The Hard Problem of Gravity

[westprog]

Well, you said that human memory was different from computer state because we "know" about our memories while computers do not "know" about their state.

So, I am pointing out that you are wrong. You are wrong because humans, just like computers, can't make heads or tails from information unless it is provided at the right time in the right format. Hence, you can't attach someone elses brain to your foot and just "know" about their memories.

You only "know" about your own memories and only when the relevant neurons are hooked up exactly like they need to be and fire exactly when they need to fire. Which, coincidentally, are exactly the same requirements for a silicon computer to make use of any information.

So while it may be true that the information processing happens in a different manner between humans and silicon computers, the fact remains that the fundamentals of computation apply to both.

But when human beings are able to process information, they are able to understand it. Computers - in the Von Neumann sense - simply cannot.

Well, you clearly aren't very involved with computers.

Because every single person I have ever worked with -- and that runs the gamut from network administrators to other A.I. programmers to artists to writers to grad students and professors -- commonly use the term "it thinks <whatever>," in reference to a software construct.

What does this mean? It means either 1) computers do think, according to most people, and you are wrong, or 2) computers do not think, but people speak as if they do, which means people use the term "think" when referencing things that do not think, which possibly includes ourselves. Either way, then, your argument hasn't been strengthened.

Well, if computer people say "the computer thinks X" then they must mean that the computer has thoughts like a human, right? Because they'd never use the term in a loose or casual way? I suppose that when sailors refer to a ship as "she" they mean that the vessel has a vagina, cervix, womb and ovaries.

Funnily enough, while people not involved with computers sometimes assume that the computers are thinking, most of the people who actually work with them realise very quickly that they aren't.

The question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim.

Artificial intelligence has been making significant progress, yet there is a huge gap between what computers can do in the foreseeable future and what ordinary people can do. The mysterious insights that people have when speaking, listening, creating, and even when they are programming, are still beyond the reach of science; nearly everything we do is still an art.

In fact, I've found that outside the very specialised area of AI, one would be hard put to find a significant percentage of programmers who think that computers think in the same sense as a human being. They know that the intelligence found in the system is there because they put it in, and the information gleaned only becomes information when it is shown to a person.

Hmmm.

You are telling an A.I. programmer "wanting won't make it so?"

No disrespect, but no **** Sherlock. Wtf do you think I am an A.I. programmer?

Had you considered the possibility that what you are trying to achieve may in fact be impossible in principle?

 

[Robin]

That fact that I am conscious is self evident. Therefore the existence of consciousness, what ever its nature, is axiomatic -- its a given.

I can't see that the existence of consciousness is axiomatic, that seems to be assuming something about the ontological status of consciousness.

I think that the very most we can say is that consciousness happens.

 

[Robin]

In fact, I've found that outside the very specialised area of AI, one would be hard put to find a significant percentage of programmers who think that computers think in the same sense as a human being. They know that the intelligence found in the system is there because they put it in, and the information gleaned only becomes information when it is shown to a person.

It depends upon what you consider thinking "in the same sense as a human being". Would you consider it possible that a chimpanzee thinks in the same sense as a human being? A dog? A cat? A mouse? As far as I know computers have not even reached the ant level in complexity

I would have thought that the "sense in which humans think" is the very question we don't have an answer to yet.

AI may help provide that answer. In fact even the failures of AI will provide useful information.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That fact that I am conscious is self evident. Therefore the existence of consciousness, what ever its nature, is axiomatic -- its a given.

No, it isn't.

Your knowledge of your own consciousness is dependent upon, among other things, your knowledge of self versus non-self. That makes it non-axiomatic. Unless you want to rewrite the rules of logic so that axioms can depend on each other.[

P.S.In fact, Mercutio is correct, and your knowledge of your own consciousness is dependent upon a whole slew of other ideas about your natural and social environment.

