Stupid teleportation topic.

[Bri]

It would still be okay to kill one before divergence, I'm just saying unless the person is special there is no reason to want more than one of them, just like you don't indescriminately want more children.

Even if you could somehow tell how "special" a person will be in the future you would still be left with a very twisted argument without a basis in reality or ethics. How do you know a stupid person won't save a genius baby from death sometime during his life? I don't know where you're from, but in most societies it is considered inethical to make a choice whether to kill or spare someone based on the value you believe they will serve society in the future. Even if you knew that someone wouldn't go on to achieve greatness, most would frown on murdering them.

That you have somehow reduced the equation down to an economic one is especially telling, and I simply don't believe you've thought the implications through. History shows this line of thinking to be an especially treacherous road leading to a place where even materialists would not want to go.

I say they would have to diverge to do anything useful, because with our perfect duplicater the only novel thing they can produce is information. If they don't diverge, they just produce the same information, which isn't useful.

Exactly my point. And once they diverge, they are two different people. So the concept of killing one of them for the sole purpose of keeping them from diverging is a bit of a problem. If you let them both live, you are left with a different dilemma, that you now have two people who both claim equal rights to the same life. Reason enough to take the bus instead, in my opinion.

To the actual matter, rather than ethics and economics (both of which I feel much less certain about), I pose the question to you: Suppose we take our duplicates, and randomly place them in a room. The clones are then left alone, and they use a random process to decide who should open the door. No one has kept track of which one has the original atoms. What possible test could distinguish between them?

First, remember that the two people in your scenario are necessarily divergent if only one of them walks outside of the room. Second, you are confusing the concepts of identification and distinguishing. Identification of which is the original and which is the clone is a separate issue from distinguishing them from each other. Distinguishing one from the other is trivial: one will be outside the room, and the other inside the room.

If you are asking how we can tell which is which (identification), we can do that the same way we can identify identical twins: ask them. In fact, there is little difference between the scenario you described and a pair of identical twins whose past is unknown. Let's pretend for a moment that they might have reason to lie or cannot identify themselves, and there is no way at all to tell them apart. What conclusions do you draw from that fact? Think carefully.

...Why should we say they are an original and a clone, if that makes no meaningful difference?

The question of identifying which is the original and the clone is only important from the standpoint of knowing who owns their life. The fact that it's difficult if not impossible to actually tell only illustrates one of my points of why folks might not want to "teleport" in this manner. However, this question does not have any bearing on the ethical implications of killing one of them since everyone has agreed that two divergent people are two separate and unique people. Just as identical twins are unique people even if you can't tell them apart (indeed even if they couldn't identify themselves).

Why should we suppose that a difference exists between them? And if no differnce exists between them, why do you suppose "you" doesn't exist in both of them?

If you are asking why we should distinguish between the two, the answer is simple: because they are different, even if we cannot identify which is the original and which is the clone. They are two different people, and therefore will contribute differently to the world in the future, so it makes a huge difference both to them and to the world. One of them might go on to cure cancer or save the life of a baby who will grow up to cure cancer, and the other might not.

So again, let's say that we cannot tell the clone from the original (or identify two identical twins), what conclusions exactly would you draw from that fact to further your argument?

-Bri

 

[DreadNiK]

You have a big "but" there (one T, not two!), but I agree. Sure the person would seem to be exactly the same person to anyone who is ignorant about the process. It might even seem real to the person being duplicated (assuming he didn't know about how the process worked), but so what? A really neat magic trick might be to really cut a woman in half, and the audience will be perfectly amazed unless they find out that it's not a trick! Then it would still simply be dishonest and more importantly murder.

-Bri

What has ignorance of the process got to do with anything?

 

[Bri]

What has ignorance of the process got to do with anything?

This was in response to the following statement:

However, to everyone but the individual, an identical duplicate that is created somewhere else followed by instantaneous or near-instantaneous destruction of the duplicate would be exactly the same as if they had travelled through some sort of wormhole to the location.

