The Hard Problem of Gravity

[six7s]

Please, do show me a computer made out of bits

Thank you in advance

http://digg.com/gaming_news/LittleBigPlanet_used_to_create_1_600_part_calculator_video

When I said bits, I meant binary digits, whole binary digits and nothing but binary digits...

 

[six7s]

Whether or not something can compute on its own is irrelevant to whether or not it computes period

And that is relevant to which discussion?

 

[quixotecoyote]

Whether or not something can compute on its own is irrelevant to whether or not it computes period

And that is relevant to which discussion?

the one you jumped in the middle of:

Software can't ever perform computation on its own. Hardware is always required. The form of the hardware is immaterial (except that it can't be immaterial).

 

[AkuManiMani]

That's certainly what I assumed; it would have taken Six7s perhaps a dozen words to say so. Something Westprog managed easily enough.


Certainly. A computer is something that performs computations. Whether it's made out of clockwork or Lego or silicon - or bits - is largely irrelevant. We can only deal with behaviours.

I agree with you that a process is what it is regardless of the medium it's operating on.

The reason I pursued this is that we often see a similar claim that simulated consciousness isn't consciousness. And this is, essentially, the same claim.

I would say that simulating a phenomenon is an invaluable means of gaining insight into it. The point of contention I have with your position is not so much that you're claiming the simulation of consciousness is a form of consciousness, but that you're simulating the wrong phenomenon and claiming it to be not only a model of consciousness but indistinguishable from it. Simply put, you're simulating the wrong brain phenomenon.

I'm sure I am about something!

From what I've read, your position is spot on except for one major and fatal flaw: You're confusing a phenomenon related to consciousness with consciousness. I understand your position and arguments quite thoroughly but I don't think you're following what I'm saying. I'm going to try again to explain to you what is meant by consciousness and why it differs from the definition you're insisting on.

Computers and computer programs are amazing instances of logical function and no doubt can help one understand aspects of human cognition and the way the mind/brain can organize and process information.

But, when I say 'consciousness', I'm not referring so much to the logical processing of information, per se, but the awareness of said information. For instance, an organic brain may receive informational input thru sensory organs and process it but there is not necessarily an conscious awareness of said informational processing going on. A nervous system can compute sensory information to produce reflexive output without conscious awareness or intentional decision. A brain's complexity does not change when it is conscious as apposed to unconscious.

Based upon what we know about the brain and about our own experiences, it stands to reason that the difference between conscious and unconscious processing in a brain is clearly not one of degree of complexity but of a physical state.

What I'm proposing is that what is colloquially referred to as consciousness is a specific class of physical state -- most likely a kind of informational field. What we call 'qualia' would be perturbations of this field. One of the main strengths of this hypothesis is that it effectively deals with the binding problem without having to invoke anything supernatural or dualistic.

In this interpretation, cognition would the logical processing of information within a particular field of awareness. Computation isn't awareness, per se, but a process that can happen within it.

NOW do you understand what I'm saying?

 

[six7s]

the one you jumped in the middle of:

Yeah.... riiiiiiiight...

FYI:

I "jumped" into this thread somewhat earlier:

VS Ramachandran:

• Qualia = sensations you are conscious of

• Self and Qualia are two sides of a Mobius Strip

Consciousness, Qualia, and Self
Dr. V.S. Ramachandran, Director of the Center for Brain and Cognition at UCSD, discusses consciousness, qualia, and self.​

Works for me

I have been - and continue to take exception with that which is patently wrong:

The software of today is a computer in and of itself as well.

 

[AkuManiMani]

AkuManiMani, I think Krauss' main point was that the brain was the least of places he could think quantum effects were to play a meaningful role. I don't think he's the only one.It's a shame they Bingham (the organizer) did not really let them go at each other, it would have been interesting to listen to, almost certainly informative.

Yes. I really would like to hear people more qualified than us debate the details of this issue. I find it very fascinating subject and would like to learn even more about it

Also, the article you pointed to says the following: "However, we still don’t know to what degree photosynthesis benefits from these quantum effects."

