The Future of Moral Science

[Kid Eager]

Late to the thread... Wow.

I think of morality as a collection of game theory outcomes that are acceptable to a group. In other words, self interest balanced by mutual benefit. Game theory is just the label given to the observed behaviour. The collection is "morality".

My 10c worth...

 

[angrysoba]

Same here. It fits with what I've been saying, that morality is our attempt to explain certain feelings that have been bred into us, rewarding us for behaving in "right" ways (ways that have been evolutionarilly successful in past generations).

Whether we feel "good" after eating a nice meal or "good" because we did something "good" (moral), it's the same kind of mental reward, because there aren't too many different ways of rewarding people mentally that could evolve, other than making them feel "good."

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

Again: Unless you are attempting to argue that “morality exists in and of itself” in some self-contained ivory tower and serves no practical purpose, then it is obvious that it consists of a set of rules, grounded in our evolved instincts and arrived at via community discourse, which enable us as social animals to modify individual selfishness and thus facilitate the group living essential for survival. Now answer the question I've asked: If you have a different understanding of what morality is then please enlighten us.

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

Late to the thread... Wow.

I think of morality as a collection of game theory outcomes that are acceptable to a group. In other words, self interest balanced by mutual benefit. Game theory is just the label given to the observed behaviour. The collection is "morality".

My 10c worth...

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

 

[Cavemonster]

Yes, science can't tell us what we "should" do, on the most atomic level, but I think it can help bring us a bit closer than some may think.

I have the following strong hunches. I can't prove any of them to a high degree of certainty, but I think if challenged I could support them as not unreasonable.

1. This one is descriptive and I hope not controversial- The moral issues that are most debated and disagreed on are not the core moral facts that people reason from. What I mean by this is that, for instance, whether torture is moral is not a moral axiom, the same for abortion, charitable giving, corporal punishment, positions on all of these are generally, whether recognized or not, something people derive from much simpler moral axioms.

2. Through science and philosophy, the simpler moral axioms that people derive their high level moral conclusions from are discoverable. We can label the axiomatic moral starting points of individuals and groups. We're still in the descriptive realm.

3. A significant amount of moral disagreement comes not from axiomatic moral disagreement, but from factual or logical disagreement in deriving outcomes from moral axioms. A few examples. The debate over corporal punishment really goes away when we see that it doesn't factually create the outcomes it's proponents claim to value. It doesn't actually get kids in line or help their self discipline or performance in the long term. There is no moral debate there, only a factual debate masquerading as a moral one.

The same can be said of religious moral beliefs. Many religious moral beliefs are grounded in factual claims about the universe and deities. If the factual claims aren't rational, and the feared or hoped for outcomes aren't real, then all moral arguments that stem from these beliefs aren't the kind of moral debates that the is/ought problem makes intractable, they're factual debates which are, in theory, solvable.

This is not to say that morality is objective or that moral axioms are universal, but I think that most of the largest moral disagreements in the world are rooted in logical and factual disagreement rather than real moral disagreement at the core, and while science may not end moral disagreement, I can imagine us coming to a point where major moral debates are like the "debate" over anthropogenic global warming, where there is clearly a logical and factual wrong side to the debate.

 

[Tassman]

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

What will tell you what you should do dear soba?

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

What will tell you what you should do dear soba?

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

What will tell you what you should do dear soba?

 

[Tassman]

Yes, science can't tell us what we "should" do, on the most atomic level, but I think it can help bring us a bit closer than some may think.

I have the following strong hunches. I can't prove any of them to a high degree of certainty, but I think if challenged I could support them as not unreasonable.

1. This one is descriptive and I hope not controversial- The moral issues that are most debated and disagreed on are not the core moral facts that people reason from. What I mean by this is that, for instance, whether torture is moral is not a moral axiom, the same for abortion, charitable giving, corporal punishment, positions on all of these are generally, whether recognized or not, something people derive from much simpler moral axioms.

2. Through science and philosophy, the simpler moral axioms that people derive their high level moral conclusions from are discoverable. We can label the axiomatic moral starting points of individuals and groups. We're still in the descriptive realm.

