At least you never called me an American this time
I am not muddying anything. He claimed there were lots of specific warnings of multiple attacks in the US using planes as weapons, the one claim he does give me is not specific, if you are going to make a claim you have to back it up. Also this was how long before 911?
Try reading posts before shooting your bolt next time
And yes, things amazingly all become much clearer with hindsight, like the fact that you claimed Iraq had the second largest oil reserves in the world.
Now, with hindsight, you know you are wrong.
We have different definitions of 'specific' of course. The timeline entry below is pretty clear and at the time was foresight.
Source for that last statement?
In all honesty, SD, I find the idea of "placing blame" for such a tremendous incident extremely odd. Unless human nature has changed drastically since I last looked, we don't usually place criminal blame on people if they make mistakes. Especially if the individual in question realizes the mistake and takes actions to correct it so it hopefully won't occur again. That's the major difference between a mistake and a calculated action, as I understand it; one is done deliberately, and one is done by accident. However, if I were forced to place blame, I would place the majority (i.e. about 75%) on Al-Qa'ida, followed by equal parts of the remaining blame on the administration, the airlines, the intelligence agencies, and the American people in general (normally I just blame Al Qa'ida, but I do recognize that it is at least partially due to the actions of the United States as a whole that they were able to carry it out at all). As an explanation for why I would put part of the blame on the American people, at least part of the reason why the airliners would likely not have implemented tougher security measures is because the American people at the time would likely have protested the need, citing the major inconvenience it would have caused them, and also pointing out that nothing had happened yet, so why did tougher measures need to be implemented? The vague warnings we had received would most likely not have been enough to convince the American people that the aggravation we're currently experiencing at the airports these days would have been worth it then. Now, we've had the problem happen, and most people, while they are aggravated by the procedures at the airport, at least recognize the necessity, BECAUSE 9/11 HAPPENED.
The gentleman I was speaking with yesterday gave a great example of that; during a previous war (I'm afraid I've forgotten the war he mentioned, but it might have been WWII), after two submarines sank due to, in retrospect, obvious weaknesses in the structure, measures were taken to reinforce the remaining submarines so as to prevent such an occurrence from happening again. No one said BEFORE those two submarines sank, "hey, there might be this problem with the submarines; maybe we should implement measures to prevent them sinking"; it had to happen first. It's a sad but true fact that historically we have had to have things HAPPEN first before we take actions to prevent them.
Source for last quote:
Without Precedent review
"The Sept. 11 commission was so frustrated with repeated misstatements by the Pentagon and FAA about their response to the 2001 terror attacks that it considered an investigation into possible deception, the panel's chairmen say in a new book," notes an Associated Press account of Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission
Washington Post
Senator Dayton's Transcript:
Here
Yeah I know its a site that people hate, but it was only hosted there.
You can also Google FAA lies to the 9/11 Commission.
Here is another timeline of the FAA and prior warnings from MSM outlets.
Coopertive Research Unfortunately the FAA ignored or refused to implement tighter security measures as requested by counter-terrorism officials.
One of the most relevant parts on this issue:
July 10, 2001: CIA Director Gives Urgent Warning to White House of Imminent, Multiple, Simultaneous Al-Qaeda Attacks, Possibly Within US
Edit event
CIA Director Tenet finds the briefing Cofer Black just gave him (see July 10, 2001) so alarming that he calls National Security Adviser Rice from his car as he heads to the White House and says he needs to see her right away, even though he has regular weekly meetings with her. [Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Tenet, Black, and an unnamed third CIA official brief Rice on the latest intelligence. Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley and counterterrorism “tsar” Richard Clarke are also present. [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] According to a later account in the Washington Post, they told her, “First, al-Qaeda was going to attack American interests, possibly in the United States itself. Black emphasized that this amounted to a strategic warning, meaning the problem was so serious that it required an overall plan and strategy. Second, this was a major foreign policy problem that needed to be addressed immediately. They needed to take action that moment—covert, military, whatever—to thwart bin Laden. The United States had human and technical sources, and all the intelligence was consistent…” However,
“Tenet and Black felt they were not getting through to Rice. She was polite, but they felt the brush-off.” They leave the meeting frustrated, seeing little prospect for immediate action. Tenet and Black will both later recall the meeting as the starkest warning they gave the White House on al-Qaeda before 9/11 and one that could have potentially stopped the 9/11 attacks if Rice had acted on it (see July 10, 2001) and conveyed their urgency to President Bush (Tenet was briefing Bush on a daily basis at this time, but he will later claim that Rice had a much better rapport with Bush). Black will say, “The only thing we didn’t do was pull the trigger to the gun we were holding to her head.” [Woodward, 2006, pp. 80; Washington Post, 10/1/2006] Clarke will recall in 2006 that Rice focused on the possible threat to President Bush at an upcoming summit meeting in Genoa, Italy (see June 13, 2001 and July 20-22, 2001). Rice and Bush had already been briefed about the Genoa warning by this time (see July 5, 2001). Rice also promised to quickly schedule a high-level White House meeting on al-Qaeda. However, that meeting does not take place until September 4, 2001 (see September 4, 2001). [McClatchy Newspapers, 10/2/2006] Rice also directs that Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and Attorney General Ashcroft be given the same briefing (see July 11-17, 2001). There will be a brief description of the meeting in a Time magazine article in 2002 that goes largely unnoticed at the time: “In mid-July, Tenet sat down for a special meeting with Rice and aides. ‘George briefed Condi that there was going to be a major attack,’ says an official; another, who was present at the meeting, says Tenet broke out a huge wall chart… with dozens of threats. Tenet couldn’t rule out a domestic attack but thought it more likely that al-Qaeda would strike overseas.” [Time, 8/4/2002] Tenet will privately brief the 9/11 Commission about the meeting in early 2004 (see January 28, 2004). According to a transcript of his briefing, he tells Rice there could be an al-Qaeda attack in weeks or perhaps months, that there would be multiple and simultaneous attacks causing major human casualties, and that the focus would be US targets, facilities, or interests. As Time reported, Tenet says the intelligence focuses on an overseas attack, but a domestic attack could not be ruled out. [Washington Post, 10/3/2006] However, this meeting will go unmentioned by the 9/11 Congressional Inquiry and the 9/11 Commission and commission members will later deny they were told about it. After the transcript is shared with reporters, the commission members will reverse their denials (see September 30-October 3, 2006). Rice will also deny the meeting took place, only to reverse her position as well (see October 1-2, 2006).