Yes, quantum biology is a nascent field so it stands to reason that the details haven't been completely worked out. Regardless, the basic conclusion one can gleam from what we do know is that QM is significant to biological function. The rest of my argument is inductive inference from this basic fact.

Perhaps your statement – "In fact, given what is already known about the brain, is seems extremely implausible that QM scale processes would not have a cogent effect on the neurological function of the brain and organism as a whole." – is a bit of an overstatement.

Perhaps it is a bit of an overstatement. But, as I've pointed out, even tho all the details of how QM relates to biology haven't been hashed out yet that fact that it does is beyond reasonable dispute.

 

[Gate2501]

I have been - and continue to take exception with that which is patently wrong:

Do you deny that software can perform computations?

Are you latched on to a narrow definition of "computer"?

I was under the impression that even a person that does a computation, would be considered a "computer".

He did compute, after all.

 

[quixotecoyote]

Yeah.... riiiiiiiight...

FYI:

I "jumped" into this thread somewhat earlier:




I have been - and continue to take exception with that which is patently wrong:

I'm aware of what you said when.

Your computer out of bits comment was not an extension to your qualia definitions, rather it was a part of the discussion over what constitutes a computer.

If you were unaware of the quote chain from westprog and rocketdoger that you were joining, that's fine, but you should just say "oops, wrong part of the conversation," rather than trying to tie it to something unrelated.

 

[PixyMisa]

When I said bits, I meant binary digits, whole binary digits and nothing but binary digits...

Transistors, nothing but transistors.

Electricity? Oh no, you're not allowed to use electricity!

 

[six7s]

Transistors, nothing but transistors.

Electricity? Oh no, you're not allowed to use electricity!

If patronising irony is your goal, please try harder

The software of today is a computer in and of itself as well.

This is, was, and always will be absurd

 

[AkuManiMani]

QM-scale processes, then, would have every bit as much significance to every other physical, chemical, and biological process as well. Why then consciousness, as opposed to the QM model of, say, running? We have no need to invoke QM to explain the mechanics, chemistry, etc., of running, because (as pixy suggested) the "bulk, statistical properties of matter" are modeled well enough without QM.

Yes. The bulk statistical properties of matter can be and are approximated quite well using classical deterministic theories, without employing QM. The thing is, what I'm referring are a class of phenomenon whose behaviors do not lend themselves well to such an approach. I am, ofcourse, referring to the behaviors of living organisms.

As I mentioned in a previous post, using classical methods we can do things like determine how fast a critter will fall, or how much energy would be required to move it from one place to another, etc. What one cannot do using such methods is predict how far it will run, in which direction it will run, why it will run or predict any other of an endless number of behaviors that organisms can exhibit.

I very strongly suspect that the reason for this is that those kinds of behaviors are linked inextricably with QM phenomenon.

And yet, the cellular metabolism works the same way; the action potentials propagate the same way; the synapses function the same way--we simply have more interneuron interaction in the brain. Last I heard, the release of neurotransmitters from synaptic vesicles into the synapse was several orders of magnitude away from being a quantum process. [eta: 13 orders? wow, even more than my poor memory was telling me!]

And yet we do not yet have a working, unified theory of either the brain or life in general. What we have are a list of biological facts and no coherent theory in which to integrate them and make meaningful predictions. Basically, what I'm saying is that we haven't yet devised a unified theory of life that can be integrated into our body of physics. I feel that the evidence suggests that integrating life into the framework of QM would be a major step towards developing such a theory.

People bring QM into consciousness because it's the closest thing to magic they know. We want to be special; we want to be more than just biology. We want our magical assumptions about human consciousness to be true, rather than looking at what consciousness actually is. The Hard Problem is how to keep humans at the center of the universe and god's heart, while still being scientific.

Its true. People often DO invoke QM in scientific discussions because it seems so weird and mysterious that it appaears to allow room for 'magic' and 'god' or other forms of 'woo'. I find your accusation of me attempting to invoke magic, while understandable, to be deeply offensive. That is not MY intention here -- in fact it is the polar opposite. I'm proposing using QM, not as a way to mystify life, but as a method to unravel the mystery of life. As far as I'm concerned, the term 'supernatural' is an oxymoron because anything that exists exists within the realm of nature.

