The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Just to be clear: Do you mean removing the experience of self?

If I appeared to be clear, I apologise. I have no idea at what point the sense of self arises or disappears. How these things work is still a mystery.

 

[rocketdodger]

Does this mean that carrying out the computation will be equivalent to the actual field? Can we generate gravity by playing around with Newton's or Einstein's equations?

What is gravity, though? You see, this is why I called the thread what I did.

We can lead a person to think an object is moving according to gravity. Isn't that gravity? Or is gravity only real gravity? How do you tell the difference as an objective observer? How do you know we aren't all in a simulation right now, being tricked the whole time?

It is not possible to create things in the real world by mathematical simulations, whether performed on paper or on a computer. If consciousness depends on a field, it will not be created in a computer.

Unless we figure out how to create such a field, and given that neurons must create it, I don't see the problem.

Let me ask you this: Assuming the technology to do so were available, do you think that we could create a conscious being using biological components, I.E. neurons and the supporting systems? If our own neurons create such a field, shouldn't other neurons that we wire correctly?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

If I appeared to be clear, I apologise. I have no idea at what point the sense of self arises or disappears. How these things work is still a mystery.

OK, I mean it seems more plausible to remove the experience of something rather than removing experience as such. The latter would be like removing rain by trying to remove weather. Which seems to only be possible in a conceptual way, yet the water would pour down regardless. Unless you're an author and simply remove any referents to weather from the story.


Anyway, regarding self-awareness, here's a good read by Ramachandran from 2007, which gives a plausible evolutionary twist to the emergence of it: [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]THE NEUROLOGY OF SELF-AWARENESS. It's pretty concise. Here's a snip from it:

Specifically, I suggest that "other awareness" may have evolved first and then counterintutively, as often happens in evolution, the same ability was exploited to model ones own mind — what one calls self awareness. I will also suggest that a specific system of neurons called mirror neurons are involved in this ability. Finally I discuss some clinical examples to illustrate these ideas and make some testable predictions.

[/FONT] He also reiterated some of it recently (2009): [FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]SELF AWARENESS: THE LAST FRONTIER. In this one he also gives his own perspectives on qualia here. Basically he just states that qualia might be a pseudo-problem whereas self-awareness appears to be an empirical question and where we should focus our attention on.
[/FONT]
[FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Although, he mentions an interesting syndrome called [/FONT][FONT=Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif]Cotards syndrome, where the patient claims he is dead and rejects all evidence to the contrary. Which of course raises some interesting questions about the patients "qualia" of being dead. [/FONT]

 

[westprog]

What is gravity, though? You see, this is why I called the thread what I did.

We can lead a person to think an object is moving according to gravity. Isn't that gravity? Or is gravity only real gravity? How do you tell the difference as an objective observer? How do you know we aren't all in a simulation right now, being tricked the whole time?

I don't know that. It's quite plausible. However, if we are in a simulation, it's one in which the only way to create simulated gravity is with simulated mass. If we try to simulate gravity ourselves, then we end up with nothing happening.

Unless we figure out how to create such a field, and given that neurons must create it, I don't see the problem.

Let me ask you this: Assuming the technology to do so were available, do you think that we could create a conscious being using biological components, I.E. neurons and the supporting systems? If our own neurons create such a field, shouldn't other neurons that we wire correctly?

I'm pretty sure that we can already create a conscious being using biological components.

 

[rocketdodger]

I'm pretty sure that we can already create a conscious being using biological components.

I interpret your sarcasm as an unwillingness to admit your position. I understand why. You know I don't mean "create" as in "have a child." You know I mean "create" as in "design and assemble using technology."

If you admit to thinking we can create a conscious being out of neurons, then you are going against your previous arguments in favor of the HPC.

If you admit to thinking we cannot, then you are admitting to a belief in magic.

Either way, you are in a corner you don't want to be in.

 

[Darat]

...snip...

I'm pretty sure that we can already create a conscious being using biological components.

What is the difference between these biological atoms and non-biological atoms and how do you distinguish them apart? Do the biological atoms stop being biological atoms once the person dies or do they always remain biological atoms?

 

[rocketdodger]

What is the difference between these biological atoms and non-biological atoms and how do you distinguish them apart? Do the biological atoms stop being biological atoms once the person dies or do they always remain biological atoms?

Haven't you been paying attention?

The configurations of atoms in human neurons are extremely succeptible to non-random quantum fluctuations.

 

[Gate2501]

Haven't you been paying attention?

The configurations of atoms in human neurons are extremely succeptible to non-random quantum fluctuations.

I don't get the quantum argument in any of these threads. Every time I post in one of the "free will" threads it gets brought up as well.

I find myself arguing constantly about how changing "deterministic" to "probabilistic" doesn't do anything for their argument. Just like it wouldn't magically put you in control of your choices(not trying to derail), it also would not magically give rise to some sort of wacky immaterial mental phenomena either.

You bring up yet another excellent point in regard to the QM invokers.

