The Future of Moral Science

[Pacal]

I didn't say they didn't have morals, in fact I'm saying the precise opposite - that they did have morals, but only some people were willing to stand up for them (then tipping point etc.).

You seem to be operating under the assumption that Those who supported slavery weren't willing to stand-up for morality. That is false most of them were just has "moral" has those opposed to slavery. It was simply that included in their moral code was the idea that slavery was moral. In a society in which the ownership of cattle and other animals was deemed proper and correct, the notion of owning human beings is often conceived of being right and proper. Generally if we can own, animals, land etc., why can't we own human beings?

The great Greek philosopher Aristotle thought some people were "slaves by nature" and he thought slavery was in keeping with nature and hence good. This conceit would be repeated for thousands of years.

Thus for quite sometime people were standing up for their morality which included the notion that slavery was moral and good. In fact in the period before the Civi8l War their were in the USA, in both the North and South, large numbers of people who defended the morality of slavery and attacked the anti-slavery people and Abolitionists for being immoral and wicked.

The problem wasn't lack of morals or unwillingness to stand up for a moral way of thinking about things but the actual moral code these people held. They thought, passionately many of them, that slavery was a moral good.

I myself find the whole concept of owning someone or being owned to be a vile and horrible abomination. Slavery in my opinion is nothing more than despotic, totalitarian like authority over someone and as such I personally think it is immoral to the nth degree.

But the sad truth is many in the past have viewed slavery has moral and good and there is no point is glossing over that and the problems that fact creates for the idea of a common universal morality.

 

[Tassman]

Then where does science derive its judgments from aside from scientific descriptions of the world?

And how is that not conceding the whole argument that it is not science that determines normative morality?

Science derives its judgements from inferences drawn from the established facts of the natural world and the evolved instincts of social species, such as us, who are a part of this natural world.

Hi Tassman

Let us play hidden assumptions. The game goes like this - I or you take respectively our individual thinking and feelings for granted and refuse to accept that this is a part of what is going on.
Someone(S1): All facts are scientific facts.
Someone else(S2): No.
S1: That is wrong.
S2: No, because that no is not a scientific fact.
S1: Are you claiming that there are facts, which are not scientific?
S2: Yes. It follows from that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world”!

Now as long as you can't combine the above no and that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, we will in effect be going in circles, because you in effect can't explain how you think and feel. Rather you take your thinking and feelings for granted; i.e. hidden assumptions; and you in effect refuse to think differently. That is it

See above.

Your answer to the question of why rape is wrong is that is bad for social cohesion. You then say "hence" it is considered wrong. When you say "considered wrong" and observing from the outside then you are still in descriptive mode. Is it "considered" wrong or "is" it wrong?

If it is merely the former then we have not arrived at normative morality, but if it is the latter and you are declaring rape to be wrong because it is bad for social cohesion then we go to the next step. Is social cohesion axiomatically good or is it good because it promotes the survival of the species?

That is all for now.

Please answer my question: Is rape wrong. Why?

 

[Tassman]

The thing is, there were always people who said slavery was wrong on moral grounds, and argued for it.

The appearance: sometimes slavery has been socially acceptable. Well, that could be because there's no such thing as morality, or it could just be because people accepted something they knew was immoral, because it was convenient or lucrative. Again, often in society, people pay lip-service to something in order to fit in, but don't express what they secretly think, until someone else has the courage to stand up and say it, and a tipping point is reached when everyone feels it's ok to say it. (This may be the case with religion, generally: obviously, as it's become less of a risk to life and limb to declare one's atheism, more people come out of the closet, but as Dennett's survey of priests showed, if you're still committed to something for various reasons, you may still choose to follow it, even if you don't agree with it.)

****************

Great thread, with some good, deep discussion. My take on it is that morality is based on reason (what is moral is what any rational, reasonable person would think is moral). The "it's just a group practice" idea doesn't work as a standalone, because it just devolves to that (analogously to the argument re. god willing it because it's just - a group picks a morality because it thinks it's reasonable to do so, it's not the moral thing because the group picks it).

