Just these, surely:
Terrorism in Canada
- Thread starter Border Reiver
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Just these, surely:
Fitter
Illuminator
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Bikewer
Penultimate Amazing
I think it's easy to call such people "crazy", and they certainly have a mind-set different from ours..... But by all accounts the 9/11 terrorists were highly motivated, well-trained individuals implementing a political act orchestrated by Bin Laden.
The plan was well conceived and well implemented.
This raises the old questions about the motivations of these people. The Bush Administration portrayed them as religious fanatics.
However, anyone who was familiar with Bin Laden and his rhetoric and aims knew that this was a political act; Bin Laden had articulated his problems with "the west" on many occasions and made no bones about the fact he was acting against US Foreign policy, not on account of Jihadist ideology.
The plan was well conceived and well implemented.
This raises the old questions about the motivations of these people. The Bush Administration portrayed them as religious fanatics.
However, anyone who was familiar with Bin Laden and his rhetoric and aims knew that this was a political act; Bin Laden had articulated his problems with "the west" on many occasions and made no bones about the fact he was acting against US Foreign policy, not on account of Jihadist ideology.
I was thinking about this.
The question is one of motive. Was he a simple madman, or was he a terrorist as such, with a political motivation, however deranged?
It also fits "Bomber" Harris, and many another military commander, if we are to judge from his and their actions. Are these terrorists, in your sense? People can become inured through ideology or training to commit the most frightful deeds. I'm not sure if they can all be called psychopaths. I wish I could say they are all mad, but unfortunately I can't.
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
I have always had a bit of a problem with criticism of Air Marshall Arthur 'Bomber' Harris. He clearly illustrates the ideas about:
- When we do that it's payback. When they do that it's barbaric.
- The victors write the history.
I was also reminded in a BBC Canada report that the Great White North has quite a bit of experience with home grown terrorists.
The call to arms of Muslims around the world by the jihadists in the Middle East has been fairly effective. The sad reality is, this is not going to end anytime soon.
There were no mass bombing raids on London in the 1930s
Then smartcooky's definition of psychopathy is far from evidently accurate, because by the criteria he invokes people who like you who "cheer on" mass slaughter would be classified as total psychos.and 1940. IMO they were essentially industrial-scale terror attacks. After watching the documentary I think most people would be quite ready to cheer Bomber Harris on. I know I was.
Also, your argument might be taken to justify individual terror against innocent citizens of countries which involve themselves in the bombing of civilian areas. May I counsel you to be careful with that argument? Personally I find it quite unconvincing.
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newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
He may be right. Ask my wife.
The argument that "You bomb our civilian areas we kill citizens in your country," seems to have a certain undeniable logic to it. Like you I don't really agree with it, but I do see the logic. It's a tactical decision to raise the price of intervention. To make the 'other side' pay a price they don't want to pay.
As a wise man once said: War is hell. Once the genie's out of the box you can't get him back in. I served in the military in Vietnam. I was stationed not too far away from the town of which American commanders explained, "We destroyed it in order to save it." That probably sounds like something straight out of Orwell's 1984 but I understood what they were saying.
I guess you woulda had to have been there.
You'll need to take that one up with smartcooky. It looks like you're extolling the logic of psychopathy.He may be right. Ask my wife.
The argument that "You bomb our civilian areas we kill citizens in your country," seems to have a certain undeniable logic to it. Like you I don't really agree with it, but I do see the logic. It's a tactical decision to raise the price of intervention. To make the 'other side' pay a price they don't want to pay.
I was in Grosvenor Square, London, UK.As a wise man once said: War is hell. Once the genie's out of the box you can't get him back in. I served in the military in Vietnam. I was stationed not too far away from the town of which American commanders explained, "We destroyed it in order to save it." That probably sounds like something straight out of Orwell's 1984 but I understood what they were saying.
I guess you woulda had to have been there.
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
I don't know what that means.
It's a reference to this. http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/march/17/newsid_2818000/2818967.stm
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
I know what happened there I don't know what you mean when you say you "were there."
Obviously you're angry and you're not ready to discuss these issues without getting emotional. I am trying to be objective, to make some attempt to see these events from both perspectives. I apologize for trying to engage you in that discussion.
Have a great day!
I'm not being emotional; I just mean I participated in that demonstration. That's all. I was not intending to prevent you from seeing the thing from these different perspectives, and not to offend you. Just trying to say that my experience of the Vietnam War was different from yours.I know what happened there I don't know what you mean when you say you "were there."
