JaysonR
Graduate Poster
- Joined
- May 16, 2013
- Messages
- 1,816
LOL!That awful chicken smell?![]()
What a typo!
Quite. I don't mean to imply the two are analogous; I only used the olfactory habituation as a comparison to how we don't notice the emotional stimulation to our image, but that it is never-the-less present.So, without ongoing emotional self image input, the sense of identity becomes unstable? not sure that really sounds much like olfactory habituation / peripheral receptor fatigue, but I think I see what you're getting at.
It's practically (meaning, it is used in neurology) identified as a network that runs from the fusiform gyrus (temporal and occipital lobes) to the amygdala.Has this emotional self-image input pathway (amygdala to frontal cortex, one would guess?) been positively identified, or is it a plausible hypothesis?
You can read the full original paper (much has been done since then, but this is the origin):
http://cbc.ucsd.edu/pdf/Capgras Syndrome - P Royal Soc.pdf
There's more research underway that now focuses on using capgras syndrome to study the formation of memory, as what appears to happen in capgras (regular and subjective) is that memories still exist and are formed, but the categorical relationship between them is disrupted so that each memory is categorically its own identity rather than a single part of several memories that make up a collective identity.
This is studied as individuals with this syndrome can have identity, but it's identity that is incredibly segmented to near what we might call, "one-dimensional characters" and are not able to carry complex associative identities. However, interestingly enough, they are capable of having memory of having complex identities, but they can't identify them when they are present in front of them due to the severing.
It's somewhat like remembering that you could play piano, but not being able to play piano anymore; even though you can identify all of the notes on the keyboard and explain the fundamentals of how one plays a piano.
What I mean by that is that it exists in the species as a norm.So, benign emotional recognition of self-identity is a requirement of your definition of consciousness despite not being a requirement of consciousness itself![]()
For instance, an iguana would not fit into this description as it hasn't a ventral visual system. As such, it is incapable of object recognition. All an iguana can see is motion, not what the object is, as it only has a dorsal visual stream.
Because of this, the iguana doesn't have the ability to create complex identities since it is incapable of recognizing even an isolated instance of object recognition.
Yes; in fact, there's a chance that we may be able to identify consciousness by residual effect of the animal's response to solving conflicting signal input that places direct illogical input against a normal input (or two counter logical inputs) and seeing if the animal can rationalize a way to solve the otherwise endless loop.Isn't rationalization a feature of consciousness per se?
Humans can solve these problems, and that's why we see very odd behaviors from people with things like subjective capgras.
There are birds, on the other hand, that attack certain colors and so if you paint an egg that color, it will just bounce endlessly back and forth between deciding to attack the egg or protect it, until you change the environment to free it from the dead-lock.
The "state" theory for consciousness essentially rests on this proposition.I'm wondering whether this linguistic/conceptual awkwardness says more about the elusiveness of the concept of 'consciousness' than about your definition...
It seems (like purpose, intent, free will, etc), to be subject to a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle, where the closer you examine it, and the more precisely you try to pin it down, the fuzzier it becomes.
It proposes that there is no single finite topography for consciousness, but that it is instead a state of the brain in processes.
If this results as true, then there are very large ethical debates to follow.
For example, is a coma patient capable of self-aware consciousness even if they are not wakefully conscious?
If the "state" is not current, will this indicate that the individual is not "currently" self-aware and not a cognitive consciousness?
We're not really sure on these things yet, but my hunch (completely just a hunch based on what we do know and how I think) is that if you retard the brain enough, self-aware consciousness is effectively absent.
We may not like claiming that another human isn't capable of self-aware consciousness because our empathetic visual input will transpose our abilities onto them by evolutionary motive of survival need, but, in my opinion, the individual is actually not cognitively present as a self-identity in some medical cases, and as such, the only thing keeping them claimed as a "person" (in the philosophical sense of that term) is our cultural sympathy towards their visage.
(My Will actually states that should I ever be in advanced stages of aggressive Alzheimer's or MS, that my life be ended [moved out of country and euthanized if needed], as "I" will no longer exist.)
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