The Hard Problem of Gravity

[Belz...]

It's well known that the brain processes vast amounts of information and that a little of this processing appears to go on consciously - "in the light." The remainder appears to go on unconsciously. In the currently popular model, Global Workspace Theory (GWT), a prevailing question is thus to ask how it is that this apparent difference is manifested in material terms.

In Pixy's model, what creates the difference would be the presence of a self-referencing loop in one of the data streams, yet to me such a notion is clearly inconsistent with what we already know of the brain and of GWT.

Why is it inconsistent ? Not sure I'm following you.

 

[Nick227]

I think what Pixy's going for is that "inner dialogue" is self-referential information processing.

We already agreed that inner dialogue is mostly self-referential.

Nick

 

[AkuManiMani]

Belz, I know darn well that genes are not the same as chromosomes -- which is why I used those terms as examples. Experiences are to qualia what chromosomes are to genes [tho, it seems codons would be more directly analogous to qualia]. Get it?

So are you now saying that experiences are made up of qualia ? And, if so, what the hell are qualia, again ?

Qualia are the qualitative elements of subjective impressions that make up the totality of our experience at any given moment. The scientific understanding of what constitutes them is still waiting for its Watson & Crick, so to speak.

With that said, I would like you to elaborate as to why the concept of emergence is necessarily "ridiculous"?

Let me help you with that boxfull of straw.

I didn't say there are no "emergent" properties, but the properties are still part of the constituents of the whole. They don't appear from thin air, and the whole is STILL the exact sum of its parts.

The properties of an overall system are not merely the sum of the components. Of course they do not rise out of 'thin air' without rhyme or reason, but there is not a direct linear correlation between individual component properties and collective emergent properties.

As in "special pleading". The human mind is immune to the sort of reasoning that made us understand flight, for instance.

Could you please clarify.

Turtles about turtles.

Eh...?

Those are all examples of conscious self-referential processing -- what we call introspection. It seems that primates, especially humans, posses this capacity to a greater degree than other animals.

Did you just agree with Pixy about the definition of consciousness ?

I've been stating repeatedly that many conscious functions are classes of self-referential processing but that self-reference, IAOI, does not explain or sufficiently describe consciousness because it applies to a huge range of processes which are NOT conscious. Perhaps if you actually took the time to UNDERSTAND what I've been explicitly saying, instead of mindlessly arguing against it, you would have picked up on this atleast 20 pages ago.

So, in answer to your question, yes. To be introspectively conscious of one's own qualia necessarily generates a corresponding qualitative experience.

How are you conscious of qualia if qualia make up experiences ? It's like asking the program to be aware of the code. It isn't.

How indeed. Yet we have language that references and communicates our qualitative experiences and the capacity to be aware of and evaluate them. Clearly, what ever the nature of our 'program', its has the capacity to be aware of some of it's 'coding'.

 

[Nick227]

Why is it inconsistent ? Not sure I'm following you.

It's inconsistent because GWT asserts that consciousness (as opposed to unconscious processing) is simply the result of a globally accessible neuronal configuration. It is that certain information is "broadcast" to a range of networked modules. This broadcasting is consciousness.

A whole variety of modules concurrently process information, yet only a small amount becomes globally broadcast / conscious. It is thus hypothesized that there is a switching (attention) going on, usually believed to take place in areas of the mid-brain.

Thus, GWT provides a model for how concurrent processing streams are switched in and out of consciousness, quite without any self-referencing loops needing to be in circuit. In GWT, what makes something conscious is that it is globally broadcast, not that it references self.

GWTs are currently the dominant models among cognitive neuroscientists for understanding the brain as the creator of consciousness .

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

According to that definition, all atoms switch. What are rocks made of?

Hmm... you must know more about particle physics than I do.

Please explain which linear changes in an internal behavior of an atom lead to a non-linear change in another internal behavior.

A rock expanding and contracting in the sun is a switch. It's not hard to see how that could effect any given physical system on a repeatable non-linear basis.

Is there a nonlinear behavior change within the rock? No.

Therefore it is not a switch, according to the defintion I just gave. That is what internal means -- within the same system.

Is the rock heating up from the sun the only way the ON state of a surrounding system could be reached? No. You can walk up to the surrounding system and use a blowtorch to heat it up and get the same result.

Therefore, it is not a switch, according to my earlier definition. That is what "if and only if" means.

Like Pixy pointed out, you are confusing a switch with things that are used to make a switch. You can make a switch with a rock, but a rock all by itself is not a switch.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Theres also a camp that posits that consciousness is a form of information processing that simply hasn't been defined.

Self-referential information processing. And it tells us a great deal.