Correction. The language I use to describe my consciousness is dependent upon my social environment. The fact that one must be taught the formal symbols that describe basic arithmetic does not change the fact that the truth of 1+1=2 is self evident. The same is true of consciousness. One must be taught language to describe conscious experience but the fact of the experience is still a fact.

One cannot be said to KNOW anything AT ALL unless they are conscious. Knowing ANYTHING makes one's consciousness self evident because it is THE requisite to knowledge. One cannot know that two ones make two unless they are conscious to perceive this fact. One cannot even be said to believe anything unless they are conscious. The reality of consciousness is THE axiom. Why is it so difficult for you to grasp this???

Wow....rocketdodger, this post reveals that 1) you completely misunderstand my position and 2) you misunderstand what a unified theory means.

First off, I'm not proposing any new force. Electromagnetism seems like a likely enough candidate since that is the fore by which chemicals interact.

You clearly don't know what is meant by 'fundamental force'. Essentially, physicists' are searching for a unified field theory; essentially a theory in which all forces are difference expressions of the same force. As of now, physicist have theoretically unified EM, weak, and strong forces, and currently are working on trying to unify gravity.

All I'm saying is that all biological phenomenon, including onsciousness, must fall within the laws of physics and I'm speculating on ways in which they might be better understood in this light. I Wanna know the physical reason for qualitative experience. What astounds me is that while I'm proposing that there is a physicalist way of understanding these things I get accused of invoking 'magic'. Seriously, what the hell is up with all the hysteria?

No, you aren't. Or at least, if you are, you have some fundamental misunderstandings about physics and mathematics.

I absolutely know that I am conscious by dint of the fact that I can know at all. I am also sure, beyond reasonable doubt, that each of you are also conscious. Given this, consciousnesses is a fact of nature. My point is that consciousness, atleast in some partial sense, should be describable by either current physics or some as of yet unformulated physical theory. The purpose of my speculation so far is to establish possible ways we could begin to gain such a physical understanding of consciousness. Its also my position that such a physical theory is vital if we are ever going to go about creating synthetic conscious entities. This means that while computer science will be vital in such a pursuit, we will still need an underlying physical theory that can atleast partially explain qualitative conscious experience.


With the above in kind, its extremely ironic that some of you would charge me with 'invoking magic' when, infact, I'm attempting to do just the opposite.

You see, anything in physics can be mathematically described. And if something can be mathematically described then what we know about computation theory is applicable to it. Thus, even if you are correct and consciousness is some kind of "field," it will still be the result of an equation or algorithm, which are mathematically the same thing.

This brings us to significant a epistemological problem: the inherent incompleteness of any formal system or theory. I'm confident that physicists will continue to make progress in developing a unified theory physics -- I just think that it is epistemologicalally impossible to come upon a final Theory of Everything. There is a heuristic quality to scientific progress and I suspect that this is a reflection of a basic heuristic element to how all processes unfold. In a way this is a good thing because it means that, in principle, it is impossible for the pursuit of science to be complete and there there will always be more for future scientists to puzzle out. So, even tho your OP was meant as a joke, there actually is an 'HPG', it just so happens that our theories for explaining it are a little farther along than our theories of consciousness. I hope that this will change.

In essence, I don't think there will be a final solution to the EMA, just an endless procession of ever improving theories.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I can't see that the existence of consciousness is axiomatic, that seems to be assuming something about the ontological status of consciousness.

I think that the very most we can say is that consciousness happens.

You're basically just paraphrasing what I've been saying all along.

 

[Mercutio]

...and this part seems to be arguing against something specific. Language like "only place where the whole image is together..." and "do not equal a unified image" imply that the thing you're claiming doesn't exist has such properties. I'm a bit confused about what that thing is--i.e., what it is exactly that you're claiming doesn't exist.

Perhaps an example or two might clarify?

Distilled to its simplest form, what I am claiming does not exist is the cartesian theatre. There is no image, and no watcher. People are jumping through hoops to try to explain a fiction. Redefining consciousness is not a dodge, it is a necessity, if we are going to look at what actually happens.

