The Future of Moral Science

[Tassman]

I didn't list a "smorgasbord of moral axioms". If you want to participate in this discussion it is necessary for you to understand what is going on. Your failure to do so is making this whole thing extremely tiresome. I am beginning to wonder if your tactic is to talk so much garbage that people give up trying to engage you.

Smokescreen!

Let's try another tack, shall we?

Whoopee!!

Is rape wrong?

What do you think - what does moral philosophy tell you about rape?

Natural morality tells me that rape is disruptive of social cohesion within the tribe and therefore wrong within the tribe. Historically, anything goes for outsiders, rape, pillaging and destruction - as we’ve seen in times past, e.g. check out Moses and his extermination of seven nations under God’s directive. Or ISIS, behaving similarly, today!

Conversely, the modern developed nations have, for perfectly sound reasons to do with international social cohesion, expanded the concept of tribalism to encompass all people. Hence rape is now considered wrong for all people.

Who is talking about universal agreement? Not me.

You failed to note the smiley.

Hallelujah! No, I have not made any axiomatic claims. And why should I? What is up for discussion here is whether or not a science of normative morality is possible. I say it isn't.

An axiom is a premise or starting point of reasoning. So you HAVE made an axiomatic claim, namely that moral science, as Harris understands it, is wrong. But you need to follow through with alternatives you consider superior to Harris’ argument, otherwise you’re being one-sided. I guess you think that your alternatives won't hold up. They haven't in the past.

But, in fact, we know from previous discussion that you hold to the Natural Law argument which posits that morality is universal. This is, of course merely an assumed, unverified, axiomatic premise.

Sam Harris, on the other hand, being a moral realist, believes that science tells us what is right or wrong.

No, he’s more nuanced than that as you are surely well aware. His argument is that our beliefs and our behaviours are the complex outcome of our physiology, genetics, social conditioning and memories. And thus it is reasonable to assume that, as neuroscience advances, science will ultimately have a lot to say about such beliefs and actions as well as their consequences for both the individual and for society. In short, morality!

What part of this argument do you disagree with and why?

That all sounds interesting enough, but then, before even doing the science he presupposes that normative morality is based on "maximizing the well-being of conscious creatures." That is, the very conclusion he is supposed to determine by science has been smuggled into the premises.ine

Yet again you limit Harris’ argument to pure science when he has specifically said that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world” as has been quoted before but you deliberately, it seems, choose to ignore. How is this “being smuggled into the premises” any more than the axiomatic claim that that Natural Law is a system of law that is determined by nature, and so is universal? Answer: It’s not.

 

[Tassman]

So moral philosophy is useless,

I didn't say “moral philosophy is useless”. Please stop misrepresenting me. Philosophy has its uses, it has an important role in community decision-making processes.

because the Scientifically Correct way to determine what is morally right is just to look at what people actually do, and declare it to be The One True Morality? I see a problem, because what people actually do, sometimes, is use moral philosophy. Hence in some cases it's moral philosophy doing the work and I am just not clear in such cases what you think science brings to the party.

Sigh! If I was playing the game YOUR way my response would be: “So you think science is useless”. But I’m not as dishonest as some. Ahem!

And of course you see a problem, because this is not what I said. Nevertheless, we do need to look at what people have actually done since time immemorial and determine WHY they have done so and what the outcomes were, as a guide to our future moral decisions. This is what science can bring to the party.

I’m quite sure that Paleolithic humans did not formally engage in moral philosophy. Their rules of community behaviour would have been grounded in their natural instincts as modified to maximize community living. Science has something to say about this both then and now.

"So you think abortion is morally tolerable, eh Mister Philosopher? Ha! You cannot make such prescriptions because you base your conclusions on scientifically unsupported axioms! Watch now as a real scientist handles this! Abortion is morally tolerable because we have evolved and because moral philosophers say it is morally tolerable! Bam! Real Scientist in charge here."

We instinctively value human life so an abortion is rarely undertaken lightly. But if essential, e. g. if the mother’s life is at risk, then science can tell us many things about an embryo/fetus, which can have an impact on our decision - such as when it becomes a sentient entity and can feel pain etc.