Obviously you're angry and you're not ready to discuss these issues without getting emotional. I am trying to be objective, to make some attempt to see these events from both perspectives. I apologize for trying to engage you in that discussion.
Have a great day!
Corsair 115
Penultimate Amazing
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There is legitimate criticism of how Harris handled the bombing campaign.
He was instrumental in turning Bomber Command from a force that was, early in the war, more of a threat to German cows than to German citizens or industry into a potent striking force later in the war. But he stubbornly stuck to the prewar theories of air power and refused to accept that more focused strategic attacks on industrial targets could have significant effect on the German war effort, even when presented with evidence. He probably should have been replaced in late 1944 by a more forward-thinking commander.
It's important to remember that logistical, operational, and technological limitations are what led to much of the nighttime bombing effort being conducted the way it was. Simply finding an enemy city proved to be a difficult task, let alone targeting anything within it. Nighttime bombing by its nature meant raids weren't going to be much more than area attacks. But daylight bombing was completely impracticable without fighter escort (as the U.S. found out when it attempted unescorted daylight raids).
Later on in the war, the development of various electronic navigational aids and the use of the Pathfinders and master bombers on raids meant accuracy on a well-conducted raid in good weather could be quite good indeed (by the standards of the time). On occasion, the RAF even outdid the USAAF in terms of accurate strikes.
It should be noted too that Bomber Command, for all its notoriety with its city area raids, also conducted plenty of raids against oil, transportation, and other purely industrial and military targets. Three-quarters of the attacks against the V-1 weapon sites in France, for instance, were done by Bomber Command.
Lastly, the area raids on cities did produce significant effects on the German war effort, albeit more indirect than direct, but the results were notable nonetheless.
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
Unfortunately I don't think that's true. It was intended to be terrorize the British people and I think that was the reason Hitler chose nighttime bombing.
I think that isn't likely because his primary inclination was daylight attacks on important targets. What shifted him away from this was the losses his bombers suffered during daylight at the hands of RAF fighters. The night bombing of cities was not his original intention; not because he was a merciful person, but because it was much less damaging to the UK war effort than pinpoint attacks on industrial and military targets.
The USAAF discovered the same thing later in the war.
The Luftwaffe had no heavy bombers and no viable long range fighters in 1940.
In fact it has been suggested that Churchill inaugurated this practice of bombing cities in order to get the Germans to respond in kind, instead of using their air power more usefully. That may not be the case, but for whatever reason, he was only too willing to engage in this kind of war.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwtwo/area_bombing_01.shtml
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
Now you're defending Hitler? And the nighttime bombing of London? Against that madman Churchill? Seriously? And why were the Germans bombing England? To stop British aggression?
angrysoba
Philosophile
Now you're defending Hitler? And the nighttime bombing of London? Against that madman Churchill? Seriously? And why were the Germans bombing England? To stop British aggression?
I am interested in reading a new book by Richard Overy on the subject. It certainly seems from the reviews that the book dispenses with emotion or moralizing, but rather looks objectively at the "myths" around the bombing campaign and allows the readers to make up their own minds:
I have no idea what you mean. Are you sure you read what I wrote, and you quoted?Now you're defending Hitler? And the nighttime bombing of London? Against that madman Churchill? Seriously? And why were the Germans bombing England? To stop British aggression?
How is that defending Hitler? He would have gained more from daylight precision bombing, but he had to abandon it because it was too costly. How is that defending the nighttime bombing of London? I'm completely baffled.
newyorkguy
Penultimate Amazing
The portrait emerging of Michael Zehaf-Bibeau, the 32-year-old gunman who invaded Canada's Parliament, is of a loner with a criminal record and a past history of drug abuse. Zehaf-Bibeau was born in Quebec and grew up in suburban Montreal, the son of a Libyan father and Canadian mother. (Ironically his mother is Susan Bibeau the deputy chairwoman of the immigration division of the Refugee and Immigration Board of Canada.)
After graduating from high school in about 1999, Zehaf-Bibeau seemed to spend his early 20s abusing drugs and getting in trouble with the law. He was sentenced to two short prison stays. For reasons that I think remain unknown, Zehaf-Bibeau traveled to Libya in 2007. Upon returning to Canada he drifted to British Columbia. It was there that he converted to Islam in about 2011. He was known at a local mosque, Masjid al-Salaam, where he attended services and prayed. However, a spokesman for the BC Muslim Association said there was a problem when Zehaf-Bibeau objected to the many non-Muslims who attended the mosque's community outreach programs. Eventually he was asked to attend another mosque. Clerics at Masjid al-Salaam then discovered Zehaf-Bibeau had somehow obtained keys for the mosque and was sleeping there at night. They changed the locks.