Someone who knows how the process works or observes the process knows that the two things aren't exactly the same (in one, a person dies and leaves behind a corpse, and in the other the person doesn't die). To anyone ignorant of the process, the following scenarios would all appear exactly the same:

1. the person travels through some wormhole to another location.
2. the person's atoms are torn from his body and sent one by one to another location where they are re-assembled.
3. the person is duplicated at another location, and the original killed at the instant of duplication.
4. the person is duplicated at another location, then the original is sent to an underground prison in Siberia where he will be retained for the rest of his life.
5. the person is duplicated at another location, then the original is dragged into a back room and violently clubbed to death.

My point is: what's your point? Except possibly for options #1 and #4, it's murder regardless of whether other people know about it or not (and option #4 is just kidnapping even if nobody knows the truth). Just because other people don't know there's a difference doesn't mean there's no difference.

-Bri

 

[Z]

That still doesn't mean there would be a discernible (to anyone) difference between a hypothetical 'destructive' teleport and a hypothetical 'wormhole/instant travel' teleport.

If anyone includes the original person, then yes, there would be a discernible difference.

 

[DreadNiK]

This was in response to the following statement:



Someone who knows how the process works or observes the process knows that the two things aren't exactly the same (in one, a person dies and leaves behind a corpse, and in the other the person doesn't die). To anyone ignorant of the process, the following scenarios would all appear exactly the same:

1. the person travels through some wormhole to another location.
2. the person's atoms are torn from his body and sent one by one to another location where they are re-assembled.
3. the person is duplicated at another location, and the original killed at the instant of duplication.
4. the person is duplicated at another location, then the original is sent to an underground prison in Siberia where he will be retained for the rest of his life.
5. the person is duplicated at another location, then the original is dragged into a back room and violently clubbed to death.

My point is: what's your point? Except possibly for options #1 and #4, it's murder regardless of whether other people know about it or not (and option #4 is just kidnapping even if nobody knows the truth). Just because other people don't know there's a difference doesn't mean there's no difference.

-Bri

My point is, if there is no possible discernible difference between the two methods, 'wormhole' and 'duplication/destruction'...then there isn't one. I've already stated I wouldn't use a destructive teleport. I'm just intrigued by this discussion. Can you prove to me you haven't just been transported to your current location using 'duplication/destruction'?

How I see this applying to anything is suppose there is a person who you need to get somewhere fast, to solve a murder, prevent a war or whatever, to do something good basically. To everyone but perhaps the individual to be transported, the two methods would be identically effective.

Likewise, would you let a loved one use the destructive method?

If anyone includes the original person, then yes, there would be a discernible difference.

The original is gone. Therefore they don't have an opinion. I know what you mean, but basically the state of affairs in the world after the 'destructive' teleport would be identical to the state of the affairs after the 'wormhole' teleport'.

Isn't the destructive method kinda how the Star Trek transporters work? I never figured out why they couldn't just use the transporter buffers to ressurrect people...

 

[Bri]

My point is, if there is no possible discernible difference between the two methods, 'wormhole' and 'duplication/destruction'...then there isn't one.

There is a discernable difference, particularly to the one being "teleported" (he would be dead using one method). Of the methods mentioned, only the wormhole would possibly result in the person actually travelling to the target location. The others would only appear to others as though he did.

I've already stated I wouldn't use a destructive teleport. I'm just intrigued by this discussion.

I am also intrigued by the discussion, especially the comments from the posters who claim to not see a possible down side.

Can you prove to me you haven't just been transported to your current location using 'duplication/destruction'?

Well...I can say this much: using the method we've discussed, if I were the "copy" after the process I would have had the experience of being in one location then appearing in a new location. Since I haven't had this experience (I'm in the same location I was in a moment ago), I can safely say that I'm not the copy. It is possible to be copied without knowing it, so it is possible that I've been copied without knowing it. If I was expecting to be teleported, this would be a bit disappointing to say the least. Therefore, as far as teleportation goes, my subjective experience is that it has failed miserably since I haven't gone anywhere. I certainly wouldn't pay any money for it, and if a duplicate of me showed up at my house demanding to sleep with my wife, I'd be a little miffed.

