The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Mercutio]

So, if we take the strip out and just let it bend without switching anything on or off...is it still conscious?

Nick

So, if we take any given neuron out of your brain, keep it alive in a petri dish, unconnected to other neurons... is it still conscious?

 

[Third Eye Open]

Sure, if I observe and measure its behaviour.

So...you're saying that if I measure the behaviour of a rock under different physical conditions, the rock is now conscious? And if I stop observing or measuring it then it ceases to be conscious?

Nick

?? That would be YOU doing the information processing.

 

[Mercutio]

So, if we take any given neuron out of your brain, keep it alive in a petri dish, unconnected to other neurons... is it still conscious?

actually, this reminds me... I reviewed an intro psych text written by a well-known neuropsych expert prior to its first edition; the chapter on nerves, brain & behavior was seriously messed up. At one point, the author, writing about the process of nerve transmission (specifically, the depolarization of the dendritic membrane due to neurotransmitter action at the synapse, and the threshold event that separates local potentials from action potentials), said "when a neuron decides it has had sufficient stimulation, it fires an action potential" (emphasis mine). Note the consciousness-language, being used in a clear S-R situation. There is no "deciding" taking place; the membrane's depolarization is a well-known phenomenon that does not require each cell to have a homunculus.

Of course, if we wish to argue that the cell does, in fact, decide, and that deciding is simply acting on the deterministic inputs by emitting the determined outputs... perhaps it is not all that different from how we decide after all.

Needless to say, the language did not make it to the first edition.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Thought this might be relevant to the discussion.

Using artificial intelligence, Adam hypothesized that certain genes in baker's yeast code for specific enzymes which catalyse biochemical reactions in yeast. The robot then devised experiments to test these predictions, ran the experiments using laboratory robotics, interpreted the results and repeated the cycle.

Just ones and zeros folks, move along, nothing to see here.

 

[westprog]

Yep.



Ahh, see, this is where you go completely wrong.

There is something extremely special about the AC -- in the thermostat there is a physical correlate of the facts "the AC should be turned on" and "the AC should not be turned on."

There is no such physical correlate in microbes at the surface of the rock. In other words, microbes don't give a darn about the AC in your house. Your thermostats do.

This is the danger of loose language. When engineers refer to a thermostat as "deciding" what "should" happen, it can actually convince people that a thermostat "gives a darn" about what it does. Of course it doesn't. It's just about possible that a microbe does, in a small way, give a darn about the temperature of the rock that it sits on.

The thermostat doesn't care what it does. Whatever happens is just fine with the thermostat. It is a physical object. It can't fail to be a physical object, following the laws of physics. It doesn't matter to the thermostat whether the AC is connected, any more than it matters to the rock if the microbe lives or dies.

Conversely, there is no physical correlate to the fact "this rock has a satisfactory temperature for feeding" in a thermostat. In a microbe there is.



Because you think all information processing is equal -- it isn't.

All information is equal. The processing is vastly different from case to case.

No, it isn't. All information is exactly equal. There are no values in physics.

There are certainly magnified effects. A rock can roll down the slope of a volcano, block a vent and cause a gigantic explosion. But that has nothing to do with coherent information. That can be totally random.

The incredible thing about this idea is that is requires such total misunderstanding of the nature of the universe that it amazes me that it is actually taken seriously at any level. So many concepts that have no place in scientific thinking are shoehorned in in an entirely incoherent way. Placing "value" on information, having inanimate devices "want" to do things, having things that "should" or "should not" happen - it's scientific nonsense. It's the Brave Little Toaster view of the world.

And yet when these words are used in their normal sense - the human sense - about human beings "wanting" to do something, about having "preferences" - that's described as sloppy, undefined thinking.

 

[westprog]

actually, this reminds me... I reviewed an intro psych text written by a well-known neuropsych expert prior to its first edition; the chapter on nerves, brain & behavior was seriously messed up. At one point, the author, writing about the process of nerve transmission (specifically, the depolarization of the dendritic membrane due to neurotransmitter action at the synapse, and the threshold event that separates local potentials from action potentials), said "when a neuron decides it has had sufficient stimulation, it fires an action potential" (emphasis mine). Note the consciousness-language, being used in a clear S-R situation. There is no "deciding" taking place; the membrane's depolarization is a well-known phenomenon that does not require each cell to have a homunculus.

