What I am saying is that the greater muslim world is angered by US interferance and perceived injustice and that engenders support of the the extremist elements and allows the extremists to recruit and gain funding.
And that does not comport with the evidence either.
If a Muslim extermist is joining a terrorist organization because of the incitements of the article, then they are joining for a purpose (ie, those incitements) and are going to join the terrorist organization that agrees with their goals. That's why a specific mujahadeen might join Hezbollah rather than Al Qaeda. That's why a speicifc donor will give to Hamas rather than Al Qaeda.
If Al Qaeda requires the support of the Muslim world, it is not because Dar-al-Islam is mad at the West. It is because they are indifferent to the West and have other things to worry about. They allow the extremists to recruit and fundraise because the personal benefits (virtually none) to stopping them are outweighed by the monumental costs (recrimination and violence at home).
When someone puts a spotlight on their indifference to terrorism, they will put forth the usual justifications... Western attacks, Israel, war against Islam, etc. But justifications are not causes.
I think they would have trouble operating in a muslim world where the majority of non-terrorist muslims are not deeply suspicious and angered by the west.
I think the evidence is quite the opposite. Terrorists can operate just fine if the population at large is indifferent as long as there is a core of radicals from whom they can solicit donations and recruits.
I see the terrorist problem as a pyramid with the terrorists at the tip and ever more moderate muslims as we work our way to the base. The tip needs the base to stand. This means two things - that islam in general must take responsibility for it's terrorists and that we need to be aware of how policies can make the situation worse.
Islam in general will take responsibility for their terrorists when the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs.
In broad strokes, there are four ways to stop extreme Muslim terrorism, all of which should be approached simultaneously.
1) Increase the benefits of getting Muslims to stop them... I don't knwo of any way to do this and I have never seen anybody ever suggest something realistic on this angle. I'd love ot hear ideas.
2) Increase the costs of not stopping them. That means pounding the crap out of the entire Muslim world. Not realistic, and as Iraq shows, almost as costly to the pounders as the to the poundees.
3) Eliminate the radical element that does the actual violence. That means getting rid of the madrasas, eliminating wahabbism, great investigative work. This is a long-term approach and will not be 100% effective. There is a diminishing rate of return in which each added dollar to investigative techniques becomes less and less effective in stopping terrorism.
4) Increase your own defenses. This means better border patrols. This means more effective defense at home. This is also not 100% effective and has a diminishing rate of return. Cost-benefit analysis plagues this aspect as surely as the first.
Now, the War in Iraq, in my opinion, was an ambitious, idealistic and ultimately misguided attempt to create benefits to a Muslim nation while simultaneously increasing the costs of supporting terror. The idea was that proseperous and stable Iraq would be a beacon that would convince dar-al-Islam to assimilate Western culture with Western aid and in the interim we'd be pounding on a regime that has (very tangential) links to terror. That aid would then be the benefit outweighing the costs of fighting terrorism. On that note, so far, it has failed. First, the links between Iraq and terror were tenuous at best. Second, even if Iraq eventually becomes proseperous and stable, the costs of the transformation will make it very unlikely that any other nation in dar-al-Islam will want to follow suit.
That said, I have seen no other proposals on how we can effectively manage goals 1 and 2. And I think we have to figure that out quickly if we have any hope of managing this problem. Concentrating solely on goals 3 and 4 will not suffice. And "winning the hearts and minds" of the Islamic world, however laudable, will be ineffective in and irrelevant to fighting terror
Zee