3. A significant amount of moral disagreement comes not from axiomatic moral disagreement, but from factual or logical disagreement in deriving outcomes from moral axioms. A few examples. The debate over corporal punishment really goes away when we see that it doesn't factually create the outcomes it's proponents claim to value. It doesn't actually get kids in line or help their self discipline or performance in the long term. There is no moral debate there, only a factual debate masquerading as a moral one.

The same can be said of religious moral beliefs. Many religious moral beliefs are grounded in factual claims about the universe and deities. If the factual claims aren't rational, and the feared or hoped for outcomes aren't real, then all moral arguments that stem from these beliefs aren't the kind of moral debates that the is/ought problem makes intractable, they're factual debates which are, in theory, solvable.

This is not to say that morality is objective or that moral axioms are universal, but I think that most of the largest moral disagreements in the world are rooted in logical and factual disagreement rather than real moral disagreement at the core, and while science may not end moral disagreement, I can imagine us coming to a point where major moral debates are like the "debate" over anthropogenic global warming, where there is clearly a logical and factual wrong side to the debate.

Yes I agree. Without an established factual basis the answers to the moral questions which arise when considering how one ought to act become meaningless - or just plain wrong. And, given that our natural instincts, which are the basis of our behaviour are increasingly understood by cognitive scientists, as is anthropogenic global warming becoming better understood by climate scientists as you mention, science in general may well have an important future role in the social discourse that determines what we should do.

 

[angrysoba]

I think this is a good post which gets to the heart of many of the issues here. Nevertheless, being a pain in the arse as I am, I will point out a few of my reservations here:

Yes, science can't tell us what we "should" do, on the most atomic level, but I think it can help bring us a bit closer than some may think.

I have the following strong hunches. I can't prove any of them to a high degree of certainty, but I think if challenged I could support them as not unreasonable.

1. This one is descriptive and I hope not controversial- The moral issues that are most debated and disagreed on are not the core moral facts that people reason from. What I mean by this is that, for instance, whether torture is moral is not a moral axiom, the same for abortion, charitable giving, corporal punishment, positions on all of these are generally, whether recognized or not, something people derive from much simpler moral axioms.

I agree here.

2. Through science and philosophy, the simpler moral axioms that people derive their high level moral conclusions from are discoverable. We can label the axiomatic moral starting points of individuals and groups. We're still in the descriptive realm.

Not sure if I agree here. For example, how do we arrive at a moral axiom through science? I would prefer to say that we can arrive at some understanding of moral sentiments through science, but I disagree that we reach moral axioms.

3. A significant amount of moral disagreement comes not from axiomatic moral disagreement, but from factual or logical disagreement in deriving outcomes from moral axioms.

I agree.

A few examples. The debate over corporal punishment really goes away when we see that it doesn't factually create the outcomes it's proponents claim to value. It doesn't actually get kids in line or help their self discipline or performance in the long term. There is no moral debate there, only a factual debate masquerading as a moral one.

Hmm...I think there could actually be a disagreement here nonetheless. While I agree with you that the question of "outcomes" could be, in principle, an empirical matter to the extent we can see whether a child will improve her spelling scores by being repeatedly rapped over the knuckles whenever she comes last, the question of corporal punishment may still rest on other moral axioms such as:

1) Pro-corporal punishment advocates may not be of the opinion that it will improve a child, but may think that the retribution is a matter of "justice". Of course, I am not advocating this, but merely showing the axiom may be different from what we imagine it is.

2) Anti-corporal punishment advocates may not be of the opinion that it will fail to improve a child, but may find violently beating a child to be wrong in and of itself. In other words, they may have a rights-based intuition that is barbaric and inhumane to inflict suffering of this kind regardless of the improvement in a child's spelling tests. Such advocates may argue that it is dangerous to simply apply an empirical test such as whether beatings are efficacious or not as to do so would leave us hostages to fortune.

