The hard problem of consciousness

[Piggy]

I think it is more appropriate to say that the vast majority of proponents of the HPC don't accept monist solutions to the problem (one of which is that it does not exist) because they are dualists.

And that's a shame. But I do think there's something distinct which needs explaining.

I'm completely confident that the explanation will not be dualistic.

But it seems clear to me that there's a higher-tier phenomenon to be explained which should require its own explanatory framework. In other words, knowing how other functions of the brain work may not, by itself, tell you how the phenomenon of conscious experience is generated.

 

[Piggy]

So... if one is a non-dualist who buys into the HPC, then they simply can't define the terms properly yet, I suppose?

So if that's the case -- and it may be -- then please explain why it has to be so.

 

[rocketdodger]

You can show how all the components work, but that won't necessarily answer the question of how this conscious experience we all have is generated by the brain.

*sigh* I have answered this at least twice in this thread alone.

Everyone arguing for the HPC just ignores my answer. Why is that?

Conscious experience is simply a reasoning system reasoning about some aspect of itself.

Self-consciousness is simply a reasoning system reasoning about reasoning about itself.

You want to learn about this stuff? Sit down, and think about what happens when you think. If you are honest, patient, and observant, you will learn much -- and arrive at the above conclusion.

 

[Piggy]

*sigh* I have answered this at least twice in this thread alone.

Everyone arguing for the HPC just ignores my answer. Why is that?

Conscious experience is simply a reasoning system reasoning about some aspect of itself.

Self-consciousness is simply a reasoning system reasoning about reasoning about itself.

You want to learn about this stuff? Sit down, and think about what happens when you think. If you are honest, patient, and observant, you will learn much -- and arrive at the above conclusion.

Sorry, that's not good enough.

That's guru stuff.

I'm asking a much more specific question than that.

If you're arguing that the phenomenon of conscious experience does not require a material explanation... or if you're arguing that material explanations of other phenomena suffice... then let's see why that should be the case.

Sitting and meditating isn't on my to-do list.

 

[rocketdodger]

But it seems clear to me that there's a higher-tier phenomenon to be explained which should require its own explanatory framework. In other words, knowing how other functions of the brain work may not, by itself, tell you how the phenomenon of conscious experience is generated.

Well, it does, but it isn't immediately apparent because the property of consciousness is emergent. All you need to know is how a neuron works when linked with other neurons. And perhaps a bit of computer science.

 

[rocketdodger]

Sorry, that's not good enough.

That's guru stuff.

I'm asking a much more specific question than that.

If you're arguing that the phenomenon of conscious experience does not require a material explanation... or if you're arguing that material explanations of other phenomena suffice... then let's see why that should be the case.

Sitting and meditating isn't on my to-do list.

Ugh.

I am saying you should sit down and patiently try to define the terms of the HPC.

What, exactly, are qualia? What, exactly, is a subjective experience?

As in, what is going on in your head when a qualia pops into awareness, or when you have a subjective experience? Here is a clue -- in every case, you will find that you are reasoning.

Hence, the explanation of conscious experience I gave you.

 

[Piggy]

Well, it does, but it isn't immediately apparent because the property of consciousness is emergent. All you need to know is how a neuron works when linked with other neurons. And perhaps a bit of computer science.

You're gonna have to pony up if you want to say something like that.

I'm not saying it's wrong. It might be right. But I haven't seen it yet.

I agree we're talking about an emergent property.

But precisely because of that, we will not be able to understand it by understanding what happens at the level of the neuron. That goes with the territory.

We will have to understand the shape of the brain, how signals from groups of these neurons are routed, triggered, related, etc.

The shape and macro-activity of the brain will likely be the necessary bridge between neural activity in the sensation-processing chain and both conscious experience and gross motor response on the output side.

If we're talking about the brain, we have to deal with the brain.

 

[Piggy]

Ugh.

I am saying you should sit down and patiently try to define the terms of the HPC.