That's all.

 

[rocketdodger]

But when human beings are able to process information, they are able to understand it. Computers - in the Von Neumann sense - simply cannot.

I guess "in the Von Neumann sense" is some kind of disclaimer?

Because for a few decades computers have been able to "understand" information they are processing given any formal definition of "understanding."

Except for the "understanding is what a human does" definition -- but aren't you arguing that the HPC doesn't rely upon such a definition? ...

Well, if computer people say "the computer thinks X" then they must mean that the computer has thoughts like a human, right? Because they'd never use the term in a loose or casual way? I suppose that when sailors refer to a ship as "she" they mean that the vessel has a vagina, cervix, womb and ovaries.

They mean that the computer "has made a decision related to X," or something along those lines. There is no other common meaning for "think." "Think" is only ever applied to things that somehow make decisions.

Just like "she" is only ever applied to nouns given a female gender -- like ships.

Or are you going to argue that neutral objects shouldn't have a male or female gender? Oops, better tell everyone speaking Spanish, French, German, and a whole bunch of languages where all nouns are given gender...

Funnily enough, while people not involved with computers sometimes assume that the computers are thinking, most of the people who actually work with them realise very quickly that they aren't.

Oh really?

I wonder, then, why the common per-frame routine on all entities in every iteration of idTech is called "Think()."

In fact, I've found that outside the very specialised area of AI, one would be hard put to find a significant percentage of programmers who think that computers think in the same sense as a human being. They know that the intelligence found in the system is there because they put it in, and the information gleaned only becomes information when it is shown to a person.

In fact, I've found that outside the very specialized area of the insane, one would be hard put to find a significant percentage of people who think that dogs and cats think in the same sense as a human being.

Yet, everyone talks about pets thinking this or pets thinking that. "I moved his water bowl ... he thinks it is in the other room."

Had you considered the possibility that what you are trying to achieve may in fact be impossible in principle?

Yes, before I was educated on the issue.

 

[AkuManiMani]

ok, and how do you distinguish "truth"? If you are saying that heliocentrism and geocentrism are equally true, you have pretty much tamed that word and forced it to jump through hoops for you.

Truth is an invariant statement of validity that remains true regardless of one's relative perspective to it. Heliocentrism and geocentrism are neither true nor false; they are merely relative perspectives within a 'true' framework. The actual truth is that the earth and sun are in relative motion to one another and the rest of the universe; each 'centrism' is merely a view of this truth from a particular "angle", so to speak.

I have read it. You axiomatically assert several things that logically (or circularly) lead to your conclusion

Axiomatic assertion is the unavoidable basis of any description of reality; this includes even Behaviorism. What is of more primary concern is the logical consistency of the postulation [do the inferences follow reasonable givens, do the conclusions justifiably follow from the premises, and is the overall postulation paradox free, etc?] and how much it can potentially explain.

but which are not supportable by any evidence.

List the claims from that post which are allegedly "not supportable by any evidence" and I will provide evidence for every one of them.

I'm going to state here that the ontological basis for your position has logical flaws. The most fatal of them is that, unless one arbitrarily imposes a cut-off point, it negates the existence of all observable entities as such

No.

And there is no arbitrary cutoff point; I simply do not add fictional layers. The cat exists.

Using the ontological reasoning that underlies behaviorism one can say that:

"'Cats' do not exist; there is simply the collective behavior of groups of atoms which we label 'cat'. To invoke 'cats' is to invoke a fiction since one does not observe the behavior of cats but of collections of atoms."

or...

"'Atoms' do not exist; there is simply the observable and predictable behaviors of electrons and nucleons. 'Atoms' are a fiction, there is only observable behavior"

One can extend this type of logic to every level of organization and basically 'dispel' any entity. Behaviorists, by and large, merely set an arbitrary cut-off point at particular layer of organization in organisms. This isn't necessarily a bad thing if one is simply using it as a way to define a narrow disciplinary focus, but if it hardens into a dogma [as I suspect it has in your case] it ceases to be science and becomes ideology.