Moreover, it is a form of instrumental reasoning - IOW, all moral reasoning is "if ... then", therefore it's all in the context of a goal, aim, perspective, ideal or purpose.

So far, then, it would seem to be amenable to scientific rigor and analysis.

There are two problems left: the universalism of morality, and the fact that it's understood to override personal preferences sometimes. These seem to imply that instrumental reasoning as the basis for morality is not enough. (i.e. it's not enough to explain it as a matter of "if ... then you ought to ....", with the "if" usually tacit).

Re. universalism: it's understandable that groups follow moralities because they think it's reasonable to do so, in light of certain ideals, goals, etc. But the sticking point is, where does the universalism (that we feel instinctively is part of morality) come in? Why should it apply to all, and not rather only some?

Re. personal preference: normally, the moral thing to do may override one's personal preference. Were morality purely instrumental, then there would be no reason not to steal a purse that's been left on a bus when there's absolutely no chance of you being caught out, for example, whereas we all know the right thing to do is hand it in, even if it's a potential personal loss.

The solution to this can only be found in mystical experience, IMHO, in terms of both the intimations people have in everyday life, and in the traces of it, in more powerful personal forms, in religion, which then become cultural artefacts passed on, and reinforcing both the personal intimations we have, and morality in general.

As a rationalist, I understand mystical experience to be a gestalt switch in the mind, that makes it flip over from seeing the world in terms of separate things (which is a true way of seeing the world), to seeing it in terms of being a single system (also a true way of seeing the world, not exclusive of the former), with one's sense of self-identification switching over to the system as a whole, instead of the part. I view this as a fully functional cognitive understanding, as it reveals something self-evident that we all understand intellectually, but don't normally feel, or see the world in perspective of.

And I think it's from this cognitive understanding (of the "unity" side of nature, through unitive experience), its instances in most peoples' experience, and its traces in culture via religion, that the universalism of morality comes. Were it not for the fact that some people had these kinds of experiences, and some more powerfully and completely than others (thereby founding religions, which then usually devolve to social control systems as the original message gets garbled through "Chinese Whispers"), there would be no universal aspect to morality, there would be no sense that moral reasoning should override personal concerns (other than when it's convenient to do so, to appear to be trustworthy). Morality would then have a group/relativist explanation only.

When the unity side of things is understood and felt, and the more it is understood and felt, the whole is what one automatically "cares for", without essential distinction of self or other. This means, practically speaking, that morality is of universal purport (via the Categorical Imperative), and also may override personal concern.

This latter has to be looked at carefully though. Morality is not (or rather I believe ought not to be) considered as essentially altruistic, it's just that the concern is for the whole, oneself not excepted; but this means that sometimes others' needs will weigh more than one's own. (IOW, morality is essentially neither altruistic nor egoistic, but holistic. This means that concern for personal virtue and personal flourishing is as much an aspect of morality as helping old ladies across the road.)

When morality is thus understood to be instrumental and largely consequentialist in that broader context of mysticism, with its universal aspect having a rational explanation in a cognitive experience of unity and lack of essential or intrinsic distinction between self and other (those being only conventional and convenient distinctions, relative truths), then the way is clear to a scientific understanding of morality, there's nothing philosophically suspicious about it any more, and nothing particularly philosophically problematic any more. It can be instrumental through and through, while retaining the universalism that seemed to contradict the instrumentalism.

With this position, though, I'm in a three-cornered fight: the rationalist is going to baulk at my invocation of mysticism (even though I naturalize it), the religionist is going to dislike the derivation of morality from reason alone (as is traditional with religionists).

Excellent post and I’m with you all the way up to the “mystical experience” bit. I don’t think it necessary to go down this path. Regarding the “purse” example, I think you’re underestimating the power of social acculturation and self-image. There are just some things that we cannot do and remain true to our self. This is not necessarily “mystic”, but more to do with learned social behaviour.

 

[Meed]

It is evidence for the idea that morality is grounded in reason (i.e. that what's moral is what reason, or reasonable people, agree is moral).

As opposed to what is moral being bound solely by the culture's preferences.