If these QM phenomena are happening on a sub-atomic scale, then what would be different about the atoms in a machine consciousness's brain vs. a humans brain? Why wouldn't the same bunk QM argument apply to that brain as well?

To add my own point:

I think that most of the people arguing against some computers today being conscious, are thinking in terms of "high end consciousness or it isn't conscious at all". They are using a definition for consciousness that is explicitly uber-complex. Sort of like saying that an abacus is not a computing device, because it can't play an MP3.

 

[Belz...]

The reality of consciousness is THE axiom.

No it isn't. You haven't been exposed to solipsists enough.

 

[Belz...]

Computers are generally not programmed to behave the same way as human mental function, because human mental function is hopelessly unreliable, and we already have plenty of it.

I am SO stealing this one.

 

[Belz...]

I find the lengths to which you, Pixy, et al. go to, just to avoid acknowledging basic facts and definitions, unnerving.

Actually, Aku, the fact that everybody here, which I'm sure you know aren't uneducated idiots, is telling you you're wrong about this, SHOULD make you start wondering if, in fact, you are wrong. The fact that you haven't even begun to consider it is, to me, unnerving.

 

[Belz...]

Haven't you been paying attention?

The configurations of atoms in human neurons are extremely succeptible to non-random quantum fluctuations.

Don't forget free will: that non-random, AND non-deterministic thingamagig.

 

[westprog]

I interpret your sarcasm as an unwillingness to admit your position. I understand why. You know I don't mean "create" as in "have a child." You know I mean "create" as in "design and assemble using technology."

If you admit to thinking we can create a conscious being out of neurons, then you are going against your previous arguments in favor of the HPC.

If you admit to thinking we cannot, then you are admitting to a belief in magic.

Either way, you are in a corner you don't want to be in.

The principle is pretty clear. We can create a conscious being out of biological material. So if you ask if we can create a conscious being out of biological material + x, the answer is obviously yes. How this puts me into a corner I'm not sure.

I don't know what is required to create a conscious being. Whether neurons alone are enough remains uncertain. It's quite possible that consciousness requires more than simple date processing to happen.

 

[westprog]

What is the difference between these biological atoms and non-biological atoms and how do you distinguish them apart? Do the biological atoms stop being biological atoms once the person dies or do they always remain biological atoms?

It's not a difficult issue. We know of exactly one way to create a conscious being. We don't know how to do it any other way. If you know how to do it, go ahead. Or do what the Pixy does and point to a thermostat and say "Look! It lives!"

 

[westprog]

Actually, Aku, the fact that everybody here, which I'm sure you know aren't uneducated idiots, is telling you you're wrong about this.

I suppose that I and Six7s and anyone else who is arguing along the same lines as Aku can safely be disregarded.

 

[Gate2501]

Or do what the Pixy does and point to a thermostat and say "Look! It lives!"

I think that most of the people arguing against some computers today being conscious, are thinking in terms of "high end consciousness or it isn't conscious at all". They are using a definition for consciousness that is explicitly uber-complex. Sort of like saying that an abacus is not a computing device, because it can't play an MP3.

Yes, I am shameless.

 

[Mercutio]

Truth is an invariant statement of validity that remains true regardless of one's relative perspective to it. Heliocentrism and geocentrism are neither true nor false; they are merely relative perspectives within a 'true' framework. The actual truth is that the earth and sun are in relative motion to one another and the rest of the universe; each 'centrism' is merely a view of this truth from a particular "angle", so to speak.

Sorry, but how can you know that is truth? How do you not know that this version is dependent on your relative perspective to it? You are clearly speaking from a 4-dimensional time-space matrix, and you may be utterly wrong by other perspectives.

Your view, however, is very pragmatic; it explains the things geocentrism does, and that heliocentrism does, and why they disagree. It has greater utility, even though it cannot be known to be "true" by your own definition. Thank you for illustrating my point.

Axiomatic assertion is the unavoidable basis of any description of reality; this includes even Behaviorism. What is of more primary concern is the logical consistency of the postulation [do the inferences follow reasonable givens, do the conclusions justifiably follow from the premises, and is the overall postulation paradox free, etc?] and how much it can potentially explain.

Certainly; one assumes axioms (def. 3 of your dictionary quote in 553) to see how far they will take us. We are supposed to be willing to abandon these axioms if they lead nowhere. We are also supposed to remember that axioms by def. 3 are not axioms by def. 1 or 2; this will become important below.

List the claims from that post which are allegedly "not supportable by any evidence" and I will provide evidence for every one of them.

Axiom 3.

Using the ontological reasoning that underlies behaviorism one can say that:

No. Using your flawed understanding of the ontological understanding that underlies behaviorism...

"'Cats' do not exist; there is simply the collective behavior of groups of atoms which we label 'cat'. To invoke 'cats' is to invoke a fiction since one does not observe the behavior of cats but of collections of atoms."

or...