I suppose the main thing I'm taking umbrage at is that the basis of most of your objections are ideological rather than scientific in nature. You need to be able to take off your behaviorists spectacles when weighing differing points of view. Judge them by their own merits and not by how much they depart from the ideology of behaviorism, or what ever other 'ism' you happen to ascribe to.

There is no evidence for the image of the cat.

Using that same logic, one can claim that there is no evidence of 'cats'. Images, what ever their composition, are ontologically real. The rationale behind such statements like "thus-n-thus doesn't exists because its merely composed of/consists of/emerges from X" is downright silly.

I'm saying that whole organisms are singular dynamic entities and that its is more accurate and useful to think of them in terms of being behaviors of complex informational fields. Not 'magical' fields, but ones that can be quantified and understood in scientific terms. You're fighting my position tooth and nail without bothering to understanding it.

I read it. I think I understand it, or what you are trying to say. I disagree with it.

Okay, I can accept that. I actually prefer that there be some disagreement -- otherwise we wouldn't have much to talk about

What I don't accept are blanket dismissals without balanced consideration of what is actually being said.

I'm saying that qualities ARE qualia just are quantities ARE quanta -- by definition. To argue that they don't exist is logically absurd.

This does not answer my question. What are some examples of what you mean by qualities?

I've already presented what I believe is a sufficient definition with more than enough examples. But since you insist on taking the questioning-by-attrition route I'm just simply going to throw the dictionary at you:

qual⋅i⋅ty
   /ˈkwɒlɪti/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [kwol-i-tee] Show IPA noun, plural -ties, adjective
–noun
1. an essential or distinctive characteristic, property, or attribute: the chemical qualities of alcohol.
2. character or nature, as belonging to or distinguishing a thing: the quality of a sound.

[...]

Origin:
1250–1300; ME qualite < OF < L quālitās, equiv. to quāl(is) of what sort + -itās -ity

Related forms:
qual⋅i⋅ty⋅less, adjective

Synonyms:
1. trait, character, feature. Quality, attribute, property agree in meaning a particular characteristic (of a person or thing). A quality is a characteristic, innate or acquired, that, in some particular, determines the nature and behavior of a person or thing: naturalness as a quality; the quality of meat. An attribute was originally a quality attributed, usually to a person or something personified; more recently it has meant a fundamental or innate characteristic: an attribute of God; attributes of a logical mind. Property applies only to things; it means a characteristic belonging specifically in the constitution of, or found (invariably) in, the behavior of a thing: physical properties of uranium or of limestone. 3. nature, kind, grade, sort, condition.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/quality

If the above is not sufficient definition no word is sufficiently defined.

You've great need to understand in what sense I'm using the term and why I'm employing it if you want to make any cogent critique of my position. Lupus_in_fabula has provided a great example of this. He actually makes the effort to understand my position enabling him to critique it more effectively. Again, you're going to have to make the effort to meet me halfway on this.

An honest effort does not mean agreement with you.

Ofcourse it doesn't. I doubt that Lupus even agrees with me on most of my positions but, because he understands my arguments and takes them under balanced consideration, he has been able to bring forward more cogent and reasoned criticisms of them than most others here.

You misunderstand my point. I'm saying that theories are technologies, in and of themselves. They are models of reality and, being such, they are inherently incomplete. Tho Newton wasn't 'wrong', per se, Einstein's theory is more robust, explains more, and covers a larger domain of applicability. It is more useful by dint of the fact that its a closer approximation of the truth. This is what I meant by 'supersede'.

How do you know it is a closer approximation of the truth, beyond the idea that it is more useful?

Internal consistency and explanatory power.

