Subconsciousness and Humanity.

[dlorde]

What we can claim is that all activity so far discovered related to the neuron has been accounted for with neurophysiological explanations sufficiently (though not always in full).

This is what I was getting at - that we aren't aware of any activity that would require novel explanations.

 

[JaysonR]

Fair enough, basically a neuron is too large to have QM interactions capable of transferring information.


Flavors are strange, it is basically a conservation property..

But here's a question, and I don't think we can answer this yet: are the constituents inside of a neuron too large to be affected by QM behavior effectively?

That's where I tend to leave room; because we don't know exactly what's in a neuron yet, or what size things are in there even.
A full neuron; clearly is too large.
But inside of it? I simply don't know; no one really does.
We don't know how large or small things get inside of the neuron on a practical application level.

 

[Navigator]

Generally speaking, any such dialogue of transhumanism should be met with a reminder of eugenics history as a very strong cautionary tale.

I am looking into it.

 

[Navigator]

Before I had mentioned how little we know about consciousness empirically; I'll circle back around to that and reinforce that point by noting that we have no empirical evidence that consciousness exists.
What we have for evidence that consciousness exists is anecdotal evidence from every human alive; we experience consciousness so therefore it must exist.
It's a granted axiom from first hand experience, so far.

For all we know, we could wake up one day and find out the neuroscience has discovered that consciousness simply doesn't exist and the impression of it is entirely a trick of the brain.
This gets brought up in the neuroscience philosophical debates over whether or not there is free will.

The important word here I feel is the word ‘trick’.

I think though what is being implied is that the brain thinks it is consciousness but that is its own self created impression.

Many brains having created that impression of being consciousness are now able to look at a brain and see a grey mass of biological material.
In examining that material deeply, it has discovered that a tiny single neuron internally has the complexity of something the size of San Francisco.

If the brain tricked itself into thinking it exists as consciousness but that consciousness does not really exist, then does the brain which that non existing consciousness examines also not exist?

Or if it still can and does exist, does it really even look like what the non existing consciousness sees it to look like – at a glance, a small mass of biological grey matter – deeper – a complex universe?

When the brain looks at itself, what does the brain really look like?

How does the brain know that what it is looking at is actually what it looks like?
If the brain had not tricked itself into thinking it exists as consciousness, what actually does it exist as?
How would the brain see itself without its illusion of consciousness?
Would it see itself?
Would it know it existed?

How do ‘we’ (consciousness created by the brain which thinks it exists but does not) know whether we are the most knowledgable part of the brain or the most ignorant?

For example, How do we know that the consciousness is the most intelligent part of the brain and not simply something which has come about from an infinitely more intelligent part of the brain and are simply little babes hardly aware of anything in comparison to what the brain actually knows and is unable to express to the wee ignorant thing called consciousness that the brain created?

How do we know that what consciousness sees as the brain (and body and Earth and Galaxy and Universe) is no more or less than a construct of the brain in relation to consciousness which we as consciousnesses cannot see (through the understanding of) other than as graspable analogies (the physical universe) which altogether vaguely represent what a brain actually is – but only as a rough outline, rather than the real thing?

 

[JaysonR]

This is what I was getting at - that we aren't aware of any activity that would require novel explanations.

For you and I; I think this is safely true.

However, while I can't begin to try to articulate the conversations I've sat and listened to in conferences and lectures, if you do sit in on a lot of these things, you'll hear quite a few in the field raise various reasons for venturing off to novel explanations.

Some are really pushing into very unknown territory way before we probably are really prepared to go wherever they are, while others are simply trying to explain witnessed neuronal behavior that cannot yet be accounted for accurately in some deficiency.

Most of neurological explanations for behavior is top-down in description rather than bottom-up.

This is primarily due the complete lack of what "bottom" is.
We don't know what "bottom" is.

So a lot of the novel explanations are from those trying to build or offer a bottom-up description of a behavior.

 

[JaysonR]

The important word here I feel is the word ‘trick’.

I think though what is being implied is that the brain thinks it is consciousness but that is its own self created impression.

Many brains having created that impression of being consciousness are now able to look at a brain and see a grey mass of biological material.
In examining that material deeply, it has discovered that a tiny single neuron internally has the complexity of something the size of San Francisco.

If the brain tricked itself into thinking it exists as consciousness but that consciousness does not really exist, then does the brain which that non existing consciousness examines also not exist?

Or if it still can and does exist, does it really even look like what the non existing consciousness sees it to look like – at a glance, a small mass of biological grey matter – deeper – a complex universe?