I would furthermore guess that proponents of the abolition of corporal punishment, as well as capital punishment and also slavery and torture are not really basing their beliefs in its wrongness on the lack of efficacy of these practices but the belief that they are simply wrong no matter what outcomes there are.

The same can be said of religious moral beliefs. Many religious moral beliefs are grounded in factual claims about the universe and deities. If the factual claims aren't rational, and the feared or hoped for outcomes aren't real, then all moral arguments that stem from these beliefs aren't the kind of moral debates that the is/ought problem makes intractable, they're factual debates which are, in theory, solvable.

Yes, I completely agree with this. Although I would also say that even if the beliefs are based on an idea such as Divine Command, and even if this were unprovable one way or another, there may be a philosophical argument which undermines it without empirical input and that is Plato's argument known as the Euthyphro dilemma.

This is not to say that morality is objective or that moral axioms are universal, but I think that most of the largest moral disagreements in the world are rooted in logical and factual disagreement rather than real moral disagreement at the core, and while science may not end moral disagreement, I can imagine us coming to a point where major moral debates are like the "debate" over anthropogenic global warming, where there is clearly a logical and factual wrong side to the debate.

I think I agree with this. Although it may be worth pointing out that both science and philosophy make progress in their own way, and certainly I have not denied it. What I do deny is that science tells us what is wrong or right.

 

[Cavemonster]

Not sure if I agree here. For example, how do we arrive at a moral axiom through science? I would prefer to say that we can arrive at some understanding of moral sentiments through science, but I disagree that we reach moral axioms.

I think if we start with a high level moral sentiment like "abortion is wrong" we can work backward with an individual or a group until we get to moral beliefs that aren't derived from other moral beliefs.

I think the role of science is in differentiating stated beliefs from sincerely held beliefs, identifying more base level beliefs in people who can only articulate higher level beliefs etc.

I can't think of a perfect real world example off the top of my head, but I can give you something in the ballpark.

A recent study investigated the question of how much charitable giving was motivated by altruism and how much by social pressure. Almost all respondents claimed their giving was altruism based, but by varying social pressure in a controlled way, they found that the large majority would not give if no one was watching them, nut would give when those social pressures existed.

Hmm...I think there could actually be a disagreement here nonetheless. While I agree with you that the question of "outcomes" could be, in principle, an empirical matter to the extent we can see whether a child will improve her spelling scores by being repeatedly rapped over the knuckles whenever she comes last, the question of corporal punishment may still rest on other moral axioms such as:

1) Pro-corporal punishment advocates may not be of the opinion that it will improve a child, but may think that the retribution is a matter of "justice". Of course, I am not advocating this, but merely showing the axiom may be different from what we imagine it is.

In the case of corporal punishment, it isn't simply that it doesn't improve behavior, but that it has clear negative effects, so the only people arguing for the value of punishment as justice will be those who value that justice more than the welfare of their child, and I think that's a rare group, at least in the west. But you're in general, correct that we can't say the moral problem of corporal punishment is universally sidestepped.

[

2) Anti-corporal punishment advocates may not be of the opinion that it will fail to improve a child, but may find violently beating a child to be wrong in and of itself. In other words, they may have a rights-based intuition that is barbaric and inhumane to inflict suffering of this kind regardless of the improvement in a child's spelling tests. Such advocates may argue that it is dangerous to simply apply an empirical test such as whether beatings are efficacious or not as to do so would leave us hostages to fortune.

I'm not saying that efficacy or outcome supplants moral discussion in all cases, or even in this case. It isn't that an empirical test determines what is right. In many cases, there's a lack of clarity among people about where the moral and factual parts of the debate begin and end. Science and reason can remove the factual part from the tangle and leave us "simpler" moral problems.

In the case of corporal punishment, the moral problem becomes: Do you value something else (justice, tradition, whatever) more than your child's academic, social and emotional well-being. When the question is put like that, there still may be individuals or societies that support corporal punishment, but for a lot of people, at that level of clarity, it's less of a question.

If scientific findings had shown the opposite to be true, it would still leave the question of how much parents value the long term outcomes for their child vs their short term experience.