How I see this applying to anything is suppose there is a person who you need to get somewhere fast, to solve a murder, prevent a war or whatever, to do something good basically. To everyone but perhaps the individual to be transported, the two methods would be identically effective.

The only real use that I can see would be to colonize a distant planet or something similar where it would not be possible for the copy to interfere with the life of the original. I can still see a huge downside since the copy is never able to see his family again, and may have enjoyed the life and loved ones he thought he had. Since the copy technically didn't have a choice in the matter, there are some interesting additional ethical problems to consider.

Likewise, would you let a loved one use the destructive method?

No, I wouldn't want my loved one to die. Would you?

Isn't the destructive method kinda how the Star Trek transporters work? I never figured out why they couldn't just use the transporter buffers to ressurrect people...

Someone mentioned earlier in the thread that they thought the Star Trek transporter basically works as we've been discussing except that it "beams" the disassembled atoms of the original to the target location. Essentially, it kills the person, sends their raw materials down to the planet, and reassembles them there as a new but identical person.

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

If anyone includes the original person, then yes, there would be a discernible difference.

Please, tell me exactly what that difference is. I used the term "he", because by the future there are two "me"s, so it's a bit confusing using personal pronouns to refer to two people. I am neither, as much as I'm not "me, two years in the future".

To summarize exactly: I claim materialistically everything which determines a "person" must be contained entirely within their body. The only thing in their body are atoms in positions. I claim that this arrangement, at any time, in any place, would by necessity be everything which the person is, and it would make no sense to claim it is different in any meaningful aspect of a "person".

You seem to claim there is some spacetime-dependant aspect of a person. What is this aspect, materialistically? How could I test for it, given an original and a duplicate, who were unconcious during the duplicating process and are indistinguishable based on all the atoms in their bodies?

 

[Dilb]

Even if you could somehow tell how "special" a person will be in the future you would still be left with a very twisted argument without a basis in reality or ethics. How do you know a stupid person won't save a genius baby from death sometime during his life? I don't know where you're from, but in most societies it is considered inethical to make a choice whether to kill or spare someone based on the value you believe they will serve society in the future. Even if you knew that someone wouldn't go on to achieve greatness, most would frown on murdering them.

That you have somehow reduced the equation down to an economic one is especially telling, and I simply don't believe you've thought the implications through. History shows this line of thinking to be an especially treacherous road leading to a place where even materialists would not want to go.

Parents make economic decisions about whether or not to have children all the time. When the Quebec government offered $5000 dollars (or some similar amount) to parents for each child they had, people had more babies. Life is not beyond economics. Especially when that life doesn't exist yet. Even traffic lights place an economic value on human life.

Exactly my point. And once they diverge, they are two different people. So the concept of killing one of them for the sole purpose of keeping them from diverging is a bit of a problem. If you let them both live, you are left with a different dilemma, that you now have two people who both claim equal rights to the same life. Reason enough to take the bus instead, in my opinion.

So the decision is made before hand to not let them diverge, thus NOT CREATING A NEW LIFE. The fact that this is accomplished by killing something is no worse to me than using spermicide to kill sperm to prevent pregnancy. In both cases, you avoid creating a "person" who will then require equal rights as a unique person.

First, remember that the two people in your scenario are necessarily divergent if only one of them walks outside of the room. Second, you are confusing the concepts of identification and distinguishing. Identification of which is the original and which is the clone is a separate issue from distinguishing them from each other. Distinguishing one from the other is trivial: one will be outside the room, and the other inside the room.

And a new life is (almost) necessarily created by not using contraceptives during sex. If they do not diverge, the metaphorical birth does not take place, a unique person does not exist to give rights to. Afterwards is entirely an ethical issue which honestly, I don't feel like I've fully thought through. Not because of any of your arguments, though.

