The hard problem of consciousness

[Mercutio]

The qualia are the hard problem. It's the fact that they are inherently subjective, and individual, that makes them nearly impossible to pin down. Ignore the qualia, and we just have behaviour. We can pretend that experience = computation, and we all work like thermostats.

This is the dualistic assumption that Darat complained about. Using the phrase "inherently subjective" implies a difference in kind; another way of looking at, say, seeing red, is that it is simply private behavior. The difference between the "seeing" and Darat's "ran" would be a matter of number of observers, but no implication of substance difference.

Oh, and we do "just have behavior". Behavior, as defined by behaviorists, is "what you do", and includes both public and private behavior. The scientific study of sensation and perception shows us nowhere at all where qualia are a necessary part of visual perception (to choose the most-studied sense). The people for whom qualia are a necessary element are those who have assumed the existence of qualia, not those who have studied the way the organism actually works.

I've posted this before, but it seems to cover this case.

I have that book in my office. "Seems" is a good choice of word. Searle's objection is as if he objects to a "world-turning" explanation of sunrise because it denies the observable fact that the sun actually rises through the sky over a stationary earth. He rejects, as far as I can tell, because the HPC, as I have said, presupposes a particular sort of answer.

If that's the case, I can't ever use the word "know". If the momentary singular experience isn't real, then what is?

You can use the word "know", but not in circumstances like this where you do not. The actual research in consciousness shows that the "momentary singular experience" is vastly different from what we usually report it as. (To take the simplest of examples--you do not, except under very constrained circumstances, experience a blind spot in your visual field [assuming you have normal vision]. But you do in fact have this blind spot.) The rich visual tapestry we report is very different from the piecemeal collection of details we actually perceive, but we can only tell this by careful experimentation.

In other words, momentary singular experience is a terrible thing to consider as your standard of reality.

 

[Dancing David]

Personally I think the issue is more that people who are obsessively rational don't feel many emotions and so can't understand what the HPC is all about.

Nick

Welcome to IGNORE oh well spring of compassion.

 

[Jeff Corey]

'Tis a far better thing to be obsessively rational than a poor fool who struts and frets his hour upon the stage and then is heard no more.

 

[PixyMisa]

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics.

Penrose may know a lot about physics, but he's still talking utter tripe when it comes to "quantum consciousness".

Max Tegmark - who happens to be a physicist too - had a few things to say about Penrose's ideas.

 

[PixyMisa]

A computational device can do only on thing and thats compute, make calculation. what makes you believe a giant calculator can draw some experience from a math formula. Do transistor enjoy math?

No, it would take several transistors to enjoy math.

Maybe he would do all those things but sadly he wouldn't experience it.

What's the basis for this claim of yours?

We can certainly create a computer system that would claim to experience these things, and describe its experiences in familiar terms.

In what sense does it not experience these events?

Interesting. Information or a signals that goes round and round creates experience.

Yes.

So a thermostat that has some sort of feed back loop turns into a experincing entity.

Yes.

Would a computer based on purely machnical action (consisting of levers gears and spings) have the same affect when it comes to creating a machine that experiences?

Yes.

sort of, but something has to experience that information for it to have any meaning. If you compute it, it only transforms that information. again no experience there.

What is this "meaning" of which you speak?

Why, it is information.

So if we transform the information that we label the "perception" of an event such as to create additional information that we label "meaning", we can combine the two sets of information into a single set that we label "experience".

What else is there? Seriously, this is the key question: What do you think is happening when you experience something, other than information processing?

 

[PixyMisa]

If we are dealing with real phenomena, then it's physics. Penrose clearly knows an enormous amount of physics. To assume that computing is a relevant discipline is to beg the question.

Not at all.

Penrose's ideas of "quantum consciousness" fail in at least three ways:

1. They rely on quantum processes that cannot possibly exist.
2. They describe properties of consciousness that do not exist.
3. They do not explain consciousness as it does exist.

Computing is at entirely relevant in understanding the properties of information processing systems - which is precisely what the brain is, and consciousness a product of.

When dealing with matters of how real things work, I wouldn't expect a philosopher to have any more insight than anyone else. And Penrose is well capable of keeping up with the developments in neuroscience.

Clearly, he is not, or he wouldn't be talking tripe.

That doesn't mean that Penrose is right, of course, but the assumption that this field isn't suitable for physicists is a good indicator of the level of waffle involved.

The physics involved is already well-understood.

 

[PixyMisa]

Do neurons only compute?

base cell: receieves potentiation and attenuation from presynaptic cells

base cell: the probability of attenuation and potentiation can increase and decrease from the presynatic signal

base cell: has a probability of firing the probaility is based on the conditioned response of attenuation and potentiation and the input that it receives

In other words it does not 'just compute', it learns an associative response to the inputs, which is plastic.

That is computation.

 

[PixyMisa]

I think its a combination of both. I wont start speculating on the non-physical, i'll just say it might be in the field quantum mechanics.

That makes no sense at all. Quantum mechanics is entirely devoted to the understanding of physical systems.

All I know for certain is that something vital is missing from the model.

What?

