To say that we "experience the quality of redness" doesn't mean anything.
Sure it does.
The very notion of "red objects" is an equivalence class of objects based on whether or not said objects influence us in such a way that we have a particular sort of percept about it. The "quality of redness" is simply another term for the "particular sort of percept" that we associate with the word red. The fact that this is authoritative, has a form of consistency across normal sighted people that applies to completely novel situations ("completely novel" here meaning outside the frame of normal experience versus mere "novel" which merely refers to something else within this frame; i.e., optical illusions, as opposed to "yet another flower"), correlates to the very
mechanisms we have for color vision (L-M), etc, should be major clues that this particular form of consistency by which we are able to tie the label "red" to, in order to form an equivalence class of "red objects", is
perceptual in nature and has to do with the common way our
minds are influenced by physical phenomenon (as a direct result of common ways that our
brains work). Furthermore, we can apply this sort of consistency of percepts... this "quality of redness", to things other than objects (such as entire scenes, lasers shining through smoke, etc).
As such, this is an
experience (perceptual in nature), with an authoritative and unique form of consistency ("quality"), associated with redness in itself. I.e., it is "experience" of the "quality of redness".
Makes perfect sense to me.
To say that we "reason about reasoning about the color red" means something.
I'm not convinced this is different than the former phrasings, unless you're ignoring particular aspects of the above (which we could include and still phrase this way).