If you are asking how we can tell which is which (identification), we can do that the same way we can identify identical twins: ask them. In fact, there is little difference between the scenario you described and a pair of identical twins whose past is unknown. Let's pretend for a moment that they might have reason to lie or cannot identify themselves, and there is no way at all to tell them apart. What conclusions do you draw from that fact? Think carefully.

Identical twins diverge INSIDE THE WOMB. They are different entities when their only particular feature is a primitive digestive tract. Any number of physical and mental differences set identical twins apart.

With my duplicates, however, they have no appreciable differences. They are entirely interchangeable, by everything there is to observe about them. They themselves cannot tell which is the original, and which the duplicate. They both feel like themselves, they both know everything about themselves (and in this case, each other). The divergence which happens to establish this means simply that in actual use of the teleporter, they won't be rigorously tested, one would simply be killed before divergence can happen.

The question of identifying which is the original and the clone is only important from the standpoint of knowing who owns their life. The fact that it's difficult if not impossible to actually tell only illustrates one of my points of why folks might not want to "teleport" in this manner. However, this question does not have any bearing on the ethical implications of killing one of them since everyone has agreed that two divergent people are two separate and unique people. Just as identical twins are unique people even if you can't tell them apart (indeed even if they couldn't identify themselves).

All of which seems to say you agree with what I said before, you can't kill them if they diverge.

If you are asking why we should distinguish between the two, the answer is simple: because they are different, even if we cannot identify which is the original and which is the clone.

That doesn't sound like a difference to me.

They are two different people, and therefore will contribute differently to the world in the future, so it makes a huge difference both to them and to the world. One of them might go on to cure cancer or save the life of a baby who will grow up to cure cancer, and the other might not.

Again, same as unborn babies. Unless we want to make economic judgements about the "utility" of certain people, we are deciding whether or not to create a life (which incidentally will be very similar to a life we already have). Before diverge, though, I don't view them as two people, I view them as the same "person" who happens to be in two different fleshy bodies. The necessity of diverge if they both live is as unimportant as the (statistical) necessity of zygotes becoming adult humans. What a thing's potential is does not determine what it is right now.

So again, let's say that we cannot tell the clone from the original (or identify two identical twins), what conclusions exactly would you draw from that fact to further your argument?

-Bri

If they are entirely indistinguishable, they are the same person. A nice, simple materialistic answer. The exact arrangement of material contained in this 3m cube is exactly identical to the arrangement of material contained in this other 3m cube. Same material, same thing.

If you can't distinguish identical twins, you're not looking hard enough. In this hypothetical, you can look at every single neuron in both brains and compare one-by-one. Identical twins will look incredibly different from perfect duplicates.

 

[Z]

Please, tell me exactly what that difference is. I used the term "he", because by the future there are two "me"s, so it's a bit confusing using personal pronouns to refer to two people. I am neither, as much as I'm not "me, two years in the future".

To summarize exactly: I claim materialistically everything which determines a "person" must be contained entirely within their body. The only thing in their body are atoms in positions. I claim that this arrangement, at any time, in any place, would by necessity be everything which the person is, and it would make no sense to claim it is different in any meaningful aspect of a "person".

You seem to claim there is some spacetime-dependant aspect of a person. What is this aspect, materialistically? How could I test for it, given an original and a duplicate, who were unconcious during the duplicating process and are indistinguishable based on all the atoms in their bodies?

I'm saying there is a spacetime-dependent divergence between any two otherwise identical masses. How can you test for it? Make a relative measure of their spacetime coordinates from another known point in spacetime. If these coordinates are the same, the person is the same person; if they are different, they are two different people.

I can't believe you couldn't see that answer coming...

The exact arrangement of material contained in this 3m cube is exactly identical to the arrangement of material contained in this other 3m cube. Same material, same thing.

But two different instances of the same type of thing. There is still thing 1 and thing 2; the two may be interchangeable and identical, but you wouldn't say you have only one thing. (Imagine the logistics problems involved! Yep, we just teleported 2000 people over from rock A to rock B. Rock A's teleporter failed, though, so we now have 4000 instances up here... but there's only 2000 people, so please send rations for 2000. Thank you!)