By "not in evidence" I mean there's no proof that there have always been people morally opposed to slavery. For instance, I don't believe there are any writings from ancient Rome expressing moral opposition to slavery as an institution. And if we get into pre-written-history, who knows what peoples' views were? However, I suspect you're probably right that there have been at least some people who morally opposed slavery for most of human existence.

 

[Tassman]

What is your evidence for that? It seems that equality and universal human rights are so new, there's hardly time to judge them to see how they stand up to the Roman Empire and some of the really long-lasting societies. I'd say they've barely been around a hundred years, as a widely accepted ideal.

It may be true, but I'm suspicious because it seems too close to arguments that whatever "we" are is the pinacle that all previous time has been working toward, like the last upright guy on the evolutionary chart. In fact, we're just yet another midway point. Inequality and slavery have at least appeared to be instinctive for many more years. Our thoughts could just be a temporary glitch, or could be okay but maybe we're missing something even more important that will show up in a century or two.

I’m basing this on what we know of anthropology and history. We know that we started as small tribal units, as per the other primates, and that each tribe maintained a behavioural code, whereas “anything goes” for outsiders was usually the norm. But over time tribes merged, alliances were formed and chiefdoms, nation states and then empires developed and all of them had much the same 'US vs THEM' mindset (e.g. a Roman citizen had specific rights that were unavailable to non-Roman citizens).

This seems to have been an ongoing trend - despite some regressions to tribalism we see among certain religious groups such as ISIS. And now, in the era of Marshall McLuhan’s global village; we have developed concepts such as equality and universal human rights for all, not just our own group.

In short, tribal morality seems to be moving towards the concept of just one international tribe, as it were, with common values and a common morality. So universal rights is not a new concept but the end result of a natural progression.

 

[Tassman]

Completely agree.

Tassman, it sounds to me like your position is that you believe science suggests that what is good for us, morally, is whatever results in social stability and cohesion, based on the observation that we are social animals that generally want to exist as part of social groups.

Not quite. I’m arguing that our morals are derivatives of self-preservation and procreation resulting from natural selection and that they arose because they were beneficial to the breeding and survival of our species as social animals. In short, morality is a functional survival mechanism.

One problem with this is that it doesn't really help much in defining actual nuts-and-bolts morals, since as you've agreed, there are tons of morally conflicting ways to do society. When you say "maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong" that still leaves in all of the very, very different and conflicting notions of right and wrong, and so doesn't seem to make sense as a basis for any prescriptive moral thought.

Where this is really falling down for me, as far as making sense, is where you make this massive jump from point A to "the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means." How are you getting there?

Please see my Post #305 to Pup on this.

I would have said that the alternative is to posit that there is no absolute, universal morality at all and in practice what we do is socially agree on some axioms, and science only comes in after that, to help us get closer to those axioms.

Perhaps science can also speak to the question of why some people like those axioms and other people don't, but I don't feel that really approaches the question of 'right and wrong' either. For example, if it turns out that people who like axiom A do so because of X characteristics, and people who like axiom B do so because of Y characteristics, that doesn't at all tell us which one is scientifically better.

That’s true up to a point but I think science is an essential part of the social discourse, not just as an after-thought, in that it provides verified knowledge of why we behave the way we do and thus provides a solid foundation upon which to build our rules of behaviour, i.e. morality.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Why is rape wrong?

Well, here are 3 kinds of wrong:

1. The moon is made of green cheese.
2. 2+2=5.
3. It is good to force other people to have sex with me; I like it.

It is not the same kind of wrong and indeed you can find people for which #3 is true/right.
So we end here - take a sufficiently large sample of humans and we will find that right/wrong in the ethical/moral sense varies. Ethics/morality is not true/right or false/wrong as neither the moon is made of green cheese nor 2+2=5.

