Teleportation

[Soapy Sam]

I feel at this point someone should point out that Star Trek style transporters do not actually exist.

I realise this may come as a shock.

 

[MageLite]

I feel at this point someone should point out that Star Trek style transporters do not actually exist.

I realise this may come as a shock.

It's called a hypothetical situation.

 

[Soapy Sam]

Hypotheses non fingo.

This lot need to be kept on a short leash around hypotheticals, or things get messy.

 

[lister]

See the novel "Spock must die".

Bones raises this very question, and then later the transporter malfunctions to produce two identical Spocks with identical memories.

ETA: And of course TNG episode "Second chances" where Riker gets duplicated, although the above novel delves into the philosphical side a lot more.

 

[cos]

It seems to me that if the original substrate (i.e. my brain) were destroyed at any point in the process, that would be the end of my conscious existence as I have known it.

In other words, if my body disintegrates, I die. My consciousness is lost, no matter what happens afterward. Even if a millisecond after my disintegration, an exact duplicate of my body in its last unvaporized state appeared somewhere, it would not be producing the same consciousness.

Or maybe like this: if an exact duplicate of my body were to appear somewhere while my original body is still alive, I would not suddenly begin to experience its consciousness as "my" consciousness. It may possess a perfect copy of my brain, but it's not actually the same brain. If my consciousness doesn't "transfer" to the double in this situation, I definitely can't see it happening when my consciousness has already been destroyed.

Brain...hurts...Am I being coherent here?

Rocketdodger's system of gradual transfer is the only sort I would consider using. You know, if someone ever actually builds a teleporter.

Until then, I'm with Dr. McCoy...

 

[Darat]

It seems to me that if the original substrate (i.e. my brain) were destroyed at any point in the process, that would be the end of my conscious existence as I have known it.

In other words, if my body disintegrates, I die. My consciousness is lost, no matter what happens afterward. Even if a millisecond after my disintegration, an exact duplicate of my body in its last unvaporized state appeared somewhere, it would not be producing the same consciousness.

...snip..

Doesn't this then lead to the conclusion that your consciousness is "lost" repeatedly second by second?

 

[Big Les]

See the novel "Spock must die".

Bones raises this very question, and then later the transporter malfunctions to produce two identical Spocks with identical memories.

ETA: And of course TNG episode "Second chances" where Riker gets duplicated, although the above novel delves into the philosphical side a lot more.

Dude, I so beat you to that second nerdism, like ages ago. Yes! Back of the net.

 

[CurtC]

In other words, if my body disintegrates, I die. My consciousness is lost, no matter what happens afterward. Even if a millisecond after my disintegration, an exact duplicate of my body in its last unvaporized state appeared somewhere, it would not be producing the same consciousness.

What if the other body/brain is created at the exact instant that your original is destroyed? Would that be a continuation? After all, that person would perceive that his existence is continuous.

What if you create the other person instantly, but a few hundred miles away, so that the separation in space-time is a millisecond apart? Would that count?

I don't think you've thought it through.

 

[cos]

What if the other body/brain is created at the exact instant that your original is destroyed? Would that be a continuation? After all, that person would perceive that his existence is continuous.

I suspect that the time interval is irrelevant. Whether you waited a microsecond or ten years to produce it, the newly created person would certainly have just as much claim to being me as I do now. For every purpose except my actually experiencing its consciousness, it would be me.

That's why I brought up the second example. If a duplicate of me was created while I was still alive, I assume I would continue to experience the consciousness of the brain that I was born with.

I don't believe that I could simultaneously be conscious of the duplicate's experiences, nor would my consciousness somehow "switch over" to the newly created brain. He would be my twin to the nth degree, but were we to meet, we would interact as two separate people.

In essence, my argument (which may be laughably wrong) is that it doesn't matter when you create the duplicate. Five minutes before you die, at the exact moment of disintegration, or in a hundred years. The results would be the same.

I don't think you've thought it through.

I'm working on it.