What, exactly, are qualia? What, exactly, is a subjective experience?

As in, what is going on in your head when a qualia pops into awareness, or when you have a subjective experience? Here is a clue -- in every case, you will find that you are reasoning.

Hence, the explanation of conscious experience I gave you.

I don't care about qualia.

And if you think that conscious experience in humans in synonymous with reasoning, I say you're quite wrong about that.

 

[rocketdodger]

If we're talking about the brain, we have to deal with the brain.

Yes. And?

Look, Piggy, if you refuse to even try to understand something as basic as the idea of a reasoning system that can reason about itself, then there is no way you can possibly hope to understand how a given brain structure functions in our consciousness.

That is analagous to a ECE student telling his professor that he doesn't need to learn about digital logic to understand how a CPU works, because 'we are talking about the CPU, so we have to deal with the CPU.' As if it were even possible to understand a CPU without knowing digital logic...

That is the problem with all you HPC proponents -- you just immediately write stuff off because it seems "too simple" to be able to answer the question. Yes, it is simple. It is so simple that you can't answer the question without it.

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't care about qualia.

And if you think that conscious experience in humans in synonymous with reasoning, I say you're quite wrong about that.

Yes, I gathered as much. Like all the other HPC proponents.

Since you are a materialist, though, and you appear to actually want to understand this issue, you should try to figure out why you feel I am wrong.

So -- have a go at it. Give me an example of a conscious experience you have had that did not involve reasoning about something at the time.

I think it will be quite difficult for you, given that it is impossible to be aware that you are having an experience without reasoning that it is yourself having the experience.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yeah, but I don't.

Then you're not talking so-called "Hard Problem Consciousness", you're talking real valid scientific questions.

Seems to me, the hard question has to do with the simple fact that we all do have conscious experiences, and it's likely that grasshoppers don't.

No, that's an easy question. It's just the number of neurons.

So that's something significant that we need to try to explain.

Done!

And that's really all there is to it.

Cool.

You can show how all the components work, but that won't necessarily answer the question of how this conscious experience we all have is generated by the brain.

Why not?

 

[Darat]

Yeah, but I don't.

...snip...

Then we are talking about two different "HPCs" - the first is the dualistic one the OP introduced with its idea of "all that physical stuff plus something else" and one that those of us who do not think there is a HPC (as stated in the OP) hold which is "Isn't consciousness a bloody difficult problem to get a handle on?"

Traditionally the term HPC is used only for the first one, your HPC really needs its own name, I would suggest the "Difficult Problem of Consciousness" or DPC for short.



ETA: I see Pixy said the same thing sorry!

 

[skiba]

Turtles.

Doing
Experience of doing
Sensation of experience of doing
Perception of sensation of experience of doing
Feeling of perception of sensation of experience of doing
Qualia of feeling of perception of sensation of experience of doing

How can a "mechanical" device experience anything? I can understand a reaction based on its physical properties. If we have a photo sensitive plate and I shine a light on it, theres a fairly simple physical reaction. No experience happens. Can we agree on this? It is the same as a rock falling
to the ground due to gravity. It just happen because of the physical laws and the physical properties of the objects.
Cause and effect or the objects involved in it do no experience this reaction.

Any physical device is dependent on the same basic princple of cause and effect.

Do you claim that if you simply multiply this basic principle of cause and effect by many factors, and run it through feed back loops and complex calculations that the cause and effect somehow starts to have experience.
Who/what is experiencing? Theres nothing but reactive patterns, nothing but a huge domino effect.

Dont get caught in the word "experience". It's ONLY A WORD, that points to something beyond language. It's the simple act of "see-ing"(not analysing) the thought, the emotion, sense perception as it happens.

As Darat implies, it is only the assumption of dualism that initially creates "these two aspects". It is not that we are denying an additional something; rather, it is that we are not making up an additional something in the first place.

I'm not claiming it has to be dualistic, I'm claiming there is some part missing from the "model" that's been proposed.

