The Hard Problem of Gravity

[yy2bggggs]

So all that you said -- what does it have to do with "quality" versus "reasoning?"

The former implies the latter, though the latter doesn't necessarily imply the former. Experiencing a quality is a form of reasoning--in particular, it's tantamount to classifying something into an equivalence class.

I have a formal definition for "reasoning" that I can use to create and/or study reasoning systems.

quality^dict
Using shade of meaning 1. In this case, it's a "distinguishing characteristic". In relation to what I've been saying, the quality is what we attribute to objects that belong to this particular sort of equivalence.

I do not have a formal definition for "quality" that I can use to create and/or study "qual --- ing" systems. In fact we don't even have a word for the "act" of "quality," as you see in the previous sentence...

Well, that's because quality is a noun, and used in this sense (at least how I parse the phrase), it doesn't specifically refer to perceptions (it's not the same in itself as "qualia"; it just mimics the form of the word--hey, I didn't come up with the phrase, I just claimed it made sense to me). "Quality of redness" is closer, but too ambiguous to reference perception still. But "experiencing the quality of redness" is pretty specific--that's referring in particular to the experiential aspect of the percept of red.

 

[westprog]

Yeah Pixy and I have different definitions of conscious. I hold that anything making decisions is conscious, whereas Pixy holds that anything making decisions about itself is conscious. I reserve that behavior for self-conscious. No biggie, we both understand exactly where the other is coming from.

BTW, a decision is being made. The thermostat has a physical correlate, in the form of it's mechanism (whether it be mechanical or electronic), of certain facts about the world. Those correlates do not exist in a rock.

Do you understand this? A rock can heat up but that is it. A thermostat heats up and then a specific part of it -- the physical correlate -- switches state.

If you took a rock, and designated part of it to be a physical correlate to some fact, and said "once it reaches a threshold temperature the fact is true, otherwise false" then it would also be a switch.

But that doesn't happen.

If you took a mountain and waited trillions of years, probability states that eventually there would be a pattern of information flow within the rock that is isomorphic with the information flow in a human mind. For that instant, the mountain would think it was a person. So what? If you waited trillions of years a copy of you might randomly assemble from molecules in the middle of Saturn.

We are talking about what happens on a regular, predictable basis. The reason switching systems work is because they have well defined physical correlates of facts that the switches represent. Rocks don't.

The reason that switching systems "work" is that human beings have a "need" which they fulfill. Rocks contain billions of switches. They are meaningless because they don't matter to human beings.

There is no objective way to distinguish between the billions of switches inside a rock, and the single switch of a thermostat. There's only the subjective element of the human being. Take the human away, and it's all meaningless.

 

[PixyMisa]

The reason that switching systems "work" is that human beings have a "need" which they fulfill. Rocks contain billions of switches. They are meaningless because they don't matter to human beings.

No. Wrong again.

Even if a a rock did contain billions of switches - I'm not sure what you think you're referring to here - they are meaningless because the end result is indistinguishable from simple thermal models.

Rocks don't switch.

There is no objective way to distinguish between the billions of switches inside a rock, and the single switch of a thermostat.

A billion thermostats that aren't connected to anything don't do anything.

But one thermostat connected to something does something.

Try controlling your central heating with a rock if you disagree.

There's only the subjective element of the human being.

Wrong.

Take the human away, and it's all meaningless.

And irrelevant.

 

[AkuManiMani]

In all of these "definitions" you merely define what you think consciousness is not. In particular, you are clear that it is not mathematically describable physical computation. But you never say what it is. I mean, you talk at length about "quality," but you never say what that is, except to assert that we all experience it.

I didn't say that it is NOT mathematically describable. I said that it has NOT BEEN mathematically described. I've also spent many pages explaining what is meant by conscious experience. Me pointing out examples of unconsciousness was simply to illustrated counter examples to the definition being provided by S-AI proponents.

Each of the concepts I've discusses are as semantically well defined as any other word in the English language. 'Experience', 'quale', 'awareness', etc. are as semantically defined as words like 'reason', and 'information'. One could easily take any word and demand further definition beyond is written in reference materials ad nauseum [which is what you're doing right now]. If providing several pages worth of clarification, dictionary/thesaurus citation, and examples is not enough to provided a coherent definition, then no word is coherently defined. You need to quit stonewalling and actually engage the issue at hand.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That tells me nothing.