If people object to science removing the factual confusion from a moral issue, then they may be emotionally attached to the lack of clarity. If they value truth to any extent, this is probably a problem.

 

[Pup]

This is an attempt at descriptive morality. Science won't tell you what you should do.

No, and I don't think science can tell you that without someone specifying a goal. As I've said in this thread, telling you what you should do always requires an initial postulate--an arbitrary goal which can't be derived scientifically.

If I say I want to minimize total suffering for humans, science could come up with a recommendation.

If I say I want to minimize total suffering for all living animals, science could come up with a recommendation--though a different one.

If I say I want to maximize wealth for those who work the hardest, again, science could come up with a recommendation, which would be yet a different one.

The initial condition will always be arbitrary, and could be based on what someone thinks is the basis of all morality, but it will only be their individual opinion.

 

[Pup]

Again: Unless you are attempting to argue that “morality exists in and of itself” in some self-contained ivory tower and serves no practical purpose, then it is obvious that it consists of a set of rules, grounded in our evolved instincts and arrived at via community discourse, which enable us as social animals to modify individual selfishness and thus facilitate the group living essential for survival. Now answer the question I've asked: If you have a different understanding of what morality is then please enlighten us.

Why do you think it's "a set of rules"? Why can't it be a variety of rules depending on various random attributes of a society?

Seems to me that expecting a single set of rules would be like saying there's a single most-fit creature for a particular environment, when in actuality there could be many creatures equally fit in different ways.

Similarly, there could be many sets of rules that all work equally well, all based on our evolved instincts but arrived at by different community discourses, depending on the specific leaders and opinions of the community. In practice, that seems to be the way it is. Various communities have held together and thrived for centuries, although they have different mutually-exclusive rules. If there's only one set of rules, how does one decide which successful community is right, or closest to being right?

 

[angrysoba]

No, and I don't think science can tell you that without someone specifying a goal. As I've said in this thread, telling you what you should do always requires an initial postulate--an arbitrary goal which can't be derived scientifically.

If I say I want to minimize total suffering for humans, science could come up with a recommendation.

If I say I want to minimize total suffering for all living animals, science could come up with a recommendation--though a different one.

If I say I want to maximize wealth for those who work the hardest, again, science could come up with a recommendation, which would be yet a different one.

The initial condition will always be arbitrary, and could be based on what someone thinks is the basis of all morality, but it will only be their individual opinion.

Okay, then I think we agree.

 

[angrysoba]

I think if we start with a high level moral sentiment like "abortion is wrong" we can work backward with an individual or a group until we get to moral beliefs that aren't derived from other moral beliefs.

I assume this bit is the philosophical bit. And if so, then this is simply the bit that I think science cannot answer, yet which seems to be the major sticking point for proponents of science as an answer to normative ethics.

I think the role of science is in differentiating stated beliefs from sincerely held beliefs, identifying more base level beliefs in people who can only articulate higher level beliefs etc.

I can't think of a perfect real world example off the top of my head, but I can give you something in the ballpark.

A recent study investigated the question of how much charitable giving was motivated by altruism and how much by social pressure. Almost all respondents claimed their giving was altruism based, but by varying social pressure in a controlled way, they found that the large majority would not give if no one was watching them, nut would give when those social pressures existed.

Sure, but in such a case what we would identify is that many people will not be acting altruistically. This does not alter the idea that we may say that genuine altruism is axiomatically a moral behaviour. In fact, this is one of the "morals" of A Clockwork Orange. We can't say that Alex is being morally good if he is refraining from violence merely because of his conditioning.

I think I know what you mean though. Maybe something like Jonathon Haidt's thought experiments when asking people about incest and having his subjects try to explain why it was wrong and trying to rationalize it. In each case they were trying to apply the principle of harm but were unable to.

I'm not sure that we have a disagreement here as such.

In the case of corporal punishment, it isn't simply that it doesn't improve behavior, but that it has clear negative effects, so the only people arguing for the value of punishment as justice will be those who value that justice more than the welfare of their child, and I think that's a rare group, at least in the west. But you're in general, correct that we can't say the moral problem of corporal punishment is universally sidestepped.