 

[Bri]

So the decision is made before hand to not let them diverge, thus NOT CREATING A NEW LIFE. The fact that this is accomplished by killing something is no worse to me than using spermicide to kill sperm to prevent pregnancy. In both cases, you avoid creating a "person" who will then require equal rights as a unique person.

If you don't see a difference between killing an already-viable, living human being and preventing a pregnancy I don't think we'll agree on this particular issue.

Identical twins diverge INSIDE THE WOMB. They are different entities when their only particular feature is a primitive digestive tract. Any number of physical and mental differences set identical twins apart.

Your scenario involved the original and copy being in the same room and you had only one emerging from the room. In this scenario, it would be impossible for them to not have diverged.

All of which seems to say you agree with what I said before, you can't kill them if they diverge.

So the only question is whether it would be ethical to kill them before they diverge, as in the identical rooms scenario I posted earlier. It seems that we are at an impasse on that question since I believe that the murder of a living, viable human being is inethical.

The real question is, of course, whether others would be reasonable in feeling the same way that I do about it, in which case we have answered the question posed by the OP, which is why people might not want to "teleport" in this manner. Not to mention the fact that the person who "teleported" actually DIES and leaves behind a corpse rather than going to the new location as expected. I don't know how you feel about that, but that would be a BIG downside for me!

Again, same as unborn babies.

The decision to bring a life into the world is very different than the decision to destroy a life already in existance.

Before diverge, though, I don't view them as two people, I view them as the same "person" who happens to be in two different fleshy bodies.

The fact that you had to put the word "person" in quotes leads me to believe that perhaps you really feel otherwise, that they actually are two different people in two different bodies, who happen to be exactly the same. At the very least, it confirms my point that most would consider them to be separate people and that there is indeed an ethical problem with needlessly killing one of them, even before they diverge.

If they are entirely indistinguishable, they are the same person. A nice, simple materialistic answer.

You again seem to be confusing indistinguishable from unidentifiable, neither of which have anything to do with divergence. They are always distinguishable from each other if they are in two different locations, even if they haven't diverged.

The exact arrangement of material contained in this 3m cube is exactly identical to the arrangement of material contained in this other 3m cube. Same material, same thing.

Really? So, if the cubes contain identical gold rings then you're saying they are the SAME ring? Not likely many people would agree with you there! Destroying either one of them would reduce the total amount of gold in the world and would therefore make a difference to the world, just as would destroying both of them.

If you can't distinguish identical twins, you're not looking hard enough. In this hypothetical, you can look at every single neuron in both brains and compare one-by-one. Identical twins will look incredibly different from perfect duplicates.

In my example, I'm referring to twins who look exactly the same (although are of course different on the insides). A divergent set of clones as in the example we were discussing would also look the same on the outside and would be different on the inside.

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

Really? So, if the cubes contain identical gold rings then you're saying they are the SAME ring? Not likely many people would agree with you there! Destroying either one of them would reduce the total amount of gold in the world and would therefore make a difference to the world, just as would destroying both of them.-Bri

How many times do I have to explain, a "person" to a "human body" is like a "ring design" to a "ring". A body does not make a person. Why does a "person", as a concious thing which you want to assign rights, require a body? What part of a person is not just reducable to information?

 

[Dilb]

I'm saying there is a spacetime-dependent divergence between any two otherwise identical masses. How can you test for it? Make a relative measure of their spacetime coordinates from another known point in spacetime. If these coordinates are the same, the person is the same person; if they are different, they are two different people.

I can't believe you couldn't see that answer coming...

I could. I just think that a "person" in no way depends on it being continuous as a flesh-and-blood human. There is a perfectly position-continuous aspect of a human present when being teleported, it's just not fleshy. Why, in order to be a person, does it need to always be a human? What does location actually have to do with being a person?