Of course, if we wish to argue that the cell does, in fact, decide, and that deciding is simply acting on the deterministic inputs by emitting the determined outputs... perhaps it is not all that different from how we decide after all.

Needless to say, the language did not make it to the first edition.

I wish the same stringency were applied to the thermostat example.

 

[PixyMisa]

If we look at a simple bimetallic strip thermostat... one piece of metal expands disproportionately to the piece to which it is joined, causing the pair to bend and connect or disconnect and electrical circuit which switches on or off a heating system.

So, if we take the strip out and just let it bend without switching anything on or off...is it still conscious?

I am not able rightly to apprehend the kind of confusion of ideas that could provoke such a question.

 

[westprog]

It's been said more than once in this thread. In fact you continue to disagree with the definition that makes humans and thermostats do things differently than rocks. So if you disagree with it you probably can make sense of it, after all.

I haven't seen a remotely coherent definition of information processing or data reading that would justify the idea yet.

 

[westprog]

From a 3rd PP it can be said that you are also only inferring your own consciousness.

Assuming that it's possible for that P not to have access to its own consciousness, and still be a P.

I'll let you be in my dreams if I can be in yours

 

[PixyMisa]

I haven't seen a remotely coherent definition of information processing or data reading that would justify the idea yet.

Have you looked?

 

[Nick227]

So, if we take any given neuron out of your brain, keep it alive in a petri dish, unconnected to other neurons... is it still conscious?

The point for me is not about interconnectivity, it is about human conscious observation. Both the stat and the rock are simply following TLOP, so why do Pixy and others claim that one is conscious and the other not? To me the only distinction in their behaviour is purely human. I don't see that attributing functionality necessarily makes something conscious. What is it that could not have functionality attributed to it?

The existence of the rock affects the environment, albeit in very minor way. If we become aware of how it affects its environment is it now conscious?

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Time to post this article again (pdf).

It's a fine article.

To me, most of it is obvious (though the history is interesting), but it's only obvious because I've been learning about this stuff for twenty years. At this point, to me, the LOSNE is so self-evident that it hardly seems worthy of a name... And yet, here's this thread.

 

[PixyMisa]

The point for me is not about interconnectivity, it is about human conscious observation.

Where, seriously Nick, where do you think human conscious observation comes from, other than interconnectivity?

Both the stat and the rock are simply following TLOP, so why do Pixy and others claim that one is conscious and the other not?

Thermostats aren't conscious. Not sure why that misunderstanding arose again, but I specifically pointed out earlier that this is not what Dennett or Hofstadter - or I, for what it's worth - suggest.

The difference between a thermostat and a rock is that the thermostat is a switch.

And a sufficient number of interconnected switches can compute anything that is computable, model any finite behaviour, including the human mind.

To me the only distinction in their behaviour is purely human.

Then try using a rock to control your central heating and see how well it works.

 

[PixyMisa]

Thought this might be relevant to the discussion.

Just ones and zeros folks, move along, nothing to see here.

Yep, I saw that too. Of course, it's just... Whatev.

You had ones? In my day, all we had was zeroes, and we were lucky to get those!

 

[PixyMisa]

Of course, if we wish to argue that the cell does, in fact, decide, and that deciding is simply acting on the deterministic inputs by emitting the determined outputs... perhaps it is not all that different from how we decide after all.

Right. If what we call decision is really just a mechanistic unconscious process, and the causal efficacy of the conscious mind an illusion, then decide is a perfectly acceptable expression in this context. And such it is.

As a computer programmer, my view of that particular verb leans that way in any case, but the dualistic misapprehension of our conscious existence was not expunged from the vocabulary in a day.

 

[Nick227]

Where, seriously Nick, where do you think human conscious observation comes from, other than interconnectivity?

I agree, but this is not to do with what I'm pointing out.