Okay, then I think we agree. I also certainly agree that science can inform us of how to proceed in all kinds of moral issues, once we have decided our moral axioms.

I'm not saying that efficacy or outcome supplants moral discussion in all cases, or even in this case. It isn't that an empirical test determines what is right. In many cases, there's a lack of clarity among people about where the moral and factual parts of the debate begin and end. Science and reason can remove the factual part from the tangle and leave us "simpler" moral problems.

In the case of corporal punishment, the moral problem becomes: Do you value something else (justice, tradition, whatever) more than your child's academic, social and emotional well-being. When the question is put like that, there still may be individuals or societies that support corporal punishment, but for a lot of people, at that level of clarity, it's less of a question.

If scientific findings had shown the opposite to be true, it would still leave the question of how much parents value the long term outcomes for their child vs their short term experience.

If people object to science removing the factual confusion from a moral issue, then they may be emotionally attached to the lack of clarity. If they value truth to any extent, this is probably a problem.

I'm all for as much empirical evidence as possible. And yes, I certainly agree with you in the sense that if, for example, we discovered some evidence that completely and irrefutably showed God to not exist it would knock away religious justification for particular morals. I think that is true. Although I am not really sure that that is disputed.

 

[Tassman]

Why do you think it's "a set of rules"? Why can't it be a variety of rules depending on various random attributes of a society?

Seems to me that expecting a single set of rules would be like saying there's a single most-fit creature for a particular environment, when in actuality there could be many creatures equally fit in different ways.

Similarly, there could be many sets of rules that all work equally well, all based on our evolved instincts but arrived at by different community discourses, depending on the specific leaders and opinions of the community. In practice, that seems to be the way it is. Various communities have held together and thrived for centuries, although they have different mutually-exclusive rules. If there's only one set of rules, how does one decide which successful community is right, or closest to being right?

I was thinking of a specific “set of rules” for a given community, not a universal set of rules to encompass the entire world. Although, that said, certain moral values do seem to be universal and I would argue that they are instinctive among social species such as us. E.g. 'murder' within a given community, or 'stealing' or 'rape' etc are generally considered wrong. And the so-called Golden Rule - i.e. "do unto others etc" - has been found in some form in almost every ethical tradition throughout human history.

Of course, for tribal societies, anything goes for outsiders including rape, pillage and destruction. But in developed societies it’s possible, I think, to envisage much of the world as one extended tribe with a common moral code applicable to all. This is assumed by the United Nations as set forward in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the concept of crimes against humanity as enforced (at least in theory) by the International Criminal Court.

Addressed to Cavemonster:

Okay, then I think we agree. I also certainly agree that science can inform us of how to proceed in all kinds of moral issues, once we have decided our moral axioms.

OK! But how, in your view, do we decide upon our moral axioms? This surely is the key to the discussion.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

OK! But how, in your view, do we decide upon our moral axioms? This surely is the key to the discussion.

I thought you were telling us that?

How do you decide what is good? How do you decide which instincts to follow, and which to suppress? What outcomes are you seeking, by selectively following and suppressing instincts? Why?

 

[Cavemonster]

OK! But how, in your view, do we decide upon our moral axioms? This surely is the key to the discussion.

Personally I think that individuals arrive at their axiomatic moral beliefs through a combination of biological instinct, cultural reinforcement and individual psychological experience.

In a way,very similar to how people arrive at their taste in food.

We can say very general things about human taste in food. Certain things are almost universally reviled for reasons we can likely chalk up to practical innate instinct selected through evolution. Certain tastes are shared culturally and shift through the generations. We can track historical trends in taste in food. Just as morality historically becomes more inclusive over time, so does the world's palate as cultures mingle and textures and flavors that were once too exotic for broad acceptance join the melting pot.

Then, on top of all those cultural trends, individuals form tastes based on accidents of biology, to some cilantro tastes like soap, to some it tastes great. Or they form tastes based on personal experience. Love or hate for something passed on by parents or a social group or associations with other life experience.