Most of the concepts invoked by SR and GR were pretty esoteric and had very little prospect of direct practical applicability anytime in the proximal future. Its eventual practicality followed from it's degree of truthfulness.

Einstein was also a trained philosopher. Regardless, the nature of his background training is irrelevant to the point I was making. Empirical observation and testing is only half of the scientific process. Postulation, intuitive hunches, and logical inferences [i.e. introspection] are vital to the formation of any workable scientific theory.

The very field of science itself is a branch of applied natural philosophy. Science is a philosophical technology for acquiring truth.

And how do we know if a hunch pans out? How do we know if it is "true"?

That is what the scientific method is for. The general process of science is a cyclical progression of observation -> postulation -> empirical testing, etc. If empirical tests contradict portions of a postulate it is either reformulated or discarded.

 

[rocketdodger]

Correction. The language I use to describe my consciousness is dependent upon my social environment. The fact that one must be taught the formal symbols that describe basic arithmetic does not change the fact that the truth of 1+1=2 is self evident. The same is true of consciousness. One must be taught language to describe conscious experience but the fact of the experience is still a fact.

Actually, I do not think 1 + 1 = 2 is an axiom. If it isn't, and you think it is, then you have proven my point.

One cannot be said to KNOW anything AT ALL unless they are conscious. Knowing ANYTHING makes one's consciousness self evident because it is THE requisite to knowledge. One cannot know that two ones make two unless they are conscious to perceive this fact. One cannot even be said to believe anything unless they are conscious. The reality of consciousness is THE axiom. Why is it so difficult for you to grasp this???

Because the only way this follows is if you define "know" to be dependent upon "being conscious."

If you are trying to construct a model for consciousness from simpler parts, then it is not advantageous to define those simpler parts in terms of what you are trying to construct.

That is called circular reasoning. We don't like to do that in ... well... science.

I absolutely know that I am conscious by dint of the fact that I can know at all.

See? That is a useless statement. And it is exactly that statement that is at the heart of the HPC. What kind of problems are built around useless statements? ...

My point is that consciousness, atleast in some partial sense, should be describable by either current physics or some as of yet unformulated physical theory. The purpose of my speculation so far is to establish possible ways we could begin to gain such a physical understanding of consciousness. Its also my position that such a physical theory is vital if we are ever going to go about creating synthetic conscious entities. This means that while computer science will be vital in such a pursuit, we will still need an underlying physical theory that can atleast partially explain qualitative conscious experience.

That is all great, but A.I. researchers think they can explain consciousness with what humans already know about physics.

And as Pixy says, there is more evidence for this than anything else in human history -- hit a guy on the head hard and he will stop being conscious.

 

[PixyMisa]

But when human beings are able to process information, they are able to understand it. Computers - in the Von Neumann sense - simply cannot.

What is that supposed to mean, though? What exactly is it that you are claiming that human brains can do that computers can't?

Funnily enough, while people not involved with computers sometimes assume that the computers are thinking, most of the people who actually work with them realise very quickly that they aren't.

Yes. In exactly the same way that people aren't.

In fact, I've found that outside the very specialised area of AI, one would be hard put to find a significant percentage of programmers who think that computers think in the same sense as a human being.

What do you mean by "in the same sense"? Computers are generally not programmed to behave the same way as human mental function, because human mental function is hopelessly unreliable, and we already have plenty of it.

This in no way means that computers can't think the way humans do; it just means that we go to great expense to avoid that.

They know that the intelligence found in the system is there because they put it in, and the information gleaned only becomes information when it is shown to a person.

Only if you define "information" that way. And then you'd just be playing semantic games.

 

[Robin]

You're basically just paraphrasing what I've been saying all along.

But you are saying consciousness exists and you are claiming we can take the existence of consciousness as an axiom. I am pointing out that we cannot take that as an axiom or claim to know anything about the existence of consciousness.

My position "consciousness happens" is very different from "consciousness exists".