You are definitely claiming that "I" cannot teleport, that "I" am somehow stuck in my body. Why is this? Why should a "person" be defined as only existing in one body in a specific location? How does location dependence add anything to a person? What would we lose if we removed location dependence?

I don't deny there are two objects, I think a person is not an object. A person is information contained in objects, whether these objects are brains, or electric signals, or whatever.

 

[Dilb]

In my example, I'm referring to twins who look exactly the same (although are of course different on the insides). A divergent set of clones as in the example we were discussing would also look the same on the outside and would be different on the inside.

-Bri

You claim, however, that one would be "you", and the other a clone. The divergence doesn't matter in that case, because I'm not planning on killing those guys. I only want you to be able to say "this one is the original, for this tangible reason". If no tangible reason exists, the teleporter works, at least. The fact that for other reasons you wouldn't use it is fine by me.

 

[Bri]

How many times do I have to explain, a "person" to a "human body" is like a "ring design" to a "ring". A body does not make a person. Why does a "person", as a concious thing which you want to assign rights, require a body? What part of a person is not just reducable to information?

And as many times as you explain it, it's still not a materialist explanation. If materialism is true, then there is no "ring design" separate from the ring itself. The body does, in fact, make the entire person.

That said, what if we are talking about identical chain links rather than gold rings? Let's say that one link happens to be lying on a table doing nothing, while the other is part of a chain suspending a 1000-pound weight above an unsuspecting baby. Do you still contend that they are the same link, and that there is no difference at all between them?

It seems to me that potential differences are differences, and the two links described above, although completely identical (non-divergent), are potentially very different given their locations.

-Bri

 

[Bri]

You claim, however, that one would be "you", and the other a clone. The divergence doesn't matter in that case, because I'm not planning on killing those guys.

Yes, one of them is the original and one is the copy, whether or not we can correctly identify them. If you aren't killing them but allowing them to diverge, they certainly won't consider themselves to be the same person. The original is the one who was still at the original location after "teleportation" and the copy is in the other location.

I only want you to be able to say "this one is the original, for this tangible reason". If no tangible reason exists, the teleporter works, at least. The fact that for other reasons you wouldn't use it is fine by me.

Why in the world would it make any difference whether or not we can identify which is the original and which is the copy as long as they can identify which is the original and which is the copy? If we lose track of identical twins and they are unwilling or unable to tell us which is which, does that mean that they're all of a sudden the same person just because we cannot identify them? Of course not! The whole notion of identification of two identical things is irrelevant to this discussion. The only question that is relevant to this discussion is whether or not we can distinguish the two as separate entities, and we certainly can do that by position in space and time.

Just because the teleportation appears to have worked to others doesn't mean that it worked to the only people that matter -- those involved in the process! For one of them, it definitely did NOT work since they are either still at the original location or dead -- either way a miserable failure. The other might actually feel as though the teleportation worked, but his entire memory is simply a lie -- a copy of the original's memory. Reasons enough for anyone to consider taking the bus instead.

-Bri

 

[Z]

How many times do I have to explain, a "person" to a "human body" is like a "ring design" to a "ring". A body does not make a person. Why does a "person", as a concious thing which you want to assign rights, require a body? What part of a person is not just reducable to information?

I could. I just think that a "person" in no way depends on it being continuous as a flesh-and-blood human. There is a perfectly position-continuous aspect of a human present when being teleported, it's just not fleshy. Why, in order to be a person, does it need to always be a human? What does location actually have to do with being a person?

You are definitely claiming that "I" cannot teleport, that "I" am somehow stuck in my body. Why is this? Why should a "person" be defined as only existing in one body in a specific location? How does location dependence add anything to a person? What would we lose if we removed location dependence?

I don't deny there are two objects, I think a person is not an object. A person is information contained in objects, whether these objects are brains, or electric signals, or whatever.

And the dualism is revealed. Sorry, Dilb, you just got rumbled.

 

[Dilb]

And the dualism is revealed. Sorry, Dilb, you just got rumbled.

So you think information is not definable in a materialistic universe? In fact, which part specifically are you referring to, because I can't imagine how you'd interpret it to be dualism.