Of course many of the religions argue, without any credible evidence, that an embryo is a “person” from the time of fertilization but this of course is nonsense. As science can tell us, it is a non-sentient entity. If you morally object to aborting at this stage of development you may as well object to shredding a lettuce for your salad.

So Kevin, how would a real philosopher handle this?

 

[Tassman]

Sorry to jump in on page seven, but, agreed. The idea that you can derive ought from is, as far as observing all the members of a successful (as in lasting) community and seeing what they feel is moral, falls down extremely quickly due to the astonishingly wide variety of ways to do community with practically all members seeing it as moral.

It seems obvious from the beginning that this is a non-starter as it's trivially easy to find successful communities where everyone including the lowest castes, slaves, beaten women, etc, largely consider their place in their community to be correct, moral and just.

The entire, and common, sentiment of 'this is my lot in life, all is as it should be' among many groups that the modern west would consider to be needlessly, unjustly suffering, looks to me as though it flies in the face of the idea that one can arrive at scientifically correct morality by observing what successful communities consider to be moral.

You (not you, Pup) really need to give your idea some more legs in order for it to be evaluated any differently than this. Right now you've got 1) Observe. 2) ???? 3) Objective morality! Which is not enough to make sense. How are you evaluating these observations? How are you weighing them so as to avoid the apparently obvious conclusion that oppressive caste systems are morally right? How are you figuring these valuations and weights are the correct things to apply?

I don't see how one could attempt to apply this line of thought and not get out the other end: "Morality is whatever practically every member of any thriving community feels is unobjectionable." With loads of conflicting moralities, each for its own community.

Indeed, and this has been the case throughout most of human history. But the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means of maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong.

The alternative is to posit an absolute, universal morality which exists over and above individuals and communities. But, short of theological notions that can’t be adequately supported, there’s no good reason to think this is the case.

 

[angrysoba]

Smokescreen!



Whoopee!!



What do you think - what does moral philosophy tell you about rape?

Natural morality tells me that rape is disruptive of social cohesion within the tribe and therefore wrong within the tribe. Historically, anything goes for outsiders, rape, pillaging and destruction - as we’ve seen in times past, e.g. check out Moses and his extermination of seven nations under God’s directive. Or ISIS, behaving similarly, today!

Conversely, the modern developed nations have, for perfectly sound reasons to do with international social cohesion, expanded the concept of tribalism to encompass all people. Hence rape is now considered wrong for all people.



You failed to note the smiley.



An axiom is a premise or starting point of reasoning. So you HAVE made an axiomatic claim, namely that moral science, as Harris understands it, is wrong. But you need to follow through with alternatives you consider superior to Harris’ argument, otherwise you’re being one-sided. I guess you think that your alternatives won't hold up. They haven't in the past.

But, in fact, we know from previous discussion that you hold to the Natural Law argument which posits that morality is universal. This is, of course merely an assumed, unverified, axiomatic premise.



No, he’s more nuanced than that as you are surely well aware. His argument is that our beliefs and our behaviours are the complex outcome of our physiology, genetics, social conditioning and memories. And thus it is reasonable to assume that, as neuroscience advances, science will ultimately have a lot to say about such beliefs and actions as well as their consequences for both the individual and for society. In short, morality!

What part of this argument do you disagree with and why?



Yet again you limit Harris’ argument to pure science when he has specifically said that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world” as has been quoted before but you deliberately, it seems, choose to ignore. How is this “being smuggled into the premises” any more than the axiomatic claim that that Natural Law is a system of law that is determined by nature, and so is universal? Answer: It’s not.

I do not argue for Natural Law. That's a bare-faced lie. The rest of your post is the same old word salad.

 

[angrysoba]

Indeed, and this has been the case throughout most of human history. But the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means of maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong.

The alternative is to posit an absolute, universal morality which exists over and above individuals and communities. But, short of theological notions that can’t be adequately supported, there’s no good reason to think this is the case.

How does science establish equal rights?