I would appreciate any help you might provide.

 

[cos]

Doesn't this then lead to the conclusion that your consciousness is "lost" repeatedly second by second?

I think I'm saying the opposite...or trying to, at any rate.

I'm saying that any separate instance of a particular body/brain/person (no matter how similar to another that once existed, currently exists, or will exist) has a specific consciousness that it generates. If that single instance ceases to exist, then that particular consciousness which it's creating dies with it.

I suspect that that's the sort of consciousness that we have. I'm having trouble seeing how this consciousness could be "transferred" to another substrate except perhaps in a stepwise fashion as mentioned earlier.

Clear as mud?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm saying that any separate instance of a particular body/brain/person (no matter how similar to another that once existed, currently exists, or will exist) has a specific consciousness that it generates. If that single instance ceases to exist, then that particular consciousness which it's creating dies with it.

Agreed, except that consciousness doesn't "die." It just ceases to be.

Or maybe like this: if an exact duplicate of my body were to appear somewhere while my original body is still alive, I would not suddenly begin to experience its consciousness as "my" consciousness. It may possess a perfect copy of my brain, but it's not actually the same brain. If my consciousness doesn't "transfer" to the double in this situation, I definitely can't see it happening when my consciousness has already been destroyed.

You should have a chat with Interesting Ian. Or not.

~~ Paul

 

[cos]

Agreed, except that consciousness doesn't "die." It just ceases to be.

Yes, sorry, I was ambushed by a passing synecdoche.

 

[cos]

You should have a chat with Interesting Ian. Or not.

I'll look him up to see what I might or might not be getting into...

 

[CurtC]

If a duplicate of me was created while I was still alive, I assume I would continue to experience the consciousness of the brain that I was born with.

Careful there with those casual pronouns. The "created you" would also experience the consciousness of the brain you were born with. That person would think that he was you, and the consciousness in the original body would think he was you. Both of them would refer to the "old" cos as "I."

 

[Darat]

I think I'm saying the opposite...or trying to, at any rate.

I'm saying that any separate instance of a particular body/brain/person (no matter how similar to another that once existed, currently exists, or will exist) has a specific consciousness that it generates. If that single instance ceases to exist, then that particular consciousness which it's creating dies with it.

I suspect that that's the sort of consciousness that we have. I'm having trouble seeing how this consciousness could be "transferred" to another substrate except perhaps in a stepwise fashion as mentioned earlier.

Clear as mud?

But we know the processes that create or are (use whichever word you like) "consciousness" are not continuous, on the most basic level neurons "fire" and then need a recovery period before they can fire again. So using your reasoning consciousness dying and being re-born from moment to moment is the default position, so the teleportation is not required for there to be a "new you".

 

[cos]

But we know the processes that create or are (use whichever word you like) "consciousness" are not continuous, on the most basic level neurons "fire" and then need a recovery period before they can fire again. So using your reasoning consciousness dying and being re-born from moment to moment is the default position, so the teleportation is not required for there to be a "new you".

I like that phrasing: "the processes that are consciousness."

I think (warning: not a neuroscientist) that consciousness exists only at the level of huge numbers of neurons working together.

As you say, there are discontinuities at the most basic level all the time, but it seems to me that a temporary interruption at that level wouldn't significantly impact the higher order processes.

I.e. even though each individual neuron is not always "on", there are always very many more which are active at the time, firing away in intricate chains.

My consciousness is not the individual neurons, but it "is" the complex interrelation of many of them together.

Another way: I am not the atoms I am made of, I am their relation to each other.

 

[Darat]

I like that phrasing: "the processes that are consciousness."

I think (warning: not a neuroscientist) that consciousness exists only at the level of huge numbers of neurons working together.

As you say, there are discontinuities at the most basic level all the time, but it seems to me that a temporary interruption at that level wouldn't significantly impact the higher order processes.

I.e. even though each individual neuron is not always "on", there are always very many more which are active at the time, firing away in intricate chains.