When the brain looks at itself, what does the brain really look like?

How does the brain know that what it is looking at is actually what it looks like?
If the brain had not tricked itself into thinking it exists as consciousness, what actually does it exist as?
How would the brain see itself without its illusion of consciousness?
Would it see itself?
Would it know it existed?

How do ‘we’ (consciousness created by the brain which thinks it exists but does not) know whether we are the most knowledgable part of the brain or the most ignorant?

For example, How do we know that the consciousness is the most intelligent part of the brain and not simply something which has come about from an infinitely more intelligent part of the brain and are simply little babes hardly aware of anything in comparison to what the brain actually knows and is unable to express to the wee ignorant thing called consciousness that the brain created?

How do we know that what consciousness sees as the brain (and body and Earth and Galaxy and Universe) is no more or less than a construct of the brain in relation to consciousness which we as consciousnesses cannot see (through the understanding of) other than as graspable analogies (the physical universe) which altogether vaguely represent what a brain actually is – but only as a rough outline, rather than the real thing?

These are all current neuroscientific and neurologic philosophical questions at this time.

Specifically, all of these quandries and paradoxes center around:
"When the brain looks at itself, what does the brain really look like?"

That's a very big question.
We don't have the answers to these questions yet because we haven't yet empirically verified consciousness, nor properly been able to quantify it as a definition.

We need these things before we can start to answer questions.
Until then, all of these questions cause a lot of speculative, and heated, discussion.

This isn't a bad thing, exactly, as all of this discussion and this problem of not being capable of definitively answering these questions in measure has prompted a lot of energy into new research to attempt to get the ball moving much further to solving the problem of consciousness empirically.

There's a general field aim for the current leading generation of neuroscience to at least begin to solve the problem of consciousness before their end and not resign to leave it "to our children, or their children's children".

In a sense, it's caused neuroscience to buckle up and get practical a bit; rather than defeatist and waxing.

 

[Dancing David]

But here's a question, and I don't think we can answer this yet: are the constituents inside of a neuron too large to be affected by QM behavior effectively?

That's where I tend to leave room; because we don't know exactly what's in a neuron yet, or what size things are in there even.
A full neuron; clearly is too large.
But inside of it? I simply don't know; no one really does.
We don't know how large or small things get inside of the neuron on a practical application level.

I think that we can safely say that there are the normal chemical interactions governed by QM, but we do know a lot of the way neurons work and that QM works, and anyone making such statements is silly and doesn't have a real grasp of QM.

They also probably talk about conscious observers in QM and don't understand what an 'observation' actually is in QM.

There is nothing in a neuron that could be transferring information, creating synchronous firing or anything like that with QM that is not covered under regular old chemistry.

They are wrong and just engaging in fantasy. Fantasy is great stuff but that is what it is.

I can discuss it further is you really wish.

 

[Dancing David]

These are all current neuroscientific and neurologic philosophical questions at this time.

Specifically, all of these quandries and paradoxes center around:
"When the brain looks at itself, what does the brain really look like?"

Well the answer is 'perceptions', we do not 'see' anything other than manufactured representation from sensory input.

That's a very big question.
We don't have the answers to these questions yet because we haven't yet empirically verified consciousness, nor properly been able to quantify it as a definition.

Which is why teh medical/neurology field uses functional behaviors and avoids the whole reification of disparate events.

We need these things before we can start to answer questions.
Until then, all of these questions cause a lot of speculative, and heated, discussion.

Not in the emergency room you don't.

This isn't a bad thing, exactly, as all of this discussion and this problem of not being capable of definitively answering these questions in measure has prompted a lot of energy into new research to attempt to get the ball moving much further to solving the problem of consciousness empirically.

Now that is the problem of philosophy, there is no problem of consciousness empirically, the problem is an incoherent defintion with philosophical baggae.

There's a general field aim for the current leading generation of neuroscience to at least begin to solve the problem of consciousness before their end and not resign to leave it "to our children, or their children's children".

In a sense, it's caused neuroscience to buckle up and get practical a bit; rather than defeatist and waxing.

Um, that seems a rather odd statement o me, psychology, medicine and neurology all have working functional definitions, there are gaps in knowledge and understanding to be sure, but the problem is in the use of the word, nothing else.

No we do not understand all the processes in the brain, nor do we have a grasp on what many of those processes are but I take exception to neuroscience having to "buckle up and get practical a bit", do you care to defend that statement? It seems to be rather an odd one to me.