Telling me consciousness and awareness mean the same thing to you (to me, they are quantitatively different) does not tell me what you think either one is.

All you've done is define two kinds of operations and arbitrarily assigned the words "conscious" and "aware" to each of them. You haven't established that the operations you've chosen are sufficient to produce consciousness by the standard english definition. You've essentially constructed your own, non-falsifiable, self-referential system of classification. You're not describing reality; you're essentially making one up and challenging people to disprove it.

You also told me that you thought consciousness was the same thing as what psychologists term arousal. Well, you can't do that, because awareness and arousal aren't the same thing.

I said that arousal is an instance of it; not the definition of the term

Yes, but you aren't using the standard definition of qualia either. We've pointed that out to you before.

You were wrong then and you're wrong now:

qua⋅le
   /ˈkwɑli, -leɪ, ˈkweɪli/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [kwah-lee, -ley, kwey-lee] Show IPA
–noun, plural -li⋅a  /-liə/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [-lee-uh] Show IPA . Philosophy.

1. a quality, as bitterness, regarded as an independent object.
2. a sense-datum or feeling having a distinctive quality.

Origin:
1665–75; < L quāle, neut. sing. of quālis of what sort

qua·le (kwä'lē) Pronunciation Key
n. pl. qua·li·a (-lē-ə)
A property, such as whiteness, considered independently from things having the property.

[From Latin quāle, neuter of quālis, of what kind; see quality.]

All of my definitions, clarifications, and elaborations have been consistent with the standard definition of the word "qualia". First you claim that I never provided a definition. Then when I do provide a definition -- AGAIN -- you want to claim that it isn't the actual definition. Sir, you truly are a dishonest piece of work.

Again, consciousness is qualitative experience of any kind.

That's not a definition. It might look like a definition, but it's not.

You making a fiat declaration does not negate a fact. That is a definition, as coherent and clear as any provided in the dictionary. You simply refuse to accept it.

What's a "qualitative experience"? What does it do? How does it interact?

That's the main point I've been making for over two dozen pages now. Its an open scientific question that needs real answers. Those questions are part of the so called 'hard problem'. Before computer programmers can have any hope of simulating or reproducing 'qualitative experience' its going to have to be sufficiently defined by the physical sciences -- which has not happened yet. The operational definition being put forward by S-AI ideologues is not a scientific definition of the phenomenon in question; its a dogmatic declaration made by fiat.

So a qualitative experience is a thought, or a class of thought?

Not exactly. Thoughts would be a class of qualitative experience because they have subjective qualities and are experienced by subjects.

Merely processing information [self-referentially or otherwise] is not sufficient to produce such states since they continue even during periods of complete unconsciousness.

Sorry, that does not follow.

All that demonstrates is one particular self-referential process is largely inactive in these states.

It proves, conclusively, that self-referential processing IAOI, is not sufficient to produce conscious experience -- period. Your stubborn refusal to admit this does not change the facts.

Okay, I'll ignore the inadequacies of that definition and just ask you this:

How do you think it is possible to have a "lucid subjective experience" of information except by processing that information? What is a "lucid subjective experience" if it's not information processing?

I'll say it again: Every physical process processes information. Simply defining a phenomenon as "information processing" is not a sufficient definition of a phenomenon.

I have one. If you want to address it, you have to define your counter-claims operationally.

Otherwise, as has been noted several times, all you are saying is "It just feels wrong to me."

Your 'definition' is a non-definition. It can be used to describe any physical process and interaction. This has nothing to do with how your conclusion 'feels'-- its a stark, demonstrable, ontological fact. The only way you can actually defend your position is by mere fiat and stubborn insistence. Even if one accepts your definition as correct then everything can be classified as 'aware' or 'conscious'; in which case its absolutely useless as a definition anyway.

Sorry, all I note is self-referential information processing.

That's because you're switching definitions. Unconscious individuals are [switch definitions] conscious.

To be more precise, there are conscious processes going on in all unconscious individuals short of outright brain death. There is one specific conscious process that is inactive, partly, largely, or entirely.

Then you sir, are operating from a fiat, circular tautology. If even unconscious individuals are 'conscious' by your definition then your definition is absolutely useless.