 

[Darat]

No.

So then why aren't what you label "qualia" just like my "ran"? Why can't "qualia" be described (in principle) in the same way everything else in the world can be?

 

[Darat]

...snip...

I'm not claiming it has to be dualistic, I'm claiming there is some part missing from the "model" that's been proposed.

But your argument is really an argument from personal incredulity - you are really saying "I can't believe that "experience" can just be the result of environmental processes". The problem you have is that there is not an iota of evidence that there is anything but those environmental processes.

 

[skiba]

But your argument is really an argument from personal incredulity - you are really saying "I can't believe that "experience" can just be the result of environmental processes". The problem you have is that there is not an iota of evidence that there is anything but those environmental processes.

I can't show you the evidence. I can only point to your own subjective experience. To the phenomenon we call experience. Not to the thing we are experiencing(what ever that might be at the moment) but to the act of experiencing.

It has nothing to do with belief. I think I explained my position somewhat rationally in my last post, so the problem i'm trying to express can be graped.

 

[PixyMisa]

How can a "mechanical" device experience anything?

Experiences are information. Mechanical devices can encode and process information.

I can understand a reaction based on its physical properties. If we have a photo sensitive plate and I shine a light on it, theres a fairly simple physical reaction. No experience happens. Can we agree on this?

Sure.

It is the same as a rock falling
to the ground due to gravity. It just happen because of the physical laws and the physical properties of the objects.

That's true of everything.

Cause and effect or the objects involved in it do no experience this reaction.

Sure.

Any physical device is dependent on the same basic princple of cause and effect.

Yes.

That does not mean that physical systems cannot have experiences.

Do you claim that if you simply multiply this basic principle of cause and effect by many factors, and run it through feed back loops and complex calculations that the cause and effect somehow starts to have experience.

Yes.

Who/what is experiencing?

The system.

Theres nothing but reactive patterns, nothing but a huge domino effect.

Yes.

Dont get caught in the word "experience". It's ONLY A WORD, that points to something beyond language.

Unfounded assumption. The fact that you might not be able to adequately define your concept of experience does not mean that the concept of experience cannot be adequately defined.

It's the simple act of "see-ing"(not analysing) the thought, the emotion, sense perception as it happens.

Sure. Machines can do all this.

I'm not claiming it has to be dualistic, I'm claiming there is some part missing from the "model" that's been proposed.

What? Where? Why?

 

[PixyMisa]

I can't show you the evidence. I can only point to your own subjective experience. To the phenomenon we call experience. Not to the thing we are experiencing(what ever that might be at the moment) but to the act of experiencing.

I see absolutely no reason why all the properties of my own subjective experience could not be replicated by some other system of hardware. Can you propose such a reason?

It has nothing to do with belief. I think I explained my position somewhat rationally in my last post, so the problem i'm trying to express can be graped.

You keep saying that something is missing. You have yet to say what this something is. That's the problem of belief.

 

[Darat]

I can't show you the evidence. I can only point to your own subjective experience. To the phenomenon we call experience. Not to the thing we are experiencing(what ever that might be at the moment) but to the act of experiencing.

It has nothing to do with belief. I think I explained my position somewhat rationally in my last post, so the problem i'm trying to express can be graped.

But don't you see that you're basing this on an assumption that "the thing we are experiencing" and "act of experiencing" are not related to one another and/or of different type of "stuff" and that fuels your argument from incredulity? This is where my example of "ran" comes back into play; if we use your reasoning and argument on this we end up with a "hard problem of locomotion", yet for "ran" you do not see that there is a problem to be addressed.

 

[leon_heller]

I think its a combination of both. I wont start speculating on the non-physical, i'll just say it might be in the field quantum mechanics.
All I know for certain is that something vital is missing from the model.

Skiba,

Once again, what is it that is missing? You claim to know what it is but you won't tell us. Is it a secret that has been vouchsafed to you only, that may not be communicated to anyone else?

Leon