 

[PixyMisa]

My point is that consciousness, atleast in some partial sense, should be describable by either current physics or some as of yet unformulated physical theory.

No worries. It is perfectly describable with current physics.

The purpose of my speculation so far is to establish possible ways we could begin to gain such a physical understanding of consciousness.

There are a couple of problems with your magic-field "theory", though. Namely:

- There is no mechanism to produce such a field
- There is no mechanism to receive such a field
- There is no such field
- Our brains do not work that way
- Our minds do not behave that way
- It's physically impossible

Most people would consider any one of these to be an indication that they might be, y'know, wrong.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Actually, I do not think 1 + 1 = 2 is an axiom. If it isn't, and you think it is, then you have proven my point.

I find the lengths to which you, Pixy, et al. go to, just to avoid acknowledging basic facts and definitions, unnerving. There are politicians and lawyers who couldn't even begin to approach the level of semantic evasion you guys are employing. Must I reference the g***amn dictionary in every post now??? Good grief!

ax⋅i⋅om
   /ˈæksiəm/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [ak-see-uhm] Show IPA
–noun
1. a self-evident truth that requires no proof.
2. a universally accepted principle or rule.
3. Logic, Mathematics. a proposition that is assumed without proof for the sake of studying the consequences that follow from it.
Origin:
1475–85; < L axiōma < Gk: something worthy, equiv. to axiō-, var. s. of axioûn to reckon worthy + -ma resultative n. suffix

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/axiom

The definitions I and others here have employed are firmly established by all reasonable criteria. This endless equivocation and sophistry is growing tiresome. Quit dodging.

Because the only way this follows is if you define "know" to be dependent upon "being conscious."

If you are trying to construct a model for consciousness from simpler parts, then it is not advantageous to define those simpler parts in terms of what you are trying to construct.

know
1   /noʊ/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [noh] Show IPA verb, knew, known, know⋅ing, noun
–verb (used with object)
1. to perceive or understand as fact or truth; to apprehend clearly and with certainty: I know the situation fully.
2. to have established or fixed in the mind or memory: to know a poem by heart; Do you know the way to the park from here?
3. to be cognizant or aware of: I know it.
4. be acquainted with (a thing, place, person, etc.), as by sight, experience, or report: to know the mayor.
5. to understand from experience or attainment (usually fol. by how before an infinitive): to know how to make gingerbread.
6. to be able to distinguish, as one from another: to know right from wrong.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/know

I've quite clearly explained why consciousness is a requisite of knowing -- by definition. Knowing is an emergent property of consciousness. Period.

You've yet to established that its even logically possible for an entity to 'know' absent being conscious. In this case, its painfully obvious that you're the one making the extra ordinary claim and its hightime you started providing some extra ordinary evidence; elsewise, we've no basis for discussion. The problem is, there is no way you can actually provide such evidence so instead you resort to this endless questioning-by-attrition and semantic dodging and playing the "Oh, we don't know what you mean by such-n-such" or "you can't even define such-n-such according to the ever-moving goalpost of my criteria, so you're wrong".

That is called circular reasoning. We don't like to do that in ... well... science.

Then stop using it. You know damn well that your objections are not scientific -- they're ideological.

See? That is a useless statement. And it is exactly that statement that is at the heart of the HPC. What kind of problems are built around useless statements? ...

The problem is just about every comment you made in this reply is a 'useless statement'.

That is all great, but A.I. researchers think they can explain consciousness with what humans already know about physics.

And as Pixy says, there is more evidence for this than anything else in human history -- hit a guy on the head hard and he will stop being conscious.

Oh-ho! So there is a difference between being conscious and unconscious. Brilliant. How is the above a useful statement? "Aw shucks! Knock a guy in the head and he ain't conscious no more!"

