Teleportation

[Beausoleil]

I see a similar problem with the oft-used idea of 'uploading' minds, in a future where humans can interface their brains with computers, and transferring them to new bodies. If a consciousness is broken down into data to be transferred, is it necessarily the same mind that is re-assembled?

It seems to me the concept of "same" applied to "mind" needs some thought.

Is my mind now the same mind as the mind I remember from yesterday?

 

[jmercer]

The issue is logical temporal continuity. No matter how it's done, there will either be a measurable gap between the original consciousness and the copy becoming self-aware and/or whole, or there will be (presumably briefly) two consciousnesses, one of whom will be snuffed out.

(Can't postulate an instantaneous copy without violating the laws of physics)

The fact that within a period of time something changes is irrelevant; you have the same legal and physical identity you had when you were 1 minute old, but you've clearly changed quite a bit, I'd imagine.

 

[Just thinking]

It seems to me the concept of "same" applied to "mind" needs some thought.

Is my mind now the same mind as the mind I remember from yesterday?

Yes and no --- (don't you just like those kind of answers?). Actually, it's the question, it's too vague ... especially in these contexts.

Since it's physically changing continuously, one can say no ... it's different in some ways.

But you still have the sense of your conscious persona existing, along with all your memories. And since it never did not exist physically (from its start to now), and I don't subscribe to a mind/body duality, then yes ... it's the same "mind".

 

[Dan O.]

You have memories of your past so you are the same self as your former self. But you have no memories of your future so you are not the same self as any possible later person that might think they are you.