Nature, as far as we can tell, is based upon the laws of QM and life [being part of nature] must be describable in quantum mechanical terms. The big issue is that our understanding and grasp of the theory hasn't developed enough to the point where we can translate it to the macroscopic scale very well. This is a problem that can and, I believe, inevitably will be overcome. In the mean time, there is ample evidence that QM plays a non-trivial role in biology and we would do well to investigate the nature and extent of its role.

Unless QM works differently in the brain than in the rest of the universe, it simply serves the function for some theorists that the pineal gland did for Descartes.

QM doesn't have to work differently in the brain in order for it to play a role in the functioning of the brain. There is something major being missed in our current approach to tackling, not only the brain, but of all biological processes. Its probably something that, in hindsight, will seem incredibly obvious.

There is a major physical difference between an organism and an inanimate object like, say, a rock. I do not think this difference lies simply in the organization of their atoms but in their physical state. Thermodynamically, living things are very strange entities and I would like to understand why this is so. It cries our for explanation.

My suspicion is that organisms are expressions of a kind of complex field that organizes the interactions of their constituent atoms. I also suspect that QM will play a major role in understanding this class of field. While I admit that this is speculation, it is based upon reasonable inference from established scientific facts.

 

[Gate2501]

Thermodynamically, living things are very strange entities

Why?

 

[PixyMisa]

If patronising irony is your goal, please try harder

Computation is a process. A CPU, by itself, will compute nothing.

A pattern of bits, by itself, will compute nothing.

Indeed, a CPU is a pattern of bits.

So where's the difference?

This is, was, and always will be absurd

Maybe so, but you certainly haven't produced any evidence or agument to support your position.

 

[PixyMisa]

Why?

Well, because.

 

[PixyMisa]

As I mentioned in a previous post, using classical methods we can do things like determine how fast a critter will fall, or how much energy would be required to move it from one place to another, etc. What one cannot do using such methods is predict how far it will run, in which direction it will run, why it will run or predict any other of an endless number of behaviors that organisms can exhibit.

That doesn't give us any reason to suspect that QM is involved.

I very strongly suspect that the reason for this is that those kinds of behaviors are linked inextricably with QM phenomenon.

Slight problem with that. Two slight problems.

One, you have no evidence for this whatsoever.

Two, it's physically impossible.

And yet we do not yet have a working, unified theory of either the brain or life in general.

What the heck is a unified theory of life supposed to be?

What we have are a list of biological facts and no coherent theory in which to integrate them and make meaningful predictions.

Starts with E. Ends with volution.

Basically, what I'm saying is that we haven't yet devised a unified theory of life that can be integrated into our body of physics.

What is that supposed to mean?

I feel that the evidence suggests that integrating life into the framework of QM would be a major step towards developing such a theory.

And I feel - as I mentioned in another thread - that everyone should keep a rabid wolverine as a bath toy.

Nature, as far as we can tell, is based upon the laws of QM and life [being part of nature] must be describable in quantum mechanical terms.

Which statistically reduce to the bulk physical properties of matter we are used to dealing with.

The big issue is that our understanding and grasp of the theory hasn't developed enough to the point where we can translate it to the macroscopic scale very well.

Wrong. Completely wrong. We can, and we do. Just in most cases, it's irrelevant.

This is a problem that can and, I believe, inevitably will be overcome.

And has been.

In the mean time, there is ample evidence that QM plays a non-trivial role in biology and we would do well to investigate the nature and extent of its role.

Instead of constantly claiming that this evidence exists, perhaps you could actually say what it is.

QM doesn't have to work differently in the brain in order for it to play a role in the functioning of the brain.

Yeah, it does. It has to work in impossible ways.

There is something major being missed in our current approach to tackling, not only the brain, but of all biological processes.

No. No there isn't.

Its probably something that, in hindsight, will seem incredibly obvious.

Damn! We were right all along! QM is irrelevant! How could we have missed that!

There is a major physical difference between an organism and an inanimate object like, say, a rock.