It tells us that consciousness has a commonality with an infinitude of other physical processes. Thats it. Simply producing a self-referential system [something ubiquitous in nature] doesn't produce consciousness. Your dumb refusal to see this is baffling.

Based on current scientific understanding, all processes are inherently informational processes.

As has been pointed out repeatedly, this is simply not true.

As has already been demonstrated to you, this -is- the current scientific understanding of physical process. You blindly asserting that it isn't doesn't negate this fact.

[Oh and FYI, don't expect much in the way of a reasoned response from Pixy. I have a sneaky suspicion that hes simply a chat-bot programed to argue for the strong AI position >_>]

If that were true, it would rather prove my point, wouldn't it?

Not really. But it would explain why you seem to share the same cognitive shortcomings of a mindless chat bot.

 

[rocketdodger]

There is at least one switch contained in the rock. Therefore it is a switch.

Indeed, the fact that the rock is made up entirely of switches should cast doubt on the idea that it can't be a switch.

There is at least one electron in an atom of gold.

Therefore all gold atoms are electrons.

Indeed, the fact that a gold atom is made up fundamental particles should cast doubt on the idea that it can't be a fundamental particle.

Huh?

 

[westprog]

Algorithmic ? I think you mean behavioral.

How can something be behavioural in nature? Everything has a behaviour.

 

[Belz...]

Qualia are the qualitative elements of subjective impressions that make up the totality of our experience at any given moment. The scientific understanding of what constitutes them is still waiting for its Watson & Crick, so to speak.

I'll say. First we'd have to understand what the hell is a "qualitative element of subjective impressions". It comes right back to you saying that qualia are experiences (which you didn't seem too sure about), since you noew say that they constitute the "totality of our experience". It doesn't seem to me like you know what you mean by "qualia".

The properties of an overall system are not merely the sum of the components. Of course they do not rise out of 'thin air' without rhyme or reason, but there is not a direct linear correlation between individual component properties and collective emergent properties.

I'd be interested in seeing examples of this. An example of an emergent property that is not wholly a function of the constituents.

Could you please clarify.

One last try: You seem to imply that the human "mind" is in a special category that makes it immune to understanding.

To qualitatively experience is qualia; to introspect is to directly observe qualia.

So you have qualia about qualia ?

Exactly. Thoughts about thoughts. Feelings about feelings.

Turtles about turtles.

Eh...?

I asked you what a qualia is. You said it is what constitutes experience, and then you say we can experience qualia. In fact:

How are you conscious of qualia if qualia make up experiences ? It's like asking the program to be aware of the code. It isn't.

How indeed. Yet we have language that references and communicates our qualitative experiences and the capacity to be aware of and evaluate them. Clearly, what ever the nature of our 'program', its has the capacity to be aware of some of it's 'coding'.

Er... no. I'm not aware of how my person generates consciousness or how it operates to make a decision. In fact I become aware of the decision after it's been made.

The mere fact that we can talk about it doesn't make us conscious because then computers that can say "I am conscious" would be conscious by definition.

I've been stating repeatedly that many conscious functions are classes of self-referential processing but that self-reference, IAOI, does not explain or sufficiently describe consciousness because it applies to a huge range of processes which are NOT conscious. Perhaps if you actually took the time to UNDERSTAND what I've been explicitly saying, instead of mindlessly arguing against it, you would have picked up on this atleast 20 pages ago.

I have been following, and perhaps you'd make more progress with less insults.

How are those unconscious processes self-aware ?

 

[Belz...]

It's inconsistent because GWT asserts that consciousness (as opposed to unconscious processing) is simply the result of a globally accessible neuronal configuration. It is that certain information is "broadcast" to a range of networked modules. This broadcasting is consciousness.

How can a neuron communicate with anything but a neuron that's right next to it ? How can GWT work ?

 

[Belz...]

Is the rock heating up from the sun the only way the ON state of a surrounding system could be reached? No. You can walk up to the surrounding system and use a blowtorch to heat it up and get the same result.

To be fair, you can get the thermostat to switch ON with the same blowtorch.

 

[Belz...]

How can something be behavioural in nature? Everything has a behaviour.

Indeed. But not everything has the same behaviour.

What do you mean by algorithmic, then ?

 

[westprog]

Hmm... you must know more about particle physics than I do.

Please explain which linear changes in an internal behavior of an atom lead to a non-linear change in another internal behavior.

IBM measures single-atom memory, molecular switch

Material dependence of switching speed of atomic switches made from silver sulfide and from copper sulfide

Illustration of an atomic switch with the double well potential for Xe atom and vibrational energy levels.

and so on.

 

[westprog]

Indeed. But not everything has the same behaviour.

What do you mean by algorithmic, then ?