Sorry, you must have missed it. Here it is: Self-referential information processing. There. Easy, isn't it?

Easy and wrong.

Here's a challenge for you; assuming that your definition of consciousness is valid, prove that atoms and molecular compounds are not 'conscious'.

 

[westprog]

Well, I can't read Pixy or RD's mind, but I think that they would agree with me on the complexity bit. I think that some people *coughwestprogcoughcough*, are using the ultra complex human manifestation of consciousness as a guideline for what consciousness is. This is wrong.

This will lead you to believe that humans are the only conscious entities, and this is clearly wrong.

Well, I'm doing what everyone else is doing - starting with the only conscious entities we know about, and trying to figure out what it is that creates the consciousness.

Trying to establish what consciousness is from first principles is a futile exercise, IMO. We have just one example. How can we extrapolate from that?

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, I'm doing what everyone else is doing - starting with the only conscious entities we know about, and trying to figure out what it is that creates the consciousness.

Okay, done! It's self-referential information processing.

Trying to establish what consciousness is from first principles is a futile exercise, IMO. We have just one example. How can we extrapolate from that?

You could start by defining the term.

 

[westprog]

In regards to itself, there's no access to; there is only access. Otherwise we would be tempted to ask where consciousness is before it is accessed. There is however access to changing content.

There is only experiencing. We can however notionally draw more or less arbitrary lines between experiences.

Philosophically we draw the line by jumping from one perspective to another (losing the regress by creating a notion of experience). Biologically the line is drawn for us when we go to sleep, or die.

I'm happy enough with most of the above. It's very difficult to talk precisely about experience, so it's a matter of niggling away at the definitions.

 

[rocketdodger]

Each of the concepts I've discusses are as semantically well defined as any other word in the English language. 'Experience', 'quale', 'awareness', etc. are as semantically defined as words like 'reason', and 'information'.

That is all fine and dandy for an armchair discussion, but that won't cut it for scientific understanding.

"Reason" and "information" have mathematical definitions that allow such terms to be used in scientific models.

The stuff you are talking about doesn't.

End of story.

Really, if you expect to be taken seriously you need to come up with mathematical definitions of the terms you use.

It doesn't need to be some tedious definition involving numbers and stuff. It could just be a behavior based definition, like what Mercutio uses. But it has to be mathematical.

 

[Mitchell314]

Well, I'm doing what everyone else is doing - starting with the only conscious entities we know about, and trying to figure out what it is that creates the consciousness.

Trying to establish what consciousness is from first principles is a futile exercise, IMO. We have just one example. How can we extrapolate from that?

Well, I would say we could justify some ... erm ... extrapolations just by a little pondering. For one, I think we could venture that consciousness is a process of internal inputs and internal outputs. What does that mean? It doesn't mean there are "multiple minds" that one talks to each other. It's feedback. Two, another statement that we could make is that "thoughts" are a prerequisite for consciousness. Now, that may be a "no duh" moment, but there is a subtle suggestion carried along. That consciousness needs context, and that we can probe further by looking at what gives context. The most obvious ones are the sense. Also, emotions, and for some (humans, dolphins, and hyper dimensional creatures posing as mice), reasoning.

Just me .002 cents.

[eta] Finally got internet back. It went out mid post.

 

[Darat]

...snip..

Trying to establish what consciousness is from first principles is a futile exercise, IMO. We have just one example. How can we extrapolate from that?

Suggest you find some friends who have a few babies between them and spend a couple of years observing those babies develop, you'll get all the empirical evidence you could want to establish what consciousness is from first principles.

 

[westprog]

Suggest you find some friends who have a few babies between them and spend a couple of years observing those babies develop, you'll get all the empirical evidence you could want to establish what consciousness is from first principles.

And perhaps I could find some other friends who have thermostats and do a comparision.

As I'd already accepted that humans can be conscious, I'm not sure what the point is.

 

[westprog]

That is all fine and dandy for an armchair discussion, but that won't cut it for scientific understanding.

"Reason" and "information" have mathematical definitions that allow such terms to be used in scientific models.

The stuff you are talking about doesn't.

End of story.

Really, if you expect to be taken seriously you need to come up with mathematical definitions of the terms you use.

It doesn't need to be some tedious definition involving numbers and stuff. It could just be a behavior based definition, like what Mercutio uses. But it has to be mathematical.