Do you think the neurological biochemists who have been studying photoreceptors and the retinal networks in the eye were engaging in something else?

There are thousands of papers published in the way that the neurotransmitter work and interact every year alone, so I have to question such an broad characterization.

If my tone is over aggressive I apologize.

 

[JaysonR]

I think that we can safely say that there are the normal chemical interactions governed by QM, but we do know a lot of the way neurons work and that QM works, and anyone making such statements is silly and doesn't have a real grasp of QM.

They also probably talk about conscious observers in QM and don't understand what an 'observation' actually is in QM.

There is nothing in a neuron that could be transferring information, creating synchronous firing or anything like that with QM that is not covered under regular old chemistry.

They are wrong and just engaging in fantasy. Fantasy is great stuff but that is what it is.

I can discuss it further is you really wish.

No, not really (in reference to further discussion).
I'm mostly with you on this when I hear things regarding QM speculations regarding the brain; however, I leave a tiny reservation for when we actually get to examining that level of the brain and seeing if anything is worth noting, because when we can measurably reach that level of the brain, the folks that will be measuring will be very pragmatic individuals and not folks caught up in flights of fancy. Folks like my 'brother-friend'; down to Earth neurophysicists.

 

[JaysonR]

Um, that seems a rather odd statement o me, psychology, medicine and neurology all have working functional definitions, there are gaps in knowledge and understanding to be sure, but the problem is in the use of the word, nothing else.

No we do not understand all the processes in the brain, nor do we have a grasp on what many of those processes are but I take exception to neuroscience having to "buckle up and get practical a bit", do you care to defend that statement? It seems to be rather an odd one to me.

Do you think the neurological biochemists who have been studying photoreceptors and the retinal networks in the eye were engaging in something else?

There are thousands of papers published in the way that the neurotransmitter work and interact every year alone, so I have to question such an broad characterization.

If my tone is over aggressive I apologize.

In general, I can summarize a response to each part you wrote with responding to this segment.

I wasn't referring to daily neurological work; that is very pragmatic and very simple. From this view, we may even call neurology functionally complete.

I was referring to the pursuit of the full map of the brain, and specifically a full account of consciousness in a bottom-up model; not a top-down conceptual model.

In this regard, neuroscience has been engaged as I noted and has now began to shift toward the goal sets which I outlined.

I did not mean that neurology itself was inept at being pragmatic unto society as a tool and service.

 

[Dancing David]

Sure I am just point out that there is lots and lots of very practical research being done into each of the multiple aspects of what is labeled as 'consciousness' : attention, focus, matching, judgement, perception,... etc...

I am saying very clearly that the 'problem of consciousness' does not exist, it is just a hold over from the philosophical baggage of millennia of usage and the mystical fuzzy mindedness of the term. I take the stance that it is 'the vague problem of definition'.

Now the area is mostly still unknown and under investigation the fine details of neuro anatomy and their functional correlates to the vague and fuzzy term consciousness are still an area of tremendous potential and discovery.

Yet I am suggesting very strongly and emphatically that the term 'consciousness' as it is commonly used in these discussion is about as well defined and useful as 'elan vital'.

That is why I keep saying that it is the use of the term consciousness as this reification of disparate processes that is the problem.




So I again am saying that the functional medical model is the way to go.

I am really curious as to why you would say this Jayson?

"In a sense, it's caused neuroscience to buckle up and get practical a bit; rather than defeatist and waxing."

because I see very little evidence that is is true.

 

[Dancing David]

JaysonR, I probably made my point over fine, a wide variety of opinions is good thing.

 

[JaysonR]

That phrase was only aimed at the problem of consciousness and neuroscience.
It wasn't aimed at neurology.
Neurology is incredibly practical and functional.

You raise a good point regarding the philosophical aspect, and that is actually raised in conferences regarding consciousness.

However, answering by stating that consciousness is an abstracted philosophical concept that isn't relevant to the neuroscientific topography and states of the brain doesn't mean there isn't a problem of consciousness because it only renames the problem.

The problem is very much functionally a problem, as subjective capgras shows us rather vividly.

Now, my personal proposal for a definition for consciousness is:
"Cognitive self-aware introspection with benign emotional recognition of self-identity."

Now, as to what the correlated topography is for these processes...that's an endeavor that has yet to be fully accounted for.

However, I do think it is a serious problem that needs progress; luckily, that is a progress that is being worked on in recognition by noting that we can't solve the problem of consciousness without a general theory for neuroscience.