Yes, the organisation of the atoms in the object.

I do not think this difference lies simply in the organization of their atoms but in their physical state.

Why not? It's different, it's the only difference, and it fully accounts for all the observed properties.

Thermodynamically, living things are very strange entities

No they aren't. They're as strange, thermodynamically, as a candle.

and I would like to understand why this is so.

It isn't so.

It cries our for explanation.

It cries out for you to read a 7th-grade science textbook.

My suspicion is that organisms are expressions of a kind of complex field that organizes the interactions of their constituent atoms.

No such field exists.

I also suspect that QM will play a major role in understanding this class of field.

So, magical fields and magical QM. Anything else?

While I admit that this is speculation, it is based upon reasonable inference from established scientific facts.

What facts are these?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Don't play dense, Pixy.

Oh, I'm not playing.

My sympathies then.

It means that I'm calling 'consciousness' a specific class of phenomenon:

"An observable fact or occurrence or a kind of observable fact or occurrence; an appearance. "

More specifically, consciousness is THE "observable fact or occurrence", sine qua non. Its the fundamental basis of every human pursuit, including science. Without 'consciousness' there is no observation of anything.

What makes you think that?

Because you cannot be said to observe anything unless you are aware of it. Science is based upon empirical observations; without observations there is no science. Why is that so difficult for you to comprehend?

I know from direct observation that there are periods of time that the phenomenon of my conscious experience has varying qualities (moods, sensations, colors, thoughts and accompanying emotional overtones, directions of focus, etc.) and varying degrees (ranging from full wakefulness, to drowsiness, and unconscious sleep).

How would you know this, though? And what difference does it make in any case?

Gods, man!! Are you retarded?? The answers to both those questions are right there!

You've already told me what your criteria for consciousness are and I reject them for a number of reasons [many of which I've already repeatedly and clearly stated in this an every other thread discussing this topic] but one of the primary reasons is that your criteria are met when I am, in fact, unconscious.

Being unconscious doesn't mean you're not conscious, of course.

Unconscious is, by definition, not conscious.

Because you are giving the word two different meanings.

No. I'm using one definition and explaining to you that what you are calling consciousness is not what I'm referring to.

Let me try and break this issue down to you in terms you can possibly relate to since, apparently, plain English is beyond your comprehension:

AMM
Statement 1: Consciousness = X
Statement 2: Cognition = Y(X)
Statement 3: Y does not explain X

PM
Statement 1: Consciousness = Y
Statement 2: Cognition = Y
Statement 3: Y explains everything

Of course, the above example is to server as an analogy to our situation. We're both using the same term [e.g. consciousness] but we each are using two completely different definitions for the same term. The difference between you and I is that, while I understand your definition, you seem to have a cognitive handicap preventing you from recognizing that I'm using a definition distinct from yours even tho we happen to be using the same term; consciousness.

From the empirical laboratory of my own experience

The what now?

Wow, metaphore is wasted on you

Lets just say its a fancy way of saying that it is a self-evident fact.

I know that the criteria you've proposed are falsified.

You not only do not know this, you can't know this.

Yes I do, because I know that we're referring to two separate things. The fact that you're too slow to realize this is irrelevant.

I don't need to refer to the intellectual authority of Dennett or any other person to see that this is the case.

It might help if you knew anything at all about the subject, though.

I've already demonstrated to you in this and threads that I do:

I'm familiar with Dennett's definition of consciousness and why he states that a thermostat is not qualitatively different than the human brain/mind. Essentially his argument is that the difference between the two examples is a matter of degree rather than kind and that the only thing that truly distinguishes human 'consciousness' from thermostat 'consciousness' is that the process in question is more complex in humans.

Yes, that's precisely correct.

Many of the thinkers you've referenced in support of your definition of consciousness, I feel, are very intelligent people who should know better, so I can't help but concluding that this equivocation is deliberate.

Then name one thing we ascribe to consciousness that is not covered by my explanation. Show that it exists, show that it really is not covered, and we'll have something to discuss.

Express 'sourness' in quantitative terms. Explain you could use this information to convey 'sourness' to an individual without taste buds.