So, exactly what definition of information are you using which allows you to discard everything that's happening in the rock and thermostat except this one item which you happen to be interested in? Since you are so proud of your rigourous model, perhaps you could explain it. So far the language used has been entirely unscientific.

 

[Mercutio]

Again, snipping some for length--if you think I snipped a crucial bit, let me know.

Not exactly, but close enough. You can get red with one wavelength, in context (though you need enough light of this wavelength to bootstrap the color vision system). I understand what you're saying, though--there are locality comparisons that come into play; under ordinary situations, red is the result of multiple wavelengths.

Out of curiosity, what wavelength of light are you using for unique red? And does "in context" mean fatiguing the opponent process blue channel? This is news to me unless you are meaning something quite different from what I am accustomed to.

Yes. It's a technicality, but it's part of my point. The human element adds the definitive aspect to this. Red is what we call red. Said detector can only possibly be described as accurate insomuch as it is able to classify objects according to their "proper" equivalence class, and what defines the "proper" equivalence class still necessarily refers to how the human visual system works. The thing that makes humans special, in this regard, is simply a "technical default"--it's their word, tied to their concept, so they get the final say in meaning about it (so long as there is a meaning in the first place... and there is, as demonstrated by the ability to consistently and independently classify the same objects as red).

"Said detector"... as nearly as I can see, said detector is defined circularly from the fact that we call things red. Unless you are calling the entire person the "detector" (which does not appear to follow from what you have been writing), then there is every possibility that there are multiple detectors, one, or no detector at all, but only parallel processes only put into a unified whole at the level of the person.

Not at all. It presumes a tiny bit more than what I have evidence for--something that is very fair to claim under Occam's razor. What I have evidence for, in particular, is that humans are capable of identifying color on the basis of something they are not specifically trained, culturally, to identify; that is, that in terms of color, there's something innate. The fact that the psyche seems to work this way, and that the evidence suggests humans work this way, simply makes a perfect marriage.

The universality of color perception is not a done deal; certainly there are physiological constraints on the relationships among colors, but the categories (Roy G. Biv) are not consistent across all cultures.

[snip]
Regarding color, specifically, and phrasing it in terms of a behavioral point of view, my claim is that there's an internal basis for the equivalence relation of "red things". Particular things that tilt me this way include:

• Subjective inter-comparitive traits that mimic the mechanics of the signals.¹ For example, violet at the end of the spectrum. This is evidence pointing towards a mechanical rather than "merely learned" basis for the commonality among humans in defining these equivalence classes.
• Consistency of percepts through color illusions. This also suggests another sort of "information source", other than things that we "merely learn". The genetic tendencies of a brain to phenotypically express a certain way seems to be the natural place to associate with this tendency.
• Cross-cultural capabilities to identify colors.
• Case studies of visual agnosics--in particular, their similarities and differences to "normal sighted" humans. For example, a break in certain structures leading to an inability to be specifically-trained-to-recognize certain things, is more evidence that the structures in themselves, as opposed to some form of highly malleable "blank slate", are critical to said capabilities.

"Mechanical rather than merely learned" is a false dichotomy. Consistency through illusions depends on the illusion, and may have multiple explanations, from mechanical (perceptual fields) through learning. Cross cultural studies show differences (link above), and case studies show multiple parallel processing, but thus far no "detector". Again, it could be one, several, or no brain structures that may be labeled "detector".

[snip]
¹And no, I don't presume that this implies a specific place in the brain where color is perceived--because it simply doesn't imply that. This is reflected in my reluctance to identify singular "quale" to any color; I see no specific reason to believe, for example, that as orange is perceived as a mix of red and yellow, that red isn't in itself a "blend" of something more fundamental--or from the other perspective--that orange is necessarily correctly described by analogous blends of signals somewhere.

Ah, then, we agree on that at least.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That is all fine and dandy for an armchair discussion, but that won't cut it for scientific understanding.

"Reason" and "information" have mathematical definitions that allow such terms to be used in scientific models.

The stuff you are talking about doesn't.

End of story.

Really, if you expect to be taken seriously you need to come up with mathematical definitions of the terms you use.

It doesn't need to be some tedious definition involving numbers and stuff. It could just be a behavior based definition, like what Mercutio uses. But it has to be mathematical.