I mean that by executing an algorithm that consciousness is exhibited. Choose whatever more appropriate definition you prefer.

 

[Nick227]

How can a neuron communicate with anything but a neuron that's right next to it ? How can GWT work ?

That's what the neurons are doing, communicating with those next to them. GWT simply proposes that when that communication is distributed across a wide array of unconscious modules, so that communication is consciousness. Other communication is unconscious.

See below for a simple summary...

At any given time, many modular cerebral networks are active in parallel and process information in an unconscious manner. An information becomes conscious, however, if the neural population that represents it is mobilized by top-down attentional amplification into a brain-scale state of coherent activity that involves many neurons distributed throughout the brain. The long distance connectivity of these "workplace neurons" can, when they are active for a minimal duration, make the information available to a variety of processes including perceptual categorization, long-term memorization, evaluation, and intentional action. We postulate that this global availability of information through the workplace is what we subjectively experience as a conscious state.

Thus, in GWT, information may be either conscious or unconscious and what creates the difference is whether that information is being represented in the intermodular "workplace neurons."

Nick

 

[PixyMisa]

Please explain this more.

Okay, first, tell me what a "conscious stream" is, exactly.

Global access is a neuronal arrangement that allows rapid dissemination of information to a wide variety of parallel networked modules.

Please find me any source from neurobiology that suggests that any such thing exists.

It is the parallel networking, as I understand it.

The entire brain is networked in parallel. This makes no sense at all.

Global access is also consciousness.

Nor does this.

Well, you're choosing to define consciousness as being innately self-referencing. Cognitive neuroscientists working with GWTs and similar do not.

Wrong.

We're just talking about a neuronal arrangement here, Pixy. How does it not exist?

The brain consists of interconnected neurons. There is no magical "global access" network. It does not exist. Just each neuron connected to a number of other neurons.

Can you explain this statement more? Are you saying that nothing is conscious?

No. I'm saying that these "streams" of yours aren't conscious.

The phrase "inner dialogue" seems to me pretty self-explanatory. Could you tell me which bit you feel there's a problem with?

Well, start by defining "inner" and "dialogue" as you are using them. We'll take it from there.

Please explain what you mean here more.

A signal is just a signal. A red light is a signal. A waving flag. An electrical impulse. Signals are not conscious.

As for your "streams" - tell me just what they are, and I will tell you just why they're not consious.

 

[PixyMisa]

There is at least one switch contained in the rock. Therefore it is a switch.

Fallacy of composition.

Indeed, the fact that the rock is made up entirely of switches should cast doubt on the idea that it can't be a switch.

Fallacy of composition.

 

[Third Eye Open]

That's fairly clear, isn't it? Nothing in the Universe can exhibit this property of consciousness except human beings and tools made by human beings**. The only place where consciousness exists and ever can exist is where humans live.


*Or dolphins, spiders, etc.
**Or hypothetical not yet found aliens.

This is the important part of this argument.

Westprog believes that only biological things can be conscious. There is something special about biological matter.

Is it the 'essence of life' perhaps? Or maybe the soul?

I wonder what special thing could happen to matter when it becomes part of a living thing that allows it to then, and only then, become conscious.


Hmm, I wonder...

Like I said in page two or three, no, I don't.

 

[Nick227]

Okay, first, tell me what a "conscious stream" is, exactly.


Please find me any source from neurobiology that suggests that any such thing exists.


The entire brain is networked in parallel. This makes no sense at all.


Nor does this.

Pixy,

You can go through your usual routine of low-level put downs, endless questions or random demands for definitions, and fragmented answers but the fact remains that these notions are the backbone of GWT and are clearly widely accepted amongst cognitive neuroscientists. They might not agree with your pet fantasy and so must of course be subjected to the usual unconscious attempts to push them out of your awareness, but nevertheless they do represent the real world.

* there is the neuronal capacity for global access and this is what consciousness is - this is the basis of GWT and it is widely accepted. Finally it may turn out to be wrong but as of now it's widely agreed.

Your theory just doesn't fit with what we know of human consciousness and no amount of your usual chatbot routine is going to alter this.

The brain consists of interconnected neurons. There is no magical "global access" network. It does not exist. Just each neuron connected to a number of other neurons.

Yet, attention-directed amplification can produce a state of global access for specific informations and this is consciousness, according to GWT.

No. I'm saying that these "streams" of yours aren't conscious.

Yes, yes, but as usual it's meaningless because you don't actually state what you mean by this. You don't expand. As usual you give nothing to ratify your case, and I am left wondering if you really believe this nonsense about self-referencing loops at all even yourself.

Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

To be fair, you can get the thermostat to switch ON with the same blowtorch.

Not the rock, the surrounding system.