"'Atoms' do not exist; there is simply the observable and predictable behaviors of electrons and nucleons. 'Atoms' are a fiction, there is only observable behavior"

Do you really, honestly, think those are practical positions? Do those offer more explanatory value for behavior than the "cat" level? Pragmatically, we are looking at a cat, not a collection of cat organs in a cat skin. Clearly, your version of pragmatism is at best a distant mutant cousin of mine.

One can extend this type of logic to every level of organization and basically 'dispel' any entity. Behaviorists, by and large, merely set an arbitrary cut-off point at particular layer of organization in organisms. This isn't necessarily a bad thing if one is simply using it as a way to define a narrow disciplinary focus, but if it hardens into a dogma [as I suspect it has in your case] it ceases to be science and becomes ideology.

Arbitrary? No. Useful. We do this all the time, across disciplines. If it ceases being useful, we must take a different approach. This is not the case here.

I suppose the main thing I'm taking umbrage at is that the basis of most of your objections are ideological rather than scientific in nature. You need to be able to take off your behaviorists spectacles when weighing differing points of view. Judge them by their own merits and not by how much they depart from the ideology of behaviorism, or what ever other 'ism' you happen to ascribe to.

I did judge it by its merits.

Using that same logic, one can claim that there is no evidence of 'cats'. Images, what ever their composition, are ontologically real. The rationale behind such statements like "thus-n-thus doesn't exists because its merely composed of/consists of/emerges from X" is downright silly.

Sorry, you are using other logic. I am not responsible for your strawman of behaviorism.

Okay, I can accept that. I actually prefer that there be some disagreement -- otherwise we wouldn't have much to talk about

What I don't accept are blanket dismissals without balanced consideration of what is actually being said.

Glad that's not what I did.

I've already presented what I believe is a sufficient definition with more than enough examples. But since you insist on taking the questioning-by-attrition route I'm just simply going to throw the dictionary at you:

So... "the quality of sound"--which? Any? Pitch? Timbre? Loudness? Or is it something more than these? Is there a quality beyond the ones that can be modeled using what we know about the basilar membrane? (JREF poster "jj" has some absolutely stunning papers on artificial simulations of the human auditory system. You might be surprised by how much quality can be quantified.)

If the above is not sufficient definition no word is sufficiently defined.

I can read a dictionary. I wanted to know what you meant.

[snip]
Internal consistency and explanatory power.

So, then, you do agree with the usefulness criterion.

Most of the concepts invoked by SR and GR were pretty esoteric and had very little prospect of direct practical applicability anytime in the proximal future. Its eventual practicality followed from its degree of truthfulness.

Practicality is not just for teflon. It refers to how well things are explained. Einstein was accepted extremely rapidly, as scientific revolutions go, because his was simply a more useful--explaining more stuff--explanation than Newton's.

That is what the scientific method is for. The general process of science is a cyclical progression of observation -> postulation -> empirical testing, etc. If empirical tests contradict portions of a postulate it is either reformulated or discarded.

What would it take for you to falsify your axiom 3?

 

[Mercutio]

The entire question before you is, why? Why the caution? Let's say I point to them and call them images. What did I do wrong?

Pointing "to them"--where? You have ripped up an image and given parts of it (odd, that some parts overlap, other parts are "motion" or "hedonic relevance") to a score of independent messengers, each zipping through the city, some to separate destinations, others to the same destination through different stops. If this constitutes "an image" to you, then we will simply disagree.

What's wrong, for example, with this mapping? Let's say the entire image, blind spot, wallpaper with a pattern on it, and all (these being examples invoked in Consciousness Explained, as I recall), mapped onto the V1 layer of the visual cortex, is a "theater screen", and let's say that Dennett's "access consciousness" is a homunculus. Wouldn't this make a Cartesian Theater? Why not?

First, I have serious disagreements with Dennett--so his "access consciousness" is not part of my view--but let's pretend. The V1 mosaic is not an image; at best it is part of one, at worst it stretches the image metaphor to the breaking point. If we pretend that our best case scenario qualifies as an image... what is the viewer? In the story of the blind men and the elephant, we have a reader to combine the disparate elements; if we only have the blind men, each with a portion of the elephant available to them, do we have the whole image perceived? I say no; if you say yes, again, we will simply disagree.

Parallel throughput processing does not have a place where an image is available, nor a place for a viewer. The tapestry of experience simply is not what it seems. Any explanation of consciousness needs to explain what actually happens, not the fairy-tale version.

 

[rocketdodger]

The principle is pretty clear. We can create a conscious being out of biological material. So if you ask if we can create a conscious being out of biological material + x, the answer is obviously yes. How this puts me into a corner I'm not sure.

I don't know what is required to create a conscious being. Whether neurons alone are enough remains uncertain. It's quite possible that consciousness requires more than simple date processing to happen.

So you don't know what is required for consciousness.

Yet this entire thread you have been claiming those of us who think we do know to be wrong.

HPC anyone?

 

[Mercutio]

Its a 'field hypothesis' not 'magic-field theory'. Stop deliberately misrepresenting what I say

Neural activity

There's no need to. Its endogenous.

I know a bit about neural activity. This explanation is... foreign to me. Could you elaborate?