Dodger, my central point is that there is currently no sufficient mathematical description of qualitative experience. Why in the world would I spend pages arguing that it isn't sufficiently defined operationally only to claim that I have a mathematical definition of it?

I'm saying that the EMA is an open scientific question just like any other [e.g. the origin of life, what gave rise to the big bang, theories of quantum gravity, etc]. I don't think that it's an unsolvable philosophical quandary, nor do I doubt the possibility of creating synthetic conscious agents. Its just that current attempts at scientifically defining and explaining it fall short. For this reason, I'm far from convinced that we have the scientific know-how to create conscious machines at this point in time.

Qualitative, subjective experience [aka. quale] are undeniably real empirical phenomenon that demand scientific explanation. That fact that sufficient explanation for it hasn't been devised yet does not make them any less real; it just illustrates that its a deep question that will probably require contributions from various fields of inquiry to tackle properly.

 

[rocketdodger]

Dodger, my central point is that there is currently no sufficient mathematical description of qualitative experience. Why in the world would I spend pages arguing that it isn't sufficiently defined operationally only to claim that I have a mathematical definition of it?

If you really think this, then you should also realize that the first step would be to come up with one.

Only after there is some kind of a mathematical definition can we proceed to try and understand what causes the phenomenon.

Qualitative, subjective experience [aka. quale] are undeniably real empirical phenomenon that demand scientific explanation. That fact that sufficient explanation for it hasn't been devised yet does not make them any less real; it just illustrates that its a deep question that will probably require contributions from various fields of inquiry to tackle properly.

I agree that a lack of explanation doesn't make anything less real.

But we aren't talking about a lack of explanation. We are talking about a lack of definition. And a lack of definition does make something less real.

 

[Mercutio]

Dodger, my central point is that there is currently no sufficient mathematical description of qualitative experience.

Sorry to intrude--I know this was not addressed to me--but could I ask you if you consider "hue" a qualitative experience?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Sorry to intrude--I know this was not addressed to me--but could I ask you if you consider "hue" a qualitative experience?

That's actually a good question.

A 'hue' would be an element of 'seemingness' [yea, I made up a word ]. It stands to reason that, just like anything else, qualia can be broken down to simpler components. I chose to call such components 'hues' because it conveys the apparent continuity of subjective impressions; one quality of 'seemingness' can blend into another in a continuous manner.

Also, just as anything else that exists, a hue can be conveyed via quanta, meaning that they are necessarily correlated with discrete units of information [i.e. hue is to unit as quale is to quantum]. A hue is essentially a subjective correlation with some quantity of information being perceived. The 'format' in which the information is being conveyed, or some property of the overall conscious system, will effect how it is qualitatively perceived. In one instance, quanta of light may be perceived as color, in another a smell, in yet others a sound or some other kind of quality that we humans cant even imagine.

 

[AkuManiMani]

If you really think this, then you should also realize that the first step would be to come up with one.

Only after there is some kind of a mathematical definition can we proceed to try and understand what causes the phenomenon.

You've got no argument from me there

I agree that a lack of explanation doesn't make anything less real.

But we aren't talking about a lack of explanation. We are talking about a lack of definition. And a lack of definition does make something less real.

This part I just don't follow you on.

Just a few hundred years ago human beings lacked many of the scientific definitions that we enjoy today. Their lack of formal definition didn't make events back then any less real. I don't understand why you would claim that lack of formal definition negates the reality of a phenomenon

 

[Mercutio]

That's actually a good question.

A 'hue' would be an element of 'seemingness' [yea, I made up a word ]. It stands to reason that, just like anything else, qualia can be broken down to simpler components. I chose to call such components 'hues' because it conveys the apparent continuity of subjective impressions; one quality of 'seemingness' can blend into another in a continuous manner.

Also, just as anything else that exists, a hue can be conveyed via quanta, meaning that they are necessarily correlated with discrete units of information [i.e. hue is to unit as quale is to quantum]. A hue is essentially a subjective correlation with some quantity of information being perceived. The 'format' in which the information is being conveyed, or some property of the overall conscious system, will effect how it is qualitatively perceived. In one instance, quanta of light may be perceived as color, in another a smell, in yet others a sound or some other kind of quality that we humans cant even imagine.

um.... I was speaking of "hue" as we use it in speaking of color. Does your answer still apply?