I don't even think you know what is meant when you use the term "consciousness".

Just because you don't [or atleast claim you don't] know what I mean by conscious does not mean that I don't. The problem is that I understand both of our positions while you only understand your own.

At least I have a definition, meaningful, relevant, objective, and consistent, and I stick to it.

You sure do have a meaningful, relevant, objective, and consistent definition; its just not the definition of what I'm referring to.

 

[yy2bggggs]

I think the issue between us is that I am meaning something other than what you think I am meaning. Perhaps it is my fault for using a term like "understand' without fully defining it.

To me, "understanding" means coming to a conclusion about something, even if subconsciously. Actually, especially subconsciously.

To me, it has the dictionary definition of comprehension.

Formally, my definition for understanding would be:

Given a rational agent A and a statement P, A understands P if and only if A can infer new or existing facts from P (combined with A's existing knowledge base, of course).

I suspect that is different from what you mean when you say "understand."

Probably, but your definition seems to lack something. For example, we have Godel's Incompleteness Theorems, and demonstration of the Halting Problem, deriving in a general sense from such devices. So if you're proposing we don't understand, you have to cull this part out. You seem to want to do this:

Note that in this case, your statements about a self-referential sentence lead to new facts -- but those facts are not inferred from the self-referential statement itself.

...but you introduce other problems. For example, "True=True" is a true statement, and we certainly can't derive any new facts from it. That squeezes you down to "existing" facts. And, okay, we can actually start with T=T and derive things from it, if that is what you mean, but then, if that's the case, what about the false claim "T=F"? Not only can you not derive new facts from this, but I think you'd find it hard to derive existing facts from it. Does this mean that per your formal definition, we do not understand the statement "T=F"?

I would argue that this starts to veer so far off of the colloquial, dictionary definition of "understanding" that perhaps it'd be better to bind the formal definition to a different word altogether.

And to explore the same thing from another perspective, let's revisit sudoku puzzles, but in a broader sense. Allow me to introduce three technical terms: a "valid sudoku puzzle" refers to the ordinary, official sudoku puzzles... these have exactly one solution. A "bad sudoku puzzle", let's say, has more than one solution (bad in the sense that it's "not a good one"--note that, for applicability to the subject at hand, a sudoku puzzle that has one solution, but is overspecified would be counted toward the good case). And finally, an "invalid" sudoku puzzle is one that has no solution. Those three categories seem like very useful things to analyze to me.

Now, certainly, you realize that sudoku puzzles are self referential, by their very nature, and are logical puzzles as well. They can (ahem!) easily be reformulated as a series of logical statements (given you have a nice set of 81 variables, sufficient lifetime, and sufficiently insufficient "having-a-life", to deal with the combinatorically huge number of statements). As such, if your claim is taken at face value, it is equivalent at least to saying that the category of "invalid sudoku" puzzles is beyond human understanding (even if we could show how they are invalid). Are you also going to claim that bad sudoku puzzles are beyond our understanding? Are you claiming, as well, that good sudoku puzzles are? I'm not sure I know how to apply your proposed formal definition to this scenario and get a useful result out of it, nor do I know what I'm supposed to infer that's particularly shocking even if said formal definition says that I don't understand one or all three classes of sudoku puzzles. I'm still perfectly capable of solving them, and even classifying them, so it makes no pragmatic difference in this regard if I'm formally accused of not understanding one or all three categories.

Do you agree that our definitions are not the same?

Sort of. I'm still not quite sure I understand what your definition is... at least formally; that is, I'm not quite sure how to practically apply your definition to the scenario, or to (especially) "antitautological" claims, or what utility I'm to derive from it that is related to the dictionary understanding of "comprehension" once I find that I formally don't understand something.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Thermodynamically, living things are very strange entities.

Why?

Because organisms actively reduce their internal entropy which, to my knowledge, is something no other naturally occurring object does.

 

[quixotecoyote]

Because organisms actively reduce their internal entropy which, to my knowledge, is something no other naturally occurring object does.

May I ask how you came by that idea?

 

[yy2bggggs]

Maybe he has a temperature.