 

[angrysoba]

Your answer to the question of why rape is wrong is that is bad for social cohesion. You then say "hence" it is considered wrong. When you say "considered wrong" and observing from the outside then you are still in descriptive mode. Is it "considered" wrong or "is" it wrong?

If it is merely the former then we have not arrived at normative morality, but if it is the latter and you are declaring rape to be wrong because it is bad for social cohesion then we go to the next step. Is social cohesion axiomatically good or is it good because it promotes the survival of the species?

That is all for now.

 

[angrysoba]

An axiom is a premise or starting point of reasoning. So you HAVE made an axiomatic claim, namely that moral science, as Harris understands it, is wrong. But you need to follow through with alternatives you consider superior to Harris’ argument, otherwise you’re being one-sided. I guess you think that your alternatives won't hold up. They haven't in the past.

Wait, I will follow up on this.

The problem that you are butting up against is a conceptual one.

You are trying to solve a non-empirical problem with empirical methods, and that is what Sam Harris is doing, too.

As for the remark, "I guess you think that your alternatives won't hold up. They haven't in the past." I don't know what you are referring to. Instead of claiming some record of defeat from the past, why not state what you are talking about here.

 

[angrysoba]

No, he’s more nuanced than that as you are surely well aware. His argument is that our beliefs and our behaviours are the complex outcome of our physiology, genetics, social conditioning and memories. And thus it is reasonable to assume that, as neuroscience advances, science will ultimately have a lot to say about such beliefs and actions as well as their consequences for both the individual and for society. In short, morality!

This is like Shermer babbling a lot and then giving the punchline, "And that's science!"

What part of this argument do you disagree with and why?

It's not an argument. It is a litany of trivial claims with a non-sequitur tacked on at the end.

In short, bollocks!

 

[angrysoba]

Yet again you limit Harris’ argument to pure science when he has specifically said that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world” as has been quoted before but you deliberately, it seems, choose to ignore. How is this “being smuggled into the premises” any more than the axiomatic claim that that Natural Law is a system of law that is determined by nature, and so is universal? Answer: It’s not.

Then where does science derive its judgments from aside from scientific descriptions of the world?

And how is that not conceding the whole argument that it is not science that determines normative morality?

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Hi Tassman

Let us play hidden assumptions. The game goes like this - I or you take respectively our individual thinking and feelings for granted and refuse to accept that this is a part of what is going on.
Someone(S1): All facts are scientific facts.
Someone else(S2): No.
S1: That is wrong.
S2: No, because that no is not a scientific fact.
S1: Are you claiming that there are facts, which are not scientific?
S2: Yes. It follows from that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world”!

Now as long as you can't combine the above no and that “no branch of science can derive its judgments solely from scientific descriptions of the world”, we will in effect be going in circles, because you in effect can't explain how you think and feel. Rather you take your thinking and feelings for granted; i.e. hidden assumptions; and you in effect refuse to think differently. That is it

 

[Pup]

Indeed, and this has been the case throughout most of human history. But the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means of maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong.

What is your evidence for that? It seems that equality and universal human rights are so new, there's hardly time to judge them to see how they stand up to the Roman Empire and some of the really long-lasting societies. I'd say they've barely been around a hundred years, as a widely accepted ideal.

It may be true, but I'm suspicious because it seems too close to arguments that whatever "we" are is the pinacle that all previous time has been working toward, like the last upright guy on the evolutionary chart. In fact, we're just yet another midway point. Inequality and slavery have at least appeared to be instinctive for many more years. Our thoughts could just be a temporary glitch, or could be okay but maybe we're missing something even more important that will show up in a century or two.

 

[epepke]

Late to the thread... Wow.

I think of morality as a collection of game theory outcomes that are acceptable to a group. In other words, self interest balanced by mutual benefit. Game theory is just the label given to the observed behaviour. The collection is "morality".

My 10c worth...

As a vague suggestion, it is not bad. Of course, it would require a means of determining what "acceptable to a group" means if you wanted to study it.

There is a problem with the game theory part, though, because it is possible to do at least stochastic studies of outcomes in game theory clearly showing good strategies that people don't use and in fact try to go against even when they know what the good strategies are.