While we can descriptively map the taste preferences of individuals, and groups across time, and we could make food decisions that would be more or less popular based on scientific measurements and predictions, there can be no such thing as a universally correct food choice.

 

[Tassman]

I thought you were telling us that?
How do you decide what is good? How do you decide which instincts to follow, and which to suppress? What outcomes are you seeking, by selectively following and suppressing instincts? Why?

Already done so many times!

Now I suggest that you and soba quit playing Grand Inquisitor, come out from the shadows and tell the waiting world how, in your view, we decide "the moral axioms" from which “science can inform us of how to proceed" to quote your equally reticent colleague. I guess you both recognise that your argument won't withstand close scrutiny, hence your reluctance.

 

[Tassman]

Personally I think that individuals arrive at their axiomatic moral beliefs through a combination of biological instinct, cultural reinforcement and individual psychological experience.

I agree and this is what I was getting at when I said in Post #200: that morality does not exist “in and of itself” in some self-contained ivory tower serving no practical purpose. It is obvious that it consists of a set of rules, grounded in our evolved instincts and arrived at via community discourse, which enable us as a social species to modify individual selfishness and thus facilitate the group living essential for survival.

In a way,very similar to how people arrive at their taste in food.

We can say very general things about human taste in food. Certain things are almost universally reviled for reasons we can likely chalk up to practical innate instinct selected through evolution. Certain tastes are shared culturally and shift through the generations. We can track historical trends in taste in food. Just as morality historically becomes more inclusive over time, so does the world's palate as cultures mingle and textures and flavors that were once too exotic for broad acceptance join the melting pot.

Then, on top of all those cultural trends, individuals form tastes based on accidents of biology, to some cilantro tastes like soap, to some it tastes great. Or they form tastes based on personal experience. Love or hate for something passed on by parents or a social group or associations with other life experience.

While we can descriptively map the taste preferences of individuals, and groups across time, and we could make food decisions that would be more or less popular based on scientific measurements and predictions, there can be no such thing as a universally correct food choice

All true. But, personal preferences aside, the important contribution of science is that it can say a great deal about nutrition which is universal (allowing for specific genetic factors among different peoples) and is, after all, the fundamental reason why we eat in the first place.

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

Already done so

Not in such a way that anyone at all has understood it and agreed with it.

 

[Tassman]

Not in such a way that anyone at all has understood it and agreed with it.

That's your problem. But you forgot to respond to the second part of my post, namely:

"I suggest that you and soba quit playing Grand Inquisitor, come out from the shadows and tell the waiting world how, in your view, we decide "the moral axioms" from which “science can inform us of how to proceed" to quote your equally reticent colleague. I guess you both recognise that your argument won't withstand close scrutiny, hence your reluctance".

 

[Kevin_Lowe]

That's your problem. But you forgot to respond to the second part of my post, namely:

"I suggest that you and soba quit playing Grand Inquisitor, come out from the shadows and tell the waiting world how, in your view, we decide "the moral axioms" from which “science can inform us of how to proceed" to quote your equally reticent colleague. I guess you both recognise that your argument won't withstand close scrutiny, hence your reluctance".

I don't know what you are talking about when you refer to "my" argument and whether it can "withstand scrutiny". I haven't advanced any argument on that topic in this thread. You might as well be ranting about how my position on Miley Cyrus will not withstand scrutiny - it is nonsensical to assert such a thing about a position which does not exist.

 

[Tassman]

I don't know what you are talking about when you refer to "my" argument and whether it can "withstand scrutiny". I haven't advanced any argument on that topic in this thread. You might as well be ranting about how my position on Miley Cyrus will not withstand scrutiny - it is nonsensical to assert such a thing about a position which does not exist.

Precisely! Which is why I’m suggesting that you and soba quit playing Grand Inquisitor, come out from the shadows and tell the waiting world how, in your view, we decide "the moral axioms" from which “science can inform us of how to proceed" to quote your equally reticent colleague.