 

[Dilb]

Just because the teleportation appears to have worked to others doesn't mean that it worked to the only people that matter -- those involved in the process! For one of them, it definitely did NOT work since they are either still at the original location or dead -- either way a miserable failure. The other might actually feel as though the teleportation worked, but his entire memory is simply a lie -- a copy of the original's memory. Reasons enough for anyone to consider taking the bus instead.

-Bri

Again, I need to ask. What tangible difference will these people have? Why does the copy, despite being physically identical (at one time), have memories which are "lies"? Why does the "actual" memory need to stay only in the atoms of the original? How can a memory be a "lie", if it's correct (the person before duplication did experience the memory)?

If the two don't know which is the original, because they were duplicated while unconcious and then moved, what differene can either of them have, before diverging? What test would reveal that "this one has true memories"?

It's a requirement to be able to do anything, to be able to accept anything, that identical things in identical situations will behave in the same way (where that involves determinism or a probabilistic approach). Given two unconcious duplicates, which I can move without changing in any important way, what difference would it make if I chose the clone over the original? If there is no difference, why do you insist they are different people?

Why in the world would it make any difference whether or not we can identify which is the original and which is the copy as long as they can identify which is the original and which is the copy? If we lose track of identical twins and they are unwilling or unable to tell us which is which, does that mean that they're all of a sudden the same person just because we cannot identify them?

-Bri

In my scenario, they couldn't tell each other apart (as I see it. You aparently think one has "false memories", which are somehow different from real memories). The issue is not whether they have diverged (they will have), it's whether we can tell which is the original. If "originality" is a property which doesn't affect anything, how can you claim it's a required part of the definition of "person"?

 

[Bri]

Again, I need to ask. What tangible difference will these people have? Why does the copy, despite being physically identical (at one time), have memories which are "lies"? Why does the "actual" memory need to stay only in the atoms of the original? How can a memory be a "lie", if it's correct (the person before duplication did experience the memory)?

The copy has memories of his body having physically experienced things that it has not (in fact, his body didn't even exist yet). The experiences occurred only to the original, not to the copy. The copy's memories did not happen to his body, and therefore are not true since he feels as though they happened to his body.

If the two don't know which is the original, because they were duplicated while unconcious and then moved, what differene can either of them have, before diverging? What test would reveal that "this one has true memories"?

It's a requirement to be able to do anything, to be able to accept anything, that identical things in identical situations will behave in the same way (where that involves determinism or a probabilistic approach). Given two unconcious duplicates, which I can move without changing in any important way, what difference would it make if I chose the clone over the original? If there is no difference, why do you insist they are different people?

Of course there is a difference since they are in two different locations. Even if they haven't diverged (which could only occur if the room is also duplicated), they will potentially have two different futures, just like the chain links in the previous post. But let's pretend there is no difference. So what? What exactly is your point? We have acknowledged that they are exactly the same except for their location. How does that allow us to pretend that they are the same person any more than the two chain links are the same link?

In my scenario, they couldn't tell each other apart (as I see it. You aparently think one has "false memories", which are somehow different from real memories).

The false memories and real memories are identical, and I never implied otherwise. However, they exist in different contexts which happens to make one false and the other true. Context (location) does make a difference even if they are otherwise identical. The statement "I am blue" when spoken by a blue jay is true, but when spoken by a red cardinal is false, even though the statement is otherwise identical in both situations.

The issue is not whether they have diverged (they will have), it's whether we can tell which is the original. If "originality" is a property which doesn't affect anything, how can you claim it's a required part of the definition of "person"?

You are the one who has insisted that it matters whether or not we can identify one as the original and the other as the copy. As I've said, this is only perhaps important in determining which would get to claim the life that they both feel they are entitled to. Otherwise, it has absolutely no bearing on the conversation at all. If you believe otherwise, please let us know why you think it's important to the discussion that we be able to tell which is the original.