Thermostats aren't conscious. Not sure why that misunderstanding arose again, but I specifically pointed out earlier that this is not what Dennett or Hofstadter - or I, for what it's worth - suggest.

OK, good. I understood you wrong. I thought you were suggesting the stat was conscious and the rock not.

The difference between a thermostat and a rock is that the thermostat is a switch.

The existence of the rock affects the gravitational pull exerted on and by the earth. In a certain situation it could potentially determine the fate of the earth. The rock can thus be validly considered a switch.

And a sufficient number of interconnected switches can compute anything that is computable, model any finite behaviour, including the human mind.

Are you familiar with Ned Block's Chinese Nation thought experiment?

Then try using a rock to control your central heating and see how well it works.

Anything which has a relatively linear response to temperature change can potentially be used as a thermometer.

Nick

 

[yy2bggggs]

Time to post this article again (pdf).

Interesting (though I've only quickly scanned--will read more as I have time). Not sure whether it's supposed to support or refute what I just said... perhaps neither and it's feeling me out.

On the assumption of the latter... what's significant, to me, is that there exists, within a person, a means of judging whether or not a percept is red, and that the means of doing so has to do with an "internal" quality. Concepts such as comparing Jack's internal quality to Jill's to see whether or not they are the "same" quality don't enter into this level of analysis; they are the "same" in regards to being capable of identifying the same set of things as red--i.e., in regards to being isomorphic using the mapping of "application"; whether or not they see "the same quality" in some other sense is something I don't think we could talk about, but something for which the first question shouldn't be if they match, but rather, if there's another meaningful sense to compare them. Personally, I would leave the question open, but would demand an answer to that question before progressing further.

But also, I really hope I'm wrong about something... most of the standard conversation about said things bores me because I feel there's a lack of meat, but when it comes to something relevant to perception, preferably backed by data, I'm fascinated (see avatar). If there's something I said that conflicts with something known specifically, let me know.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

.... and so...

how many angels can dance on a pin head this days?

 

[rocketdodger]

Sure it does.

The very notion of "red objects" is an equivalence class of objects based on whether or not said objects influence us in such a way that we have a particular sort of percept about it. The "quality of redness" is simply another term for the "particular sort of percept" that we associate with the word red. The fact that this is authoritative, has a form of consistency across normal sighted people that applies to completely novel situations ("completely novel" here meaning outside the frame of normal experience versus mere "novel" which merely refers to something else within this frame; i.e., optical illusions, as opposed to "yet another flower"), correlates to the very mechanisms we have for color vision (L-M), etc, should be major clues that this particular form of consistency by which we are able to tie the label "red" to, in order to form an equivalence class of "red objects", is perceptual in nature and has to do with the common way our minds are influenced by physical phenomenon (as a direct result of common ways that our brains work). Furthermore, we can apply this sort of consistency of percepts... this "quality of redness", to things other than objects (such as entire scenes, lasers shining through smoke, etc).

As such, this is an experience (perceptual in nature), with an authoritative and unique form of consistency ("quality"), associated with redness in itself. I.e., it is "experience" of the "quality of redness".

Makes perfect sense to me.

I'm not convinced this is different than the former phrasings, unless you're ignoring particular aspects of the above (which we could include and still phrase this way).

Is this a joke?

Because I have no idea wtf you are talking about in that first paragraph.

 

[rocketdodger]

So...if the stat is not connected to a heating system it is no longer conscious?

Nick

If you take the thermally expansive element out of a thermostat it is no longer conscious.

Unless you consider the element all by itself to be the thermostat.

In any case, the principle is simple -- if a decision is made, it is conscious. So no, the element all by itself is not conscious with respect to the information about it being hot or cold enough to trigger some external event.

Note that the element all by itself could still be argued to be conscious under certain definitions, in particular with respect to other decisions that might be made in the system. If you want to be like westprog, you could say "if molecule 32626 hits molecule 22667 instead of molecule 89989 then a decision has been made." Fair enough, but if nobody is interested in the results of that decision then... well... nobody is interested in the results.