Many of these have the following property. People are willing to increase their suffering if they can make someone else suffer more.

If one is serious about studying morality, this has to be studied as a part of it.

 

[Lithrael]

But the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means of maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong.

Inequality and slavery have at least appeared to be instinctive for many more years. Our thoughts could just be a temporary glitch, or could be okay but maybe we're missing something even more important that will show up in a century or two.

Completely agree.

Tassman, it sounds to me like your position is that you believe science suggests that what is good for us, morally, is whatever results in social stability and cohesion, based on the observation that we are social animals that generally want to exist as part of social groups.

One problem with this is that it doesn't really help much in defining actual nuts-and-bolts morals, since as you've agreed, there are tons of morally conflicting ways to do society. When you say "maintaining the social stability and cohesion which is instinctive for our species and which forms the basis of our notions of right and wrong" that still leaves in all of the very, very different and conflicting notions of right and wrong, and so doesn't seem to make sense as a basis for any prescriptive moral thought.

Where this is really falling down for me, as far as making sense, is where you make this massive jump from point A to "the concept of equality and universal human rights, as we now recognize them, has slowly emerged as the most effective means." How are you getting there?

The alternative is to posit an absolute, universal morality which exists over and above individuals and communities. But, short of theological notions that can’t be adequately supported, there’s no good reason to think this is the case.

I would have said that the alternative is to posit that there is no absolute, universal morality at all and in practice what we do is socially agree on some axioms, and science only comes in after that, to help us get closer to those axioms.

Perhaps science can also speak to the question of why some people like those axioms and other people don't, but I don't feel that really approaches the question of 'right and wrong' either. For example, if it turns out that people who like axiom A do so because of X characteristics, and people who like axiom B do so because of Y characteristics, that doesn't at all tell us which one is scientifically better.

 

[gurugeorge]

What is your evidence for that? It seems that equality and universal human rights are so new, there's hardly time to judge them to see how they stand up to the Roman Empire and some of the really long-lasting societies. I'd say they've barely been around a hundred years, as a widely accepted ideal.

It may be true, but I'm suspicious because it seems too close to arguments that whatever "we" are is the pinacle that all previous time has been working toward, like the last upright guy on the evolutionary chart. In fact, we're just yet another midway point. Inequality and slavery have at least appeared to be instinctive for many more years. Our thoughts could just be a temporary glitch, or could be okay but maybe we're missing something even more important that will show up in a century or two.

The thing is, there were always people who said slavery was wrong on moral grounds, and argued for it.

The appearance: sometimes slavery has been socially acceptable. Well, that could be because there's no such thing as morality, or it could just be because people accepted something they knew was immoral, because it was convenient or lucrative. Again, often in society, people pay lip-service to something in order to fit in, but don't express what they secretly think, until someone else has the courage to stand up and say it, and a tipping point is reached when everyone feels it's ok to say it. (This may be the case with religion, generally: obviously, as it's become less of a risk to life and limb to declare one's atheism, more people come out of the closet, but as Dennett's survey of priests showed, if you're still committed to something for various reasons, you may still choose to follow it, even if you don't agree with it.)

****************

Great thread, with some good, deep discussion. My take on it is that morality is based on reason (what is moral is what any rational, reasonable person would think is moral). The "it's just a group practice" idea doesn't work as a standalone, because it just devolves to that (analogously to the argument re. god willing it because it's just - a group picks a morality because it thinks it's reasonable to do so, it's not the moral thing because the group picks it).

Moreover, it is a form of instrumental reasoning - IOW, all moral reasoning is "if ... then", therefore it's all in the context of a goal, aim, perspective, ideal or purpose.

So far, then, it would seem to be amenable to scientific rigor and analysis.

There are two problems left: the universalism of morality, and the fact that it's understood to override personal preferences sometimes. These seem to imply that instrumental reasoning as the basis for morality is not enough. (i.e. it's not enough to explain it as a matter of "if ... then you ought to ....", with the "if" usually tacit).