It goes to the difference between brute, abstract cognitive and emotional facts or if you like objective as independent of brains, objective as neutral, abstract cognition and subjective as first person value judgment. So no matter how much huff and puff the ethical objectivists place on: "We can use science"; it ends here:

• The we is not a brute fact nor abstract cognitive fact and can't be established using a scientific methodology.
• We can't use science on normative moral/ethical claims, because we can't see neither right nor wrong; i.e there is no way to test right or wrong, because we can't neither observe right nor wrong.
• The ethical objectivists always retreat back into a combination of cognition and emotions/feelings and take for granted that they can use science on their first person cognition and emotions/feelings as in that they can give evidence for first person cognition and emotions/feelings using science.

In short as an actual contradiction the way in the end ethical objectivists use science amounts to this: Moral science is build on in part that we can observe and can't observe moral right and wrong. It doesn't matter that we can't observe right and wrong, because it is still science and science requires observation.

That is back to create versus discover: Moral/ethical right and wrong are both created individually and in part inter-subjectively in brains, where as gravity is discovered.
I am looking at you, Wowbagger
We can objectively as describing without personal feelings and value judgments use science to explain how morality/ethics work, but we can't use science to do (normative) morality/ethics, because we don't discover/observe morality/ethics. We create in our brains!!!

With regards

PS We can observe that other people create morality/ethics, therefore we can observe morality/ethics and do morality/ethics without creating it ourselves in our brains. If that was the case, we could use science to do morality/ethics, but that is not how reality works.

 

[Pup]

And now, in the era of Marshall McLuhan’s global village; we have developed concepts such as equality and universal human rights for all, not just our own group.

In short, tribal morality seems to be moving towards the concept of just one international tribe, as it were, with common values and a common morality. So universal rights is not a new concept but the end result of a natural progression.

But even people within groups were denied rights in the past, and there are some such people who would be difficult not to notice as different, even in a global village. Women, for example. If they're offered more rights in the last few decades, well, that's not due to a global village, because they were living intermingled with men as part of their tribe virtually forever. Criminals, who start out within a group and separat from it due to their actions, have been treated differently by different groups, given more or less opportunity for defense, a fair trial and a non-torturous punishment. The mentally ill have received a variety of treatments, often not very good. Children, too, have been categorized many different ways, often not leaving them in particularly good circumstances.

The global village may make everyone part of the same "tribe," and therefore eliminate xenophobia, but even if that happens, it won't be a guarantee that a liberal first-world morality of the early 21st century will be the dominant morality of that tribe, because such a thing might be one of the "efflorescences," rather than the end goal of morality.

If morality is based on reproductive success, it's not the first-world liberal countries who have been doing the best at that.

 

[gurugeorge]

Okay, you're saying that morals are unchanging and everyone has "known" that slavery was wrong, even if they pretended it was right.

Well, not quite. The ideal set of rules out there in possibility space is unchanging, but our attempts to discover it, to get to it, are part of a process.

The result is the usual bell curve distribution - there's some consensus, and some consensus across cultures - excactly what you'd expect from a discovery process.

It's easy to give evidence that some people have always said slavery was wrong, but what evidence do you have to accept them at their word but reject the word of those who have said slavery was moral?

Well, you just have to think slavery through, to see that it's inconsistent with other things we call moral.

(And what the two arguers (slavery wrong/right) are saying is of little importance, what actually is or is not the case, is the thing to focus on; one doesn't decide between the two arguers' positions by considering their words, but by looking at the world to see if it's like what either of them say it is.)

Speaking about a wider point... I don't see how one can get around the arbitrary declaration that what's good for the human species is, by definition, moral.

That's just the word we use for what's good for the human species (in terms of several human flourishing). There's nothing wrong with that thing that's actually out there having a word.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Well, not quite. The ideal set of rules out there in possibility space is unchanging, but our attempts to discover it, to get to it, are part of a process.

Explain more, please.

 

[Pup]

Well, not quite. The ideal set of rules out there in possibility space is unchanging, but our attempts to discover it, to get to it, are part of a process.

...

That's just the word we use for what's good for the human species (in terms of several human flourishing). There's nothing wrong with that thing that's actually out there having a word.

Yes, I'd also like to see more explanation or evidence for the first paragraph, particularly in light of the last one. If morality is what's good for the human species, then what's good for the human species has changed when their environment has changed, as is usual for natural selection. How do you reconcile an ideal set of rules that presumably doesn't change over time, with a changing environment?

