Good morning, David Talbott.
1) until a quantitative "model" is completed you can ignore evidence falsifying a longstanding theory
2) until a quantitative "model" is completed you can ignore evidence pointing to a rational alternative
The first seems to me to be meaningless, scientifically; if there is "a longstanding theory", there must be at least one quantitative model. It is likely, however, that by "a quantitative "model"" you are referring to something which might be developed, one day, from electric comet ideas. If so, then your statement is correct ... the large body of solid research into the history of science shows exactly that (think of Neptune vs Vulcan, and theories of gravity, for example).
The second is more interesting ... the existence of 'a rational alternative' is surely a necessary precondition for there to be a quantitative model. However, unless and until such a quantitative model is developed (and published, etc), it is perfectly rational to ignore evidence pointing to its 'rational precursor'. Further, you'd be crazy not to do this; it is extraordinarily easy to create rational alternatives, for which there is at least some evidence pointing to such alternatives' plausibility. It's only when such rational alternatives have been successfully developed to the point where quantitative models can be constructed that they even start to become scientifically interesting (unless you're a historian, of course).
Combining the two into a single statement is tricky, if only because you're mixing two quite different factors.
But this takes us well away from electric comets ...
There are, of course, two parts to your statement:Well now Reality Check. It seems that an endlessly repeated lie has taken over the critical comments here on the Electric Comet hypothesis: the lie is that until a quantitative "model" is completed you can ignore evidence falsifying a longstanding theory and pointing to a rational alternative.
1) until a quantitative "model" is completed you can ignore evidence falsifying a longstanding theory
2) until a quantitative "model" is completed you can ignore evidence pointing to a rational alternative
The first seems to me to be meaningless, scientifically; if there is "a longstanding theory", there must be at least one quantitative model. It is likely, however, that by "a quantitative "model"" you are referring to something which might be developed, one day, from electric comet ideas. If so, then your statement is correct ... the large body of solid research into the history of science shows exactly that (think of Neptune vs Vulcan, and theories of gravity, for example).
The second is more interesting ... the existence of 'a rational alternative' is surely a necessary precondition for there to be a quantitative model. However, unless and until such a quantitative model is developed (and published, etc), it is perfectly rational to ignore evidence pointing to its 'rational precursor'. Further, you'd be crazy not to do this; it is extraordinarily easy to create rational alternatives, for which there is at least some evidence pointing to such alternatives' plausibility. It's only when such rational alternatives have been successfully developed to the point where quantitative models can be constructed that they even start to become scientifically interesting (unless you're a historian, of course).
Combining the two into a single statement is tricky, if only because you're mixing two quite different factors.
It's pretty much a normal state of affairs, and those who've spent a lot of time examining how science actually works - Kuhn is perhaps the most famous, but also Quine, Latakos, Duhem, ... - have written extensively on this topic.When did the history of scientific progress ever support such an idea?
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But this takes us well away from electric comets ...
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