Re. universalism: it's understandable that groups follow moralities because they think it's reasonable to do so, in light of certain ideals, goals, etc. But the sticking point is, where does the universalism (that we feel instinctively is part of morality) come in? Why should it apply to all, and not rather only some?

Re. personal preference: normally, the moral thing to do may override one's personal preference. Were morality purely instrumental, then there would be no reason not to steal a purse that's been left on a bus when there's absolutely no chance of you being caught out, for example, whereas we all know the right thing to do is hand it in, even if it's a potential personal loss.

The solution to this can only be found in mystical experience, IMHO, in terms of both the intimations people have in everyday life, and in the traces of it, in more powerful personal forms, in religion, which then become cultural artefacts passed on, and reinforcing both the personal intimations we have, and morality in general.

As a rationalist, I understand mystical experience to be a gestalt switch in the mind, that makes it flip over from seeing the world in terms of separate things (which is a true way of seeing the world), to seeing it in terms of being a single system (also a true way of seeing the world, not exclusive of the former), with one's sense of self-identification switching over to the system as a whole, instead of the part. I view this as a fully functional cognitive understanding, as it reveals something self-evident that we all understand intellectually, but don't normally feel, or see the world in perspective of.

And I think it's from this cognitive understanding (of the "unity" side of nature, through unitive experience), its instances in most peoples' experience, and its traces in culture via religion, that the universalism of morality comes. Were it not for the fact that some people had these kinds of experiences, and some more powerfully and completely than others (thereby founding religions, which then usually devolve to social control systems as the original message gets garbled through "Chinese Whispers"), there would be no universal aspect to morality, there would be no sense that moral reasoning should override personal concerns (other than when it's convenient to do so, to appear to be trustworthy). Morality would then have a group/relativist explanation only.

When the unity side of things is understood and felt, and the more it is understood and felt, the whole is what one automatically "cares for", without essential distinction of self or other. This means, practically speaking, that morality is of universal purport (via the Categorical Imperative), and also may override personal concern.

This latter has to be looked at carefully though. Morality is not (or rather I believe ought not to be) considered as essentially altruistic, it's just that the concern is for the whole, oneself not excepted; but this means that sometimes others' needs will weigh more than one's own. (IOW, morality is essentially neither altruistic nor egoistic, but holistic. This means that concern for personal virtue and personal flourishing is as much an aspect of morality as helping old ladies across the road.)

When morality is thus understood to be instrumental and largely consequentialist in that broader context of mysticism, with its universal aspect having a rational explanation in a cognitive experience of unity and lack of essential or intrinsic distinction between self and other (those being only conventional and convenient distinctions, relative truths), then the way is clear to a scientific understanding of morality, there's nothing philosophically suspicious about it any more, and nothing particularly philosophically problematic any more. It can be instrumental through and through, while retaining the universalism that seemed to contradict the instrumentalism.

With this position, though, I'm in a three-cornered fight: the rationalist is going to baulk at my invocation of mysticism (even though I naturalize it), the religionist is going to dislike the derivation of morality from reason alone (as is traditional with religionists).

 

[tsig]

It's interesting that you think that calling out dishonest behaviour is "manufactured outrage".



This has been explained to you very patiently over and over again. You do it with a combination of "non-factual statements" or "moral axioms" or whatever you prefer to call them today, and factual statements.



The problem is more that you are unable to distinguish between something being logically impossible, and it merely being my personal opinion that something is logically impossible.

Yet again you have snipped all the awkward points you cannot respond to intelligently and tried to reboot the argument. Henceforth I am just going to assume that when you do this you are admitting that you are wrong, as this will save a lot of time and is almost certainly correct.

I've always found that when I assume I'm right I always win the argument.

 

[Pup]

The thing is, there were always people who said slavery was wrong on moral grounds, and argued for it.

The appearance: sometimes slavery has been socially acceptable. Well, that could be because there's no such thing as morality, or it could just be because people accepted something they knew was immoral, because it was convenient or lucrative. Again, often in society, people pay lip-service to something in order to fit in, but don't express what they secretly think, until someone else has the courage to stand up and say it, and a tipping point is reached when everyone feels it's ok to say it. (This may be the case with religion, generally: obviously, as it's become less of a risk to life and limb to declare one's atheism, more people come out of the closet, but as Dennett's survey of priests showed, if you're still committed to something for various reasons, you may still choose to follow it, even if you don't agree with it.)

