Yep. We disagree. What you say we cannot know, I can think of various ways to test. Appreciating the computational analogy in the paper you cited, and the fact that I'm a damned good software engineer (just like PixyMisa??), essentially, what's going on here is that you're pointing at "behaviors", and "environmental influences". In this analogy, these are inputs, and outputs. They are inputs and outputs, specifically, to a black box. Given this setup--a black box, a set of inputs, and a set of outputs, it's difficult to tell exactly what's going on inside the black box, true. But it's easy to demonstrate that the black box is generating information, or has come preset with information. If the outputs seem to generate richer qualities than can be explained by the inputs, especially if various forms of the same model generate the same sort of qualities, you can be sure that something is happening inside the black box. There are various independent ways to test that the outputs are richer than the inputs. The list above shows a few that convince me about color.
Alright... I've read the paper. Without hunting down the sources, all I can say is that it reads too much like "yet another person's opinion"--it seems to lack that a posteriori flair that I require to tilt my opinions--instead, it seems to jump "by default" to a conclusion of behaviorism based, from what I can ascertain, from the lack of ability to identify specific brain cells where percepts manifest. That doesn't do it for me--I'm not sure what the argument is that suggests that identifying said structures is necessary in order to demonstrate that the structures of the brain do not in some way contain information or processing not specifically trained for within a culture about certain equivalence classes, especially in regards to sensory organisms as vastly important, in evolutionary terms, and sophisticated, as the human visual system.
1And no, I don't presume that this implies a specific place in the brain where color is perceived--because it simply doesn't imply that. This is reflected in my reluctance to identify singular "quale" to any color; I see no specific reason to believe, for example, that as orange is perceived as a mix of red and yellow, that red isn't in itself a "blend" of something more fundamental--or from the other perspective--that orange is necessarily correctly described by analogous blends of signals somewhere.
lupus_in_fabula
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In regards to itself, there's no access to; there is only access. Otherwise we would be tempted to ask where consciousness is before it is accessed. There is however access to changing content.westprog said:
There is only experiencing. We can however notionally draw more or less arbitrary lines between experiences.
Philosophically we draw the line by jumping from one perspective to another (losing the regress by creating a notion of experience). Biologically the line is drawn for us when we go to sleep, or die.