My consciousness is not the individual neurons, but it "is" the complex interrelation of many of them together.

Another way: I am not the atoms I am made of, I am their relation to each other.

This to me seems to be the same reasoning others are using to explain why in the hypothetical teleport scenario the teleported "you" would still consider that they are the same "continuous you" as you and I do moment to moment.

Remember the proposed hypothetical teleport recreates that "relation to each other" as well as the atoms (or replaces the atoms with the same type of atom and recreates the various relationships) so I'm not sure why you view that consciousness will have ceased/died when you are teleported?

 

[hodgy]

Regarding that sleep issue ... I didn't know the bit about not be unconscious until recently myself, so don't feel bad.

As for the reincarnation bit, perhaps it's a bit different than the religious aspect, but essentially it amounts to living again after dying --- and if a Star Trek style transporter actually disintegrates all of your atoms, I can only see that as dying, since you would be considered dead if you didn't re-integrate, right? So what's the difference if you re-integrate in 5 microseconds or 10,000 years after the disintegration?

You wouldn't get me in to one of those things unless it had a very reliable 2 phase commit mechanism.

 

[cos]

This to me seems to be the same reasoning others are using to explain why in the hypothetical teleport scenario the teleported "you" would still consider that they are the same "continuous you" as you and I do moment to moment.

If so, I'm drawing an additional (false?) conclusion from the same line of reasoning.

Remember the proposed hypothetical teleport recreates that "relation to each other" as well as the atoms (or replaces the atoms with the same type of atom and recreates the various relationships)

It's precisely the "re-creation" that troubles me. The newly created person would certainly be conscious. Their experience would feel continuous, and they would go on living just as I would have.

I'm suggesting that the "I" who experiences those sensations wouldn't be the same "I" that has experienced all of my life thus far. It would be a new instance, since the particular pattern that had always been "me" would have been destroyed.

That's why I brought up the notion of creating the copy while I'm still alive.

Try it this way: make the copy. Let us shake hands ("wow, it's another me! Crazy!") and then kill me. I believe that in that situation, I would be dead, and my consciousness would cease to exist.

I don't understand how choosing a different moment to disintegrate me could produce a different outcome.

(I apologize if this seems incoherent. I've often wondered about this sort of thing, but haven't had much opportunity to discuss it properly.)

 

[Phaedrus74]

If so, I'm drawing an additional (false?) conclusion from the same line of reasoning.



It's precisely the "re-creation" that troubles me. The newly created person would certainly be conscious. Their experience would feel continuous, and they would go on living just as I would have.

I'm suggesting that the "I" who experiences those sensations wouldn't be the same "I" that has experienced all of my life thus far. It would be a new instance, since the particular pattern that had always been "me" would have been destroyed.

That's why I brought up the notion of creating the copy while I'm still alive.

Try it this way: make the copy. Let us shake hands ("wow, it's another me! Crazy!") and then kill me. I believe that in that situation, I would be dead, and my consciousness would cease to exist.

I don't understand how choosing a different moment to disintegrate me could produce a different outcome.

(I apologize if this seems incoherent. I've often wondered about this sort of thing, but haven't had much opportunity to discuss it properly.)

Don't apologize, it's a tricky business (trust me, philosophical articles treating this subject aren't significantly more coherent).

It boils down to the question what you consider to be you. Your position is that the entire causal history of your being is a necessary precondition for identity. This is the same position Davidson assumes in "Knowing One's Own Mind".

What Darat points out that from the perspective of you and/your copy there is no way to determine which is which (short of talking to the teleporter operator). Consequently you can wonder about how useful a more restricted notion of "Self" (including causal history and all that) is. Since there is no meaningful way of distinguising between you and your copy (apart from the fact which one was 're-created') the question whether or not your copy is "really you" becomes somewhat empty: Your copy believes he's really you, his friends and family believe he's really you and there is no way to determine whether or not he's really you. Under those circumstances why would you want to maintain that he is not really you, it's not like something essential has been lost.