 

[gurugeorge]

Explain more, please.

Given our structure (our "nature" in the old-fashioned parlance that we're so touchy about using nowadays), and given the nature of the world we move about in and do things in, there is necessarily some optimal set of abstract conditions that, if all human action follows it, will result in maximization of (whatever you think is right, put here).

Now, that is a standalone, abstract structure. And the logical necessity that it must be out there somewhere, fixed, is what gives us the sense that morality has something of the quality of the "hard, logical 'must'". But we tend to see that through a glass darkly, and interpret it as command or force laid upon us by some higher power. It's not, it's just grammar (in Wittgenstein's sense).

The conditions vary over time, but quite slowly (e.g. our current gradual cyborgification is going to change our nature, which will shift the ideal network of rules ever so slightly to the side in some dimension - but this type of shift can take many generations). This works the same way as language: it can change over time, but at any given time it's stable relative to the span of most peoples' lives, and even generations of lives.

The other part is then the dynamic part - how we discover that structure. By debate (including philosophical), by everyone mulling it over, essaying to test it in action, and see what pans out, etc. This is an evolutionary process (formerly it was just biological, now it's also cultural).

Natural Law is discovered. That ideal pattern is discovered. Just like the result of 2,689,552 x 9.5 + 3 is discovered.

 

[gurugeorge]

Yes, I'd also like to see more explanation or evidence for the first paragraph, particularly in light of the last one. If morality is what's good for the human species, then what's good for the human species has changed when their environment has changed, as is usual for natural selection. How do you reconcile an ideal set of rules that presumably doesn't change over time, with a changing environment?

The "right" set of rules shifts to a related set of rules (which will have a "family resemblance" to the first, and may have a lot in common), when either the nature of the entity or the nature of its environment changes.

The logic of each set of rules doesn't change and is immutable (all those "if ... thens"); the interpretation (in more or less the mathematical sense) is what has changed, such that they are no longer the ideal (or they become the ideal, looking at it from the other angle of approach).

But note: not "good for the human species", but rather "good for the collection of living human beings". The species can go hang, it's an abstraction; what we're really interested in the well-being of is that real, concrete, living people be happy (flourish, be productive, whatever), and not just now, but into the future - no?

 

[gurugeorge]

By "not in evidence" I mean there's no proof that there have always been people morally opposed to slavery. For instance, I don't believe there are any writings from ancient Rome expressing moral opposition to slavery as an institution. And if we get into pre-written-history, who knows what peoples' views were? However, I suspect you're probably right that there have been at least some people who morally opposed slavery for most of human existence.

I trust you will find evidence of anti-slavery sentiment and argument in both the ancient Greek and the ancient Roman literature, but it's a while since I've looked into it. Obviously there's a question of how prevalent that sort of thing was, but that's not germane to my point, which is that any reasonable person can see the logic in morality, the common sense. (Whether they then have the balls to speak it if it happens to be the opposite of what the rest of society believes, is another question.)

 

[gurugeorge]

But the sad truth is many in the past have viewed slavery has moral and good [...]

But the question is, were they right to do so?

See, that datum can lead to one of two conclusions, either relativism (many definitions of "good"), or just that they were wrong about a single (or tight basket) definition.

And relativism is not the obligatory choice

 

[gurugeorge]

Excellent post and I’m with you all the way up to the “mystical experience” bit. I don’t think it necessary to go down this path. Regarding the “purse” example, I think you’re underestimating the power of social acculturation and self-image. There are just some things that we cannot do and remain true to our self. This is not necessarily “mystic”, but more to do with learned social behaviour.

Cheers. I'd only ask that you set aside whatever connotations you have for "mystical", and try on my definition for size, and see if that fits. Agree that acculturation and such are factors too, but the impact of spiritual "moments" in peoples' lives, and the reflection of that in literature, texts, etc., is vastly understimated as a factor.