It was at that point that Zehaf-Bibeau's life seemed to really get out of control. He turned himself in at a British Columbia police station and confessed to a robbery in Montreal in 2003. Police could find no record of the crime. Next Zehaf-Bibeau tried to rob a McDonald's with a sharpened stick and then waited outside the restaurant for police to arrive.
Most recently he had been staying at Vancouver homeless shelters. A counselor at one of the shelter's said Zehaf-Bibeau had been using both crack cocaine and heroin. Recently he had been frustrated by his failure to secure a passport supposedly to travel to Syria and join ISIS. That was his reason for deciding to come to Ottawa. To try and straighten out his passport problems.
NY Times news story link
After graduating from high school in about 1999, Zehaf-Bibeau seemed to spend his early 20s abusing drugs and getting in trouble with the law. He was sentenced to two short prison stays. For reasons that I think remain unknown, Zehaf-Bibeau traveled to Libya in 2007. Upon returning to Canada he drifted to British Columbia. It was there that he converted to Islam in about 2011. He was known at a local mosque, Masjid al-Salaam, where he attended services and prayed. However, a spokesman for the BC Muslim Association said there was a problem when Zehaf-Bibeau objected to the many non-Muslims who attended the mosque's community outreach programs. Eventually he was asked to attend another mosque. Clerics at Masjid al-Salaam then discovered Zehaf-Bibeau had somehow obtained keys for the mosque and was sleeping there at night. They changed the locks.
It was at that point that Zehaf-Bibeau's life seemed to really get out of control. He turned himself in at a British Columbia police station and confessed to a robbery in Montreal in 2003. Police could find no record of the crime. Next Zehaf-Bibeau tried to rob a McDonald's with a sharpened stick and then waited outside the restaurant for police to arrive.
Most recently he had been staying at Vancouver homeless shelters. A counselor at one of the shelter's said Zehaf-Bibeau had been using both crack cocaine and heroin. Recently he had been frustrated by his failure to secure a passport supposedly to travel to Syria and join ISIS. That was his reason for deciding to come to Ottawa. To try and straighten out his passport problems.
NY Times news story link
Corsair 115
Penultimate Amazing
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The heavy bomber was the only weapon with which Britain had to strike back at Germany. So of course it was going to be used. Before the war it was thought nighttime bombing would be relatively easy. That turned out to not be the case.
It had been thought it would be easy to find cities at night, what with all the lights from industry and such. But that was only true at lower altitudes (and in good weather). The problem was flying at such lower altitudes meant flying through thick flak. So that wasn't practical. Flying higher avoided much of the flak, but now finding even a city on a moonless night proved to be difficult indeed. As the Butt Report from August of 1941 made clear, the RAF's bombing efforts were largely a farce.
The report found that of the bombers which claimed to have attacked their target, only one in three got within five miles of the intended target. That means two-thirds of bombers were further away than that. Nearly half of the bombs dropped by Bomber Command between May 1940 and May 1941 landed in open countryside—hence the comment that the early bombing efforts were more of a threat to German cows than to German citizens or industry.
The main difference between the daylight and nighttime bombing efforts is that the former aimed to hit specific industries related to the war effort to cause specific economic dislocation* while the latter was aimed at morale and causing general economic dislocation. A population whose housing is wrecked, a city whose streets are blocked with debris, is obviously not going to be functioning as efficiently, economically speaking, as one not suffering those consequences. But of course measuring how much that general economic dislocation impacted war production is difficult to assess. But it certainly put some drag on the German war effort. One need only look at the number of men tasked to repair such damage, the large numbers of Luftwaffe personnel assigned to anti-aircraft duties (who might well have been more effectively used in other capacities) as well as the enormous disruption such bombing made to the allocation of artillery (which meant that Allied soldiers and tanks faced far less artillery than they might have otherwise) for evidence of these indirect effects.
*In theory; in practice it often ended up as little more than general area attacks. Operational issues played a major role in determining how accurate a given USAAF air raid would be.
According to Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction, the 'Battle of the Ruhr' from March to July of 1943 had, according to the German's own records, a substantial impact and relatively long-lasting effect on the German war economy. That battle specifically went after industrial targets in the Ruhr (along with more general area raids mixed in). Indeed, the campaign was nearing the point of perhaps being decisive when it was called off by Harris in order to prepare for his ill-fated 'Battle of Berlin.'