Perhaps the lesson is that paying lip service to something to fit in, is an example of a moral act that helps with social cohesion, and it's better to go along with society than to state one's own person belliefs that are in conflict.

Of course societies and ideas about morality do change, and a sort of tipping point, then normalization of what used to be strange, and a new consensus, is how it occurs. But if one is to say that certain people are right, such as those who argued against slavery on moral grounds, one needs to state it as an arbitrary postulate only. If not, how do you propose we derive it on a scientific basis?

Also note that if slavery is socially acceptable, it doesn't mean there are no morals. You're equating "morals" with "your morals" and assuming that if people don't have the same ones, they have none. On the contrary, societies which accept slavery generally show all the attributes of having a moral code as much as our society or any other.

I'm sure there are dozens of things that any of us here genuinely think are moral, which there are protestors against even today and which in a few centuries there might be people saying we don't really believe they're moral and are only saying so to get along and doing them out of convenience or greed.

the solution to this can only be found in mystical experience, IMHO, in terms of both the intimations people have in everyday life, and in the traces of it, in more powerful personal forms, in religion, which then become cultural artefacts passed on, and reinforcing both the personal intimations we have, and morality in general.

I'd argue that morals feel "mystical" because they're made up of urges that are inborn in us, through the many generations of natural selection, and that are socialized in us by our society at such a young age we hardly realize it. So they seem so powerful they must be from outside force, and we search for gods or other sources of that force.

On the example of the purse left on the bus... I'd say it only works as long as we consider the person who left the purse as part of our "tribe." Without that inborn urge to help "our tribe," the morality starts to fade. If an enemy with whom we were at war left something behind, I doubt most people would feel they were acting immorally to keep it. In fact, they would probably consider it moral to assist "their tribe" and help weaken the enemy. Our culture even has room to see Robin Hood as a moral hero, when he goes out of his way to steal from the rich (not our tribe) to give to the poor.

 

[gurugeorge]

Perhaps the lesson is that paying lip service to something to fit in, is an example of a moral act that helps with social cohesion, and it's better to go along with society than to state one's own person belliefs that are in conflict.

Of course societies and ideas about morality do change, and a sort of tipping point, then normalization of what used to be strange, and a new consensus, is how it occurs. But if one is to say that certain people are right, such as those who argued against slavery on moral grounds, one needs to state it as an arbitrary postulate only. If not, how do you propose we derive it on a scientific basis?

Also note that if slavery is socially acceptable, it doesn't mean there are no morals. You're equating "morals" with "your morals" and assuming that if people don't have the same ones, they have none. On the contrary, societies which accept slavery generally show all the attributes of having a moral code as much as our society or any other.

I didn't say they didn't have morals, in fact I'm saying the precise opposite - that they did have morals, but only some people were willing to stand up for them (then tipping point etc.). This is related to the following point:-

I'm sure there are dozens of things that any of us here genuinely think are moral, which there are protestors against even today and which in a few centuries there might be people saying we don't really believe they're moral and are only saying so to get along and doing them out of convenience or greed.

I think there's always been a fair consensus on what rational people think is moral - it's not rocket science The Golden Rule has been around since forever. And it's fairly cross-cultural. As I understand it from my investigations, there's actually a lot in common across moralities, but there are variations too. The question is, are the variations consistent with the common core, or random efflorescences? Where not, that could indicate either that the whole thing is arbitrary, OR that people are being inconsistent.

Another point: if we view morality both evolutionarily and rationally (in terms of natural morality/law), that's just what one would expect - i.e. one would expect that, morality being discovered (as an ideal set of rules that maximize flourishing, in the context of our structure and our several desires, or whatever, waiting out there in possibility space), various cultures try various things out, and in the long run retain what works (the common core), with constant efflorescences ("is slavery ok?" - 2,000 years later, "naah", with some already having said "naah" 2,000 years ago, the rest of us catching up )

I'd argue that morals feel "mystical" because they're made up of urges that are inborn in us, through the many generations of natural selection, and that are socialized in us by our society at such a young age we hardly realize it. So they seem so powerful they must be from outside force, and we search for gods or other sources of that force.