 

[Meed]

I trust you will find evidence of anti-slavery sentiment and argument in both the ancient Greek and the ancient Roman literature, but it's a while since I've looked into it.

I've heard a historian of ancient Rome claim otherwise (I believe it was Garret G Fagan). Specifically the claim was that there was no opposition to slavery present on moral grounds in the writings that remain from ancient Rome. Of course that doesn't mean such sentiments didn't exist, it just means we lack evidence of it, and that it was probably a rare sentiment among elites (those who had the means, time and education to engage in writing).

Obviously there's a question of how prevalent that sort of thing was, but that's not germane to my point, which is that any reasonable person can see the logic in morality, the common sense. (Whether they then have the balls to speak it if it happens to be the opposite of what the rest of society believes, is another question.)

I think I agree. It is not just a question of balls, but of selfishness. One may see slavery as immoral but live in a society in which it is perfectly acceptable and in which it is of great financial benefit, and thus one may perpetuate the practice despite one's moral reservations. However, if one is raised to believe something is moral, then reasonable or not, it is going to be much harder for them to change their mind. Not impossible, but harder.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Explain more, please.

It's the Platonic ideal you have when you aren't having a Platonic ideal like those stupid philosophers on the Aristotle wikipedia page, because you're a SCIENTIST!

 

[Tassman]

Why is rape wrong?

Well, here are 3 kinds of wrong:

1. The moon is made of green cheese.
2. 2+2=5.
3. It is good to force other people to have sex with me; I like it.

It is not the same kind of wrong and indeed you can find people for which #3 is true/right.
So we end here - take a sufficiently large sample of humans and we will find that right/wrong in the ethical/moral sense varies. Ethics/morality is not true/right or false/wrong as neither the moon is made of green cheese nor 2+2=5.

It goes to the difference between brute, abstract cognitive and emotional facts or if you like objective as independent of brains, objective as neutral, abstract cognition and subjective as first person value judgment. So no matter how much huff and puff the ethical objectivists place on: "We can use science"; it ends here:

• The we is not a brute fact nor abstract cognitive fact and can't be established using a scientific methodology.
• We can't use science on normative moral/ethical claims, because we can't see neither right nor wrong; i.e there is no way to test right or wrong, because we can't neither observe right nor wrong.
• The ethical objectivists always retreat back into a combination of cognition and emotions/feelings and take for granted that they can use science on their first person cognition and emotions/feelings as in that they can give evidence for first person cognition and emotions/feelings using science.

In short as an actual contradiction the way in the end ethical objectivists use science amounts to this: Moral science is build on in part that we can observe and can't observe moral right and wrong. It doesn't matter that we can't observe right and wrong, because it is still science and science requires observation.

That is back to create versus discover: Moral/ethical right and wrong are both created individually and in part inter-subjectively in brains, where as gravity is discovered.
I am looking at you, Wowbagger
We can objectively as describing without personal feelings and value judgments use science to explain how morality/ethics work, but we can't use science to do (normative) morality/ethics, because we don't discover/observe morality/ethics. We create in our brains!!!

With regards

PS We can observe that other people create morality/ethics, therefore we can observe morality/ethics and do morality/ethics without creating it ourselves in our brains. If that was the case, we could use science to do morality/ethics, but that is not how reality works.

So, in your opinion is rape wrong. Why?

 

[gurugeorge]

It's the Platonic ideal you have when you aren't having a Platonic ideal like those stupid philosophers on the Aristotle wikipedia page, because you're a SCIENTIST!

Yeah, there's nothing wrong with the concept of the Platonic idea, it's a handy way of looking at things; even though we know those abstract rules and things aren't really anywhere in any concrete sense (they're just latent in the rules of the game plus initial conditions), it's useful to think in terms of possibility spaces.

One important use of them is in biology with the concept of "fitness landscapes" - almost the same thing.

Human beings search for and discover morality; what they discover is forms of life that fit the "free floating rationales" found in Nature (the way things are, the Logos, the Dao of things).

By taking cognizance of how the world actually is, and how we actually are, we are able to discover "paths" (relatively stable patterns of behaviour) which lead to the fulfillment of our desires.