Pardon my frustration but no ◊◊◊◊, Sherlock. Have you anything more insightful to add to this discussion other than endless equivocation and sophistry? I really wanna give you the benefit of the doubt and have a reasonable discussion with you but if we can't even get passed the "you don't know what you mean by that" bull there is nothing to discuss.

*takes a breath*

Okay.... I want you, in a single post, to sum up my position on this subject. If you can do this without misrepresenting anything I've said I will continue this discussion with you. If you cannot, I'll save us both from a waste of time and just cut this exchange off. Do we have a deal?

 

[AkuManiMani]

No worries. It is perfectly describable with current physics.


There are a couple of problems with your magic-field "theory", though. Namely:

Its a 'field hypothesis' not 'magic-field theory'. Stop deliberately misrepresenting what I say

Edited by chillzero: 

Edited for civility

- There is no mechanism to produce such a field

Neural activity

- There is no mechanism to receive such a field

There's no need to. Its endogenous.

- There is no such field

More baseless, inane assertion.

- Our brains do not work that way
- Our minds do not behave that way
- It's physically impossible

Aw, gee. I guess if you say so then it must be. Everyone else must provide evidence and justification for what they say, but every word you utter is infallible truth. You disgust me.

Most people would consider any one of these to be an indication that they might be, y'know, wrong.

My apologies for contradicting the inerrant gospel of PixyMisa. Surely, I can be forgiven???

 

[AkuManiMani]

But you are saying consciousness exists and you are claiming we can take the existence of consciousness as an axiom. I am pointing out that we cannot take that as an axiom or claim to know anything about the existence of consciousness.

The axiom is that it exists period. Otherwise we could not even speak of it.

My position "consciousness happens" is very different from "consciousness exists".

Dude, atoms 'happen' as well. It is absurd to argue from this that they do not exist.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Perhaps we could say that the child is conscious of "internal" reactions. Although it's quite plausible that the child would not experience them as it being conscious of them. Yet if probed for behaviour it could be found that certain behaviours would entail the child is "acting" as a functional whole in some instances. It would be very difficult to assess however.

Although keeping in "mind" the plasticity and the inherent capabilities of adaptation (a newborn has more connections in the brain than adults, which it then looses by reaction to the environment and learning etc., i.e. malleability) we might even say it would be conscious of things happening in the organism that we aren't. Thus in some circumstances it would be more conscious. For us, even meditation or everyday contextual changes might also change what we become conscious of momentarily.

Hence we reach a point where we must formulate a framework for what we think the brain (or the whole organism) is and what is 'being conscious' entails. Is it ultimately satisfying to approach the organism (and the brain) as a single units, or is it more like an ecosystem where cells interact with each other independently without some of them them ever reaching a larger conscious representation, but whereas other kinds of interactions do, provided the "right" context? How could we ever pinpoint exactly where the conscious aspect is therein, or must we settle for describing the playing field where it happens, where describing the functions also means explaining IT itself?

Lupus, I would just like to say that my hat is off to you. You've taken the initiative to honestly consider whats been said in this discussion to reach you own conclusions rather than simply claim from ideological authority. You are exemplar of an honest, true, independent thinker. Regardless on whether or not we agree on details you have my respect.

 

[Robin]

The axiom is that it exists period. Otherwise we could not even speak of it.

Does "running" exist?

Dude, atoms 'happen' as well. It is absurd to argue from this that they do not exist.

Strawman. I did not say "consciousness does not exist because consciousness happens" as you appear to be implying that I did.

I did not even say that consciousness does not exist.

I said we can't know that consciousness exists, we can only know that it happens.

 

[yy2bggggs]

Distilled to its simplest form, what I am claiming does not exist is the cartesian theatre.

This seems to be a reference to Dennett. I was never quite sure what Dennett was getting at either, so I'm not quite sure this helps.

There is no image, and no watcher.

This doesn't help either. Two posts ago (in this exchange), you said this:

I would caution you strongly against the statement "the images stored throughout our brains", though.