And even at the purely 'morale' level, it might have been possible to have won the war. The bombing of Hamburg in July of 1943 cause a firestorm which largely razed the city to the ground. The casualties were enormous. But so to was the fear, and some degree of panic, it caused in the Reich's government. Albert Speer himself—surely someone in a position to know such things—said that if in short order another half-dozen or so German cities met the same fate as Hamburg it would knock Germany out of the war. But Bomber Command could not create city-wrecking firestorms on command—they relied too much on luck. So the fears expressed by Speer and others in the German leadership later eased.
It should be noted too that Germany poured a lot of effort in defending its airspace from both day and night attacks. It hardly acquiesced to the onslaught. There were plenty of fighters and pilots, a comprehensive early-warning radar network, a command-and-control system to guide interceptions of incoming bomber streams, and large numbers of light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery (and the men to operate them). The cost to both the RAF and USAAF in terms of crews and aircraft was significant; at times crews stood a poor chance indeed of surviving their tours. (This did improve as the war went along, especially for the USAAF once long-ranged fighter escorts became available in numbers.)
The overall point to be taken from all this is that the Combined Bomber Offensive is actually a complex subject with a great many aspects and features. This is too often lost in discussions of the subject.
It had been thought it would be easy to find cities at night, what with all the lights from industry and such. But that was only true at lower altitudes (and in good weather). The problem was flying at such lower altitudes meant flying through thick flak. So that wasn't practical. Flying higher avoided much of the flak, but now finding even a city on a moonless night proved to be difficult indeed. As the Butt Report from August of 1941 made clear, the RAF's bombing efforts were largely a farce.
The report found that of the bombers which claimed to have attacked their target, only one in three got within five miles of the intended target. That means two-thirds of bombers were further away than that. Nearly half of the bombs dropped by Bomber Command between May 1940 and May 1941 landed in open countryside—hence the comment that the early bombing efforts were more of a threat to German cows than to German citizens or industry.
The main difference between the daylight and nighttime bombing efforts is that the former aimed to hit specific industries related to the war effort to cause specific economic dislocation* while the latter was aimed at morale and causing general economic dislocation. A population whose housing is wrecked, a city whose streets are blocked with debris, is obviously not going to be functioning as efficiently, economically speaking, as one not suffering those consequences. But of course measuring how much that general economic dislocation impacted war production is difficult to assess. But it certainly put some drag on the German war effort. One need only look at the number of men tasked to repair such damage, the large numbers of Luftwaffe personnel assigned to anti-aircraft duties (who might well have been more effectively used in other capacities) as well as the enormous disruption such bombing made to the allocation of artillery (which meant that Allied soldiers and tanks faced far less artillery than they might have otherwise) for evidence of these indirect effects.
*In theory; in practice it often ended up as little more than general area attacks. Operational issues played a major role in determining how accurate a given USAAF air raid would be.
According to Adam Tooze's The Wages of Destruction, the 'Battle of the Ruhr' from March to July of 1943 had, according to the German's own records, a substantial impact and relatively long-lasting effect on the German war economy. That battle specifically went after industrial targets in the Ruhr (along with more general area raids mixed in). Indeed, the campaign was nearing the point of perhaps being decisive when it was called off by Harris in order to prepare for his ill-fated 'Battle of Berlin.'
And even at the purely 'morale' level, it might have been possible to have won the war. The bombing of Hamburg in July of 1943 cause a firestorm which largely razed the city to the ground. The casualties were enormous. But so to was the fear, and some degree of panic, it caused in the Reich's government. Albert Speer himself—surely someone in a position to know such things—said that if in short order another half-dozen or so German cities met the same fate as Hamburg it would knock Germany out of the war. But Bomber Command could not create city-wrecking firestorms on command—they relied too much on luck. So the fears expressed by Speer and others in the German leadership later eased.
It should be noted too that Germany poured a lot of effort in defending its airspace from both day and night attacks. It hardly acquiesced to the onslaught. There were plenty of fighters and pilots, a comprehensive early-warning radar network, a command-and-control system to guide interceptions of incoming bomber streams, and large numbers of light and heavy anti-aircraft artillery (and the men to operate them). The cost to both the RAF and USAAF in terms of crews and aircraft was significant; at times crews stood a poor chance indeed of surviving their tours. (This did improve as the war went along, especially for the USAAF once long-ranged fighter escorts became available in numbers.)
The overall point to be taken from all this is that the Combined Bomber Offensive is actually a complex subject with a great many aspects and features. This is too often lost in discussions of the subject.
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