No, I dont exclude doing, only experience of doing. Can't there be a "doing" without an experience? All the "no HPC folks" here want to keep these two aspects together. Why is that?

Where's the separation?

I know, "just computation" is a gross simplification

It's very dynamic and flexible, I'll give you that, but still based on computation. (as far as we know)

So what part of consciousness is not "just computation"?

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm not aware of machines experiencing illusions.

Happens all the time. Far too often, in fact. A substantial part of my income comes from curing machines of their illusions.

 

[PixyMisa]

Computers have memory.

I don't mean to be flip, but it's certainly possible to consider memory apart from consciousness.

Agreed.

I don't see how storage and retrieval of information is equivalent to having an experience of your own existence.

If you can retrieve information from memory, process it, and then store it back, then you have an experience of your own existence.

This is what Dennett is pointing out that thermostats are lacking (clearly true) and what Ramachandran is saying is lacking in bees (true to a substantial degree).

Therefore, it's a meaningful and significant question to consider how the brain produces this effect.

I can't see how it can be simply equated with memory.

Memory and processing. An experience is a memory. Experiencing is a process.

 

[Piggy]

Anyone care to explain to me, tho, how the hard problem assumes dualism?

I don't believe it does.

 

[PixyMisa]

You can use the word "know", but not in circumstances like this where you do not. The actual research in consciousness shows that the "momentary singular experience" is vastly different from what we usually report it as. (To take the simplest of examples--you do not, except under very constrained circumstances, experience a blind spot in your visual field [assuming you have normal vision]. But you do in fact have this blind spot.) The rich visual tapestry we report is very different from the piecemeal collection of details we actually perceive, but we can only tell this by careful experimentation.

In other words, momentary singular experience is a terrible thing to consider as your standard of reality.

Exactly. That's why I strongly recommend that MIT lecture series. It's a very good introduction to the fact that just because you have a conscious mind doesn't mean you have the faintest idea what it is or how it works. By discussing a series of concrete and interrelated examples of how minds behave, it builds up a picture of what minds are. Which is all we can do, of course.

Westprog and Skiba, the problem is that you are starting from a false belief of what consciousness is. Seriously, listen to the lecture series - it's fascinating, entertaining, and free - and then we'll be able to have an interesting and meaningful discussion.

 

[PixyMisa]

Anyone care to explain to me, tho, how the hard problem assumes dualism?

I don't believe it does.

Qualia and P-Zombies are inherently dualistic (in other words, meaningless).

The idea of P-Zombies is to ask the question, what if you had something that behaved in every observable respect exactly like a human being, but had no internal experience.

Under a materialist (naturalist, physicalist) worldview, the question is nonsensical, because internal experiences are behaviours.

Qualia is a term for internal experiences that aren't behaviours. Again, necessarily dualistic.

 

[Piggy]

Qualia and P-Zombies are inherently dualistic (in other words, meaningless).

The idea of P-Zombies is to ask the question, what if you had something that behaved in every observable respect exactly like a human being, but had no internal experience.

Under a materialist (naturalist, physicalist) worldview, the question is nonsensical, because internal experiences are behaviours.

Qualia is a term for internal experiences that aren't behaviours. Again, necessarily dualistic.

Ok, but I don't think that answered my question.

 

[rocketdodger]

Westprog and Skiba, the problem is that you are starting from a false belief of what consciousness is. Seriously, listen to the lecture series - it's fascinating, entertaining, and free - and then we'll be able to have an interesting and meaningful discussion.

Or read "Godel, Escher, and Bach."

 

[PixyMisa]

Ok, but I don't think that answered my question.

Well, if you look back to the original post and see the definitions of HPC, you'll find that qualia and P-Zombies are considered to be equivalent phrasings of the question.

 

[rocketdodger]

Ok, but I don't think that answered my question.

I don't agree with a statement that general either, Piggy.

I think it is more appropriate to say that the vast majority of proponents of the HPC don't accept monist solutions to the problem (one of which is that it does not exist) because they are dualists.

 

[PixyMisa]

Or read "Godel, Escher, and Bach."

Yes, excellent suggestion!

In fact, the two in combination would make an excellent foundation for a layman. I had to wait twenty-odd years between reading GEB and discovering Jeremy Wolfe's lecture series, but today you can get both at the same time.

 

[Piggy]

Well, if you look back to the original post and see the definitions of HPC, you'll find that qualia and P-Zombies are considered to be equivalent phrasings of the question.

Yeah, but I don't.

Seems to me, the hard question has to do with the simple fact that we all do have conscious experiences, and it's likely that grasshoppers don't.

So that's something significant that we need to try to explain.

And that's really all there is to it.

You can show how all the components work, but that won't necessarily answer the question of how this conscious experience we all have is generated by the brain.

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, if you look back to the original post and see the definitions of HPC, you'll find that qualia and P-Zombies are considered to be equivalent phrasings of the question.

Yes but you can come up with material definitions for qualia and p-zombies.

Of course, once you have done that, the HPC no longer exists -- you have solved the problem by defining the problem!

So... if one is a non-dualist who buys into the HPC, then they simply can't define the terms properly yet, I suppose?