The entire question before you is, why? Why the caution? Let's say I point to them and call them images. What did I do wrong?

What's wrong, for example, with this mapping? Let's say the entire image, blind spot, wallpaper with a pattern on it, and all (these being examples invoked in Consciousness Explained, as I recall), mapped onto the V1 layer of the visual cortex, is a "theater screen", and let's say that Dennett's "access consciousness" is a homunculus. Wouldn't this make a Cartesian Theater? Why not?

 

[rocketdodger]

I find the lengths to which you, Pixy, et al. go to just to avoid acknowledging basic facts and definitions unnerving. There are politicians and lawyers who couldn't even begin to approach the level of semantic evasion you guys are employing. Must I reference the g***amn dictionary in every post now??? Good grief!

The definitions I and others here have employed firmly established by all reasonable criteria. This endless equivocation and sophistry is growing tiresome. Quit dodging.

Err... ok... but "1 + 1 == 2" is not an axiom of mathematics.

If anything, that is just a definition of "2," I.E. the successor of the successor of zero, or S(S(0)) or something along those lines.

So thank you for proving me correct -- something you thought was irreducible to the point of needing to be an axiom, because it "seemed" so simple to you as to be self evident, is in fact the result of logical inference applied to even simpler true axioms.

I mean, you can add whatever you want as an axiom to any system, but since you are wrong about this statement needing to be an axiom maybe you are wrong about consciousness as well.

I've quite clearly explained why consciousness is a requisite of knowing -- by definition. Knowing is an emergent property of consciousness. Period.

Actually, you haven't -- none of the definitions you just listed include "consciousness" anywhere. Of course, you can claim that some of the other terms included require "consciousness" as a prerequisite, but isn't that the same game all over again?

Face it -- your argument, just like the arguments of the HPC that you are supporting, is circular.

You've yet to established that its even logically possible for an entity to 'know' absent being conscious. In this case, its painfully obvious that you're the one making the extra ordinary claim and its hightime you started proving some extra ordinary evidence; elsewise, we've no basis for discussion.

Huh?

All one has to do in order to show this to be logically possible is to provide a definition of "know" that can be satisfied by a scientifically observable process.

If you don't agree with that definition, so be it.

What is interesting is that the only difference tends to be this assumption that "consciousness" is required to begin with.

Suppose, for instance, that I said "to know X" simply means "to have a fact X in one's knowledge base, where 'knowledge base' is simply a collection of facts about the world."

What is wrong with that definition -- that it doesn't presume consciousness?

Then stop using it. You know damn well that your objections are not scientific -- they're ideological.

I guess you could consider the desire to adhere to the rules of logic and mathematics -- which have, after all, gotten us this far -- to be ideological. Guilty as charged!

The problem is just about every comment you made in this reply is a 'useless statement'.

I can see how you would think pointing out the uselessness of uselessness might be useless. Zero multiplied by any number is, after all, zero.

Okay.... I want you, in a single post, to sum up my position on this subject. If you can do this without misrepresenting anything I've said I will continue this discussion with you. If you cannot, I'll save us both from a waste of time and just cut this exchange off. Do we have a deal?

You don't understand how subjective experience could be the result of a system that can be fully described by mathematics / physics as we know it. In other words, you think it is irreducible I.E. can't be explained in terms of simpler concepts or, formally, can't be inferred from the existing axioms of any system.

Is that close?

 

[PixyMisa]

I find the lengths to which you, Pixy, et al. go to, just to avoid acknowledging basic facts and definitions, unnerving.

What facts? What definitions? You can't just wave your hands about; you have to tell us.

Must I reference the g***amn dictionary in every post now???

Referencing the dictionary at all would be nice.

The definitions I and others here have employed are firmly established by all reasonable criteria.

Maybe so. But you have to say what they are.

I've quite clearly explained why consciousness is a requisite of knowing -- by definition.

By what definition? You haven't provided one.