I think that sort of thing definitely happens, but it's not the sense of "mystical" that I'm interested in (I defined my term in the post).

On the example of the purse left on the bus... I'd say it only works as long as we consider the person who left the purse as part of our "tribe." Without that inborn urge to help "our tribe," the morality starts to fade. If an enemy with whom we were at war left something behind, I doubt most people would feel they were acting immorally to keep it. In fact, they would probably consider it moral to assist "their tribe" and help weaken the enemy. Our culture even has room to see Robin Hood as a moral hero, when he goes out of his way to steal from the rich (not our tribe) to give to the poor.

Again, I go back to the point that the universalism of morality is an essential part of it. It's not just "my tribe" that's supposed to live this way, but all tribes. And every tribe thinks that.

And every tribe is partly wrong, partly right.

Morality is universal because reason is universal, and morality is grounded in reason (instrumental). The problem has been that we haven't been able to see the connection, philosophically, between the instrumentalism and the universalism. We can understand morality as instrumental, and up to a point, see it as instrumentally grounded. The universal part doesn't seem to fit in, so we may feel justified in ditching it. Premature, I say!

Also, culturally, there's been a fear of a sort of "fascist" aspect to the claims of universalism of reason itself, therefore allergy to the claims of morality's universalism too, and a tendency to settle for relativism. Again, premature!

Why would we want to retain the universalism of reason and morality? Because both reason and morality are uniters, not dividers - ghettoising and accepting cultural differences as groundless fait accompli forbids us from appealing across the abyss between man and man to something that unites us. For that reason, it would be a matter for regret if relativism were true. Fortunately, it isn't

 

[Meed]

The thing is, there were always people who said slavery was wrong on moral grounds, and argued for it.

This is probably true, but it's not in evidence.

 

[gurugeorge]

This is probably true, but it's not in evidence.

It is evidence for the idea that morality is grounded in reason (i.e. that what's moral is what reason, or reasonable people, agree is moral).

As opposed to what is moral being bound solely by the culture's preferences.

 

[Pup]

I didn't say they didn't have morals, in fact I'm saying the precise opposite - that they did have morals, but only some people were willing to stand up for them (then tipping point etc.).

Okay, you're saying that morals are unchanging and everyone has "known" that slavery was wrong, even if they pretended it was right.

What evidence do you have for that?

It's easy to give evidence that some people have always said slavery was wrong, but what evidence do you have to accept them at their word but reject the word of those who have said slavery was moral?

I think there's always been a fair consensus on what rational people think is moral - it's not rocket science The Golden Rule has been around since forever.

Unless one goes down the "no true Scotsman" road of rejecting certain views as not rational, I don't think it's as simple as that. If you were a virgin, would you want to be thrown into a volcano? If you didn't believe in the dominant religion, would you want to be tortured? If you were born female, would you want to have no input in your government or church?

People have constructed societies in which the golden rule is distorted to such an extent that it's barely recognizable, declaring certain things better for the greater good, and separating people into categories as necessary. And these aren't just temporary variations; in some cases they're typical things that have gone on for centuries in various cultures.

("is slavery ok?" - 2,000 years later, "naah", with some already having said "naah" 2,000 years ago, the rest of us catching up )

It seems you're arbitrarily defining typical first world modern morality as "right" and most everything else as "wrong." What evidence do you have that certain things, lasting centuries, were efflorescences and that the dominant first-world view of the last few decades is "right." Personally, I also believe it's "right," but I would say that's because I was raised to think so, not because it arbitrarily is.

Speaking about a wider point... I don't see how one can get around the arbitrary declaration that what's good for the human species is, by definition, moral. That's certainly how we've been bred to believe, with enough empathy that it might be expanded to what's good for all things that can feel pain.

But that still seems like an arbitrary declaration based on how we've come to think after generations of natural selection, and not a definition of morality derived scientifically.