A comparison is imagine trying to solve HOW gravity is as it is without the Standard Model and General/Special Relativity.
We couldn't very well propose the Higgs boson without both of these two models (one a bottom-up, and the other a top-down model) to discern the missing link between the two models as the solution to how gravity is as it is.

Right now, we haven't the neuroscience equal of either the Standard Model (bottom-up) or General/Special Relativity (top-down).

As such, it's practically impossible to find the missing link between the two models.
And so yes; without those, consciousness as problem makes about as much sense as calling gravity a problem in 1905.

 

[Dancing David]

maybe it is more like a periodic table of the elements than a GUT?

 

[dlorde]

... my personal proposal for a definition for consciousness is:
"Cognitive self-aware introspection with benign emotional recognition of self-identity."

So one is not conscious if one's recognition of self-identity is not benign?

What is meant by 'benign emotional recognition of self-identity' ? Feeling good about oneself?

 

[Dancing David]

Thanks dlorde, I did not want to belabor my stance.

 

[Navigator]

So one is not conscious if one's recognition of self-identity is not benign?

What is meant by 'benign emotional recognition of self-identity' ? Feeling good about oneself?

I would say so yes...and where that idea leads ones self.

Although I wouldn't call someone who is not benign 'unconscious' but 'not fully conscious' they have a distorted idea of who they and thus who everyone is.

...and they are not trustworthy...not that I advocate trust in anyone else if you don't trust yourself. Learning to trust yourself is great self awareness and if you are benign about it, all the better.

 

[JaysonR]

So one is not conscious if one's recognition of self-identity is not benign?

What is meant by 'benign emotional recognition of self-identity' ? Feeling good about oneself?

Sorry, no; or rather, not quite put that way.

Benign refers to regular.
For instance, in subjective capgras what has happened is a cessation of benign emotional stimulation in response to the individual's own image.
As a result, their brain solves the problem by rationalizing that "this" reality is (in some manner they elaborate on) not real (either they are dead-alive, a fake living thing, stuck in hell, etc...).

When we look at our own image, we aren't overwhelmed with notable emotional input, but we are never-the-less receiving emotional input related to our image.
It is simply that the emotional input is so common and regular that it is "benign"; somewhat similar to how the olfactory sense will disregard a fowl odor if the odor becomes a chronic and non-threatening experience of every-day life.

Lacking "benign" emotional recognition of self-identity doesn't remove the capability of the individual from having consciousness, but we can easily witness that removing this radically shocks the brain to the point where it becomes incredibly difficult for the brain to function correctly and attend to its own identity as a recognized consciousnesses and will often rationalize itself as not conscious or aware as a result.

 

[JaysonR]

maybe it is more like a periodic table of the elements than a GUT?

That idea may work; I'm not sure what the concept of the periodic table would look like when used to organize information regarding the brain, but that would be interesting to see if it lends any help (though I have a hunch it might be too large of a table to be functionally useful).

Either way, the GUT of neuroscience is what's being pushed for now, and I think that's a pretty good idea since there's a general theory for pretty much every other field except for neuroscience.

 

[dlorde]

Benign refers to regular.

OK.

... the emotional input is so common and regular that it is "benign"; similar to how the olfactory sense will disregard a fowl odor if the odor becomes a chronic and non-threatening experience of every-day life.

That awful chicken smell?

So, without ongoing emotional self image input, the sense of identity becomes unstable? not sure that really sounds much like olfactory habituation / peripheral receptor fatigue, but I think I see what you're getting at.

Has this emotional self-image input pathway (amygdala to frontal cortex, one would guess?) been positively identified, or is it a plausible hypothesis?

Lacking "benign" emotional recognition of self-identity doesn't remove the capability of the individual from having consciousness

So, benign emotional recognition of self-identity is a requirement of your definition of consciousness despite not being a requirement of consciousness itself

... we can easily witness that removing this radically shocks the brain to the point where it becomes incredibly difficult for the brain to function correctly and attend to its own identity as a recognized consciousnesses and will often rationalize itself as not conscious or aware as a result.

Isn't rationalization a feature of consciousness per se?

I'm wondering whether this linguistic/conceptual awkwardness says more about the elusiveness of the concept of 'consciousness' than about your definition...

It seems (like purpose, intent, free will, etc), to be subject to a Heisenberg-like uncertainty principle, where the closer you examine it, and the more precisely you try to pin it down, the fuzzier it becomes.