I contend that the only important thing is whether or not they are two different people. Most would agree that they are two different people regardless of whether or not we can identify which is the original and which is the copy. The truth is that one is the original and the other the copy, even if we cannot identify which is which.

-Bri

 

[Dilb]

The copy has memories of his body having physically experienced things that it has not (in fact, his body didn't even exist yet). The experiences occurred only to the original, not to the copy. The copy's memories did not happen to his body, and therefore are not true since he feels as though they happened to his body.

Which apparently means you think that the atoms of the original are somehow special. That's wrong. Atoms are indistinguishable. Given indistinguishable atoms, it doesn't matter that an even occured with one set of atoms; in fact, it didn't, since atoms are changed in your body with time.

Of course there is a difference since they are in two different locations. Even if they haven't diverged (which could only occur if the room is also duplicated), they will potentially have two different futures, just like the chain links in the previous post. But let's pretend there is no difference. So what? What exactly is your point? We have acknowledged that they are exactly the same except for their location. How does that allow us to pretend that they are the same person any more than the two chain links are the same link?

Because I claim that a "person", at any moment, is no more than the information which is discribed in a body. Information can be perfectly duplicated, so it becomes meaningless to say "this is the original information".

The false memories and real memories are identical, and I never implied otherwise.

You call them "false" and "real". If it's not a difference, why would you distinguish between them? I distinguish between the material bodies, but not the person inside the material bodies, if you're wondering.

However, they exist in different contexts which happens to make one false and the other true. Context (location) does make a difference even if they are otherwise identical. The statement "I am blue" when spoken by a blue jay is true, but when spoken by a red cardinal is false, even though the statement is otherwise identical in both situations.

Again, atoms are indistinguishable. It's possible (though unlikely) that during the duplication process, all the atoms in each body switched with their counterparts (although extremely unlikely).

Suppose you and your duplicate are in suspended animation (cryogenics, or whatever). Over the course of a year, every atom in your body is switched with the corresponding one in the other body. At every point in time during this year, which one is you?

You are the one who has insisted that it matters whether or not we can identify one as the original and the other as the copy. As I've said, this matter is only possibly important in determining which would get to claim the life that they both feel they are entitled to. Otherwise, it has absolutely no bearing on the conversation at all. If you believe otherwise, please let us know why you think it's important to the discussion that we be able to tell which is the original.

You say it would determine which gets to claim the life. How can you possibly imagine that's not important?

I say, in a pragmatic view, that if no possible difference between them exists, they are the same. If I have godlike powers and can arbitrarily switch their place, and no difference will arise because the atoms have been changed, they are interchangable and thus the same person (Remember a person must be contained entirely within the body, since this is materialism, and the only material of consequence is atoms). The minor difference of one being on mars is no more an important difference to the "person", than if I randomly (using nuclear decay, for example) decide to take the bus rather than the train. It may lead to differenes, but those differences have not meaningfully changed the person yet.

I contend that the only important thing is whether or not they are two different people. Most would agree that they are two different people regardless of whether or not we can identify one as the original and the other as the copy. The truth is that one is the original and the other the copy, even if we cannot identify which is which.

-Bri

I'm not asking if they are two different people afterwards. After the duplications they immediately start to diverge (personally, I think they'd diverge any time they are concious afterwards, even in identical rooms) I'm asking why it is meaningful to say "this is the original" and "this is the clone". You are saying that, should you be knocked unconcious, and duplicated, such that you have all your memories, you feel in every way that you are "you", someone else can say "you are a clone, beat it and find your own life", and you would be able to accept that (if you are the duplicate). You think you go to sleep in room A, you wake up in room B, and you would presumably abadon your identity. Who are you, then?

I suppose, given godlike powers, that if I take the "original", and put him in some situation, and take the "clone", and put him in the situation, they will behave the same way (as much as if I flip two identical coins, they will show the same patterns, though probability may mean they do not behaive identically). Given this identical behaivior, I think it is wrong to claim "original" and "copy" mean anything, in regards to the person. Not to all the information we could have about the atoms, only to the person.